Thesis advisor: Jeremy D. Wilkins / The basic question of this dissertation is, “Why a crucified God?” The history of this question is traced through strategically chosen increments in Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Lonergan. Each contributes in some important way to the development of a tradition that focuses on the choice of divine love and wisdom to answer evil through the justice of the cross rather than by coercion. In light of these earlier transpositions and Lonergan’s own development, this dissertation examines the meaning and justice of the cross, as epitomized in Lonergan’s Law of the Cross, and re-contextualizes this law in relation to our collective responsibility in and for history. This teleological re-reading of Lonergan’s soteriology brings to the forefront that a fitting remedy to the problem of a dis-ordered love is a re-ordering and (re-)ordered love, not coercive power. According to Lonergan’s Law of the Cross, the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption is the transformation of evil into good by love. This love, caritas ordinata et ordinans, is understood by analogy with the antecedent offer of diffusive friendship and by analogy with sacramental penance. The restoration of right order through the cross is fitting because, if the laws of nature and history are not suspended, retaliation would only multiply the objective surd. The constructive part of this dissertation further specifies ontological conditions for the fittingness of the cross by bringing the lex crucis into dialogue with Lonergan’s general theory of historical process. In continuity with the emerging world order (as subject to classical, statistical, dialectical, and genetic laws), the cross manifests an orderly communication of divine friendship to sinners. Correspondingly, the justice of the cross regards, not retributive justice, but the possibility of justice among sinners. This possibility, it is argued, is inaugurated by Christ’s transformation of suffering into the means of a new finality in history, the probabilities of which are decisively shifted in the cross event and concretely realized through the emergent agape network, the higher integration of the human good of order through the whole Christ, head and members, by the power of the Holy Spirit. The justice of the cross, then, is an emergent agapic justice which proceeds from the dynamic state of being in love with God as its principle and is realized in a dialectic unification of all things in Christ, constituting the “cruciform” transformation of human (inter-)subjectivity and the recovery of human progress as ordered to the eschatologically definitive reign of God. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Over the last 20 years, "engineering for good" has grown into a widespread phenomenon premised on the belief that engineers can and should combine technical expertise with the desire to make positive change. In the United States and abroad, many organizations conduct projects that enroll over ten thousand engineering students, faculty, and professionals. These engineers pursue their "doing good" efforts in the context of the history of Christian missions and colonialism, failed development efforts, and often competing individual and institutional values. These individual and institutional values are entangled in religious analogies and engineers' desire to fit into an overwhelmingly "secularized" profession. Given these nuanced dynamics, what do engineers mean when they say they want to "do good"? In this dissertation, I ask, what is engineering for good? Further, how do different individual and institutional values impact what engineering for good is and does? To answer these questions, I use three case studies of engineers for good being trained in institutions of higher education: Colorado School of Mines (CSM), Baylor University, and University of San Diego (USD)—a public (secular), Baptist, and Catholic university, respectively. I connect the training and practice of engineers for good to three larger social, cultural, and political movements—international development, humanitarian service, and social justice. I argue that engineers for good navigate complex dimensions of assessing and assigning need as they decide what it means to do their work well. These new humanitarians do not simply engage in pro bono efforts done for new users that cannot afford their traditional services. They are creating a new type of engineering to address newly recognized forms of need. Those involved in engineering for good redefine what engineering can and should be used for by drawing on larger values to pursue their purpose and reconcile this purpose with their professional identity. I conclude by showing what the formation of the engineering for good movement illuminates about good engineering. A close examination of the movement reveals engineers reformulating their relationship to notions of technological and moral progress. I show how differing values impact engineering pedagogy and practice. I argue that these engineers are remaking development, their identities, and the engineering profession itself. These findings are core not only to science and technology studies scholars, but historians, political scientists, religious studies scholars, and practitioners—in academia, the non-profit sector, and government aid work— just trying to "do good." / Doctor of Philosophy / Over the last 20 years, "engineering for good" has grown into a widespread phenomenon premised on the belief that engineers can and should combine technical expertise with the desire to make positive change. In the United States and abroad, many organizations conduct projects that enroll over ten thousand engineering students, faculty, and professionals. These engineers pursue their "doing good" efforts in the context of the history of Christian missions and colonialism, failed development efforts, and often competing individual and institutional values. These individual and institutional values are entangled in religious analogies and engineers' desire to fit into an overwhelmingly "secularized" profession. Given these nuanced dynamics, what do engineers mean when they say they want to "do good"? In this dissertation, I ask, what is engineering for good? Further, how do different individual and institutional values impact what engineering for good is and does? To answer these questions, I use three case studies of engineers for good being trained in institutions of higher education: Colorado School of Mines (CSM), Baylor University, and University of San Diego (USD)—a public (secular), Baptist, and Catholic university, respectively. I connect the training and practice of engineers for good to three larger social, cultural, and political movements—international development, humanitarian service, and social justice. I argue that engineers for good navigate complex dimensions of assessing and assigning need as they decide what it means to do their work well. These new humanitarians do not simply engage in pro bono efforts done for new users that cannot afford their traditional services. They are creating a new type of engineering to address newly recognized forms of need. Those involved in engineering for good redefine what engineering can and should be used for by drawing on larger values to pursue their purpose and reconcile this purpose with their professional identity.

The search for new identity factors and shared values in the post-Soviet region has given rise to a process of reevaluation of the role of religion in society. Not least the Central Asian countries are struggling with these issues in their nation building processes. They share important parts of their history with other Muslim dominated nations, but the Soviet heritage sets them apart. The focus of this study lies on the way religion as a general concept and Islam in particular are treated in four textbooks used in Kazakhstan’s school education. The contents of the textbooks are analyzed within a historical and societal context as well as a framework of contemporary secularity theory. The results elucidate a contrast between the discourse on religion found in the textbooks and the official legal status of religion in Kazakhstan today, which is taken as an indication of an ongoing reevaluation of religion leading away from the staunch Soviet secularity and possibly towards a situation where religion is seen as a natural part of societal developments. At the same time, however, the normative effect of official discourse is a double-edged sword, which, while shaping ideas of what religion is and ought to be, may also undermine the credibility and authority of a religion too closely associated with political authority.

Revisions to secularization theory over the past two decades call for reconceptualization of the relation between race and secularity. Structural theories— depicting secularization as the linear, straightforward decline of religion in modernity— commonly explain the tenacity of African-American religiosity as resulting from their marginalization in modern society, a product of educational and economic disparities. However, recent theories address the secular as a historically contingent, incidental phenomenon, what has been called an "accomplishment"; it merits substantive study in itself, carrying the distinct values, beliefs, and understandings of a particular social history. This new framework invites analysis of the racial assumptions embodied in mainstream US secularity as explanation for blacks' religiosity, rather than citing their structural exclusion alone. This research attempts such through ethnographic analysis of black and white young adults' discussion of their religious and spiritual identities, using interviews conducted in Wave 4 of the National Study of Youth and Religion. Finding that most white young adults pursue autonomy from family and community as means of establishing credible identity, and that most black young adults facilitate identity by showing fidelity to them, I argue that these differences demonstrate racialized understandings of human agency, personhood, and social structure that vividly persist in the 21st century United States. Yet those of white young adults are typically treated as normative both in sociological discussions of secularity as well as in broader Western culture, with costly political consequences.

Säkularismus ist in Indien spätestens seit den Assembly Debates Ende der 1940er Jahre ein Schlüsselbegriff in öffentlichen Debatten und ein zentraler Wert der Verfassung und der nationalen Identität. Als Gegenkonzept zu Kommunalismus, insbesondere Hindunationalismus, und Gewalt wird Säkularismus in Indien vorrangig als Toleranz und equal respect for all religions konzipiert. Die akademische Debatte über Säkularismus erscheint in Indien ausgesprochen normativ, emotional und politisiert. In der von mir untersuchten Kontroverse, die um die Frage kreist, inwieweit es sich bei der Kategorie Säkularismus um ein hegemoniales, westliches Konzept oder eine indigene Tradition handele, stehen sich zwei Lager oder „Clans“ gegenüber. Während die postkolonialistischen Säkularismus-Kritiker T.N. Madan und Ashis Nandy diese in ihren Augen fremde, imperiale Kategorie ablehnen und Säkularismus in Indien als gescheitert betrachten, unternehmen die Säkularismus-Befürworter Rajeev Bhargava und Romila Thapar den Versuch, säkulare Wurzeln in der indischen Tradition zu rekonstruieren und Säkularismus damit in Indien anschlussfähig zu machen. Interessanterweise beziehen sich alle vier Wissenschaftler in ihren Texten auf die tolerante Religionspolitik des Maurya-Königs Ashoka (3. Jh. v. Chr.) und des Mogulherrschers Akbar (16. Jh. n. Christus). Während Bhargava und Thapar darin eine Art Proto-Säkularismus sehen, geht es Nandy und Madan darum, die indische Toleranztradition von der Vorherrschaft der Säkularismuskategorie zu befreien. Ihnen schwebt eine tolerante „ghandianische“ Staatspolitik vor, die nicht unter dem Label Säkularismus läuft, sondern auf alten, indischen Traditionen und der gelebten, auf Religion basierenden Toleranz des Volkes gründet. Alle vier Wissenschaftler bekennen sich in ihren Texten über den Säkularismus explizit zu ihren politischen Positionen und verstehen sich gleichzeitig als Wissenschaftler und Aktivisten. Beide Lager, sowohl Madan und Nandy, als auch Thapar und Bhargava, engagieren und echauffieren sich in der Kontroverse über Säkularismus und die Anwendbarkeit dieses Konzepts im indischen Kontext in einem bemerkenswerten Ausmaß. Ziel meiner Arbeit ist es, Antworten auf die Frage zu finden, weshalb die untersuchte Debatte so hochgradig emotional ausfällt und was die Wissenschaftler antreibt, so leidenschaftlich am Säkularismus festzuhalten oder diese Kategorie genauso vehement abzulehnen.

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À la fin des années 1980, trois adolescentes d’origine musulmane ont été exclues de leur collège parce qu’elles refusaient d’enlever leur voile en classe. Ce « fait divers » aurait pu passer inaperçu s’il n’avait pas été étalé de manière spectaculaire sur la scène médiatique. Les raisons invoquées pour justifier cet engouement tiennent en un mot : faire respecter le principe de laïcité au sein de l’école républicaine. Mais très vite, le débat a pris d’autres proportions avec l’intervention d’une grande partie d’intellectuels et l’on apprend soudainement que, derrière le foulard, se cache la soumission de la femme, si ce n’est une volonté affichée de « communautarisme », voire d’« intégrisme religieux ». La nation serait alors en danger et l’on comprend que la question du foulard rebondisse en 1994, avec cette fois-ci une détermination de la part des militants laïcs de mettre en échec le droit en vigueur, formulé par le Conseil d’État en des termes limpides : le port d’un signe religieux par les élèves ne saurait, en lui-même, constituer un motif d’exclusion, sauf cas avéré de « port ostentatoire et revendicatif ». Reste que dans un mouvement d’éternel retour, le problème du foulard resurgit brutalement en 2003, se politise et s’achève par la promulgation en mars 2004 d’une loi interdisant le port du voile dans les établissements publics.Sur le fond, cette évolution a mis en exergue un aspect essentiel : la crainte des « immigrés » et d’un islam devenu trop visible. Elle a également permis d’opposer la laïcité à la liberté religieuse. Notre travail consiste justement à comprendre comment on en est arrivé à rendre antinomiques deux principes fondamentaux sur lesquels repose, entre autres, la notion de démocratie en République française. Cette interrogation est d’autant plus légitime que la polémique autour du foulard avait explicitement ignoré le point de vue des femmes voilées, passant ainsi à côté des différentes significations que ce bout d’étoffe pouvait contenir. De fait, si l’objectif de notre recherche est de passer au crible la position de ceux qui ont oeuvré à l’interdiction du foulard dans l’espace scolaire, il s’agit aussi de donner la parole à ces femmes qui n’ont pas eu droit de cité. Dans cette optique, notre souci premier est de connaître comment elles vivent leur voilement. Quel sens donnent-elles au port du voile ? Quel regard jettent-elles sur un débat qui semble mettre en cause leur liberté d’expression confessionnelle ? Ces questions sont à la base de notre problématique. / At the end of the 80s, three girls of Moslem origin were excluded from their middle school because they refused to remove their veil in class. This «news item» would have been able to pass unnoticed, had not it been spread in a spectacular way over the media scene. The reasons called to justify this craze like are the will to make respect the principle of secularism within the republican school. But, very fast, the debate took other proportions with the intervention of many intellectuals who thought that behind the scarf hides the submission of the woman, if it is not a will posted by «communitarism» even of « religious fundamentalism ».Then, the nation would be in danger and we can understand that the question of the scarf bounces in 1994, with this time a determination on behalf of laic activists to put in check the current law, formulated by the Council of State in crystal clear terms: the bearing of a religious sign by the pupils does not constitute in itself a motive for exclusion, except in cases of «ostentatious and claiming bearing» . But in a movement of eternal return, the bearing of the scarf reappears brutally in 2003, politicizes, and ends with the promulgation in March, 2004 of a law forbidding the wearing of the veil in public institutions. In fact, this evolution highlighted an essential aspect: the fear of the «immigrants» and the Islam become too visible. It also allowed to set secularism against the freedom of religion. Our work consists in understanding how we managed to make paradoxical these two fundamental principles on which the notion of democracy in French Republic, among others, rests. This interrogation is all the more justifiable since the debate around the scarf had explicitly ignored the point of view of the veiled women, so passing next to the various meanings which this end of fabric could contain. Actually, if the objective of our research is to examine closely the position of those who intervened for the ban on the scarf in the school space, it is also a question of giving the floor to these women who have not been established. So, our first questions are: how do they live their buckle ? What sense do they give to the wearing of the veil ? What glance do they throw on a debate which seems to question their confessional freedom of expression ? These questions are on the base of our research

This master thesis is focused on interpreting theological motives in the social theory of P. L. Berger and Ch. Taylor, particularly in relation to their interpretation of the concepts of secularization and secularity. The first objective of the thesis is to demonstrate whether these partial sociological concepts can be read as theologically conditioned. Consequently, to elucidate how the dependence of these concepts on their theological origins influences the explanation of the pertinence of Christianity in the contemporary world. The second aim of this thesis is to testify the inner connection between the ideas of both authors; in order to explain how and for what reason the concepts of secularization and secularity acquire the same or different expressions. This thesis is organized into four sections, the first section defines the framework of the secularization debate in which the topic of this work operates. The second and third sections provide an analysis of Berger and Taylor's sociological approach. The last section compares the concepts that prove to be essential for the interpretation of secularization and secularity in Berger and Taylor.

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