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We begin with an account of the Prime Mover argument. This originated in the "laws" of Plato, where it is argued that a self-moving mover must exist as source of other motions, and that it must be a kind of soul. In Aristotle this Prime Mover is not itself moved, and elaborate proofs of its existence are offered in the "Physics": all motion requires a mover, and the series cannot go on to infinity, but must end in one or more unmoved movers. His proofs, however, were far from watertight, and later Peripatetics like Theophrastus and Strato rejected them. The argument reappeared in Proclus, but only as subsidiary to a First Cause argument; moreover,the Prime Mover is only the second member of the Neoplatonic "trinity". John Philoponus' theory of "impetus" should have undermined the argument, but in fact did not, and it continued to be used by the Arabs (despite criticism by Avicenna) and the Jews (notably Maimonides). It was taken over by the Christian scholastics like Aquinas. But criticism also continued, especially from Algaael in Islam and by Ockham and his followers in Christendom, and a detailed refutation was offered by the Jew Crescas. The arrival of non-Aristotelian physics was fatal to the argument; it is indeed still defended occasionally by neo-Scholastic philosophers, but none of their defences is adequate. Outside Scholasticism it has few supporters, though Samuel Clarke used it for the Platonic purpose of pointing out an analogy between the Prime Mover and mind, Lotze, however, advanced a quite different kind of argument, but based, like the Platonic and Aristotelian ones, on the existence of change; he argued that change ought always to be internal to that which changes, and hence that the universe must be in some sense a unity. The relationship between this unity and individual things would then be analogous to that between a mind and its states. [Continued in text ...]

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The thesis explores and takes a stand with respect to the differences between the religious epistemologies of Alvin Plantinga and Hendrik Hart. For Plantinga, direct rational knowledge of God "in Himself" is possible because it is grounded in the experience of our rational faculties. For Hart, direct rational knowledge of God's nature is impossible because God transcends the created order and, therefore, the limits of rational understanding. Our knowledge of God, as a consequence, can only be faith knowledge that is decidedly indirect and metaphoric in nature. Plantinga believes that such views are Kantian in inspiration and that they turn our knowledge of God into nothing more than rationally incoherent "disguised nonsense." The thesis shows that Plantinga's own philosophical theology fails to meet the rational standards he sets for religious knowledge, his critique of Kantian religious epistemologies fails to apply to Hart's position, and that he himself allows for indirect knowledge of God in certain instances. The thesis concludes by noting if our knowledge of God can be indirect in some instances without also being rationally incoherent disguised nonsense, then perhaps Hart is not wrong for regarding it to be indirect in all instances.

This study explores how successful Alvin Plantinga is in his contention that belief in God can be obtained and maintained in a basic way that attains and retains rationality for reflective persons. Plantinga indeed calls into question any confident presumption that theistic belief is epistemically irresponsible. He not only seriously challenges the necessity for propositional evidence to be available for such belief to be justified, he also supplies significant support for the conclusion that it remains legitimate even if it faces a preponderance of contrary considerations. However, Plantinga does not convincingly demonstrate that basic theistic belief merits privileged status by virtue of a character sufficiently analogous to paradigmatic perceptual, memory and ascriptive beliefs. Nor does he adequately argue its independence from the bearing of evidentialist concerns, especially regarding its background moorings. He needs to do more work to show the full warrant for theistic belief.

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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Augusine's search for the nature of God's exisistence as well as the origin of evil, reaches a climax in Book 7 of his Confessions. This study assumes the position that Augustine strives to find answers to the above mentioned two questions in the first six books of the Confessions. The answers to both these questions were vitally important to Augustine, since it would then convince him to convert to the Christian faith. Augustine repeatedly thought he grasped the true answer to the existence of God and the origin and the nature of evil but he was disillusioned time and again. His quest for an answer started with his reading of Cicero's Hortentius (Conf. 3.4.7), a book that urged Augustine to search for Truth. Augustine then joined the Manicheans, a sect claiming that their doctrine was based on reason and contained the Truth (Conf. 3.6.10). Augustine believed that the Manicheans could resolve his quest for answers to the existence and nature of both God and evil. The Manichean intellectual and scientific exposition of the cosmos allowed Augustine to imagine God and evil as opposing substances. Eventually, promted by his own intellect, Augustine discovered weaknesses in their theories (Conf. 5.3.3-5.6.10). Augustine's final break with the Manicheans, after nine years as an adherent, came when he heard the sermons of Ambrose of Milan. Not only was Augustine impressed by Ambrose's eloquence but his sermons also embodied an interpretation of Platonism in Christian terms. Augustine's reading of the Neoplatonic books in a Latin translation urged him to turn into himself (Conf. 7.10.16) and search for God there. Once Augustine could pronounce upon the intelligible existence of God, his inquiry into the origin of evil resolved itself (7.12.18). / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Augustinus se soeke na die bestaanswyse van God en die aard en onstaan van die kwaad bereik 'n klimaks in Boek 7 van die Confessiones. In hierdie studie word daar van die standpunt uitgegaan dat Augustinus onder andere in die eerste ses boeke van die Confessiones poog om antwoorde te kry op bogenoemde twee vraagstukke. Antwoorde op beide hierdie vrae was van kardinale belang, aangesien dit Augustinus sou oortuig om hom tot die Christelike geloof te bekeer. Augustinus het herhaaldelik gepoog om die ware antwoorde op die vraag na bestaanwyse van God sowel as die oorsprong en die aard van die kwaad te vind. Hy was egter telke male ontnugter. Augustinus se soeke het begin toe hy in aanraking gekom het met Cicero se Hortensius (Conf. 3.4.7), 'n boek wat Augustinus aangemoedig het om die Waarheid na te jaag. Gevolglik het Augustinus by die Manicheërs aangesluit, aangesien dié sekte geglo het dat hulle leerstellinge gebaseer is op die rede en sodoende die volle waarheid bevat (Cant. 3.6.10). Augustinus het geglo dat die Manicheërs sy soektog na antwoorde op die vraag van God en die kwaad se bestaanswyse kon oplos. Die Manicheërs se intellektuele en wetenskaplike uiteensetting van die kosmos het Augustinus toegelaat om God en die kwaad as teenstrydige entiteite te beskou. Ongeveer nege jaar na sy aansluiting by die Manicheërs, aangemoedig deur sy eie intellek, het Augustinus die swak punte in die Manichese leerstellinge ontdek (Cant. 5.3.3-5.6.10). Die finale breek met die Manicheërs het gekom toe Augustinus die preke van Ambrosius in Milaan gehoor het. Nie alleen was Augustinus ingenome met Ambrosius se welsprekendheid nie, maar sy preke het ook die interpretasie van Platonisme in Christelike terme beliggaam. Die Neoplatoniese leerstellinge het Augustinus aangemoedig om na homself, in homself te draai (Conf. 7.10.16) en vir God daar te gaan soek. Sodra Augustinus kon verklaar dat God in die vorm van 'n kenbare wese bestaan, het sy soeke na die oorsprong en die aard van die kwaad dit self opgelos (Cant. 7.12.18).

To accomplish the purpose of this thesis an examination of the hermeneutical method expounded by Athanasius will be made. There are three books that comprise Contra Arianos so the progression of this thesis will follow the progression of the stated Athanasian work. This thesis will also review the relevant passages that Athanasius utilizes to present his case for the Eternal Sonship of Jesus Christ. This review will adequately demonstrate the Athanasian Trinitarian concept of eternal, functional subordination of the Son to the Father. The thesis will also review the word ”homoousios” in order to support the conclusions of Contra Arianos. The word ”homoousios” was the term that became the official recognized position of orthodox Christology at the Council of Nicea. The need for such a review arises from the academic concern that the word ”homoousios” may exclude the idea of functional subordination. A review of this word (along with its history) seems appropriate. However, the conclusion (and defense of that conclusion) that will be presented is that homoousios is not mutually incompatible with the idea of ”functional subordination” in a temporal or eternal relationship. This term and concept will adequately demonstrate that an eternal, functional subordination relationship exists between the Father and Son from the Athanasian point of view. Historical and background studies, which will help interpret and clarify cultural meanings, will also be employed to enhance the study of this thesis. Finally, certain conclusions will be presented showing the results of the study. The conclusions will attempt to answer questions that have undoubtedly arisen in the mind of the informed reader of ancient theology and may help identify and even address contemporary issues concerning the Christological and Trinitarian doctrines. / Systematic Theology & Theological Ethics / M. Th. (Theological Studies)