Revisions to secularization theory over the past two decades call for reconceptualization of the relation between race and secularity. Structural theories— depicting secularization as the linear, straightforward decline of religion in modernity— commonly explain the tenacity of African-American religiosity as resulting from their marginalization in modern society, a product of educational and economic disparities. However, recent theories address the secular as a historically contingent, incidental phenomenon, what has been called an "accomplishment"; it merits substantive study in itself, carrying the distinct values, beliefs, and understandings of a particular social history. This new framework invites analysis of the racial assumptions embodied in mainstream US secularity as explanation for blacks' religiosity, rather than citing their structural exclusion alone. This research attempts such through ethnographic analysis of black and white young adults' discussion of their religious and spiritual identities, using interviews conducted in Wave 4 of the National Study of Youth and Religion. Finding that most white young adults pursue autonomy from family and community as means of establishing credible identity, and that most black young adults facilitate identity by showing fidelity to them, I argue that these differences demonstrate racialized understandings of human agency, personhood, and social structure that vividly persist in the 21st century United States. Yet those of white young adults are typically treated as normative both in sociological discussions of secularity as well as in broader Western culture, with costly political consequences.

The purpose of this study is threefold: (1) to give a historical background of the concept of religion; (2) critically examine the challenges in the Study of Religions based on David Thurfjell and his essay Religionswissenschaft and the challenge of multi-religious student groups; and (3) to offer a solution that might improve and turn the Study of Religions into a more fruitful field. The results show that the concept of religion is the result of the developments in Western Europe and Christian theology. Secondly, the results illustrate that the methodologies of the department for the Study of Religions at Södertörns University College are seriously flawed. Finally, some personal suggestions and reflections are made that might improve the methodologies of the field.

The aim of this thesis has been to discuss whether remainders of colonial influences exist within the UN's definition of torture or not. The discussion has been presented from a postcolonial point of view, in dialogue with contemporary power critical theorists. In order to raise awareness of a potential colonial influence, the following questions were intended to be answered: –                                        Are there any reasons, if so – which ones, to regard the UN's definition of torture as a colonial project? And; –                                        To what extent is the term “inhumane” limiting for the prohibition against torture from a postcolonial perspective? One of the most central arguments of the chosen theories is that the term “inhumane” evokes prejudices that a racializing apparatus within the social norms of the UN automatically produces. These prejudices are, according to the theorists, influenced by images of people in non-western and non-secular (especially muslim) societies as more prone to exercise “violence” and “cruelty” towards their own citizens as well as towards the population of the world in general. Thereby, these people's state of being leave them with no access to the human rights – they are not acting in a humane way and are therefore not allowed to be treated humanely. Even though the reasoning of the theorists are understandable at a theoretical and emotional level, the language of the convention against torture leaves no substantial evidence for this assumed cultural bias and colonial tendency.   Where the theories point out some human suffering as excluded from the definition, the solutions on how to include more aspects of suffering might be too intangible to be sustainable within the context of international law. One of the theorists however, Talal Asad, makes an appealing effort by introducing a paragraph of consent within the definition of torture. A paragraph of consent makes it, according to him, easier to account for emotional experiences of suffering. At the same time it makes it possible to exercise self-selected suffering (such as religious rituals and certain sexual preferences) between two or more consenting adults, without them being stigmatized within the discourse of suffering. By introducing the paragraph of consent and the elimination of the word “cruel” (because of its tendency of being linked to racializing factors) from the definition, Asad's  argumentation points out a way to possibly improve the prohibition to include more aspects of suffering.

This essay studies the implicit and explicit perspectives of Bruce Lincoln, Jürgen Habermas, Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Charles Taylor, José Casanova and their approach to secularism as a phenomenon. This is done by categorizing them into three categories. The categories,enlightenment-centered theorists, critical theorists and implicit-theological theorists, all have explicit accounts and implicit forms of reasoning that shape and contextualize their respective approach. The Enlightenment-centered theorists tend to regard secularism as a neutral and peace-keeping statecraft. This approach implicitly contains the idea of a clear division between secular and religious. This implicit form of reasoning I argue is problematically non-reflexive to the theorist’s own standpoint and risks becoming a form of secular ideology. The theorists categorized as critical theorists view secularism more as a type of discourse where what is seen as religious and the secular is inherently fluid. This is then analyzed by them as a special strategy for Western sovereignty. The perspective of the implicit-theological theorists is similar both to the Enlightenment-centered and the criticaltheorists' perspective in that secularism is primarily peace-keeping and that the categories are often fluid. I show that their approach contains theological assumptions that religion responds to a realm which challenges the immanent world. In the last chapter of the essay, I give a normative evaluation of the three approaches to secularism where I argue that while the enlightenment-centered theorists have useful explanatory models, the critical and to a lesser extent implicit-theological approach to secularism are more fruitful for religious studies. They allow for more flexibility in studying the relationship between secular and religious groups as they do not determine the categories in advance. The essay also contains a concluding discussion on the type of problems for philosophy of science and religious studies that arise when secularism and what is seen as the secular is deconstructed.

This dissertation analyses the use of the word “religion” in Canadian law and theorises the consequences of its use for the legal protection of religious movements in Canada. Chapter One establishes the problems of the word “religion” in academic discourse by providing an overview of work in the field of critical religion. This dissertation considers whether the critiques of the term “religion” by scholars working within critical religion are equally relevant when considering the role of religion in human rights law. Chapter Two turns an investigative eye toward Canadian case law using the word “religion”, from Chaput v Romain (1959) to Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony (2009). The analysis highlights how the use of “religion” in Canadian law does indeed reflect academic concerns. Chapter Three uses queer theory to speculate the consequences of an unstable concept of religion for the protection of religious freedom, especially as it pertains to new religious movements. Judith Butler’s notions of performativity and drag are applied to theorise the performance of “religion” and its outcomes. Some suggestions for how to proceed conclude the dissertation.

This dissertation analyses the use of the word “religion” in Canadian law and theorises the consequences of its use for the legal protection of religious movements in Canada. Chapter One establishes the problems of the word “religion” in academic discourse by providing an overview of work in the field of critical religion. This dissertation considers whether the critiques of the term “religion” by scholars working within critical religion are equally relevant when considering the role of religion in human rights law. Chapter Two turns an investigative eye toward Canadian case law using the word “religion”, from Chaput v Romain (1959) to Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony (2009). The analysis highlights how the use of “religion” in Canadian law does indeed reflect academic concerns. Chapter Three uses queer theory to speculate the consequences of an unstable concept of religion for the protection of religious freedom, especially as it pertains to new religious movements. Judith Butler’s notions of performativity and drag are applied to theorise the performance of “religion” and its outcomes. Some suggestions for how to proceed conclude the dissertation.