This thesis is concerned chiefly with the military role of sea power during the English Civil War. Parliament’s seizure of the Royal Navy in 1642 is examined in detail, with a discussion of the factors which led to the King’s loss of the fleet and the consequences thereafter. It is concluded that Charles I was outmanoeuvred politically, whilst Parliament’s choice to command the fleet, the Earl of Warwick, far surpassed him in popularity with the common seamen. The thesis then considers the advantages which control of the Navy provided for Parliament throughout the war, determining that the fleet’s protection of London, its ability to supply besieged outposts and its logistical support to Parliamentarian land forces was instrumental in preventing a Royalist victory. Furthermore, it is concluded that Warwick’s astute leadership went some way towards offsetting Parliament’s sporadic neglect of the Navy. The thesis demonstrates, however, that Parliament failed to establish the unchallenged command of the seas around the British Isles. This was because of the Royalists’ widespread privateering operations, aided in large part by the King’s capture of key ports in 1643, such as Dartmouth and Bristol. The Navy was able to block many, but not all, of the King’s arms shipments from abroad, thus permitting Charles to supply his armies in England. Close attention is paid to the Royalist shipping which landed reinforcements from Ireland in 1643-44. The King’s defeat in the First Civil War is then discussed, with the New Model Army, and greater resources, cited as the key factors behind Parliament’s victory, with recognition that the Navy provided essential support. Finally, the revolt of the fleet in 1648 is examined. It is concluded that the increasing radicalism of Parliament alienated a substantial section of the Navy, but that the Royalists failed to capitalise on their new-found maritime strength.

郭芳杰. / "2004年6月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2004. / 參考文獻 (leaves 103-109). / 附中英文摘要. / "2004 nian 6 yue". / Guo Fangjie. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2004. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 103-109). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 序章 --- p.1-5 / Chapter 第一章 --- 硏究回顧 --- p.6-13 / Chapter 第二章 --- 宋夏戰爭的歷史背景及緣邊地理形勢 --- p.14-30 / Chapter 第三章 --- 李憲取蘭州以及蘭州堡寨群的建立 --- p.31-51 / Chapter 第四章 --- 堡寨、蕃兵與弓箭手一北宋經略西夏 的經驗總結 --- p.52-76 / Chapter 第五章 --- 北宋禦夏大戰略:以朝臣的爭論爲中心 (1086-1094) --- p.77-99 / 結論 --- p.100-102 / 參考書目 --- p.103-109 / 附圖 --- p.110-116

楊軍. / "2003年12月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2003. / 參考文獻 (leaves 102-107). / 附中英文摘要. / "2003 nian 12 yue". / Yang Jun. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2003. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 102-107). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 文章提要 --- p.1 / 緒論 --- p.4 / Chapter 第一章 --- 宋遼關係槪況及河北地區的重要性 --- p.8 / Chapter 第一节 --- 宋遼對峙的歷史背景 --- p.8 / Chapter 第二节 --- 北宋時期河北地區及城市發展槪況… --- p.13 / Chapter 第三节 --- 河北地區在北宋時期的重要戰略地位 --- p.16 / Chapter 第二章 --- 河北的交通系統 --- p.18 / Chapter 第一节 --- 河北交通情況槪述 --- p.18 / Chapter 第二节 --- 太行山東麓大道 --- p.19 / Chapter 第三节 --- 宋遼驛路 --- p.22 / Chapter 第四节 --- 御河 --- p.24 / Chapter 第五节 --- 邊境地區的水路交通網絡 --- p.28 / Chapter 第六节 --- 其他交通路線 --- p.33 / Chapter 第三章 --- 河北沿邊城市與宋遼間的間諜戰 --- p.38 / Chapter 第一节 --- 北宋對間諜活動的重視 --- p.38 / Chapter 第二节 --- 沿邊城市開展的對遼間諜活動 --- p.40 / Chapter 第三节 --- 北宋對遼間諜活動中的一些制度 --- p.43 / Chapter 第四节 --- 沿邊城市對遼國間諜活動的防範 --- p.45 / Chapter 第四章 --- 河北城市的外交職能 --- p.50 / Chapter 第一节 --- 宋遼使節的往來以及河北城市所發揮的外交作用 --- p.50 / Chapter 第二节 --- 河北城市在處理邊界糾紛中的作用 --- p.53 / Chapter 第五章 --- 沿邊城市設置的對遼榷場 --- p.56 / Chapter 第一节 --- 沿邊城市的對遼榷場的設立 --- p.56 / Chapter 第二节 --- 榷場貿易的規模 --- p.58 / Chapter 第三节 --- 北宋對沿邊榷場的管理 --- p.61 / Chapter 第四节 --- 榷場的作用和影響 --- p.63 / Chapter 第六章 --- 河北城市的三層防禦體系 --- p.66 / Chapter 第一节 --- 沿邊城市 --- p.66 / Chapter 第二节 --- 次邊城市 --- p.73 / Chapter 第三节 --- 近裏城市 --- p.80 / Chapter 第七章 --- 河北城市的重要性及城市的修築 --- p.84 / Chapter 第一节 --- 城市對於河北地區防守的重要性 --- p.84 / Chapter 第二节 --- 對於河北官員的重視 --- p.86 / Chapter 第三节 --- 河北城市在宋遼戰爭中的作用和表現 --- p.90 / Chapter 第四节 --- 河北城市的修築 --- p.95 / 結論 --- p.100 / 徵引文獻目錄 --- p.103

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As early as the 18th century, the Ottoman provinces, of which the Beylik of Tunis was one, entered into a period of decline from which the West emerged the principal beneficiary. These circumstances forced the Regency of Tunis to redefine itself a redefinition which initially took the shape of military reforms. If it is true that this restructuring was a reply to the nascent imperialism of the West, it is also true that it has a context within the relations which Tunis maintained with Istanbul. In order to understand these reforms one must examine them in the light of the internal evolution of the Tunisian military institutions. Therefore, following a review of the literature on the subject, chapter 2 surveys the relations of the Beylik of Tunis with the West and with the Sublime Porte, while chapters 3 and 4 describe, respectively, the military institutions before the reforms and the military reforms themselves.

<p> This paper examines the role of Major General Everett S. Hughes during World War II. While Hughes has often been quoted in biographies of Dwight D. Eisenhower or George S. Patton Jr. this is the first work to exclusively examine Hughes' contribution to the Allied victory in World War II. The paper argues that Hughes played an important part throughout the war, both in his ability to solve numerous problems and his influence with Eisenhower. It also examines topics such as Hughes' work with the Women's Army Corps, his friendship with Patton, the relationship between Eisenhower and his driver Kay Summersby, along with many other issues afflicting the Allied high command. Finally, this paper argues that Hughes' influence in Eisenhower's Headquarters needs to be taken seriously by those trying to understand the decisions of the U.S. military leadership in Europe during World War II.</p>

<p>In this comparative social history of the American Revolution, the stories of eight men recounted through the use of their biographies, journals, and memoirs. The lives of four enlisted soldiers and four officers are depicted to gain an understanding of how they became involved in the revolution. In order to do so, their early lives are scrutinized, as well as their post-war lives as they transitioned to peacetime. The main purpose, however, is to examine how each man became motivated to join the war for independence, whether socially, economically, and/or politically. As each man had different aspirations for their expectations before and after the war, one thing is certain: the enlisted soldiers were motivated for different reasons compared to the officers. </p><p> By examining their early lives, as well as post-war lives, one can gain a better understanding of whether their motivations came to fruition, in the end. The intention is not to disprove their patriotism or zeal for joining the war, but instead to prove there were other motivational factors that contributed to their decision. Their patriotism is undeniable, which was a crucial reason why they were able to win the war after eight long years. Even though they experienced deprivation for eight years, due to the lack of resources, the spirit of the men could not be deterred. Despite harrowing circumstances, the revolutionary soldiers were able to prevail over a superior enemy. With that, their motivations and expectations must be examined to shed light on how these men were able to win the war. </p>

<p> During the 17^th Century, the Caribbean saw an explosion in seaborne raiding. The most common targets of these raids were Spanish ships and coastal towns. Some of the men who went on these raids experienced degrees of social and economic mobility that would not have been possible in continental Europe. This was because the 17^th Century Caribbean created an environment where such mobility was possible. Among these was a Welshman was known to his compatriots as Harry Morgan. By the end of his life, Morgan would become one of the most famous buccaneers in history, a wealthy sugar planter, the Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica, and a knight. </p><p> No one is exactly sure of Morgan's social status before he entered the Caribbean. Historians largely agree that he was born to a freeholding family in Wales, although some dissenters contend that Morgan entered the Caribbean as an indentured servant. From either position, he experienced a high degree of social and economic mobility through his raids against the Spanish Empire and the conventional businesses that those raids funded. His life does not represent the way that social or economic mobility worked for a typical buccaneer. What it does represent is the best case scenario for an individual who came to the Caribbean and engaged in buccaneering. Morgan utilized his raiding as a means to fund more conventional business interests such as sugar planting. This paper argues that the Caribbean provided a unique political, economic, and military atmosphere for an individual to climb the social and economic ladder from Harry Morgan, a common buccaneer, to Sir Henry Morgan, Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica and Admiral of Buccaneers.</p>

The story of Prussia's defeat at the Battles of Jena and Auerstedt and subsequent reform has dominated the historiography of Napoleonic Prussia. While Napoleon has received the vast majority of historical attention, those who have written on Prussia have focused on the Prussian reform movement or the Prussian army's campaigns against Napoleon. These historians present the Prussian army before 1807 as an ossified relic, a hopelessly backward and rigid army commanded by a series of septuagenarians. Apart from the 1806 campaign, these scholars scarcely address the field operations of the Prussian army during the French Wars (1792-1801). This thesis seeks to prove that the Prussian army during the War of the Bavarian Succession and the War of the First Coalition was still an effective fighting force by examining the field operation of the Prussian army from 1778-1793 and the reactions of Prussian thinkers to it. The history of the Prussian army from 1778-1806 challenges the narrative of the army as a force in decline. The Prussian army struggled in the War of the Bavarian Succession, and the war revealed two of its weaknesses, the lack of light troops and an uncoordinated strategic approach. However, many of the problems of the war were failures of Fredrick and Henry as generals rather than the army as a whole. The army's performance during the War of the First Coalition against the French proved that it was a highly effective force and able to win even when significantly outnumbered. The existence of the reform movement following the war of the First Coalition and the implementation of some changes demonstrated that the army was far from dormant and its officers still sought ways improve it. While the army did not enjoy commanders of the caliber of Frederick the Great in his prime, before 1806 it retained the discipline and effectiveness in battle it displayed under Fredrick.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Lehigh University, 2008. / Adviser: John K. Smith.