Säkularismus ist in Indien spätestens seit den Assembly Debates Ende der 1940er Jahre ein Schlüsselbegriff in öffentlichen Debatten und ein zentraler Wert der Verfassung und der nationalen Identität. Als Gegenkonzept zu Kommunalismus, insbesondere Hindunationalismus, und Gewalt wird Säkularismus in Indien vorrangig als Toleranz und equal respect for all religions konzipiert. Die akademische Debatte über Säkularismus erscheint in Indien ausgesprochen normativ, emotional und politisiert. In der von mir untersuchten Kontroverse, die um die Frage kreist, inwieweit es sich bei der Kategorie Säkularismus um ein hegemoniales, westliches Konzept oder eine indigene Tradition handele, stehen sich zwei Lager oder „Clans“ gegenüber. Während die postkolonialistischen Säkularismus-Kritiker T.N. Madan und Ashis Nandy diese in ihren Augen fremde, imperiale Kategorie ablehnen und Säkularismus in Indien als gescheitert betrachten, unternehmen die Säkularismus-Befürworter Rajeev Bhargava und Romila Thapar den Versuch, säkulare Wurzeln in der indischen Tradition zu rekonstruieren und Säkularismus damit in Indien anschlussfähig zu machen. Interessanterweise beziehen sich alle vier Wissenschaftler in ihren Texten auf die tolerante Religionspolitik des Maurya-Königs Ashoka (3. Jh. v. Chr.) und des Mogulherrschers Akbar (16. Jh. n. Christus). Während Bhargava und Thapar darin eine Art Proto-Säkularismus sehen, geht es Nandy und Madan darum, die indische Toleranztradition von der Vorherrschaft der Säkularismuskategorie zu befreien. Ihnen schwebt eine tolerante „ghandianische“ Staatspolitik vor, die nicht unter dem Label Säkularismus läuft, sondern auf alten, indischen Traditionen und der gelebten, auf Religion basierenden Toleranz des Volkes gründet. Alle vier Wissenschaftler bekennen sich in ihren Texten über den Säkularismus explizit zu ihren politischen Positionen und verstehen sich gleichzeitig als Wissenschaftler und Aktivisten. Beide Lager, sowohl Madan und Nandy, als auch Thapar und Bhargava, engagieren und echauffieren sich in der Kontroverse über Säkularismus und die Anwendbarkeit dieses Konzepts im indischen Kontext in einem bemerkenswerten Ausmaß. Ziel meiner Arbeit ist es, Antworten auf die Frage zu finden, weshalb die untersuchte Debatte so hochgradig emotional ausfällt und was die Wissenschaftler antreibt, so leidenschaftlich am Säkularismus festzuhalten oder diese Kategorie genauso vehement abzulehnen.

In this paper, we show how this plural legal landscape is negotiated by litigants, especially women, and thereby illustrate the procedural interplay between civil and religious courts through this adjudication process. The ethnography of adjudication at the Darul-Qaza situated in a large Muslim neighbourhood in Kanpur and the institution’s intersections with the societal (We mean the tribunals that function at the neighbourhood or community level) secular courts show how Muslim personal law functions. In this paper, we identify both the links between the Darul-Qaza and civil courts, and the processes of evidence making and legal reasoning that are integral to this interlegality. We argue that the issue of personal law should be understood within the post-colonial legal structure of India and with a good understanding of the processes through which disputes in the delicate area of family, affect and kinship are addressed and resolved. The above case shows how resolution occurs in a family dispute when plural institutional mechanisms are at work. This paper explores the adjudication process at a Darul-Qaza to understand how religion-based family laws get constituted as litigants seek both religious counsel and civil authority.

Säkularismus ist in Indien spätestens seit den Assembly Debates Ende der 1940er Jahre ein Schlüsselbegriff in öffentlichen Debatten und ein zentraler Wert der Verfassung und der nationalen Identität. Als Gegenkonzept zu Kommunalismus, insbesondere Hindunationalismus, und Gewalt wird Säkularismus in Indien vorrangig als Toleranz und equal respect for all religions konzipiert. Die akademische Debatte über Säkularismus erscheint in Indien ausgesprochen normativ, emotional und politisiert. In der von mir untersuchten Kontroverse, die um die Frage kreist, inwieweit es sich bei der Kategorie Säkularismus um ein hegemoniales, westliches Konzept oder eine indigene Tradition handele, stehen sich zwei Lager oder „Clans“ gegenüber. Während die postkolonialistischen Säkularismus-Kritiker T.N. Madan und Ashis Nandy diese in ihren Augen fremde, imperiale Kategorie ablehnen und Säkularismus in Indien als gescheitert betrachten, unternehmen die Säkularismus-Befürworter Rajeev Bhargava und Romila Thapar den Versuch, säkulare Wurzeln in der indischen Tradition zu rekonstruieren und Säkularismus damit in Indien anschlussfähig zu machen. Interessanterweise beziehen sich alle vier Wissenschaftler in ihren Texten auf die tolerante Religionspolitik des Maurya-Königs Ashoka (3. Jh. v. Chr.) und des Mogulherrschers Akbar (16. Jh. n. Christus). Während Bhargava und Thapar darin eine Art Proto-Säkularismus sehen, geht es Nandy und Madan darum, die indische Toleranztradition von der Vorherrschaft der Säkularismuskategorie zu befreien. Ihnen schwebt eine tolerante „ghandianische“ Staatspolitik vor, die nicht unter dem Label Säkularismus läuft, sondern auf alten, indischen Traditionen und der gelebten, auf Religion basierenden Toleranz des Volkes gründet. Alle vier Wissenschaftler bekennen sich in ihren Texten über den Säkularismus explizit zu ihren politischen Positionen und verstehen sich gleichzeitig als Wissenschaftler und Aktivisten. Beide Lager, sowohl Madan und Nandy, als auch Thapar und Bhargava, engagieren und echauffieren sich in der Kontroverse über Säkularismus und die Anwendbarkeit dieses Konzepts im indischen Kontext in einem bemerkenswerten Ausmaß. Ziel meiner Arbeit ist es, Antworten auf die Frage zu finden, weshalb die untersuchte Debatte so hochgradig emotional ausfällt und was die Wissenschaftler antreibt, so leidenschaftlich am Säkularismus festzuhalten oder diese Kategorie genauso vehement abzulehnen.

Diese Schriftenreihe dokumentiert die Forschungsergebnisse des Humanities Centre for Advanced Studies 'Multiple Secularities - Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities' (Kolleg-Forschergruppe KFG).

For the last few decades, sociological debates about religion and secularisation have been characterised by confrontation between (often American) critics and (mostly European) defenders of secularisation theories. There has also been a remarkable rise in academic and public debates about the role of secularism in political regimes and in national as well as civilisational frameworks. These debates are shaped by the context of the changing position of the West in world politics, Islamist terror and the war on terror, struggles of religious minorities for recognition and influence, and the concomitant negotiations over the place of religion in the public sphere, as well as the emergence of post-national citizenship. Contributions from political theory, social anthropology and religious studies that emerged from this context have enriched the debate, but also contributed to fragmenting existing theories on the relationship between religion and modernity. Whereas scholars previously aimed to develop ‘general theories’ of secularisation that included deviations from the general model, newer approaches tend to highlight the specificity of Western European developments as opposed to those in the rest of the world, and sometimes even highlight their incomparability.

The project seeks to explore the boundaries that distinguish between the religious and non-religious, in modern as well as pre-modern societies. In doing so, we are aligning ourselves with current debates but we are approaching the debated issues from a basic theoretical perspective. At present, a general distinction can be drawn between three narratives: The first claims the dwindling presence and relevance of religion (“secularisation”); the second regards religion to be returning globally, consequently irritating the self-perception of modern societies (“return of religions”, “post-secular society”). According to the third, religion has always been present and has simply changed shape, meaning secularisation assumptions are misleading (“invisible religion”). There is also a theoretical-methodological conflict to be taken into consideration. Where the secularisation hypothesis considers its theories and methods to be universally applicable, the critics of this theory not only increasingly challenge the transferability of Western development paths, but also the transferability of the concepts used. This applies right down to the challenge of the religious/secular dual, which is understood to be an expression of Western experience and power of interpretation that forces other cultures into Western schematisations. In contrast, we are formulating an alternative position, in which we are trying to explore the boundaries between the religious and non-religious beyond normative concepts. We are particularly seeking such boundaries in regions that differ greatly from the so-called “West” in the “Modern World” in terms of culture and history: In various Asian regions and – partly overlapping with these – in the so-called “Islamic World”, but also in different epochs. This is linked to a plea for comparability across multifaceted regions and cultural contexts, and for investigating their entangled history.

This article discusses four concepts: religionization, religio-secularization, religio-secularism, and religion-making. These concepts are proposed as heuristic devices for the analysis of the processes through which social networks, practices, and discourses come to be understood as ‘religious’ or ‘religion.’

Debates about the usability of the concept of ‘secularity’ in academic research are not merely theoretical. Standpoints are also politically informed and arguments are sometimes emotionally charged. To some, merely using the term ‘secularity’ seems to inflict violence upon certain objects of research or even upon themselves. Others object to applying the concept beyond a particular arrangement of secularity, lest that defense-worthy arrangement be undermined. Taking a step back, however, the actual hermeneutical problem and historical question still seems rather clearly to be this: is it possible to uncouple the link between secularism as a political regime and secularity as an analytical concept with broader historical purchase? In this paper, I argue that the basic approach of Multiple Secularities is indeed the commendable way forward, but could be refined and improved, also by learning from the valid points of its critical alternatives. Thus, this paper aspires to shed light on two basic questions, namely, how to take ‘secularity’ beyond the modern West, and, as a logical prior, why take ‘secularity’ beyond the modern West in the first place?

If any one thing marks early modern history, it is religious transformation. Confessional and pietist movements, both European firsts, are prominent examples of such catalysts for change.1 In large parts of the Islamic world in the 15th and 16th centuries, it was Sufi piety that carried the day. The historiographical record reveals strikingly new imaginaires and novel modes of connectivity to the past. The focus in this paper is on the manifold ways in which new forms of religiosity redefined the landscape of politics in the eastern Islamic world. It traces invocations of the past in Fakhr al-Dīn Kāshifī’s (d. 1532) Rashaḥāt ‘ayn al-ḥayāt 2 (Sprinklings from the Fountain of Life), a 16th-century collected biography of Naqshbandī Sufi masters, to argue that the classificatory schema adopted by the author reveals a template of secularity that marks a significant departure from past manners of adherence.

This working paper is derived from a larger research project exploring what I consider to be a tenuous but persistent form of “public culture” extending between Inner Asia and Europe over the course of the 18th and, especially, 19th centuries. This “stranger relationality,” as Michael Warner would have it, was mediated by new forms and routes of Eurasianist textual circulation. In this late imperial period, spread along the frontiers of the Qing, Tsarist, and British empires, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Buryat monks read works by European and East Asian intellectuals on all manner of technical knowledge, and began writing not to fellow scholastics or local readers, but to a global community of “the knowledgeable” (Tib. mkhas pa; Mon. baγsi, nomčin). The social site of what I am exploring as a new form of reading, interpreting, and writing in Asia’s heartland was the dispersed web of monastic colleges (Tib. grwa tshang; Mon. datsang) that connected generations of polyglot and cosmopolitan scholastics across the otherwise diverse and segregated socio-political blocs of late imperial Central and Eastern Tibet, north China, all Mongolian territories, and Siberia. My ongoing research is revealing how the practices of secularity (as defined by the Multiple Secularities framework) enacted by this commonwealth of frontier, synthetic scholastics was repurposed in the early 20th century, in the ruins of the Qing and Tsarist empires, to invent the social imaginaries, national subjects, civil societies, and other products of socialist secularism that produced modern Inner Asia (and continues to legitimize claims by Russia and the PRC on its Inner Asian frontiers). In this working paper, I will briefly introduce the social sites of my sources, the Buddhist monastic colleges that spanned the Sino-Russian frontiers, and provide a few examples of synthetic scholastic products that emerged in this previously unstudied form of Eurasianist public culture (c. 1750–1930s). I will also share some preliminary arguments I have drawn about the ways that practices of secularity amongst the actors my work considers led directly to the creation of the modern public sphere, civil society, and ironically, revolutionary institutional forms and models of history that had violently erased scholastic culture from public life.