Depuis l'enchâssement constitutionnel de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, le contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité subit d'importantes critiques. Pour contester la légitimité démocratique de ce contrôle, des politologues et des juristes invoquent notamment le fait que les juges ne sont pas élus, qu'ils ne représentent pas la population, alors qu'ils imposent leurs préférences et leurs interprétations aux législateurs et gouvernements. En réponse à ces critiques, des théories de la légitimité de la justice constitutionnelle ont été élaborées. Ce débat doctrinal influence la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada, ce qui se traduit par l'élaboration de différentes normes de contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité. Ce choix entre l'activisme et la retenue judiciaires est déterminant dans le résultat d'un contrôle constitutionnel sous la Charte. Alors que les critiques du contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité témoignent d'une conceptualisation insuffisante du jugement juridique, les attitudes de retenue et d'activisme semblent également problématiques au plan philosophique et théorique. Devant cette situation, la justice constitutionnelle doit être placée dans la perspective de la démocratie délibérative. Il est de plus possible de préciser la fonction du contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité dans un système juridique. Se renouvelle ainsi l'explication des opérations d'interprétation et de limitation des droits et libertés ainsi que celles de sanction et de réparation en cas de violation. En adoptant une dimension contextuelle et systémique, le contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité prend la forme d'une institutionnalisation de la critique interne du système juridique et sert ainsi d'instance d'autoreproduction du droit. / Judicial review has been the object of substantial criticism since the enshrinement of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms. Political scientists and lawyers have contested the democratic legitimacy of judicial review by notably invoking that although judges are not elected and do not represent the population, they nevertheless impose their preferences and interpretations on legislators and governments alike. In response to this criticism, theories have been developed addressing the legitimacy of constitutional justice. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada has been influenced by this ideological debate, which has in turn, established different norms ofjudicial review. The choice between judicial activism and restraint is a determining factor resulting in judicial review under the Charter. While the criticisms ofjudicial review suffer from an inadequate conceptualization of legal judgment, attitudes of judicial restraint and activism seem equally problematic with respect to theoretical and philosophical issues. Under these circumstances, constitutional justice must be considered from the perspective of deliberative democracy. Moreover, it is possible to specify the function ofjudicial review within a legal system. This can generate renewed understanding of the approaches to interpretation and limitation of rights and freedoms, as well those applying to sanctions and reparation in case of a violation. The adoption of a contextual and systemic approach institutionalizes judicial review as an internaI review of the legal system and thus serves as an authority for the self-reproduction of the law. / "Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de doctorat en droit (LL.D.)"

Proportionality review has become a common and expected legal test to determine the limits of rights under Canadian Charter adjudication. Section 2(a) of the Charter, which provides for freedom of religion, is one tool for people of cultural diversity to challenge the social order with their own nomoi. In this thesis I look at the freedom of religion cases that have been decided under section 1, thus also through proportionality analysis for how the proportionality test engages the democratic voice of persons of religious diversity. I argue that while the proportionality test is intended to recognize the democratic voice of diversity the reasoning structure of the test as usually utilized does not facilitate the processes of communication necessary to respectfully engage the voice of religious diversity and results in societal fragmentation. There are however, two recent cases that exemplify a very different and significantly new form of reasoning under the language of the proportionality test. I argue that these forms of proportionality analysis represent a form of deliberative or practical reason in which the nomoi of religious persons is recognized as of equal value as legislative nomoi and where political conflicts might be resolved not solely on the basis of power, but through the construction of shared histories that facilitate creating shared nomoi.

The idea that Canada was transformed into a "constitutional democracy" in 1982 is widely believed by the public, yet rarely examined in academic literature. This article identifies what it calls a "theory of Constitutional democracy" and then applies it to a test case, the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions on the equality claims of lesbians and gay men. It concludes that if the public expected such a transition, it has yet to be made.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Depuis le 20 janvier 2002, la République du Congo s'est dotée d'une nouvelle Constitution. Ce quatrième texte fondamental depuis l'avènement de la démocratie en 1990 avait un double objectif : rompre avec le modèle constitutionnel français consacré par la Constitution de mars 1992 qui instaurait un régime semi-présidentiel et restaurer l'autorité de l'Etat affaiblie par les années de guerre civile. C’est donc finalement un régime de type présidentiel qui est mis en place. À cet égard, l'article 114 de la Constitution de 2002 déclare : « le Président de la République ne peut dissoudre l'Assemblée nationale. L’Assemblée nationale ne peut démettre le Président de la République ». Mais la comparaison avec le régime américain s'arrête là. Car le Président, au Congo, dispose d'une suprématie non conforme au principe d'équilibre des pouvoirs connu aux Etats-Unis et, surtout, n'encourt aucun risque de destitution. En définitive, le dispositif mis en place est plus proche d'une architecture des pouvoirs issue de la Constitution russe de 1993 et au présidentialisme latino-américain. Trois facteurs expliquent cette convergence : d'abord, l’objectif du texte fondamental adopté en 2002 était bien la consécration constitutionnelle de la victoire militaire de 1997. Cette réalité rapproche la Constitution congolaise de la Constitution russe adoptée à la suite de la « décommunisation » lors de la chute du Mur de Berlin. Ensuite, les constituants entendaient reproduire la culture bantoue dans le marbre juridique, en consacrant la suprématie du chef. Une telle approche est similaire à l’influence culturelle bolivar dans le présidentialisme latino-américain. Enfin, la nécessité de contenter la communauté internationale a conduit à l’adoption d’un texte fondamentalement libéral avec une pratique foncièrement autoritaire. Finalement, seule une instrumentalisation de la Communauté internationale peut expliquer le paradoxe du régime constitutionnel congolais. / Since the 20th of January 2002, the Republic of Congo has adopted a new constitution. This fourth fundamental text since the advent of democracy in 1990 has two objectives : to depart from the French constitutional model enshrined in the constitution of March 1992 which established a semi- presidential system and to restore the authority of the state that had be shaken and weakened by years of civil war. The new constitution opted for a presidential system. In this regard , Article 114 of the 2002 constitution states that " the President of the Republic may dissolve the National Assembly. The National Assembly cannot impeach the President of the Republic. " This is the only commun feature the system has with that of the United States. In the Republic of Congo, the President is not subject to the principle of checks and balances as in the case of United States and, especially, runs no risk of impeachment. In the end, the system in place is closer to the Russian architecture of powers and the Latin American presidentialism. Three factors explain this convergence : firstly, the fundamental objective of the text adopted in 2002 was indeed the constitutional enshrinement of the military victory of 1997. This reality takes the Congolese Constitution a step towards the Russian Constitution adopted after the " decommunisation " following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Then, the constituent Assembly had the intention to reproduce the Bantu culture in the legal marble, establishing the supremacy of the leader. Such an approach is similar to the bolivian cultural influence in the Latin American presidentialism. Secondly, the need to satisfy the international community led to the adoption of a fundamentally liberal text with inherent authoritarian practice. Finally, manipulation by the international community is the only plausible explanation to the paradox of the Congolese constitutional regime.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD (Education) / The National Policy Framework for Teacher Education and Development in South Africa of 2006 (NPF) outlines seven principles which underpin this policy as expressed in the Norms and Standards for Educators (2000). These principles require a teacher to be: a specialist in a particular learning area, subject or phase; a specialist in teaching, learning and assessment; a curriculum developer; a leader, administrator and manager; a scholar and lifelong learner; and a professional who plays a role in community development, citizenship education, and pastoral care. Beginner teachers have difficulty adapting to these new roles as they have not had efficient exposure to the actual, often harsh realities of the classroom situation as it unfolds on a daily basis. A qualitative research approach is employed in the research study to explore beginner teachers' perceptions of school support to enhance their capability sets in relation to teacher education policy. Generally, a qualitative study lends itself to developing an understanding of a particular phenomenon of interest without formulating a hypothesis. In this explorative study, the investigation was underpinned by the elements of Amartya Sen's Capability Approach which include "Freedoms", "Unfreedoms", "Capabilities" and "Functionings" (Sen 1992). These elements were used to understand the nature of beginner teachers' competences and the impact of policy on their performance. In this regard, the achievement of quality learning outcomes concerning the basic competences of beginner teachers could be linked to Sen's vision for reaching achieved functionings (those valuable activities and situations that make up a person's well-being, which is also referred to as that which a person ultimately manages "to be and to do").

Présidé par la Cour Suprême, le système judiciaire Libyen est caractérisé par le principe de l'unité de la justice qui n’a pas impliqué la création de tribunaux administratifs parallèlement aux tribunaux civils. La Cour exerce ses fonctions à travers ses Chambres «constitutionnelles, administratives, civiles, pénales et du statut personnel». Ainsi, l'approche libérale de cette Cour est fondée sur les principes de la justice, de l'égalité et de la liberté. S'il apparait que l'action principale de Cour Suprême est limitée dans ses pouvoirs et sa compétence, il s'avère qu'elle tend vers un élargissement progressif de sa capacité à protéger les droits individuels. Celui-ci se manifeste à travers le jugement obligatoire sur l’inconstitutionnalité des lois ou règlements qui s’opposent aux documents constitutionnels Libyens durant toutes les périodes ( Monarchie, Jamahiriya et transition). / Headed by the Supreme Court, the Libyan judicial system is based on the principle of the unity of justice, which does not involve the establishment of administrative courts alongside civil courts. The Court exercises its functions through its constituencies (constitutional, administrative, civil, criminal and personal). Thus, the liberal approach of this court is based on the principles of justice, equality and freedom. While the main procedure of the Supreme Court appears to be limited in its powers and jurisdiction, it appears to tend to gradually expand its ability to protect individual rights. This is reflected in its binding provisions on the unconstitutionality of laws or regulations that oppose Libyan constitutional documents during all periods (monarchy, mass, and transition).

La question des droits de l’homme et des libertés a suscité un intérêt majeur en Libye depuis l’accès à l’indépendance de ce pays en 1951. La Déclaration constitutionnelle, proclamée le 3 août 2011 dans le sillage du ‘‘printemps arabe’’, a ouvert de nouvelles perspectives pour définir la nature d’un nouvel État post-Kadhafi, voulu démocratique et respectueux des droits de l’homme. En effet, le nouveau texte affiche clairement sa reconnaissance des droits et des libertés qu’il compte promouvoir au niveau national et international. Le constituant libyen a choisi de doter l’ensemble de ces droits et libertés d’une valeur supérieure en les inscrivant dans le corps de la Constitution. Cette valeur les met hors de toute atteinte pouvant provenir des pouvoirs publics. Les particuliers peuvent, en cas de transgression, les défendre devant les juridictions nationales. C’est dire que la Déclaration libyenne ne se satisfait pas seulement de reconnaître les droits et les libertés au plan interne. En effet, ces droits et libertés seraient vains s’ils n’avaient pas été complétés par des garanties effectives qui leur assurent un respect total en cas de violation. Ces mesures se résument principalement, quant aux garanties juridictionnelles, dans l’accès au juge et, quant aux garanties non juridictionnelles, dans l’indépendance de l’autorité judiciaire et des juges. / Since its independence in 1951 Libya has given great priority to human rights and freedoms. The Constitutional Declaration proclaimed, on August 3, 2011 following the “Arab Spring”, opened new horizons while laying the foundations for a new democratic state respectful of human rights beyond the Gaddafi era. Indeed, the Constitutional Declaration is specific about the kinds of rights and freedom the new Libyan state would like to support both nationally and internationally. Such rights and freedoms were embedded within the Constitutional Declaration and prioritized in order to protect them from any abuses by the different executive government branches. This means that individual citizens are constitutionally enabled to seek judiciary protection before local courts whenever their rights are infringed or abused. Rights and freedoms are meaningless unless constitutionally protected and supported through providing for non-judiciary guarantees centered on judiciary independence both as process and practitioners i.e. impartiality of judges.

Magister Educationis - Med / Since the dawn of democracy, the South African government has set up different measures to improve education in schools, inter alia the provision of funding, resources, feeding schemes and the introduction and amendment to different curricula. The current education policy, the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS), was adopted in 2012 following three other consecutive education policies that had not delivered to the desired standard in terms of educational outcome. This study focuses on the perceptions of teachers in terms of their freedom to pursue the aims of CAPS in low-income school communities. The teachers' perceptions and freedoms were explored and analyzed using the Capabilities Approach (CA) authored by Amartya Sen which forefronts the capabilities (the ability to achieve) and the functionings (real achievements). Teachers' perceptions were therefore explored and analyzed in terms of freedoms and unfreedoms they enjoy and face in the process of transferring the knowledge to learners. The thesis studied and analyzed the capabilities and perceptions of teachers in terms of their real freedoms through the deconstruction of their experiences.

Notre projet de thèse suggère une lecture juridique, politique et sociale d'un conflit entre deux droits fondamentaux culturels. Plusieurs controverses existent aujourd'hui dans le monde occidental, dont l'objectif serait la légitimation éventuelle des restrictions de la liberté d'expression, et la liberté de l'art en particulier, au nom de la protection des croyances religieuses. Nous pourrions constater en effet un certain « paroxysme », qui aboutit, en dernier essor, à un conflit juridique, voire, un conflit réel. Au plan international, les premières indications de ce conflit apparussent peu ou prou au même époque que la controverse autour les « Versets sataniques » de Salman Rushdie. Quinze ans après, déclencha une autre « crise mondiale »: l'affaire des caricatures danoises, suivie, jusqu'aujourd'hui, par des dizaines de résolution du Conseil des droits de l'Homme et de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur la diffamation des religions. Si l'on associe ce prétendu ‘conflit de valeurs' aux répercussions des attaques du 11 septembre et de la guerre contre le terrorisme, ainsi qu'aux politiques de discrimination constante à l'encontre des immigrés et les requérants d'asile en Europe, ou encore à la théorie de Huntington qui prône un supposé « conflit de civilisations », nous comprenons bien que la discussion est loin de concerner uniquement la liberté d'expression, ni, a fortiori, la liberté de l'art. Notre but est de proposer des approches « alternatives » aux conflits de droits, basées sur l'analyse des valeurs qui sont en jeu, et ciblant plutôt à la prévention de tels « conflits culturels », qu'à leur résolution formelle en faveur d'un droit ou d'un autre. / Our thesis project suggests suggests a legal, political and social reading of a conflict between two fundamental cultural rights. Several controversies exist today in the west world claiming the eventual legitimacy of the restrictions on artistic freedom, in the name of the protection of religious beliefs. We could even observe a certain ‘paroxysm' on this matter, which ends up at a legal, and virtually a real, conflict. From an international law point of view, the first indications of this kind of conflict appeared more or less during the notorious controversy around Salman Rushdie's ‘Satanic Verses”. Fifteen years later, in 2004, another ‘global crisis' appears: that of the Danish cartoons, followed by several resolutions on the subject of defamation of religions, issued by the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. Associating this supposed “conflict of values” with the impact of 9/11 and the war against terrorism, as well as the discrimination politics against immigrants and asylum seekers in Europe, or even Huntington's theory concerning a pretended ‘conflict of civilisations', we realize that this ‘conflict' is not a matter concerning exclusively freedom of expression(FoE), and certainly not the freedom of the arts. Our aim is to propose alternative methods of conflict resolution techniques, based on the analysis of the values at stake and focusing on the prevention of such « cultural conflicts », rather then on their resolution, in favour of one right or the other.