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Each of the fifty U.S. state constitutions establishes a fundamental framework for governmental operations within the state. Described by previous scholarship as the state's political technology, state constitutions delineate formal gubernatorial and legislative authority. Extant literature has focused on gubernatorial and legislative relations from the standpoint of the contemporary contextual political factors associated with individuals serving in the respective offices. Although useful, this focus limits a deeper understanding about how state constitutions, as a point of departure, might affect the way in which governors and legislators interact in the policy process. Specifically examined by this research is how variation in design might impact the ability of governors and state legislatures to achieve preferred policy alternatives. This is addressed through the divergence between the governor's proposed budget and the state legislature's enacted budget. To analyze potential influences of this divergence, state budgets from 27 U.S. states over a recent period of eleven years were collected and coded according to policy areas. Data were used to test hypothesized effects of state constitutional design of formal authority. Based on Tobit model estimation and predicted values of divergence derived from alternative constitutional design scenarios, some state constitutional factors affect the ability of governors and state legislatures to achieve preferred policy alternatives. Salient constitutional variables include gubernatorial and legislative budget authority, institutional control, and duration in service factors. The empirical focus of this research contributes to a more enriched understanding of state constitutions as political technologies. In essence, the design of state constitutional authority has the potential to affect how governors and state legislatures interact in the policy process. In addition to contributing to state constitutional theory, these findings enrich the understanding of the design of authority by reformers and citizens. / Ph. D.

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The Öresund Region is a historical cross border region working over the national borders of Sweden and Denmark. The regional administration, the Öresund Committee, is the only political forum that encompasses the whole region and serves its interests collectively. Not only is it cooperating with the national governments but also has a close relationship with the Nordic Council and especially with the European Union. According to a method developed by Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Arjan H. Schakel, it is possible to retrieve a Regional Authority Index which mirrors the formal authority of a region. The method is evaluated in accordance to the complications of the Öresund Region’s dual nationality and finds that the Öresund Committee has a rather concealed role with greater indirect impact than it is given credit for. However, in terms of formal authority, the Öresund Committee has a weak position and shares no rule with higher political entities, such as the Danish, Swedish and European central administrations.