This thesis uses the recently decided R v NS to assess the contours of the freedom to wear the niqab, as part of religious freedom, in Canada. By criticizing the majority and concurring opinions I argue that, properly understood, a witness’s religious freedom should protect her from an order to unveil when she is testifying in court. I show that the concurring opinion holds the witness to an illiberal, unfair standard of personal behaviour that fails to respect the witness’s religious freedom. I show that the majority’s decision, though following a justified liberal process of balancing rights, failed to protect NS’s meaningful choice to practice her religion, a standard set by the court in Hutterian Brethren. I then assess the broader implications of R v NS. I argue that in theoretical terms R v NS reaffirms Canada’s commitment to a liberal system of reciprocal rights and rejects a perfectionist approach according to which societal values can override rights. These theoretical lessons are then applied to other policies regulating the veil. I argue that despite its shortcomings, R v NS should generate optimism that perfectionist policies will be rejected and that the veil will only be limited minimally and only when the limit is necessary to uphold other legitimate aims. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-29 20:00:52.439

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À la fin des années 1980, trois adolescentes d’origine musulmane ont été exclues de leur collège parce qu’elles refusaient d’enlever leur voile en classe. Ce « fait divers » aurait pu passer inaperçu s’il n’avait pas été étalé de manière spectaculaire sur la scène médiatique. Les raisons invoquées pour justifier cet engouement tiennent en un mot : faire respecter le principe de laïcité au sein de l’école républicaine. Mais très vite, le débat a pris d’autres proportions avec l’intervention d’une grande partie d’intellectuels et l’on apprend soudainement que, derrière le foulard, se cache la soumission de la femme, si ce n’est une volonté affichée de « communautarisme », voire d’« intégrisme religieux ». La nation serait alors en danger et l’on comprend que la question du foulard rebondisse en 1994, avec cette fois-ci une détermination de la part des militants laïcs de mettre en échec le droit en vigueur, formulé par le Conseil d’État en des termes limpides : le port d’un signe religieux par les élèves ne saurait, en lui-même, constituer un motif d’exclusion, sauf cas avéré de « port ostentatoire et revendicatif ». Reste que dans un mouvement d’éternel retour, le problème du foulard resurgit brutalement en 2003, se politise et s’achève par la promulgation en mars 2004 d’une loi interdisant le port du voile dans les établissements publics.Sur le fond, cette évolution a mis en exergue un aspect essentiel : la crainte des « immigrés » et d’un islam devenu trop visible. Elle a également permis d’opposer la laïcité à la liberté religieuse. Notre travail consiste justement à comprendre comment on en est arrivé à rendre antinomiques deux principes fondamentaux sur lesquels repose, entre autres, la notion de démocratie en République française. Cette interrogation est d’autant plus légitime que la polémique autour du foulard avait explicitement ignoré le point de vue des femmes voilées, passant ainsi à côté des différentes significations que ce bout d’étoffe pouvait contenir. De fait, si l’objectif de notre recherche est de passer au crible la position de ceux qui ont oeuvré à l’interdiction du foulard dans l’espace scolaire, il s’agit aussi de donner la parole à ces femmes qui n’ont pas eu droit de cité. Dans cette optique, notre souci premier est de connaître comment elles vivent leur voilement. Quel sens donnent-elles au port du voile ? Quel regard jettent-elles sur un débat qui semble mettre en cause leur liberté d’expression confessionnelle ? Ces questions sont à la base de notre problématique. / At the end of the 80s, three girls of Moslem origin were excluded from their middle school because they refused to remove their veil in class. This «news item» would have been able to pass unnoticed, had not it been spread in a spectacular way over the media scene. The reasons called to justify this craze like are the will to make respect the principle of secularism within the republican school. But, very fast, the debate took other proportions with the intervention of many intellectuals who thought that behind the scarf hides the submission of the woman, if it is not a will posted by «communitarism» even of « religious fundamentalism ».Then, the nation would be in danger and we can understand that the question of the scarf bounces in 1994, with this time a determination on behalf of laic activists to put in check the current law, formulated by the Council of State in crystal clear terms: the bearing of a religious sign by the pupils does not constitute in itself a motive for exclusion, except in cases of «ostentatious and claiming bearing» . But in a movement of eternal return, the bearing of the scarf reappears brutally in 2003, politicizes, and ends with the promulgation in March, 2004 of a law forbidding the wearing of the veil in public institutions. In fact, this evolution highlighted an essential aspect: the fear of the «immigrants» and the Islam become too visible. It also allowed to set secularism against the freedom of religion. Our work consists in understanding how we managed to make paradoxical these two fundamental principles on which the notion of democracy in French Republic, among others, rests. This interrogation is all the more justifiable since the debate around the scarf had explicitly ignored the point of view of the veiled women, so passing next to the various meanings which this end of fabric could contain. Actually, if the objective of our research is to examine closely the position of those who intervened for the ban on the scarf in the school space, it is also a question of giving the floor to these women who have not been established. So, our first questions are: how do they live their buckle ? What sense do they give to the wearing of the veil ? What glance do they throw on a debate which seems to question their confessional freedom of expression ? These questions are on the base of our research

I detta arbete har jag undersökt hur diskussionen om niqab har sett ut i Frankrike, Storbritannien och Sverige. Jag har även undersökt olika lagar som till exempel religionsfrihet och mänskliga rättigheter. För att få en ökad förståelse om länder kan förbjuda niqab. Jag har samlat in mina data genom artiklar som jag hämtat från databaser som CSA Social Sciences, PsycInfo och Social Services Abstracts, tidningsartiklar som publicerats i Dagens Nyheter samt protokoll från riksdagens hemsida. Jag har även läst litteratur om islam för att få en djupare förståelse för hur religionen ser ut. I detta arbete har jag använt mig av en kvalitativ textanalys, d.v.s. jag har läst hela artiklar för att sedan välja ut väsentliga delar genom noggrann läsning för att inte missa någonting dolt i textens innehåll. Jag har därefter analyserat diskussionen i de olika länderna med två teorier, antidiskriminerande teori och intersektionalism. Genom teorierna har jag belyst hur diskrimineringen ser ut i diskussionen om niqab i tre olika länder. Antidiskriminerande teori undersöker bl.a. hur länder assimilerar eller ackulturerar människor i det nya landet. Det som jag har kommit fram till i min analys är att Frankrike assimilerar sina ”invandrare”, medan Storbritannien och Sverige ackulturerar sina ”invandrare” i det nya landet. Jag har även använt mig av intersektionalism som bland annat diskuterar dikotomier, det vill säga motsatspar, och att vissa kategorier ses som ”bättre”, än andra kategorier, t.ex. män ses som ”bättre” än kvinnor. Med hjälp av intersektionalitet har jag kunnat analysera hur kvinnor med niqab diskrimineras.

The fundamental freedoms and human rights is something the countries, and its citizens, of the European Union more or less take for granted. However, in recent years these rights have become a topic of discussion in the way that a debate about the Islamic headscarves has developed. This debate has resulted in that a number of countries, including France, have taken legislative measures to ban clothing that fully covers ones face. Out of these bans a discussion has arisen concerning the fundamental freedoms and human rights. These burqa bans, as it is labeled in the pubic debate, have been accused to wrongfully limit the individuals freedoms and human rights. This study therefore has the aim to analyze these burqa bans in relation to the European Union, United Nations and the Council of Europe’s general declarations concerning the fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. The main result of this study shows that these bans in fact is not a proportionally restrict in the fundamental freedoms and human rights. These results also are strengthened by the theoretical positions on freedom as put forth by Samuel Pufendorf and John Stuart Mill.

This thesis concerns the recent debate about the so-called cover ban in Denmark, which has been known in media as the ‘burka ban’. The ban involves an illegalization of covering of the face that does not have a justifiable cause like weather conditions. Through a discourse analysis of media articles the aim of this thesis is to identify which arguments are represented in this debate. The material for the analysis is found in the two major Danish newspapers; Politiken and Berlingske. The analysis is inspired by the theories of Norman Fairclough. The theoretical framework of the thesis is centered on theories regarding gender equality and feminism, and the analysis focuses on the discourses of these topics that are reproduced in the debate. The results show how the discourse of gender equality is the most prominent in the debate, and it shows how this discourse is naturalized. Within this discourse, there is an element of liberation of women, and this liberation is presented as the goal for all women. Furthermore, only the majority has access to this discourse, and it is not possible for the minority to negotiate it in any way. I discuss how the debate can be seen as an expression of the discourse about Islam in Denmark in general, as well as how the ban can be seen in a context of objectification of the female body.

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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and other international conventions have been ratified by many countries, yet the basic freedoms established therein continue to be taken for granted. In recent years, the Islamic veil has been widely debated as an oppressive garment against Muslim women and a threat to Western secular democracy. This debate has led countries, including France, to take legal action to ban clothing that completely covers the face. France has professed itself as a secular state for centuries following its historical revolution, with a narrative of guaranteeing equal rights and opportunity to all citizens. However, this secular orientation has, in practice, led to a law that has created and promoted juridical and institutionalized inequality. This thesis discusses the prohibition of the veil in relation to basic human rights and freedoms established by the UDHR, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as other relevant documents that hold the central idea of protection of religious freedom and expression. These documents will be analyzed alongside John Stuart Mill’s foundational philosophy on freedom. The main findings of this study are that the issue of the veil is complex, and its story must be understood before it can be judged. Muslim women who choose to wear the veil have a right to freedom of religion given by the UDHR. France is a signatory and therefore infringing on those rights is a violation of international law. This conclusion is supported by the theoretical foundations of freedom presented by John Stuart Mill and previous research that dealt with the issue of the veil in Western societies. / <p>Presentation gjordes online på grund av Covid19.</p>

The niqab is a veil worn by some Muslim women that covers the face except the area around the eyes, which can be seen through a rectangular slit in the fabric. In recent years, a number of countries have enacted measures against the niqab in public spaces. Canadian law and policy makers have made significant contributions to ongoing debates about the niqab as well as the acts of facial covering and uncovering. While objections to the niqab have been framed in many different ways, the guiding premise of this dissertation is that negative reactions to the niqab are grounded within the expectation and demand to see the human face. Drawing upon the case of R. v. N.S, the niqab ban during the Canadian citizenship oath, and Bill 62: An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain bodies, this dissertation considers how Canadian legal and political actors have justified restrictions against the niqab by invoking the idea that the visibility of the face is a central part of Western cultural values. Ultimately, my research questions the kind of work that the human face and the sense of sight is expected to do by examining how demands to see people’s faces reflect and maintain interlocking cites of privilege and oppression such as racism, sexism, ableism, imperialism, and colonialism.

A law proposal was passed by the Danish parliament in 2018 prohibiting the wear of niqab and burqa in all public spaces. This study aims to analyse the discourse of the debate in the parliament leading up to the passing of the law by using Fairclough’s method of critical discourse analysis. The analysis focusses on the construction of Muslim women in the Danish parliament’s debate regarding the ban on niqab/burqa in public spaces, thereby centering the gendered role of islamophobia. Fairclough’s method of critical discourse analysis is used in the analysis in conjunction with perspectives from postcolonial theorists such as Said, Spivak, Yeğenoğlu and Mohanty. The study concludes that the discourse of the debate can be understood as a form of cultural violence. By drawing on orientalist and white feminist discourse it reproduces a cultural hegemonic relation between Western societies and their “Others”. Culture and religion are used as explanations for gender oppression, placing the fault on the “Other”. This not only stigmatizes anyone who is understood as an “Other” but also obscures gender oppression among the majority Danish population making it harder to address.