Kwame Nkrumah was the first African leader to pursue the idea of Africa’s continent-wide unity with fervour. Many thought that African unity will only be the pooling of poverty and that Nkrumah’s dream was impossible. Nkrumah was known for his philosophy "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto it". He thought that political unity should precede economic unity, which would naturally follow. Even though the newly independent African states agreed on the necessity of unity, his philosophy was not welcomed when the Organisation of African Unity was established in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in 1963. Rather, delegates opted for incremental political integration leading to economic integration –an aspiration that Africa is still struggling to bring to fruition. This study demonstrates that Nkrumah’s idea of political unity before economic integration was and still is valid for Africa’s continent-wide unity. To this end, the study will use textual sources and use diachronic and integrative approaches as analytical tools. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Non Governmental Organisations have been operating in Africa since the 1940’s; then, their work was heavily biased towards relief work. From the 1980s however, the role of NGOs evolved to include development; understandably, African governments were finding it increasingly difficult to provide adequate levels of basic services for their people. To this effect and initially; NGOs got involved in development as short term "gap fillers" in the provision of basic services; health and education amongst others. As Africa’s development discourse continued unabated, NGOs were recognised by donors and host governments alike, as indispensible to the provision of such services; in time however, they became the subject of criticism for allegedly failing to irreversibly ameliorate the conditions of the poor. In delivering services, NGOs work in a complex partnership characterised by power imbalances. The partnership involves donors who own the means of production which facilitate NGOs’ work and host governments who “own” the humanitarian space which NGOs need to fulfil their humanitarian mandate. While seemingly poor and powerless, the communities served wield the power to facilitate or block the success of NGO interventions through their commitment and/or lack thereof; respectively; NGOs’ contribution is their skills and humanitarian spirit. The success of NGO interventions is a function of resources, humanitarian space and the goodwill that donors, host governments and the communities served bring to the partnership table respectively. The study sought to establish why between 2001-2006; NGO post-drought rehabilitation through to development interventions failed to irreversibly reduce vulnerability against drought in communities in Machakos District and the extent to which power imbalances which characterise “partnerships for development” contributed to the failure by NGOs to fulfil their mandate. The study revealed that NGOs are unwaveringly committed to their humanitarian mandate however; the power imbalances that characterise “partnerships for development” and in particular, that between NGOs’ and donors militated against the fulfilment of their mandate in Machakos District. When NGOs fail to deliver on their mandate; they lose credibility amongst the other partners and this reinforces the power imbalances; it’s a vicious cycle. “Caught at Crossroads...” NGOs are indeed. / Development Studies / D. Litt. et Phil. (Development Studies)

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below. The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations. Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.