The fundamental freedoms and human rights is something the countries, and its citizens, of the European Union more or less take for granted. However, in recent years these rights have become a topic of discussion in the way that a debate about the Islamic headscarves has developed. This debate has resulted in that a number of countries, including France, have taken legislative measures to ban clothing that fully covers ones face. Out of these bans a discussion has arisen concerning the fundamental freedoms and human rights. These burqa bans, as it is labeled in the pubic debate, have been accused to wrongfully limit the individuals freedoms and human rights. This study therefore has the aim to analyze these burqa bans in relation to the European Union, United Nations and the Council of Europe’s general declarations concerning the fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. The main result of this study shows that these bans in fact is not a proportionally restrict in the fundamental freedoms and human rights. These results also are strengthened by the theoretical positions on freedom as put forth by Samuel Pufendorf and John Stuart Mill.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms can be interpreted in two ways regarding its relation with administrative law. First, as an alternative statutory remedy against government; second, as a general democratic mandate to reconsider the foundations of Canadian administrative law. Nevertheless, in spite of the entrenchment of the Charter, the former interpretation has prevailed. Indeed, since 1982, the Charter has developed as a distinct body of rights operating separately from administrative law remedies. / The interpretation of the Charter as a distinct statutory remedy has caused problems in both the definition of administrative power under the Charter and in the judicial review of administrative action. First, the interpretation of the Charter as autonomous remedy has polarized the definition of administrative power insofar as administrative authorities can either apply or not apply the Charter. However, both solutions are extreme: administrative authorities are not superior courts; conversely, the notwithstanding clause set aside, the power to give effect to the Charter cannot validly be withdrawn. Second, at the judicial level, even though it is part of the Constitution, the Charter has been treated as an autonomous cause of action against government, thus distinct from inherent judicial powers. This has prompted a separate regime of judicial power under the Charter, and separate constitutional and administrative law standards of review. / However, the autonomy of the Charter and administrative law, at both administrative and judicial levels, is being reconciled through the integration of the Charter into the process of statutory interpretation, thus minimizing the distinction between "administrative law" and the "law of the Charter".

Dialogue between courts and legislatures can occur where legislatures reverse, modify or avoid judicial decisions. With two exceptions, however, legislatures have only reversed the Supreme Court on three occasions. Defiant legislative responses enacted without the notwithstanding clause undermine the Charter and the courts, and are an inappropriate means of expressing institutional disagreement. However, based on a model of coordinate constitutionalism, recourse to the override constitutes a legitimate means for legislatures to advance alternate interpretations of Charter rights. Furthermore, section 33's value lies in the opportunity it creates for public deliberation regarding issues of national importance. Its relative disuse can be attributed to a combination of factors including its legislative history, the influence of American constitutionalism and an executive-dominated parliamentary process. Recognizing the legitimacy of section 33 would contribute to a greater respect for the roles and responsibilities of all three branches of government under a system of constitutional supremacy.

This study represents a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada's treatment of the exclusionary rule set out in s.24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the theoretical debate between legal positivism and legal realism by examining judicial discretion and the application of s.24(2) by the justices of the Supreme Court. The goal of this work is to demonstrate the weakness of the positivist school in its basic premise that judicial decisions are based solely on the application of the rule of law. It is contended that Supreme Court decisions are derived not only from the words of the law, but also from extra-legal factors, since judges possess certain predispositions by virtue of their own personal experiences. This thesis will illustrate that the exercise of judicial discretion by the Court in its interpretation of s.24(2) has had a profound impact on the nature of Canadian criminal justice policy, moving Canada even closer to the due process model of criminal justice and further from the crime control model than was intended by the framers of the Charter. Both the qualitative and quantitative analysis of s.24(2) Supreme Court decisions show that the language of this provision is often circumvented by the justices who are not constrained by either the intention of the framers or even their own precedent. Consequently, the vague wording of this provision coupled with the discretion conferred on these justices allows the Court to read the exclusionary provision in a manner that best accommodates the exclusionary philosophies of the majority of Supreme Court justices.

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

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Yes / The capability approach and sustainability can be connected in numerous ways. One could think of sustainability as a self-contained domain of human analysis – thus there could be theories of sustainability and there may be difficulties in this domain as elsewhere in moving from theory to policy or practice. Thus, capability approach could be considered as an additional lens that can facilitate the transition from sustainability theory to practice; alternatively one could think of the capability approach as offering an alternative paradigm and thus build on both theories and then find ways to move from theory to practice. In this chapter, both of these approaches are recognised and discussed. The capability approach is mainly about enhancing substantive freedoms- we examine the conjectures whether an approach of increasing freedoms is compatible with sustainability and whether freedoms are sufficient for sustainability. We use the case of Mongolia to explore some of these issues of application.

« La garantie des droits de l’homme et du citoyen nécessite une force publique : cette force est donc instituée pour l’avantage de tous, et non pour l’utilité particulière de ceux auxquels elle est confiée. » Telle est la lettre de l’article 12 de la Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du citoyen du 26 août 1789. La relation qui s’opère entre la force publique et les droits de l’homme présente un caractère amphibologique. En effet, la force publique est à la fois la garante des droits de l’homme, mais elle constitue en même temps un danger potentiel d’atteinte aux libertés publiques. Notre étude a donc pour objet de s’interroger sur la manière dont la force publique peut être la garante des droits et libertés. L’état de paix sociale est généré par la force publique qui se pose comme étant la garante des droits et libertés par l'exercice du monopole de la violence physique légitime (Max WEBER). L’exercice du monopole de la contrainte physique légitime doit viser à garantir les droits et libertés de chaque être humain vivant au sein de la société. Pour atteindre ce but fondamental, il est nécessaire que la contrainte exercée soit encadrée. Il conviendra d’étudier les éventuelles atteintes à ces droits et libertés selon une gradation examinée par rapport à l’action de la force publique. À cet égard, il convient d’étudier l’encadrement juridique de l’emploi de la contrainte opérée par la force publique au regard des libertés individuelles, lesquelles concernent la liberté d’aller et de venir et le droit de propriété. Puis, l’on examinera les atteintes potentielles de la force publique à l’égard de l’intégrité de la personne. / "The guarantee of the rights of man and citizen requires a public force: this force is thus instituted for the advantage of all and not for the personal benefit of those to whom it is entrusted." This is the letter of Article 12 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 26 August 1789. The relationship that occurs between law enforcement and human rights presents an amphibological character. Indeed, the police is both the guarantor of human rights, but it is also a potential danger of infringement of civil liberties. Our study aims to question the way in which the police may be the guarantor of rights and freedoms.The state of social peace is generated by the public force that arises as the guarantor of rights and freedoms by exercising the monopoly of legitimate physical violence (Max WEBER). The exercise of the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion must seek to ensure the rights and freedoms of every human being living in society. To achieve this fundamental goal, it is necessary that the coercion is framed. It will be necessary to investigate possible violations of these rights and freedoms in a gradation examined in relation to the action of the police. In this regard, it is necessary to study the legal framework for the use of coercion made by the police in respect of individual freedoms, which concerns freedom of coming and going and the right to property. Then, we examine the potential damage of the police with regard to the person's integrity.