John Rawls's The Law of Peoples has been criticized for focusing on the interests of peoples rather than individuals and for compromising individuals' fundamental human rights in order to tolerate nonliberal ideas of justice. This dissertation develops a new political liberal approach to international justice theory that responds to these concerns. This approach gives explicit moral primacy to the individual while also upholding the political liberal commitment to toleration. I do this by developing a political conception of the person specifically for international justice theory and a global original position of persons for working out principles of international justice. This involves the specification of an idea of freedom that is not parochially liberal and the development of a new political liberal human rights framework. This dissertation does not offer a defense of political liberalism as the right account of justice; the aim of this work is to consider whether a political liberal theory of international justice is able to give the individual moral primacy and to explore how it might do so.

The Guantanamo issue refers to the classic question concerning the role of ethics in international relations. That is why the purpose of this research was to, by relating to the dilemma between national security and human rights, study the current Obama Administration's standpoint given to the Guantanamo prisoners in reference to three different ethical views. These three ethical views are Joseph Nye's innovative perspective on morality within international relations, which constitute the theoretical frameworks of this research and they are sceptics, state moralists and cosmopolitans. With help of the descriptive and explanation approaches within ideology and argumentation method, I studied speeches of the representatives of the Obama Administration as well as executive orders and reports which focus on the Administration's statements and decisions given to the Guantanamo issue. The analysis of the material in reference to the theorethical framework of this research, lead to a conclusion that the Obama Administration underlines the importance of both national security and human rights  given to the Guantanamo prisoners. Analysis of this research displays also that the Obama Administration has not change its line of argumentation since 2008 as well as the Administration's decisions are affected first and foremost by state moralist view point.

In 2001, Amnesty International, the worlds largest international human rights non-governmental organization, made the decision to change its narrow mandate into a much broader mission statement that called for the protection and promotion of both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. Although the organization had added to its original mandate core concerning the release of prisoners of conscience before, the addition of economic, social, and cultural rights represented a major shift away from Amnesty Internationals classic focus on civil and political rights. Amnesty Internationals decision to promote all of the human rights listed in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and become a full spectrum human rights defender was a controversial one within the organization. The debate by the Amnesty membership over whether to accept an expanded form of mandate took place within the organization over a period of a decade before any changes were made. Concerns and fears over accepting economic, social and cultural rights into the mandate ranged from the practical to the theoretical.<p> This thesis will look at the decision made by Amnesty International to begin actively promoting and defending economic, social and cultural rights. It will examine why a leading human rights organization decided to modify its focus considerably and what the challenges were in doing this. In exploring the issues of contention brought up during the debates by the organizations membership, the larger questions surrounding international political acceptance of economic, social, and cultural rights will be examined.

Having soberly reflected upon the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the author observed that though international law and treaties restrict pre-emptive war, they do allow for war in self-defense. Consequently, some powerful nations have used this as a justification for launching pre-emptive strikes. The threats posed by the powerful nations using self-defense as a justification for pre-emptive strikes and the inability of weaker nations to do the same, greatly account for the unprecedented explosion of global terrorism. The author thinks that confronting terrorism therefore requires a pro-pacifist ethical framework whose principles have to be applied with international law to narrow the legitimacy of self-defense wars. Hence, he proposes "Moral Consistency" as a required condition for launching pre-emptive strikes with two main aims - to reduce violent conflicts and to draw a substantial distinction between reason and justification, and between crime and criminal justice.

Having soberly reflected upon the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the author observed that though international law and treaties restrict pre-emptive war, they do allow for war in self-defense. Consequently, some powerful nations have used this as a justification for launching pre-emptive strikes. The threats posed by the powerful nations using self-defense as a justification for pre-emptive strikes and the inability of weaker nations to do the same, greatly account for the unprecedented explosion of global terrorism. The author thinks that confronting terrorism therefore requires a pro-pacifist ethical framework whose principles have to be applied with international law to narrow the legitimacy of self-defense wars. Hence, he proposes "Moral Consistency" as a required condition for launching pre-emptive strikes with two main aims - to reduce violent conflicts and to draw a substantial distinction between reason and justification, and between crime and criminal justice.

It is an integral part of rights protection that "adequate" remedies exist. This thesis examines the present functioning of human rights legislations in Canada and articulates fundamental problems with the current Canadian regimes in the enforcement of rights against private actors. The possibility of using tort action as an alternative in the protection of human rights in Canada is then discussed, with particular attention given to the potential for increased damage awards and for wider grounds of prohibition of discriminatory practices.<p> The thesis revisits the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bhadauria v. Seneca College and anaylzes the basis on which human rights legislation was seen as a creating barrier to a collateral tort action. In contrast with the decision in Bhadauria , the thesis concludes that the present state of tort law is capable of handling this new category of compensable damage. It is further suggested that the realities of human rights protection require reconsideration of alternatives to the present schemes in order to give effect to "adequate" remedies.<p> Drawing on the philosophy of A.J.M. Milne, the thesis addresses the role of judiciary as actively protecting the rights rather than simply enforcing what already exists.<p> Referring specifically to a nominate tort of discrimination, the thesis provides a framework for the consideration of such a tort, relying on a standard of care equivalent to "negligence" in which the private actor has failed to live up to a universal or "community" standard of reasonable behaviour.<p> In part, because any group can narrowly focus and prioritize issues and concerns that are of primary importance to them as a group, this "community" can not be a localized body. A well functioning "community", instead, is characterized as utilizing and applying universal standards and principles such the principle to fair treatment. This principle entails that there be a "sufficient connection" between the ground of distinction and and the treatment involved. These become the standard by which the private actor is to be judged.

This paper examines China’s policy towards human rights internationally with the intent of discerning real support for human rights. It compares China’s responses to two cases of mass human rights violations (the Darfur and Israel-Palestine conflicts) in which it has a serious interest (energy in particular). It finds that China treats human rights self-interestedly, but also has some support for them when its interests are not at stake.

The United States prioritizes human rights rhetorically but not in practice. As a result, United States policy is disjointed and conflictual between human rights and security. The result is an inconsistency in foreign policy. There have been examples of this throughout United States history such as in El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain. This thesis explored the three cases in depth by 1) providing background information and a summary of human rights violations in order to provide context for the analysis, 2) listing and explaining the reasons why the United States prioritized security, and 3) analyzing when human rights are absent and present in policy. Following the analysis of the case studies the final section sought to provide a recommendation in order to reduce the inconsistencies in United States Foreign Policy. The central recommendation focuses on merging human rights considerations within security driven policies.

This dissertation argues that the idea of constitutional rights transformed Canadian constitutional law well before the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, it locates the origins of Canada’s twentieth-century rights revolution in the constitutional thinking of scholars, lawyers, judges, and politicians at mid-century (1930-1960). Drawing on archival documents, personal papers, government reports, parliamentary debates, case law, and legal scholarship, this work traces the constitutional thought and culture that first propelled human rights and fundamental freedoms to the forefront of the Canadian legal imagination. As a work of legal history, it also seeks to revive the dormant spirit of constitutional history that once pervaded the discipline of Canadian constitutional law. The Introduction situates the chapters that follow within the emerging Canadian historiography of rights. Chapter Two traces the origins of Frank Scott’s advocacy for constitutional rights to the newer constitutional law, an approach to constitutional scholarship sparked by the social and political upheavals of the Depression, and the influence of Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence. Chapter Three explores the varied dimensions of the Second World War’s influence on the nascent idea of Canadian constitutional rights. In particular, the rapid rise of the wartime administrative state produced a rights discourse that tended to reflect the interests of property while ignoring the civil liberties of unpopular minorities. Chapter Four examines the rise of a politics and scholarship of rights in the years immediately following the war. In response to international rights ideals and continuing domestic rights controversies, scholars and lawyers sought to produce a theory of Canadian constitutional law that could accommodate the addition of judicially-enforced individual rights. If not entirely successful, their efforts nonetheless further reoriented the fundamental tenets of Canadian constitutional law. Chapter Five reveals the influence of Canada’s emerging constitutional culture of rights on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly Justice Ivan Rand and his conception of an implied bill of rights. Together, these chapters demonstrate the confluence of ideology, circumstance, and personality – the constitutional history – that altered the future of Canadian constitutional law.

John Rawls's The Law of Peoples has been criticized for focusing on the interests of peoples rather than individuals and for compromising individuals' fundamental human rights in order to tolerate nonliberal ideas of justice. This dissertation develops a new political liberal approach to international justice theory that responds to these concerns. This approach gives explicit moral primacy to the individual while also upholding the political liberal commitment to toleration. I do this by developing a political conception of the person specifically for international justice theory and a global original position of persons for working out principles of international justice. This involves the specification of an idea of freedom that is not parochially liberal and the development of a new political liberal human rights framework. This dissertation does not offer a defense of political liberalism as the right account of justice; the aim of this work is to consider whether a political liberal theory of international justice is able to give the individual moral primacy and to explore how it might do so.