Spelling suggestions: "subject:"financial incentives"" "subject:"dinancial incentives""
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The influence of financial incentive on teacher motivation and learner performance in rural Namibian schoolsShikalepo, Elock Emvula 18 January 2018 (has links)
One of the challenges facing education systems worldwide is the motivation of qualified teachers to teach at rural schools. Teaching at rural schools is a challenge as rural areas are characterised by adverse living and working conditions, making qualified teachers prefer living and working at urban schools where conditions are more comfortable. Namibia implemented the financial incentive to motivate qualified teachers to teach at rural schools and improve learner performance. The implementation of the financial incentive in Namibia has received little research attention in establishing its effectiveness.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the financial incentive on the performance of learners at rural schools, as this performance relates to teacher motivation. To achieve this, a literature study and an empirical investigation were conducted. An interpretivist research paradigm informed the methodology for the study. A mixed-methods research approach, which relied more on a qualitative research design, included a research sample of 28 teachers, five school principals and two education officials. Data were collected through interviews and document analysis. Individual interviews were conducted with education officials and school principals. Focus group interviews were conducted with teachers. Document analysis entailed accessing applicable documents of each research site in the office of the school principal. Textual data were analysed and presented thematically and numeric data were analysed and presented as frequencies and percentages.
Key findings established that financial incentive has contributed little to the performance of learners in rural schools. The fact that rural schools are not properly categorised according to environmental challenges results in teachers not receiving realistic financial incentive. Teachers were therefore not motivated by financial incentive, but by other factors relating to being tuned to nature in rural areas, being exposed to lower living costs and enjoying accommodating school leadership and community care. A revisiting of the implementation of the financial incentive is recommended in order to negate shortcomings and enhance the potential of financial incentive to contribute to improved learner performance as steered by motivated teachers. / Educational Studies / Ph. D. (Education)
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Allocation dynamique de portefeuille avec profil de gain asymétrique : risk management, incitations financières et benchmarking / Dynamic asset allocation with asymmetric payoffs : risk management, financial incentives, and benchmarkingTergny, Guillaume 31 May 2011 (has links)
Les gérants de portefeuille pour compte de tiers sont souvent jugés par leur performance relative à celle d'un portefeuille benchmark. A ce titre, ils sont amenés très fréquemment à utiliser des modèles internes de "risk management" pour contrôler le risque de sous-performer le benchmark. Par ailleurs, ils sont de plus en plus nombreux à adopter une politique de rémunération incitative, en percevant une commission de sur-performance par rapport au benchmark. En effet, cette composante variable de leur rémunération leur permet d'augmenter leur revenu en cas de sur-performance sans contrepartie en cas de sous-performance. Or de telles pratiques ont fait récemment l'objet de nombreuses polémiques : la période récente de crise financière mondiale a fait apparaître certaines carences de plusieurs acteurs financiers en terme de contrôle de risque ainsi que des niveaux de prise de risque et de rémunération jugés excessifs. Cependant, l'étude des implications de ces pratiques reste un thème encore relativement peu exploré dans le cadre de la théorie classique des choix dynamiques de portefeuille en temps continu. Cette thèse analyse, dans ce cadre théorique, les implications de ces pratiques de "benchmarking" sur le comportement d'investissement de l'asset manager. La première partie étudie les propriétés de la stratégie dynamique optimale pour l'asset manager concerné par l'écart entre la rentabilité de son portefeuille et celle d'un benchmark fixe ou stochastique (sur ou sous-performance). Nous considérons plusieurs types d'asset managers, caractérisés par différentes fonctions d'utilité et qui sont soumis à différentes contraintes de risque de sous-performance. Nous montrons en particulier quel est le lien entre les problèmes d'investissement avec prise en compte de l'aversion à la sous-performance et avec contrainte explicite de "risk management". Dans la seconde partie, on s'intéresse à l'asset manager bénéficiant d'une rémunération incitative (frais de gestion variables, bonus de sur-performance ou commission sur encours additionnelle). On étudie, selon la forme de ses incitations financières et son degré d'aversion à la sous-performance, comment sa stratégie d'investissement s'écarte de celle de l'investisseur (ou celle de l'asset manager sans rémunération incitative). Nous montrons que le changement de comportement de l'asset manager peut se traduire soit par une réduction du risque pris par rapport à la stratégie sans incitation financière soit au contraire par une augmentation de celui-ci. Finalement, nous montrons en quoi la présence de contraintes de risque de sous-performance, imposées au gérant ou traduisant son aversion à la sous-performance, peut être bénéfique à l'investisseur donnant mandat de gestion financière. / It is common practice to judge third-party asset managers by looking at their financial performance relative to a benchmark portfolio. For this reason, they often choose to rely on internal risk-management models to control the downside risk of their portfolio relative to the benchmark. Moreover, an increasing number are adopting an incentive-based scheme, by charging an over-performance commission relative to the benchmark. Indeed, including this variable component in their global remuneration allows them to increase their revenue in case of over-performance without any penalty in the event of underperforming the benchmark. However, such practices have recently been at the heart of several polemics: the recent global financial crisis has uncovered some shortcomings in terms of internal risk control as well as excessive risk-taking and compensation levels of several financial players. Nevertheless, it appears that analyzing the impact of these practices remains a relatively new issue in continuous time-dynamic asset allocation theory. This thesis analyses in this theoretical framework the implications of these "benchmarking" practices on the asset manager's investment behavior. The first part examines the properties of the optimal dynamic strategy for the asset manager who is concerned by the difference of return between their portfolio and a fix or stochastic benchmark (over- or under-performance). Several asset manager types are considered, defined by different utility functions and different downside-risk constraints. In particular, the link between investment problems with aversion to under-performance and risk management constraints is shown. In the second part, the case of the asset manager who benefits from an incentive compensation scheme (variable asset management fees, over-performance bonuses or additional commission on asset under management), is investigated. We study how, depending on the choice of financial inventive structure and loss aversion level, the asset manager's strategy differs from that of the investor (or the strategy of the asset manager receiving no incentive remuneration). This study shows that the change in investment behavior of the asset manager can lead to both a reduction in the risk taken relative to the strategy without financial incentives or conversely an increase thereof. Finally we show that the existence of downside risk constraints, imposed on the asset manager or corresponding to their aversion for under-performance, can be beneficial to the investor mandating financial management.
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Einfluss verschiedener Lernanreize auf das Lernverhalten und die Prüfungsleistungen von Studierenden der Humanmedizin / Effect of different learning incentives on the learning behavior and test performance of medical studentsWieland, Anna Katherina 21 December 2016 (has links)
No description available.
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