In their pursuit of profits, adventure and new markets, humans have traded since prehistoric times. The relations between trade, profits and technological change, how- ever, were not the main concern of early economists ranging from Aristotle to the mercantilists. Presumably because in their world, the rate of technological change was decidedly low, and the basket and quality of goods available through production and trade did not change much over decades, or even centuries! In addition, it was not the technological change that brought markets closer, but “the ferocity of nomadic horsemen or the edge of a scimitar”, while “violently imposed monopolies and plunder”. (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2003) made trade more profitable. It was not until the industrial revolution that growth rates began to rise to high levels. Now that human inventions and discoveries came faster and cheaper than ever, trade liberalization was not only the way to gain access to new markets; trade liberalization had also a role in promoting growth. Trade liberalization in the form of lower trade costs, increases profits from exporting, and consequently, overall profits. That increases the incentives to innovate, produce something new and export it. Trade liberalization thus promotes technological change by increasing the incentives firms have to conduct R&D, implement the innovation or improvement and make larger profits. The field of economics that studies economic growth as the result of decisions made by profit-maximizing firms is called endogenous growth theory. There have been a number of theoretical advances in endogenous growth theory over the last 20 years, but there is no consensus on whether trade liberalization promotes growth or not. Some models predict that trade liberalization has a positive effect on growth. Other models predict no effect at all. In addition, not all countries have benefited equally from globalization. In this dissertation, I study the linkages between trade liberalization and economic growth (papers one and two). In papers two and three, I also explore the relationships between globalization, growth and the demand for labor. There is well documented evidence from a number of countries, that the demand for less-skilled labor has decreased in recent decades, and this decrease has resulted in a higher skilled-wage premium, that is, the degree in which the wages of skilled workers exceed less-skilled worker wages. This phenomenon has occurred in several countries, including the U.S. The skilled- wage premium has also increased in Europe, although less dramatically. In paper two, the relationships between trade liberalization, growth and wage inequality are analyzed using an endogenous growth model. The third and final paper is an empirical study on the relationships between the demand for labor and offshoring. More specifically, I examine what happens to the demand for different types of labor (not only skilled and unskilled labor) in the Swedish plants of Swedish multinational enterprises, when these multinationals expand abroad. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 2011

In this thesis we analyse a problem of the real economic adjustment between two countries, one of which is an emerging market and the other is a developed economy. When they form a monetary union the only possible adjustment to asymmetric shocks transmitted internationally is through the real variables. We take into account existing asymmetries in the foreign direct investment (FDI) intensity and FDI relations. The issues of FDI and differences in the FDI intensity are real aspects of functioning of economies and relations between them. They reveal some problem from the macroeconomic perspective. However, the problem relates also to microeconomic foundations. The given trade and FDI relations between countries depend on decisions of firms that are heterogeneous. To study the effect of plant delocalization and FDI on output fluctuations between two countries we use a framework that accounts for all this issues, that means dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with heterogeneity in firm productivity. We add a new dimension to the existing literature on DSGE models with heterogeneous firms. First, we complete goods market with a new segment of production, namely products offered by multinationals which produce abroad and export back to their economy of origin. Second, we account for asymmetries in the FDI intensity and differences in production structures that occur between two economies forming a monetary union. Summing things up, the analysis allows us to state that the real aspects of economy functioning, such as trade connections between countries and differences in production structures, determine economic performance and behaviour of economies in terms of output fluctuations.

Subsidising investment in lagging regions is an important regional policy instrument in many countries. Some argue that this instrument is not specific enough to concentrate the aid towards the regions that are lagging behind most, because investment subsidies benefit capital owners who might reside elsewhere, possibly in very rich places. Checking under which conditions this is true is thus highly policy relevant. The present paper studies regional investment subsidies in a multiregional neoclassical dynamic framework. We set up a model with trade in heterogeneous goods, with a perfectly integrated financial capital market and sluggish adjustment of regional capital stocks. Consumers and investors act under perfect foresight. We derive the equilibrium system, show how to solve it, and simulate actual European regional subsidies in computational applications. We find that the size of the welfare gains depends on the portfolio distribution held by the households. If households own diversified asset portfolios, we find that the supported regions gain roughly the amounts that are allocated to them in the form of investment subsidies. If they only own local capital stocks, a part of the money is lost through the drop in share prices. From the point of view of total welfare, the subsidy is not efficient. It can lead to a welfare loss for the EU as a whole and definitely leads to welfare losses in the rest of the world, from where investment ows to the supported EU regions.

Dans cette thèse, nous analysons la question de l’ajustement réel entre des économies de niveau de développement diffèrent au sein d’une union monétaire. Dans ce, les deux économies représentées – une économie développée et une économie émergente – ne peuvent utiliser le taux de change nominal pour s’ajuster à des chocs asymétriques. Pour étudier les conditions de l’ajustement réel entre ces pays, nous prenons en compte les flux d’investissements directs. En effet, ce type d’investissement a profité largement aux économies d’Europe de l’est non membres de le zone euro. Pour étudier cette question, nous utilisons un modèle DSGE (« dynamic stochastic general equilibrium ») permettant de micro fonder les décisions d’investissement direct sur l’hétérogénéité productive des firmes. Nous complétons la littérature existante dans ce domaine en privilégiant deux aspects : (1) les investissements directs peuvent être à la fois des substituts aux importations ou une solution retenue par les firmes pour réduire leurs coûts de production afin de réimporter des biens sur leur marché national et (2) les pays sont traités de manière asymétrique, afin de relier leur niveau de développement aux types de variétiés de biens (non échangeables, exportables, délocalisables). Nous évaluons de quelle manière ces éléments affectent la dynamique des économies à un choc de productivité asymétrique. De manière générale, on observe que les économies vont répondre de manière différente au niveau macroéconomique en fonction de leur structure productive. En résumé l’analyse proposée dans cette thèse montre que des différences structurelles et la possibilité pour les pays de s’engager dans des investissements directs détermine de manière critique la réaction des variables macroéconomiques à des chocs asymétriques. / In this thesis we analyse a problem of the real economic adjustment between two countries, one of which is an emerging market and the other is a developed economy. When they form a monetary union the only possible adjustment to asymmetric shocks transmitted internationally is through the real variables. We take into account existing asymmetries in the foreign direct investment (FDI) intensity and FDI relations. The issues of FDI and differences in the FDI intensity are real aspects of functioning of economies and relations between them. They reveal some problem from the macroeconomic perspective. However, the problem relates also to microeconomic foundations. The given trade and FDI relations between countries depend on decisions of firms that are heterogeneous. To study the effect of plant delocalization and FDI on output fluctuations between two countries we use a framework that accounts for all this issues, that means dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with heterogeneity in firm productivity. We add a new dimension to the existing literature on DSGE models with heterogeneous firms. First, we complete goods market with a new segment of production, namely products offered by multinationals which produce abroad and export back to their economy of origin. Second, we account for asymmetries in the FDI intensity and differences in production structures that occur between two economies forming a monetary union. Summing things up, the analysis allows us to state that the real aspects of economy functioning, such as trade connections between countries and differences in production structures, determine economic performance and behaviour of economies in terms of output fluctuations.

We set up a trade model with heterogeneous firms and a worker population that is heterogeneous in two dimensions: workers are either skilled or unskilled, and within each skill category there is a continuum of abilities. Workers with high abilities, both skilled and unskilled, are matched to firms with high productivities, and this leads to wage differentials within each skill category across firms. Self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting generates an exporter wage premium, and our framework with skilled and unskilled workers allows us to decompose this premium into its skill-specific components. We employ linked employer-employee data from Germany to structurally estimate the parameters of the model. Using these parameter estimates, we compute an average exporter wage premium of 5 percent. The decomposition by skill turns out to be quantitatively highly relevant, with exporting firms paying no wage premium at all to their unskilled workers, while the premium for skilled workers is 12 percent.

Subsidising investment in lagging regions is an important regional policy instrument in many countries. Some argue that this instrument is not specific enough to concentrate the aid towards the regions that are lagging behind most, because investment subsidies benefit capital owners who might reside elsewhere, possibly in very rich places. Checking under which conditions this is true is thus highly policy relevant. The present paper studies regional investment subsidies in a multiregional neoclassical dynamic framework. We set up a model with trade in heterogeneous goods, with a perfectly integrated financial capital market and sluggish adjustment of regional capital stocks. Consumers and investors act under perfect foresight. We derive the equilibrium system, show how to solve it, and simulate actual European regional subsidies in computational applications. We find that the size of the welfare gains depends on the portfolio distribution held by the households. If households own diversified asset portfolios, we find that the supported regions gain roughly the amounts that are allocated to them in the form of investment subsidies. If they only own local capital stocks, a part of the money is lost through the drop in share prices. From the point of view of total welfare, the subsidy is not efficient. It can lead to a welfare loss for the EU as a whole and definitely leads to welfare losses in the rest of the world, from where investment ows to the supported EU regions.