Critics and analysts of religious politics in India have described Hindu nationalism variously over the years: as fascist, fundamentalist, right-wing, jingoist, extremist, and ethnicist. The already large corpus of writing on the ideology and activities of the Hindu nationalists continues still to describe the serious threat of communal thinking to the secular/liberal character of the modern Indian state. What is missing from this discourse, however, is an interrogation of the very concepts on which both critiques of communal politics and defenses of secular-liberalism are based. What does it mean to understand 'fundamentalism' as the cultural 'other' of such liberal virtues as secularism and tolerance? What are the implications of constituting ethnicist movements not merely as obstacles, but as threats to the project of modernity? This dissertation examines first the dominant phraseology of such Indian intellectual critiques, arguing that narratives of ethnicism and extremism are created not only from within, by ethno-nationalist ideologues, but also from without, paradoxically by the very liberal discourses that describe communal threats to secular modernity. Second, by tracing the evolution of feminist activism in Hyderabad, I trace also the processes by which liberal discourses of difference and diversity come to structure activist praxis, making ethnicity the dominant descriptor of social reality, and instituting a 'culture of ethnicism' that implicates both activist-intellectual and ethnicist. Working thus within the frameworks of secular liberalism, and bound by a pre-constituted opposition to political expressions of religiosity, the Indian activist/intellectual community does not have the tools by which to understand the phenomenon of Hindu ethnicism. Finally, this dissertation suggests that Hindu religious ethnicism needs to be seen essentially as a challenge to the prevailing secular order that separates religious belief from the modern, the rational, the scientific, regarding it (at worst) as a pre-modern affliction, or (at best) as an individual, private expression of identity. Hindu ethnicist belief represents a rationality unto itself, I argue: a (religious) critique of the liberal logic of secularism; a religious ideology of tolerance and governance; a rationality of and for modernity that we can afford to ignore only at our own ultimate peril.

During the revolutionary period the Soviets came into political and cultural conflict with Russia's Muslims. Despite indications that the majority of Muslims desired political unification based on their Islamic heritage, the Party divided them into separate "nationalities" along narrow ethnic lines, incorporated most into the RSFSR, and attempted to uproot traditional Islamic institutions and customs under the aegis of class war. Resistance took the form of pan-Muslim nationalism, a reformist political conception with roots in the Near East. This conflict not only aborted the export of revolution to the Islamic world, contributing to the passing of the revolutionary era in Russia, but aided Stalin's rise to power. Soviet policy succeeded politically, defining the terms of interaction between Russians and Soviet Muslims for the next 70 years, but failed culturally in 1921-22, when the Party was forced to suspend its "war on Islam" as the price of political control.

No description available.

The history, culture and ethnic diversity of the Republic of the Indonesia make it a highly complex country. With an area as vast as the whole Europe, at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific oceans, having abundant natural resources, a dynamic population which is the fourth in the world, Indonesia also benefits from a very resistant economy. / Economic take off is supported by a strong political regime that has been led by President Suharto for thirty years now. Foreign investors are attracted by this new, very magnetic and promising market. Faced with a high demand for investments approvals, the government is liberalizing regulations dealing with direct and portfolio investments. / In 1995, Indonesia was the first host country for foreign investments, before the Chinese People's Republic, which amounted to 39.9 billions of dollars.

This thesis shows that the doctrine of Active Defence has been the overriding concern of the PLA since 1950 and not any form of People’s War. Active Defence is based on three basic principles: no provocation of other nations; no bases anywhere on foreign soil; and no seizure of territory. The PLA’s articulated doctrine in the 1950s was to ‘Protect the North and Defend the South’. In the 1960s this changed to ‘Lure the Enemy Deep into the Country’ in order to crush him with ‘People’s War’. In the 1970s, this became ‘Prepare to Fight Early and Fight Big’. By using examples of the PLA in battle this thesis shows how the doctrine changed in light of failures in battle. The post-Mao reorganisation of the PLA to rectify these faults turned it into a modern military force, building on this legacy by transforming itself into a hardened and networked military. The PLA has now reached a stage of its history where it can fully implement its operational art that took root in the theories espoused in the 1920s and 1930s through the Soviet model, and tried to be implemented in the 1950s and 1960s only to be thwarted by the Cultural Revolution. The People’s Liberation Army’s operational art, this thesis demonstrates, has now come of age.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2005. / (UnM)AAI3219852. Adviser: Steven J. Ross. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2281.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2006. / (UMI)AAI3254008. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-02, Section: A, page: 0741. Advisers: Neil Fligstein; Trond Petersen.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Marsha L. Frey / Donald J. Mrozek / Jesuits presented evidence in both French and Chinese to defend Christianity by citation of legal and historical precedents in favor of the "Teaching of the Lord of Heaven" (Catholicism) even after the Yongzheng Emperor's 1724 imperial edict proscribed the religion as a heterodox cult. The Jesuits' strategy is traceable to Matteo Ricci's early missionary approach of accommodation to Chinese culture, which aimed to prove grounds for a Confucian-Christian synthesis based upon complementary points between Christian theology and their interpretation of Yuanru (Original Literati Teaching). Their synthesis involved both written and oral rhetorical techniques that ranged from attempts to show compatibility between different religious values, to the manipulation of texts, and to outright deceit. Personal witness, observation, and interpretation played a key role in Jesuit group translation projects. French and Chinese apologetic texts composed to prove grounds for the repeal of the 1724 proscription edict contain these approaches. The Lettres edifantes et curieuses ecrite par des missionnaires jesuites (1702-1776) contain examples of this approach, as well as the Ruijianlu (1735-1737). Memorials in the Ruijianlu cited favorable legal precedents and imperial patronage rendered to Xiyangren (Men from the West). Jesuits presented their case for toleration of Christianity in the Ruijianlu in terms of Chinese notions of hospitality, diplomacy, and defense found in texts from as early as the Zhou dynasty. They cited an enduring Chinese defensive notion of "welcoming men from afar" (rouyuanren), but the court refused to return to this soft policy. The Qianlong Emperor rejected the Kangxi era policy of "welcoming men from afar" regarding established missions. In 1735 the imperial Board of Punishments re-enforced the proscription order against Christianity in military units and also ruled that baptism of abandoned infants by a Chinese convert constituted religious heterodoxy based on the Qing Code (Article 162). The twenty-one Jesuits (not expelled in 1724) remained in imperial service and at liberty to practice their religion among themselves. Officials pursued a severe policy of punishing any cult deemed heterodox according to statutes of the Code. Persecution of Christians increased throughout the eighteenth century, but abated during the reign of the Daoguang Emperor (1821-1851) when most anti-Christian edicts were rescinded and a subsequent imperial edict pardoned those Christians who practiced the faith for moral perfection.

This paper considers the efforts of the Russian government to counter the growth of China’s soft power in the Russian Far East in the context of the dramatic rise in trade between the two nations in the 15 years of the “Putin Era,” from 2000 to 2015. The Amur (or “Black Dragon”) River watershed forms the core of the Russian Far East, Russia’s last territorial acquisition from the former Chinese empire and the key to Moscow’s efforts to connect with the burgeoning Asia-Pacific economies. This study investigates which federal- and provincial-level policies the Russian government has implemented to counter the growth of Beijing’s influence in the Russian Far East, and analyzes the effectiveness of these policies in the area’s three most populous sub-regions: Amur Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai, and Primorsky Krai. Though initially hypothesizing that the Russian government had no coordinated strategy to counter China’s soft power in the region, this study concluded that policymakers in both the Kremlin and the Russian Far East have successfully discouraged a large-scale Chinese demographic or economic footprint along the Russian side of the Amur. However, Moscow’s failure to both encourage sufficient ethnic Russian immigration to the Far East and to effectively stimulate local economies in need of Chinese labor and investment has paradoxically strengthened Beijing’s regional soft power. Russia’s citizens in the Far East increasingly look south across the Black Dragon River towards China for a brighter future.

No description available.