Disagreement over the nature of religion in China - a civilization that has long confounded the vocabulary of religious and secular - is nothing new. With an imperial institution that eclipsed confessional structures, and bound Heaven and Earth in ritual cosmology, China was what John Lagerwey called a “religious state.” When native notions of religion were forced into European-derived categories, the result was either a clash of interests, particularly with Christian missionaries, or dreadful mistranslations, such as the still pervasive idea of “emperor worship.” Religion in the twentieth century was been punctuated by periods of intense persecution, but the more longstanding policy of the People’s Republic has been to allow organized religion to exist, and even thrive, albeit at the cost of being coopted or transformed into a museum piece, its teaching is reduced to moral platitudes. The ideological wave under Xi Jinping is something new. Combining nationalism, personal advancement, economic welfare, and an unprecedented level of surveillance of public and virtual spaces, this wave has made the state more ideologically pervasive than it has been in half a century. It has tamed the independent charitable organizations that grew up over the previous decade, but even this is just a symptom of the larger reorientation of ideology to public spaces to become what I call the “Chinese secular.”

In the first half of the 17th century, three major Buddhist governments that combined a twofold religious and political structure under a Buddhist ruler were established in the Tibetan cultural area (hereafter: Joint Twofold System of Governance).1 In 1625/26,2 Bhutan was united under the rule of a charismatic Tibetan Buddhist master, Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel (1594– ca. 1651; hereafter: Zhabdrung); Tibet and Sikkim followed, both in 1642 – although with significant differences in their respective institutionalisation. The Bhutanese government as a constitutional monarchy with a Buddhist king is the only one among the three still in existence today. Bhutan’s transformation into a modern society along the lines of this Joint Twofold System of Governance under the conditions of non-colonialisation but with crucial and intense encounters of its societal elites with Western and Asian forms of modernity and secularity represents, therefore, a unique case in point.

This article aims to analyse the relationship between state and religion (in this case, Islam) in political and legal developments in Indonesia from colonial times to the present, and to determine the model of Indonesian secularity within the multiple secularities approach. The legal and political developments relating to the relationship between the state and Islam in Indonesia are understood to be the products of societal debate as well as instruments for solving particular societal problems, guided by certain guiding ideas1 that shape Indonesian secularity. The paper first describes Indonesia’s evolving socio-political conditions, noting in particular the emergence of two distinct groups: Islamic groups calling for Islam to be made the foundation of the Indonesian state and for Islamic law to be enforced for Muslims in Indonesia, and nationalist groups that support the idea of a secular nation-state based on Pancasila, a set of five founding principles. In the second part, the paper outlines the development of Pancasila as a national agreement and state ideology. The third part analyses the state’s legal policy on Islamic law. The fourth part analyses the relationship between the character of the contemporaneous regime and its attitude towards the aspirations of Islamic law. The fifth part analyses some state laws in Indonesia that relate to Islamic law in order to establish whether they constitute a legalisation of Islamic law and to what end the laws were created. The sixth part determines the model of Indonesian secularity based on the societal problems to be solved by the legal and political developments and the guiding ideas referred to. The final part defines the general boundaries between the state and Islam.

This working paper is part of a larger research project on emerging visualities and imaginaries of living together in plurality and on equal terms. Against the background of growing majoritarianism in India and the normalization of violence against religious minorities and marginalized communities, the search for new visual forms and aesthetic means to counter increasing divisiveness and conflict has acquired exceptional urgency. It is a search pursued by many and in multiple directions, occasionally even in the realm of marketing and advertising which is the focus of this article. The larger project considers documentaries, fictional films and transmedia interventions in order to understand how different actors seek to create new visualities that are markedly different from earlier form(at)s used to visually mediate the normative project of political secularism for many decades, but nevertheless draw on the idea that secularity is a mode of living together and socially interacting in plural societies.

Iran’s constitutional revolution of 1906 is arguably the most significant turn toward the secular in its modern history.1 I start this investigation by making a conceptual distinction between secularism and secularity.2 Here, secularism is defined as the ideologically-driven separation of religion and state according to an agenda, a blueprint, a model, that could be indigenously, or externally informed and is achieved with the assistance of the modern state and explicit political motivations. Secularity, on the other hand, is expressed in terms of a non-ideological separation that comes about unintentionally. In some accounts, this separation may take on evolutionary connotations in terms of the natural separation of functions as a result of the growing complexity of a natural organism or social system. What I have in mind here is a separation of functions that is agent-driven but the secularity that emerges is both unintentional and unideological.

In the context of my involvement with the CASHSS Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities’ research programme, I chose Ghazali’s autobiography, and in particular his “crisis of indecision,” as an example of a pre-modern negotiation of the boundaries of religion at the micro level. The research programme suggests employing the analytical concept of secularity to investigate both non-Western and pre-modern forms of secularity, in terms of conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiations between religious and non-religious social spheres. In this essay, I would like to propose a method of pursuing these goals from my own theoretical perspective. More specifically, I will argue that in Ghazali’s reflections on spiritual religiosity, theology, philosophy and science, we can discern the individual engagement of a prominent Muslim thinker with emerging communicative realms. In the Modern Systems Theory of Niklas Luhmann, these realms are taken to represent functionally differentiated subsystems of modern society.

The paper argues that the distinction between religious and secular realms of society is not as clear-cut in modern societies as it appears in theories of functional and institutional differentiation. The data used are mainly from China with a short excursion to the United States. The starting point is ancestor worship, which is a central element of traditional Chinese religion. The significance of ancestor worship in Chinese history and culture is briefly explained to illustrate on the one hand its central importance as a ritual practice and on the other hand the ambiguities of interpretation. On this basis, some theoretical considerations about the existence of ancestors are presented. This is followed by a report on contemporary temple festivals focusing on the worship of Fuxi, a mythic figure considered to be the first ancestor of the Chinese people. The next step is the description of official state rituals devoted to the worship of the very same mythological hero in contemporary China. Against this backdrop, the last part of the paper discusses the theoretical questions of classification and distinguishing between the religious and the secular. / Theoretischer Ausgangspunkt des Beitrages ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Religion und säkularen Bereichen der Gesellschaft. Es wird argumentiert, dass diese Unterscheidung auch in modernen Gesellschaften weniger klar ist, als es Theorien der funktionalen und institutionellen Differenzierung unterstellen. Die empirische Basis der Überlegungen bilden Beobachtungen zu kollektiven Formen von Ahnenkult im heutigen China. Dazu werden zunächst die Bedeutung und verschiedene Interpretationen von Ahnenkult in China historisch erläutert. Daran anschließend folgen einige theoretische Überlegungen zur Existenz von Ahnen. Die nächsten Abschnitte beschreiben die heutige kollektive Verehrung von Fuxi als Ahn des chinesischen Volkes in zwei verschiedenen Formen: im Rahmen eines populären Tempelfestes und im Rahmen eines offiziellen staatlichen Rituals. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird im letzten Abschnitt gezeigt, dass bei der Verehrung von Toten die Grenze zwischen religiösen und säkularen Ritualen verschwimmt.

L’accommodement raisonnable, perçu de manière erronée comme un outil octroyant des privilèges particuliers aux communautés ethno religieuses, fût la source d’une atmosphère de malaise social au sein de la communauté québécoise. Face à une immigration récente non occidentale, ayant fortement contribué à la modification du paysage sociétal québécois, un désarroi populaire transformé en « la crise des accommodements » (2006-2007), s’est emparée soudainement d’une partie de la population canadienne – française. Plusieurs questions fondamentales relatives au droit à l’égalité se posent : comment préserver l’identité québécoise si chacun veut faire valoir sa propre culture et religion ? Mais aussi, n’avons-nous pas lutté pour que les droits fondamentaux soient assurés pour tous ? Ce mémoire montre que l’accommodement raisonnable, loin de privilégier les minorités religieuses, est un moyen juridique permettant à tous les citoyens d’accéder à l’égalité et de vivre sans subir de discrimination. La liberté de religion faisant partie des droits fondamentaux garantis par les chartes canadienne et québécoise, doit être protégée en tant que telle. L’accommodement raisonnable révèle une autre dimension de sa fonction : une contribution fondamentale à la réflexion collective sur le vivre - ensemble social, vecteur de l’évolution sociétale. Un équilibre peut être atteint entre les exigences d’un État neutre et le respect des libertés individuelles fondamentales. Ainsi, les choix de la laïcité ouverte et de l’interculturalisme s’inscrivent harmonieusement dans l’esprit des autres valeurs de la société québécoise, laquelle est marquée de part son histoire par des valeurs laïques respectueuses de la diversité culturelle et religieuse. / The concept of reasonable accommodation, erroneously perceived as a means for ethnic and religious minorities to enjoy special privileges, has plunged Quebec society in social unrest. Indeed, recent years non-western-based immigration contributed to changing Quebec society ethnic mix, leading to important social concerns by Quebecers of French Canadian descent and ultimately to the “accommodations crisis” (2006-2007). Such social crisis raises numerous questions: How can we live together with a common identity when each one of us defends his/her religion? And also: have we not fought for those rights to be guaranteed for every person? Far from privileging minority groups, reasonable accommodations are a flexible judicial tool allowing all citizens access to equality and protection against discrimination. As religion is only one of several motives for discrimination, it is erroneous to believe that reasonable accommodations solely concern religious and cultural matter. Nonetheless, religious freedom, a fundamental right guaranteed by the Canada and Quebec charters, should be protected as such. Reasonable accommodations reveal another benefit: they are a key contribution to collective thinking regarding social coexistence and living together, a means to manage Quebec’s pluralism and to facilitate minority integration. But how to accommodate religious minorities while preserving Quebec’s identity, characterized by secular values? Our analysis shows that a balance between neutral state requirements and fundamental individual rights can be reached. Specifically, Quebec’s open secularity and interculturalism, are choices harmoniously blended in other social values: they call for the integration of cultural minorities into society through a common set of cultural values.

Ce mémoire se propose d’étudier la manière nouvelle dont se présente la croyance religieuse à l’âge séculier dans la philosophie de la religion du philosophe Charles Taylor. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à démontrer que la croyance et l’incroyance possèdent les mêmes fondements phénoménologiques, qui sont à trouver du côté des questions identitaires. Afin d’y arriver, nous commençons par analyser sa redéfinition de la sécularité afin de comprendre pourquoi l’âge séculier n’est pas en soi un âge irréligieux. Nous montrerons en quoi, selon Taylor, les Occidentaux partagent un même « arrière-plan » moral et spirituel – le « cadre immanent », que nous appréhendons comme le contexte au sein duquel émergent les positions croyantes et athées. Nous présentons ensuite une brève analyse des éléments historiques et phénoménologiques du cadre immanent ainsi que de sa fonction « transcendantale », ce qui nous permet d’expliquer la raison pour laquelle Taylor soutient que la croyance et l’incroyance relèvent avant tout de l’identité morale et des considérations éthiques qui soutiennent notre vision du monde. Ici nous suivons Taylor en affirmant que ce sont toutes deux des expériences vécues qui a priori s’équivalent sur le plan rationnel. Enfin, au cœur de notre réflexion se trouve la mise en valeur d’un concept très important que Taylor développe à partir des travaux de William James, à savoir l’« espace ouvert jamesien ». Cette ouverture, rendue possible par la sécularité elle-même, vise à rendre compte d’un état de lucidité par lequel nous pouvons ressentir la force des deux options. / This paper aims to describe how Charles Taylor articulates his philosophy of religion in his major work, A Secular Age. We argue that belief and unbelief share the same phenomenological fundamentals, which can be found in the constituents of identity. In order to do that, we shall first analyse his redefinition of secularity in order to see how the secular age is not irreligious in itself. What will emerge of this preliminary investigation is the Taylorian idea that all Westerners share the same spiritual and moral “background”, the “immanent frame”, which must be understood as the context in which we form our beliefs. Then we develop an analysis of the historical elements of the immanent frame and of its “transcendental” function, which makes it possible to explain why Taylor conceives belief and unbelief as questions of moral identity. We follow Taylor in arguing that they are both lived experiences of equal rational value. At the heart of our paper, there is an important concept that Taylor has developed from William James’s work, which is the “Jamesian open space”. This openness illustrates a state of lucidity that is characterised by the ability to feel the force of both options, belief and unbelief.

Récemment, le Chili a vu la victoire des politiques publiques de prévention et de soins de l'infection à VIH promues par la vérité technique de l'OMS et de l'ONUSIDA (notre acception de la vérité technique a été définie dans les derniers travaux de Michel Foucault). Pourtant, l'histoire récente des politiques de santé du Chili dans notre domaine de recherche nous incite à la prudence. Des questions telles que la responsabilité sociale des dépenses de santé ont connu des va et vient répétés dus aux bouleversements politiques de ces dernières décennies. Certains sujets cruciaux pour la prévention de la transmission verticale du VIH / SIDA, liés à la morale privée et à son influence sur les politiques publiques, comme dans le cas de l'avortement thérapeutique, ont longtemps été influencés par la dose laïcité permise par l'église catholique aux partis politiques chiliens les plus conservateurs. La promotion du préservatif comme seul moyen de prévenir la transmission sexuelle du VIH, simple vérité technique «connue» par les politiques publiques du Nord depuis les années 80, a partagé les campagnes de prévention officielles chiliennes avec abstinence et fidélité jusqu'en 2015. Cependant, si une vérité mérite notre sympathie, elle mérite en même temps l'aversion des secteurs de la population tout aussi respectables que nous. Si nous considérons avec bienveillance une vérité technique qui émerge du débat pour s'imposer comme «la vérité», ignorant que ce qui a vraiment été imposé est le prestige de la technicité, nous ignorons probablement le sens du combat politique comme objet scientifique. / Recently, Chile lived the victory of public policies of prevention and care of the HIV infection as promoted by the WHO’s and UNAIDS technical truth (our meaning of the technical truth has been defined in the latest works by Michel Foucault). Yet the recent history of Chile's health policies in our research matters urges us to be cautious. Issues such as social responsibility of health spending have come and gone according to the political upheavals of the recent decades. Some crucial topics for the prevention of vertical transmission of HIV/AIDS, linked to private values and its influence on public policies, as in the case of therapeutic abortion, has long been under the influence of the dosage of secularity allowed by the catholic church to the most conservative political parties. The promotion of the condom as the only way to prevent the sexual transmission of the HIV, a simple technical truth “known” by the northern public policies since the 80’s, shared the official prevention campaigns with abstinence and fidelity till 2015. However, if a truth deserves our sympathy, it deserves at the same time the aversion of sectors of the population just as respectable as we are. If we consider with kindness a technical truth that emerges from the debate to impose itself as "the truth", ignoring that what has really been imposed is the prestige of technicality, we probably ignore the sense of political struggle as a scientific object.