Thesis (D. Litt. et Phil. (History))

This PhD examines the role of British intelligence in Anglo-American relations during the period of American neutrality in the First \Vorld \Var. Unbeknownst to the Americans, British intelligence began to intercept and decrypt virtually all American diplomatic telegrams between Washington and U.S. diplomatic outposts throughout Europe. Although several studies of Anglo-American relations in this period exist, none consider British intelligence's role. Providing an analysis of the relevant cod.es and cryptographical developments during the war, the thesis traces British intelligence's progress in deciphering these various diplomatic codes and offers an analysis of the distribution and use of this intelligence material. Through an exploration of this intelligence aspect, this thesis challenges existing interpretations of British and American policy in this period. A crucial conflict at the heart of British policy-one missed by previous historians-existed over the importance of the United States. Presaging America's international role later in the twentieth centu1y, many of Britain's leaders came to seriously doubt that, without the United States, the war remained winnable at all. Yet these officials contended with a second, powerful faction that remained wedded to outmoded ideas of America's limited relevance on the global stage and that refused to accept the existence of practical limits to British power. This conflict play~ out in several areas of British policy-over diplomatic, military, financial, and political affairs. Intelligence, however, provea a favoured weapon. Intercepted communications, sometimes ripped from their context, caused serious but spurious paranoia that the Americans were collaborating with Germany. Previous scholars, however, by ignoring the weapon, have failed to see the battle. Until it entered the war, American policymakers worked t:u:elessly to achieve a peaceful settlement. Previous historians have entirely dismissed the significance of these efforts, casting them as well-intentioned but futile. In reality, however, those British leaders who understood Britain's dependence on the United States tended to favour these proposals as a useful way of ending an unwinnable war that was bleeding the country d17- This PhD makes a significant contribution to the history of British intelligence, British policy, and American diplomacy during the period of American neutrality during the First World War.

No description available.

This dissertation examines British munitions procurement chronologically from 1914 through early 1916, the period in which Britain's war effort grew to encompass the nation's entire industrial capacity, as well as much of the industrial capacity of the neutral United States. The focus shifts from the political struggle in the British Cabinet between Kitchener and Lloyd George, to Britain's Commercial Agency Agreement with the American banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, and to British and German propaganda in the United States.

British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, Yalta exposes Britain’s impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference. This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes that aligned more favorably to British interests. A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy.

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished