One of the chief international security issues of today is humanitarian militaryintervention. In light of this, some questions have been raised about when and howoutsiders should get involved or if they are morally right at all to engage in humanitariancrises. In this paper Syria is the chosen case study because of its brutal crackdown and amassive human rights violation. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand themoral and legal criteria for launching a military intervention for humanitarian aid in Syriafollowed by a detailed analysis of its ethical, normative and legal issues. The maintheoretical framework of this study is just war theory. This study utilizes the criteria ofJus ad bellum principles, namely ‘legitimate authority’, ‘just cause’ and ‘right intention’in order to asses the extent to which Syria fits into the framework of just war theory. Thispaper also applies legal criteria such as the Charter of United Nations and internationallaw for the purpose of legal examination. The most complex issue in this thesis is the factthat although legitimate authority has the moral responsibilities to protect civilians, but itoften fails to uphold its responsibility mainly because of self-interest and the lack of rightintention.

Créée en 2002 en remplacement de l’OUA, l’Union africaine affiche l’ambition de trouver des solutions africaines aux problèmes africains en ajoutant l’article 4 dans son Acte constitutif. Cet article lui donne le droit de déployer une force militaire au sein d’un État membre pour protéger les civils lors de violations de droits de l’homme, de génocide ou de crimes contre l’humanité. Tandis que les conflits intraétatiques continuent de faire rage sur le continent africain, l’UA et ses États membres n’ont jamais autorisé — sans y renoncer — une intervention humanitaire contre l’un de ses membres. Ce mémoire vise à connaitre les raisons pour lesquelles les dirigeants africains ont renoncé à déployer une force militaire pour protéger les civils burundais en 2015, et ce, malgré le fait que l’UA l’a initialement recommandé quelques semaines plus tôt. En s’inspirant de la théorie réaliste des relations internationales, cette étude du conflit burundais de 2015 démontre que la non-intervention de l’UA est avant tout liée à un manque de volonté de la part des dirigeants africains qui ont privilégié leurs intérêts personnels ainsi que les intérêts économiques de leur pays au détriment de l’urgence humanitaire au Burundi. De plus, plusieurs dirigeants africains, qui ont un contentieux avec Paul Kagamé et qui voient le Burundi comme un contrepoids à l’influence rwandaise, se sont positionnés contre la MAPROBU pour léser le Rwanda. Ensuite, l’abandon de la MAPROBU s’explique aussi par le fait que le Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité est totalement dépendant de la volonté des États membres et ne dispose pas de l’autonomie institutionnelle nécessaire pour autoriser le déploiement des troupes de l’UA au Burundi. / Created in 2002 to replace the OAU, the African Union’s desire to find African solutions to African problems was demonstrated by the addition of Article 4 to its Constitutive Act, which gives the Union the authority to deploy a military force within a member state to protect civilians from human rights violations, genocide or crimes against humanity. While intrastate conflicts are still devastating the African continent, the AU has never authorized a humanitarian intervention against one of its members. This master’s thesis seeks to explain why the African leaders did not authorize the deployment of a military force to protect Burundian civilians in 2015, despite the fact that the AU had initially recommended it a few weeks earlier. Based on the realist approach in International Relations, this case study demonstrates that the decision not to intervene in Burundi is primarily due to a lack of commitment from African leaders who have prioritized their own interests as well as economic interests over the humanitarian urgency in Burundi. In addition, many African leaders, who see Paul Kagame as a rival, perceive Burundi as a counterweight to Rwanda’s influence. Therefore, their position against MAPROBU is also intended to undermine Rwanda. Secondly, the decision not to deploy MAPROBU could be explained by the fact that the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is totally dependent on the will of member states and does not have the necessary institutional autonomy to authorize the deployment of AU troops in Burundi.