This dissertation studies how organized crime and corruption can penetrate the legal economy. In the first chapter I document the infiltration of organized crime in public procurement auctions in the aftermath of natural disasters. I focus on recent earthquakes that occurred in Italy between 2008 and 2016 and I utilize investigative data on participation in procurement auctions of firms associated with the mafia (in short, "mafia firms''). I show that criminal firms increase their participation in public procurement auctions in emergency-designated municipalities, particularly after relief status is declared over. Emergency status leads to a temporary increase in monitoring efforts, but a permanent positive shock to affected municipalities' reconstruction budgets, thus explaining the lagged effect. Using information on awarding procedures, I show that after the emergency the participation of mafia firms increases only in auctions with minimum discretion, suggesting it is not the result of collusion with local administrators. In Chapter 2, I investigate whether windfalls from natural resources increase corruption and how this varies across countries with different institutions. I utilize leaked information on the beneficiaries of secret offshore entities to construct a measure of malfeasance. I find that countries respond to a rise in the price of the commodities they export with increased incorporation of offshore entities in tax havens. However, such a relationship exists only for autocratic regimes. In Chapter 3, I develop a theoretical model to explain the role of political brokers in mediating clientelistic transactions between parties and voters. Brokers enjoy an informative advantage over parties: they observe the electorate's political preferences as well as their need for a private good (hospital beds) provided by the government. A party hires the broker to make a deal with the voters. The broker insures them against the risk of not receiving the private good when in need (sick) in exchange for their vote. The presence of the broker reduces aggregate welfare if parties focus on the electoral benefits coming from the provision of the private good and thus reduces the amount of public good (schools) below the optimal level. On the other hand welfare increases if private goods are delivered to citizens in need who would have not received them, had the broker not been present.

This paper examines the relevance of tax havens for China by determining which tax havens are important for China and to what extent. Furthermore, the motives for Chinese tax haven activity are analysed and compared to the motives of Western companies that primarily use tax havens for the purpose of tax arbitrage. An analysis of two listed Chinese companies, a private and a state-owned entity (SOE), exemplifies how Chinese businesses incorporate tax havens into their business structure and discusses differences between the motives of private and state-owned companies. The magnitude of tax havens found in the business structures emphasise the importance of tax havens for Chinese companies, irrespective of whether the company is an SOE or private, or conducts its business in China or internationally. While the reasons why the state-influenced company incorporated tax havens into their structure seemed to be related to legitimate business motives, the motives behind the structure of the private company seemed questionable. The assessment furthermore confirms that China’s weak institutional framework and restricting business environment is a major push factor and gives companies plenty of incentive to go offshore. / Die Relevanz von Steueroasen für China

In the past decade, there has been a significant decrease in US corporate tax revenues. Multinational companies have been employing several different techniques of tax avoidance to get around paying corporate taxes. Tax avoidance is used by any large multinational corporation for a variety of reasons. The US has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world and is seeing many companies relocate their operations abroad to lower their tax expenses. The different methods of tax avoidance are discussed in this thesis, as well as the different reasons behind their use. To understand how companies implement tax avoidance techniques, it is necessary to understand US corporate taxes. I have researched the few key items of US corporate taxes, which are vital to understanding the implementation of tax avoidance techniques. Through different examples you will see how tax avoidance occurs and how it benefits multinational companies.

Diplomová práce Ondřej Martínek Abstract Tax havens are thorn in the eye of the OECD countries, nonetheless they emerged originally on europian soil and on the ruins of british empire. Classical accusation argues, the tax havens are supposed to earn on luring foreign capital that is enabled to evade taxation and by that they breach the balance of national budgets and tax justice in developed countries, enwiden social imbalance and speed up global tax competition. There are many forms of tax avoidance via tax havens: transfer pricing, holding structures, trusts, foundations or offshore business. Although many of these forms remain illegal, for certain other ones the states are the ones responsible for - e.g. generous web of double tax treaties. Global shortage to national budgets is estimated at around 3% of total revenues. Tax competition exists and global tax rates are in fact decreasing, however national tax revenues are, in absolute terms, rising. Because of this ambiguous effect on global economy and near impossibility to distinguish "real" tax havens, the developed countries are choosing rather careful policy to the tax havens and concentrate on negotiations and concluding TIEA's.

Tax havens are of signicant importance in the current global economy. The wealth hidden in these havens is estimated to add up to $6000 billion and this issue is linked with wealth inequality and money laundering. Identication of tax havens differs between sources, and blacklists are often politicised. Activists, experts and academics have claimed recently that the US serves as a tax haven for foreign tax-evading households. The tax environment in the US does favor foreigners; they are for example exempt from paying taxes on interest income generated by bank deposits and it is easy to set up entities hiding the identity of the ultimate owner. The effects of two international initiatives implemented to battle tax evasion in offshore centres are studied in this paper. These are the European Savings Directive and the Common Reporting Standard, under which the US does not cooperate. Using bilateral cross-border bank deposit data, it is estimated whether tax evaders moved their wealth to the US as a result of these measures. The results of the difference-in-difference approach neither confirm nor reject the claims that the US is being used as a tax haven by foreign households. Estimates on the effects in cooperating tax havens can not rule out the possibility that the Common Reporting Standard did not have its intended effect on tax evaders.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Interdepartmental Program - Political Science / Emizet N. Kisangani / The goal of this dissertation is two-fold. First, is to investigate the relationship between the consequences of state failure and terrorist sanctuaries, which is the prevailing explanation in extant literature. Post 9/11 United States counterterrorism policy has focused on the role of the state in providing safe haven or sanctuary to transnational terrorist organizations. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that both weak and strong states host terrorist sanctuaries. Thus, no clear explanation for why transnational terrorist sanctuaries are in some weak and strong states but not present in others currently exists. Second, this dissertation seeks to fill this gap by adopting Migdal’s (1988) state-society interaction approach to explain the presence of terrorist sanctuaries. This dissertation hypothesizes that the role of society’s structure and societal strongmen’s interactions with the state are an important determinant in whether or not transnational terrorist organizations will seek to establish safe haven within a given territory. Sageman’s (2008) hub and node approach on the operational capacities of transnational terrorist sanctuary networks helps to explain differences in types of sanctuaries. Using a newly constructed dataset on terrorist sanctuaries for quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis through case studies, this dissertation intends to show that the presence of terrorist sanctuaries in both weak and strong states can be understood through four state-society interaction typologies. The implications of this study are relevant for policymakers seeking to understand and counter the enduring threat of transnational terrorism across the globe.

Submitted by Luanna Matias (lua_matias@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-02-03T20:52:54Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissetação - Márcio Roberto da Costa Barbosa - 2014.pdf: 900808 bytes, checksum: f26a3a2e63584d0fe4cd10d0dd6747ea (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-02-04T14:02:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissetação - Márcio Roberto da Costa Barbosa - 2014.pdf: 900808 bytes, checksum: f26a3a2e63584d0fe4cd10d0dd6747ea (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-04T14:02:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissetação - Márcio Roberto da Costa Barbosa - 2014.pdf: 900808 bytes, checksum: f26a3a2e63584d0fe4cd10d0dd6747ea (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-05 / Uruguay, previously known as the “South American Switzerland”, adopted the tax haven model. Nevertheless, with the Tax Reform (Law No. 18.083) passed in 2007, the country abandoned this model. The question that this paper aims to answer is the reason for the political decision taken by the country to stop being a tax haven. The hypothesis raised for this investigation was subdivided in two planes. Externally, the scenario was one of version to tax havens and the pressure exerted over them. Internally, the motive would be the difficulty of establishing compatibility between a leftist government and a tax haven model. It was exactly when a political party with this ideology came into power that the reform was accomplished. This case study used documents as supporting data. The theory that erved as basis for this analysis is found on the work An Economic Theory of Democracy, by Anthony Downs and such theory was in part confirmed empirically. Regarding the ypothesis, and taking into consideration the international standpoint, an adverse nternational scenario served as confirmation of the country‟s decision. The same cannot be said about the internal scenario, in which the issue of ideology was not shown to be a determining factor for the decision which is the object of this study. / O Uruguai, antes conhecido como a “Suíça sul-americana”, adotava o modelo de paraíso fiscal. Não obstante, com a Reforma Tributária (Lei nº 18.083) aprovada em 2007, este modelo foi abandonado. A pergunta que este trabalho visa responder é sobre a motivação da decisão política uruguaia de deixar de ser um paraíso fiscal. A hipótese levantada se subdividiu em dois planos que teriam contribuído para a mudança institucional. Externamente, havia um cenário de grande aversão aos paraísos fiscais e pressão sobre os mesmos. Internamente, a motivação seria a difícil compatibilização entre um governo de esquerda e o modelo de paraíso fiscal. Foi justamente quando um partido com esta ideologia chegou ao poder que a reforma foi levada a cabo. O método utilizado é o estudo de caso e a fonte de dados empregada é a documental. Teoricamente, a presente pesquisa se ampara na obra Uma Teoria Econômica da Democracia, de Anthony Downs. A teoria utilizada parcialmente se confirmou empiricamente. Em relação à hipótese, no que se refere ao prisma internacional, houve a confirmação, com a influência de um cenário externo adverso. O mesmo não se pode dizer do prisma interno, no qual a questão da ideologia não se mostrou determinante para a decisão analisada.

Si la notion de pays à fiscalité privilégiée est souvent employée, il reste malaisé de définir ce qu'elle désigne. Au sens le plus général, il s'agit des pays dans lesquels des résidents étrangers placent leur argent, afin d'éviter d'être imposés sur leur territoire d'origine. L'histoire des pays à fiscalité privilégiée n'est ni linéaire ni continue. Elle est faite de ruptures et de mutations. Ces territoires off-shore jouent ainsi des rôles économiques et politiques différents selon les époques. Leur évolution a été telle qu'ils sont devenus les piliers de la mondialisation économique contemporaine construite depuis près d'un siècle autour de pays, d'acteurs et de stratégies différentes.Ainsi, les acteurs économiques internationaux profitent, à bien des égards, de l'attractivité de ces territoires. Les outils mis à leur disposition sont nombreux et les montages d'optimisation fiscale complexes. Au cours des derniers siècles, les États ont tenté de maîtriser puis de diminuer le rôle des territoires off-shore, sans une grande conviction, ni une persévérance notable. La crise des subprimes a cependant donné lieu à l'émergence d'une lutte accrue contre les pays à fiscalité privilégiée, notamment, par le G20. L'objectif est de mettre fin à toutes formes de secret à des fins fiscales. Une évolution, est, incontestablement en cours, mais ses résultats sont loin d'être garantis. A ce jour, les pays à fiscalité privilégiée et les outils qui y sont associés demeurent très attractifs pour les acteurs économiques internationaux. / While the concept of tax haven is a term used extensively, it remains difficult to define. It general terms, it refers to countries where foreign companies and individual alike invest their money in order to avoid tax in their home country. The history of tax haven is neither linear nor continuous. It is made of ruptures and mutations. These offshore jurisdictions are playing different economics and politics roles. Their evolution has been such that they have become the pillars of the economic globalization built since a century around different countries, actors and strategies. International economic actors benefit in many ways from the attractiveness of tax havens. International companies, individuals and banks use offshore tax haven to reduce their tax burden, avoid regulatory pressures, or hide a high level of debts in order to provide supposedly healthy financial statements. Many and complex tools are available to them in order to lower their burden. Evolution is undoubtedly underway but the results are far from guaranteed. Until now, tax havens remain attractive for international economic actors.

This thesis focuses on the effects tax havens have on both developed and developing countries. The work is presented in four chapters. The first chapter builds a framework of the subject by focusing on tax havens and the issues they create. A brief history of tax havens is discussed and essential statistics are presented. The second chapter discusses the effects tax havens have on developing countries. The link between transfer pricing and tax havens is also analyzed. The third chapter identifies the effects tax havens have on developed countries and its role in the financial crisis. The last chapter explores the current fight against tax havens and their likely impact in the future.

This work analyses tax-favored areas which are used in international tax planning. The first part of this work contains information about corporate tax in the Czech Republic and characterizes tax havens in general. The second part presents tree states -- The Bahamas, Cyprus and Great Britain and describes an establishment of model society in these countries. The cost of setting up a company and taxation are compared with a fictive limited company which is based in the Czech Republic. In the conclusion, there are some additional information - for instance arrangements against tax havens, tax havens of the world and czech firms in tax havens.