Faculty of Humanities 9301506x Sarah-Britten@za.yr.com / The New South Africa came into being on February 2, 1990, with State President F.W. de Klerk’s announcement of the sweeping changes that signalled the end of white minority rule. The New South Africa immediately assumed mythical status, functioning as a structuring, legitimating narrative in the face of a history that carried with it the possibility of inter-racial conflagration. Later, another myth emerged, that of the rainbow nation, together with a latter day epic hero in the form of Nelson Mandela. Together with a third, less defined myth of the freedoms promised by the new Constitution of 1996, these constitute a mythology of the New South Africa. Advertising played an important role in the propagation and interrogation of these myths. Campaigns for an assortment of consumer goods and services tracked momentous shifts in society, politics and culture, often with penetrating insight and incisive humour. Three campaigns, for Castle Lager (beer), Vodacom (cellular network) and Castrol (motor oil), and individual advertisements for Nando’s (fast food chicken), Sales House (retail clothing) and South African Airways, are analysed. The material is approached using a hybrid methodology of a structure that draws upon Fairclough’s (1989, 1995) Critical Discourse Analysis, while analysing the texts themselves using an approach most closely allied to the social semiotics of Barthes (1972). Using this approach, it can be seen, for example, how the Castle Lager ‘Friendship’ campaign is perhaps the most sustained articulation of the ideals embodied in the New South Africa and particularly the myth of the rainbow nation. In contrast, an analysis of the Vodacom ‘Yebo Gogo’ campaign reveals that even at its most dominant, the mythology of the New South Africa was being undermined by prototypical myths that would consolidate under the heading of the African renaissance. An overview of all of the campaigns analysed in this thesis point to the existence of three types of approach to advertising the nation, namely, incantatory, novelistic and identificatory. Incantatory advertising reproduces dominant national myths without questioning them; in contrast, novelistic advertising interrogates the assumptions upon which such myths are based even if it ultimately endorses them. Identificatory advertising focuses on ‘typical’ examples of what constitutes South Africanness, without any attached overt ideological agenda. Incantatory advertising tends to emerge at important national anniversaries or international sporting events, while identificatory advertising became more prominent as the mythology of the New South Africa became less immediate. It is likely that advertising will continue to play a significant role in the imagining of the South African nation.

A headteacher recruitment crisis continues in the primary education sector (Howson & Sprigate, 2011; Rhodes et al., 2008). This research offers a voice for an increasingly marginalised group and synthesises the experiences of 15 primary headteachers, including retired, experienced and new school leaders against the changing educational scenery of four decades. An extended metaphor describing a changing epistemological landscape is utilised (Pascale, 2011), including dramaturgical discourse (Goffman, 1974). The research assesses whether the lived experiences of school leaders evidence a supposed movement away from the ‘freedom’ of the ‘secret garden’ of the pre-National Curriculum era to a time of reducing freedoms for headteachers under a central panoptic gaze (Foucault 1979; Ball 2006) and then to a new ‘supported autonomy’ as suggested by ‘Education Excellence Everywhere’ (DfE, 2016). The thesis assesses the capacity of phenomenological methodology to address the research questions and distinctions are made between approaches to phenomenology. A case is made for ensuring critical rationalism within the methodology and difficulties of attaining ‘epoche’ and ‘phenomenological reduction’ are debated. Findings support the view that there have been significant changes to headship over time. Analysis of these changes does not support the concept of a linear movement from a time of freedom to a landscape defined by Panopticism. The research suggests that a new paradigmatic shift is significantly changing the nature of primary headship with new forms of executive leadership and structures for leadership progression. Recommendations call for a reduction in the frequency of change for school leaders, a simplification of the inspection grading system, provision of clearer pathways to headship and greater support for school leaders as local authority services decline and safeguarding for leaders from the growth of social media abuse. This research offers a unique insight into headship and addresses an identified gap in educational research.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

In the Credit Lyonnais case, the CJEU concluded that the proportion of input VAT deduction on mixed-use goods and services is to be calculated by taking into account the output supplies carried out by establishments located within the same territory only. This interpretation of the VAT Directive leads to a different treatment of domestic and foreign branches and is, hence, questionable in the light of the freedom of establishment. This paper analyses the impact of the fundamental freedoms on VAT law in general and possible reasons behind the interpretation chosen by the Court in the Credit Lyonnais case more specifically.

Note:

Within the field of religious studies, the definition of religion is constantly debated. While subjective definitions of this concept may be useful in day to day conversation, what happens when “religion” and other religious language is mentioned in constitutionally entrenched documents and policies? Drawing on critical theory, this thesis examines the biases associated with the the protection of freedom of religion and the preamble to Canada’s constitution which states that, “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and rule of law”.

La question de la relation entre nationaux et étrangers en droit public connaît un certain nombre de mutations caractérisées par un apparent rapprochement des deux statuts juridiques et par leur définition. La question est bien celle de la place que le droit public peut ou doit accorder à ceux qui vivent au sein de l'État mais n’en possèdent pas la nationalité et donc celle de l’actuelle signification donnée au lien de nationalité en droit public français. Cette signification semble dépendre à la fois du mode de distinction entre les concepts de national et d’étranger, c'est-à-dire de l’exercice de la souveraineté de l'État dans ce choix, et des statuts qui leur sont ensuite attachés en tant qu’ils sont liés par un élément primordial : la présence sur un même territoire. Ainsi, l’étranger, s’il n’est pas attaché à l'État par le lien de nationalité, est tout de même soumis au pouvoir étatique du fait de sa présence sur le territoire de l'État. Le droit relatif à la nationalité et à l’extranéité est avant tout un droit d’exclusion et de restriction qui conduit à reconnaître à l’étranger moins de droits qu’au national et qui codifie cette différence. Mais ce droit est aussi, en parallèle, un droit d’intégration car il définit un statut de l’étranger dans l'État où il réside et en fait un sujet du droit de cet État. L’enjeu d’une étude des relations entre « nationaux » et « étrangers » est donc de questionner l’actuelle distinction juridique des deux concepts. Il s’agirait ainsi à la fois de réconcilier en la matière les deux expressions du pouvoir étatique : le pouvoir de commandement unilatéral fondé sur la contrainte et la conservation de l’autonomie et de la liberté reconnue à l’individu dans la société, et d’assurer l’équilibre entre une nécessaire différenciation des statuts, en raison de l’existence d’une communauté nationale qui fonde le pacte constitutionnel et qui est à distinguer de la simple société civile, et le respect des libertés individuelles au sein de l'État. / The issue of the relationship between nationals and foreigners in civil law is undergoing a number of mutations characterised by an apparent convergence of the two judicial statuses and by their redefinition. The issue is indeed that of the place which civil law can or must grant to those who live in the State but do not possess the nationality there of and that of the current significance given to the status of nationality in French civil law. This significance seems to depend simultaneously on the mode of distinction between concepts of national and foreigner, i.e. the exercise of State sovereignty in that choice, and the status they are then granted, inasmuch as they are tied by a primordial element: presence on the same territory. Thus, the foreigner, if not attached to the State by a tie of nationality, is nonetheless subject to state power by his or her presence on State territory. Logically, the relative right to nationality and foreignness is primarily a right of exclusion and restriction which leads to granting the foreigner less rights than the national and which codifies this difference. But this right is also, at the same time, a right of integration as it defines a status for the foreigner in the State in which he or she lives, making the foreigner subject to the law in that State. The concern of a study of the relations between « nationals » and « foreigners » is therefore to question the present judicial distinction of the two concepts. It will thus be necessary to reconcile the two expressions of state power: the power of unilateral command founded on constraint and conservation of autonomy and the freedom given to the individual in society, while maintaining the balance between a necessary differentiation of the statuses, by reason of the existence of a national community which establishes the constitutional pact, which is to be distinguished from simple civil society, and the respect for individual freedoms in the State.

La France est une République laïque, elle garantit la liberté de conscience et le libre exercice du culte sous les réserves tenant à l'ordre public et à la protection des libertés d'autrui. Ainsi, la laïcité est un principe de notre République et la liberté cultuelle est une assise essentielle de toute démocratie. Dès lors, l'existence de rapports entre la laïcité et les cultes en France ne peut être remise en cause. Cependant, la France est marquée par un regain d'engouement de ses citoyens pour des croyances cultuelles. Légitimement, ces croyances cultuelles s'extériorisent au sein des domaines public et social. Cette extériorisation n'est pas toujours apaisée, elle entraine de vives incompréhensions voire une remise en cause du principe de laïcité. Un certain apaisement a vu le jour, sous l'impulsion de la Haute juridiction administrative et cette œuvre doit encore être poursuivie. Actuellement, certains domaines juridiques sont marqués par un embrasement entre le droit laïc et les cultes. Certes, sur certains sujets, il est toujours malaisé de s'immiscer au sein du for intérieur des individus, et le législateur ainsi que les pouvoirs publics semblent incommodés par ce problème. Pourtant, eu égard à la multiplication des conflits d'ordre cultuel et à l'apparition d'une certaine radicalisation, le législateur et les pouvoirs publics ont le devoir d'intervenir afin de rétablir un apaisement dans les rapports entre la laïcité et les cultes. / France is a "laïc" Republic, which garantees the right to freedom of conscience and the right to freedom of religion, provided public order and citizens rights and freedoms are protected. Thus, "la laïcité” is a principle of our Republic and religious freedom is an essential basis for any democracy. Therefore, the links which exist between "la laïcité" and religions in France can not be questionned. Besides, France is faced with a revival of religious beliefs and a renewed interest in religious matters.These religious beliefs are legitimately expressed in the public and social spheres. However, the way they are expressed is not always peaceful, it causes deep misunderstandings even a challenge to “laïcité”. Under the guidance of the High administrative jurisdiction there are signs of a will to calm things down, and we must continue this way. Nowadays, in some fields of the legal framework there are clashes between law, based on neutrality, and religions. As far as some subjects are concerned, interfering in people's conscience and inner self is certainly not easy and law makers and the authorities seem to feel uncomfortable faced with this problem. Yet, given the increasing number of conflicts involving law and religions and the emergence of more radical positions, law makers and the authorities have to get involved and interfere so as to restore a more peaceful relation between "laïcité" and religions.

In the context of Canadas Kindergarten to Grade 12 education system and given the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there is a growing body of jurisprudence which reflects ongoing debates about who should ultimately maintain control of the formal and informal curriculum in our schools. In these cases, debates about curricular battles play out through rights conflicts, which our courts are required to resolve. These conflicts typically involve claims relating, directly or indirectly, to fundamental freedoms such as freedom of religion and freedom of expression as well as claims associated with the right to equality.<p>In this thesis, I aim to offer a critical assessment of the relevant body of jurisprudence. My critique draws on the theoretical work of Rob Reich and Jeremy Waldron. Reich suggests that our best hope of understanding and resolving the curricular struggles related to the control of childrens education requires a balanced approach whereby we attempt to reconcile the educational interests of three primary actors: parents, the state and children. Building on Reichs conceptualization of the different interest holders, I identify a fourth stakeholder, namely, teachers, who have interests which are germane to our analysis because these interests raise issues connected to curricular control and childrens education. In my analysis, I apply Reichs matrix of interests to the extant body of jurisprudence to ascertain whether or not our courts are alive to the different interest holders in its treatment of cases involving conflicts of constitutional rights. I also want to know whether the interests of the four stakeholders overlap or conflict with another. Finally, I want to know how these interests are conceptualized by the court and whether this conceptualization is consistent with, or differs from, the one offered by Reich. <p>Waldrons work offers analytical clarity for how we might better understand and resolve conflicts of rights, including conflicts involving constitutional rights claims. He maintains that rights conflicts are fundamentally about conflicts of duties and that we are likely to have more success reconciling conflicts of rights when we conceive of these conflicts in this manner. Applying Waldrons strategy for reconciling rights conflicts to the cases in my study, I posit that we can make sense of the reconciliation process by examining the duties associated with the rights in question. Although our courts do not explicitly draw on Waldrons theoretical framework in their legal analysis, I maintain that, generally speaking, what our courts do is consistent with a Waldronian analysis of conflicts of rights. <p>In my conclusion, I note that the jurisprudence considered initially seems to focus exclusively on two key guiding values: liberty and equality. Yet, a closer examination of the case law reveals a concern for two other important meta values, namely, efficiency and community. Furthermore, the notion of children as rights bearers poses special challenges. We might treat older children as rights claimants, on their own terms, because of their capacity to advance certain projects and to engage in certain commitments. Yet, the exact moral and legal status, for example, of a six- or seven-year old is still uncertain. Finally, I recognize that a rights only version of what happens in our schools provides only a partial account of educational reality. Other values such as duty, love, friendship and compassion are needed to furnish a richer and more nuanced account of morality for our school communities.

In the context of Canadas Kindergarten to Grade 12 education system and given the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there is a growing body of jurisprudence which reflects ongoing debates about who should ultimately maintain control of the formal and informal curriculum in our schools. In these cases, debates about curricular battles play out through rights conflicts, which our courts are required to resolve. These conflicts typically involve claims relating, directly or indirectly, to fundamental freedoms such as freedom of religion and freedom of expression as well as claims associated with the right to equality.<p>In this thesis, I aim to offer a critical assessment of the relevant body of jurisprudence. My critique draws on the theoretical work of Rob Reich and Jeremy Waldron. Reich suggests that our best hope of understanding and resolving the curricular struggles related to the control of childrens education requires a balanced approach whereby we attempt to reconcile the educational interests of three primary actors: parents, the state and children. Building on Reichs conceptualization of the different interest holders, I identify a fourth stakeholder, namely, teachers, who have interests which are germane to our analysis because these interests raise issues connected to curricular control and childrens education. In my analysis, I apply Reichs matrix of interests to the extant body of jurisprudence to ascertain whether or not our courts are alive to the different interest holders in its treatment of cases involving conflicts of constitutional rights. I also want to know whether the interests of the four stakeholders overlap or conflict with another. Finally, I want to know how these interests are conceptualized by the court and whether this conceptualization is consistent with, or differs from, the one offered by Reich. <p>Waldrons work offers analytical clarity for how we might better understand and resolve conflicts of rights, including conflicts involving constitutional rights claims. He maintains that rights conflicts are fundamentally about conflicts of duties and that we are likely to have more success reconciling conflicts of rights when we conceive of these conflicts in this manner. Applying Waldrons strategy for reconciling rights conflicts to the cases in my study, I posit that we can make sense of the reconciliation process by examining the duties associated with the rights in question. Although our courts do not explicitly draw on Waldrons theoretical framework in their legal analysis, I maintain that, generally speaking, what our courts do is consistent with a Waldronian analysis of conflicts of rights. <p>In my conclusion, I note that the jurisprudence considered initially seems to focus exclusively on two key guiding values: liberty and equality. Yet, a closer examination of the case law reveals a concern for two other important meta values, namely, efficiency and community. Furthermore, the notion of children as rights bearers poses special challenges. We might treat older children as rights claimants, on their own terms, because of their capacity to advance certain projects and to engage in certain commitments. Yet, the exact moral and legal status, for example, of a six- or seven-year old is still uncertain. Finally, I recognize that a rights only version of what happens in our schools provides only a partial account of educational reality. Other values such as duty, love, friendship and compassion are needed to furnish a richer and more nuanced account of morality for our school communities.