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11	Ett år med MiFID II : Fondförvaltare och aktieanalytikers upplevelser av direktivets följder / One year with MiFID II : Fund managers and equity analysts view on the aftermath of the regulation Pham, Julia, Zuber, Caroline January 2019 (has links) Background: On January 3, 2018, the discussed MiFID II directive was implemented. The proponents argue that MiFID II increases transparency and benefits the end customers. The critics argue that smaller players are driven out from the market and that companies lose coverage. Although a year has passed, there are few studies on how financial players perceive the effects and how research, that in theory contributes to reduce information asymmetry on the financial market, is affected. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of how the Buy and Sell side of equity analysis experience the aftermath of MiFID II one year after the implementation, and what continued impact the directive is expected to have in the long run. This study will more specifically study how equity research, operations, the market and its players got effected by MiFID II. Method: In order to answer the purpose of this study a qualitative method is being used. Moreover, the study has an abductive approach and a case study design in which eight semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to answer the research questions and capture the phenomenological perspective. Conclusion: The study shows that the biggest change that the Buy and Sell side observe MiFID II has had is the unbundling cost of research and execution. This change has led to a decrease in demand, a fall in prices and a decrease in the overall quality of analyzes. The Buy side has reduced the number of counterparties, while the Sell side experienced reduced revenues. / Bakgrund Den 3 januari 2018 infördes det omdiskuterade MiFID II direktivet. Förespråkarna menar att MiFID II ökar transparensen och gynnar slutkunderna. Kritikerna menar att mindre aktörer slås ut och att bolag tappar bevakning. Trots att ett år passerat finns få studier av hur finansiella aktörer såsom fondförvaltare och aktieanalytiker upplever MiFID II:s följder, samt hur aktieanalyser, som i teorin bidrar till att minska informationsasymmetrin på den finansiella marknaden, påverkats. Syfte Syftet med denna studie är att öka förståelsen för hur köp- och säljsidan av aktieanalyser aktieanalyser upplever att MiFID II har haft för följder ett år efter implementeringen, samt hur MiFID II förväntas ha för fortsatt påverkan på sikt. Mer specifikt ämnar studien att undersöka hur verksamheten, marknaden, aktörerna och aktieanalyser påverkats. Metod För att besvara studiens syfte används en kvalitativ metod. Vidare har studien en abduktiv ansats och en fallstudiedesign, där åtta semistrukturerade intervjuer genomfördes för att kunna besvara studiens forskningsfrågor och fånga studiens fenomenologiska perspektiv. Slutsats Studien visar att den största förändringen som respondenterna på köp- och säljsidan upplever att MiFID II haft är uppdelningen av kostnaden för analys och exekvering. Denna förändring har bland annat lett till att efterfrågan minskat, priset sjunkit och den generella kvalitén på analyserna minskat. Köpsidan har dragit ned på antal parter och säljsidan upplever problem medminskade intäkter. MiFID II transparency efficient market principal-agent model information asymmetry research analyst fund manager equity research MiFID II transparens effektiv marknad principal-agentteorin informationsasymmetri aktieanalytiker fondförvaltare aktieanalyser Business Administration Företagsekonomi
12	La régulation des gestionnaires de hedge funds en droit européen et américain : Enjeux et perspectives. Une étude comparée des régimes juridiques issus de la directive AIFM et du Dodd Franck Act / The regulation of hedge fund advisers under EU and US laws : Challenges and perspectives. An analysis of financial regulation through the prism of the AIFM Directive and the Dodd Franck Act Rivière, Anne 23 June 2017 (has links) Plusieurs trillions de dollars d’actifs sous gestion : tel est le poids de l’industrie des hedge funds dans le système financier. Acteurs indispensables des marchés, les hedge funds sont pourtant des créatures méconnues. Réservés aux investisseurs professionnels ou qualifiés, ils ont longtemps tiré partie d’exemptions et échappé à une trop forte contrainte réglementaire. La crise financière de 2008 a bouleversé ce schéma et fait apparaître, en Europe et aux États-Unis, une même volonté d’encadrer davantage ces structures, par le biais de leurs gestionnaires. Aussi cette étude propose-t-elle une analyse comparée des dispositions introduites en la matière par la directive AIFM et par le Dodd Frank Act. Après un nécessaire éclairage sur cette industrie de l’ombre, elle examine les apports des deux textes, les confronte avant d’en dégager forces et faiblesses. Le traumatisme de la crise a fait émerger un double impératif : mieux protéger les investisseurs et prévenir le risque systémique. C’est à la lumière de ces deux objectifs que la seconde partie s’attarde sur le bien-fondé des réformes, leur portée réelle ainsi que leurs limites. Cette vue d’ensemble de la régulation applicable aux gestionnaires de hedge funds est également prétexte à une réflexion plus large sur la régulation financière, ses finalités, ses contours et ses défis. Nous concluons sur une feuille de route pour un acte II de la directive AIFM et formulons plusieurs propositions, en particulier l’interdiction totale de commercialisation auprès d’investisseurs de détail et la création d’une base de données mondiale du risque systémique. / The hedge fund industry manages several trillion dollars in assets. Though they are key players of the financial system, hedge funds remain mysterious creatures. Available only to professional or qualified investors, they managed, for a long time, to take advantage of exemptions and to avoid a heavy regulatory burden. The 2008 financial crisis profoundly changed perspectives and led the European Union and the United States to introduce new regulations targeting hedge funds, through their managers and advisers. This study is a comparative analysis of such regulations, brought about by the AIFM Directive and the Dodd Frank Act. After a brief overview of the industry, both texts are examined and compared so as to identify their respective strengths and weaknesses. Two imperatives emerged out of the crisis: increasing investor protection and preventing systemic risk. In light of these two objectives, part II discusses the validity of the reforms, their scope and their limits. This extensive analysis of hedge fund regulation also leads to broader remarks on financial regulation, its aims, contours and challenges. Finally, a roadmap for a revised version of the AIFM Directive is proposed and concrete measures are suggested, such as the total prohibition of marketing to retail investors and the creation of a global database of systemic risk. Hedge fund Gestionnaire de FIA AIFM Dodd Frank Act Régulation financière Private fund adviser Risque systémique Protection des investisseurs Harmonisation Convergence Crise financière Effet de levier Agrément Passeport européen Dépositaire Compliance Reporting Supervision Base de données SEC ESMA France Italie États-Unis Hedge fund Alternative investment fund manager AIFM Dodd Frank Act Financial regulation Private fund adviser Systemic risk Investor protection Harmonization Convergence Financial crisis Leverage EU passport Depositary Compliance Reporting Supervision Database SEC ESMA France Italy United States
13	Development Finance Institutions’ Effect on The Fund Manager’s Investment Decisions : Balancing Financial Performance Goals and Development Impact Objectives Adolfssson, Alexander, Åström, Marie January 2016 (has links) Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have played a crucial role in moving socially responsibility considerations up on the private equity industry’s agenda. DFIs add a development impact criterion to traditional financial performance goals in the investment industry and play a catalytic role by mobilizing other investors. The gap in research regarding DFIs implications and significance in the investment community from a SRI perspective is evident. The development impact objective introduced by the DFIs is examined to understand its effects on fund managers’ decision-making and if it exists a trade-off between this objective and financial performance. An understanding of how DFIs control fund managers to act in accordance to their objective as well as how they determine compensation schemes to incentivize them to pursue high return on investments, is discussed in relation to the agency theory. Furthermore, stakeholder/shareholder consideration is examined in relation to the subject. The aim of this study is to examine how the behavior of fund managers is affected by the involvement of a DFI investor and try to add to the understanding of their significance as institutional investors in developing markets. Previous studies have been more focused on determining the financial performance of socially responsible investments by using very similar quantitative data collection methods. This thesis undertakes an in-depth approach with the purpose to understand the fund manager’s drives as well as how a DFI involvement affects the behavior and decision-making process. This thesis undertook a qualitative research strategy and semi-structured interviews were used as the tool to understand the fund managers’ personals beliefs and perceptions of how the relationship with DFIs affect them. The selection criteria for the fund managers was that they needed to work in a fund in which a DFIs has invested. We also included DFI investors in order to understand their point of view. The interview was recorded, transcribed and later divided into themes in accordance with the thematic approach, following six steps. Our findings show that Development Finance Institutions plays an important role in emerging markets and affect fund manager behavior to a certain extent. They did not perceive a trade-off between financial performance goals and development impact objectives. We conclude that DFIs increase fund manager focus on ESG/SEE elements in the investment process. DFIs requirements and reporting obligations is used as a tool to ensure that the fund manager act in accordance to DFI objective. The fund managers were neither willing to sacrifice commercial return in favor of development impact. Lastly, the interest among the DFIs and commercial investors is fairly similar, hence reducing the conflict of interest between investors. DFI Development Finance Institutions MDFI SEE SRI Socially Responsible Invesments CSR NGO SIDA DEG FM SME Multiplier Effect Agent Theory Stakeholder Theory Qualitative Subjectivism Objectivism Postitivsm Intepretivism Investment Behavior Standard Asset Pricing Model ESG Sin Industries Principle-agent Theory Positivist Agent Thoery Agent Conflict Incentives Investment Behvaior Optimal contracts Descriptive Stakeholder Thoery Convergent Stakeholder Theory Stakeholder Shareholder Financial Performance Development Impact Hands-off model Direct-involvement model Affirmative Behavior Aviodance Behavior Tripple Bottom Line Agent Principle Control Fund Manager Business Administration Företagsekonomi

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Ett år med MiFID II : Fondförvaltare och aktieanalytikers upplevelser av direktivets följder / One year with MiFID II : Fund managers and equity analysts view on the aftermath of the regulation

Development Finance Institutions’ Effect on The Fund Manager’s Investment Decisions : Balancing Financial Performance Goals and Development Impact Objectives