The aim of this research is to explore the behavioral aspects that are affected among mid-level and lower-level team members when outsourcing to foreign countries in the film industry in a project management context. More specifically, we delve into how team dynamics, communication, and trust are affected within project teams. Previous research and theory are employed throughout the research process, including Hofstede's Six Cultural Dimensions, Stuart Hall’s Model of Encoding and Decoding, the Riley & Riley Model of Communication, the FIRO model, and Adler’s Optimal Levels of Trust. This research is inductive and qualitative, consisting of five semi-structured interviews with various professionals in the film industry. The analysis is triangulated amongst the interviewees and previous research to give further insight into the behavioral aspects affected by outsourcing in the film industry. Our findings emphasized improvement in team dynamics when open-mindedness and willingness to learn is present amongst team members. Guided by the leadership of mid-level management, the work environment became more desirable when adapting to thelocal crew’s industry standards, leading to quicker team bonds and higher levels of trust. This was also accomplished through allocating time for socialization between team members. Conflict may be avoided through successful knowledge transfer between original and native teams. Language barriers may require a translator or fixer to be hiredto bridge those gaps. Overall, outsourcing to foreign crews was found to be an extremely valuable experience, provided all aforementioned behavioral aspects were successfully met by team members. This research serves to add to the understanding of how foreign outsourcing has an effect on the work environment of a project team, as past literature has not explored these behavioral aspects within the film industry. Therefore, we found it necessary to provide further insight into this field.

過去的文獻成功地運用不完全契約，解釋低資本密集的產業偏向採用外包合作而非垂直整合。然而，不完全契約理論卻忽略外包接單廠商自身的研發行為，尤其是在接單競爭被強化時。因此，我們延伸不完全契約模型，發現若接單廠商身處越資本密集的產業，越能從上游廠商奪取利潤，因此有更強的誘因從事研發活動。當接單競爭強化時，我們發現低資本密集的產業較不願意從事研發活動，甚至被市場淘汰，所以可以看到生產活動逐漸高資本密集的廠商或產業集中。另外我們利用計量模型驗證文章中的結論，並得到一致的結果。 / Previous study utilizes incomplete contracts theory to explains why industries with lower capital intensity adopt outsourcing policy instead of vertical integration. However, incomplete contracts is silent in explaining foreign supplier's R&D activities, especially when the competition is intensified. We extend the incomplete-contracting model, and discover that foreign supplier of higher capital intensity producer has a higher profit extracted from final-good producers. Such excess profit gives foreign supplier more incentive to engage in R&D activities. When competition is intensified, we also show that suppliers of less capital intensive producer spend less in R&D or may leave the market; therefore within an industry, factors are reallocated to suppliers of capital-intensive producers or toward suppliers in capital intensive industries. Econometric evidence we provide supports the prediction of the model.