Zugl.: Freiburg (Breisgau), Univ., Diss., 2009

Universiẗat, Diss., 2005--Würzburg.

Diss.--Fakultät für Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften--Universität Hannover, 1998. / Contient un resumé en anglais. Bibliogr. p. 225-241.

Habili.-schr.--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität Münster, 1985. / Bibliogr. p. 243-256. Index.

Extr. de: Th. doct.--Philosophie--Paris 12, 1999. Titre de soutenance : Le débat réalisme-idéalisme : Husserl-Ingarden. / Titre de couv. : "Roman Ingarden : Husserl, la controverse idéalisme-réalisme" Réunit : "Phénoménologie et ontologie chez Roman Ingarden" / Patricia Limino-Heulot. "Lettre à Husserl sur la 6e recherche logique et l'idéalisme" ; "Remarques sur le problème idéalisme-réalisme" ; "Des motifs qui ont conduit Husserl à l'idéalisme transcendantal" ; "Qu'y a-t-til de nouveau dans la Krisis de Husserl ?" / Roman Ingarden. Bibliogr. p. 251-259. Index.

Texte remanié de: Ph.D.--University of Stockholm, 1990. / Bibliogr. p. 249-258.

Μπορεί να συνεισφέρει η θεωρία της διυποκειμενικότητας του Husserl στις σύγχρονες θεωρίες της αντίληψης; Με αφορμή αυτό το ερώτημα εξετάζουμε, αφενός δύο σύγχρονες θεωρίες της αντίληψης - αυτή του Alva Noë και του John McDowell -, αφετέρου τη θεωρία της διυποκειμενικότητας του Edmund Husserl. Προτείνουμε μια γραμμή σκέψης - η οποία περνά μέσα από τις αναλύσεις της χουσσερλιανής φαινομενολογίας για τη διυποκειμενική συγκρότηση του ορίζοντα της αντιληπτικής εμπειρίας και την υπερβατολογική λειτουργία της διυποκειμενικότητας - η οποία θα μπορούσε σε ορισμένα σημεία να ισχυροποιήσει, ή, σε κάποια άλλα, να θέσει εν αμφιβόλω τις θέσεις των Noë και McDowell. Στόχος μας δεν είναι η οριστική απάντηση στα ζητήματα αυτά αλλά η γόνιμη ερωτηματοθεσία μέσα από τη σύζευξη της αναλυτικής και της φαινομενολογικής παράδοσης. / Can Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity contribute to the contemporary theories of perception? Launching from this question we examine, on the one hand two contemporary theories of perception – Alva Noë’s and John McDowell’s – and, on the other, Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity. We propose a line of thought - which passes through Husserl’s analysis of the intersubjective constitution of the horizon of perceptual experience and the transcendental function of intersubjectivity – which could, at some parts strengthen, or object at some others, the contemporary theories of Noë and McDowell. Our aim is not the final answers on these issues, but the productive questioning through the conjugation of the analytical and the phenomenological tradition.

This project involves a sustained investigation into the sense of the enemy. Chapter one begins by focusing on a common understanding of the enemy found within our homeworld: the political enemy. As will become clear, this mode of encountering the enemy has become the dominant framework for understanding the enemy in our liberal-democratic home. Our task at this point is to identify the political elements from which our mode of understanding the enemy emerges. Once this dominant understanding has been developed, I will treat it as a clue for a fuller investigation into the sense of the enemy. In chapter two, we see that even positions critical of liberal-democratic thought tend to occupy a similar political understanding of the enemy. Working with the writings of Carl Schmitt, we observe how even his critical posture towards the liberal-democratic understanding of the enemy is itself operating within a similar articulation of the enemy. I argue that Schmitt's articulation is similar to the liberal-democratic articulation in that they are both modern in nature. The task of the third chapter is to understand the problematic aspects of the modern understanding of our world so as to clear the way for a fuller understanding of the enemy. This is followed by the fourth chapter that is devoted to finding a way to think outside of the modern liberal-democratic model of politics that regulates our homeworld understanding of the enemy. In so doing, chapters three and four help us find an opening into a more essential structure organizing the sense of the enemy. Once this goal is accomplished, the final chapter investigates the way we encounter the enemy within generative and intersubjective lived experience.

In this dissertation I examine our relationship with the Earth and our natural environment by clarifying what it means to be human. I do this by looking at the interpenetration of spheres of being or philosophical anthropology to articulate how the human being is the dynamic meeting point of life and spirit. In this interpenetration of life and spirit, the task of the human being as loving flashes forth. On the basis of this task, it is possible to realize a loving relationship with the Earth and our natural environment that is not based on domination or use. To understand further how we are situated in relation to the earth and our natural environment, I discuss shortcomings of both the conservation and deep ecology movements. I also discuss problems with traditional philosophical anthropologies to highlight how some of these presuppositions have been incorporated into our relationship with the earth and our natural environment. To illuminate how life and spirit are enmeshed in one another, I describe Nicolai Hartmann's new ontology and Edmund Husserl's regional ontology as well as Scheler's philosophical anthropology since all of these philosophers ground their reflections in experience. However, since Scheler grounds being human in loving, his approach is unique and not only resolves the supposed dualism between life and spirit but gives us a fresh outlook on the responsibility inherent to being human. This opens the possibility for living a loving relationship with the earth and our natural environment.

Frege and Husserl are both recognized for their significant contributions to the overthrowing of logical psychologism, at least in its 19th century forms. Between Frege's profound impact on modern logic that extended the influence of his anti-psychologism and Husserl's extensive attempts at the refutation of logical psychologism in the Prolegomena to Logical Investigations, these arguments are generally understood as successful. This paper attempts to account for the development of these two anti-psychologistic conceptions of logical objects and for some of the basic differences between them. It identifies some problems that are common to strongly anti-psychologistic conceptions of logic and compares the extent to which Frege's and Husserl's views are open to these problems. Accordingly, this paper is divided into two parts. Part I develops a conception of the problems of logical psychologism as they are distinctively understood by each philosopher, out of the explicit arguments and criticisms made against the view in the texts. This conception is in each case informed by the overall historical trajectories of each philosopher's philosophical development. Part II examines the two views in light of common problems of anti-psychologism.