Submitted by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-12-03T08:08:27Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Yuri Manzi Giani - 2015.pdf: 863627 bytes, checksum: d04221eca0ab941f151b72987248992c (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-12-03T08:10:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Yuri Manzi Giani - 2015.pdf: 863627 bytes, checksum: d04221eca0ab941f151b72987248992c (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-03T08:10:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Yuri Manzi Giani - 2015.pdf: 863627 bytes, checksum: d04221eca0ab941f151b72987248992c (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-09-15 / This research proposes an epistemological debate of Communication, focused on the dualnature of the communicational object. This specificity of the object, which unfolds in two well-defined perspectives – the prospect of information and the perspective of sense – is characterized as a halt to the field of study. In an effort to move towards the solution of this problem, we used the traditional phenomenologic approach developed by Husserl (2001). Starting from a phenomenology of communication we came to a possible essence of communication. Finally, the essence which we found was analyzed from two perspectives contributing to resolve the impasse. / Este trabalho propõe um debate epistemológico da comunicação cujo foco está centrado na questão da dupla natureza do objeto comunicacional. Essa especificidade do objeto, que se desdobra em duas perspectivas bem definidas - a perspectiva da informação e a perspectiva do sentido - se caracteriza como um impasse para o Campo. Na tentativa de avançarmos para a resolução do problema, recorremos à tradição fenomenológica tal como desenvolvida a partir de Husserl (2001). Partindo de uma fenomenologia da comunicação chegamos a uma possível essência da comunicação. Por fim, essa essência encontrada foi analisada a partir das duas perspectivas de modo que ela contribuísse para a resolução do impasse.

O objetivo desta tese consiste em avaliar, sob um prisma fenomenológico, as concepções presentes na obra de Santo Agostinho referentes ao uso da reflexão como instrumento do conhecimento de si. Para isso, analisamos as obras As confissões (397d.C.) A trindade (416 d.C.) e fragmentos de outras obras em que ele aborda o tema da reflexão. Consideramos dois diferentes níveis em que as ideias se encontram presentes nas obras: nas descrições de estados subjetivos narrados em primeira pessoa por Agostinho nas Confissões e nas exposições feitas por Agostinho em outras de suas obras. Investigamos alguns temas que se mostraram de grande importância para se compreender o papel da reflexão em Agostinho. Em primeiro lugar, o espírito humano entendido como uma realidade íntima, um ser reflexivo e imaterial. Em segundo lugar, analisamos o papel do método reflexivo em suas investigações acerca da memória, da percepção e das inter-relações entre o corpo e a mente. Em terceiro lugar procuramos observar como Agostinho compreende a vida do espírito em suas inter-relações com o mundo e com Deus. Na segunda parte da tese, os temas foram retomados e abordados sob um prisma fenomenológico. Para isso procuramos expor e avaliar, no que tange aos temas abordados por Agostinho, o percurso metodológico traçado por Husserl em Ideias 1 (1913) e Ideias 2 (1952). Na terceira parte da tese, fizemos uma análise comparativa entre as concepções e os métodos adotados pelos dois autores. Observamos que, embora haja diferenças no modo de aplicar a reflexão, muitas das conclusões tiradas por Husserl já haviam sido antecipadas por Agostinho, embora, neste, com um menor nível de rigor. Merecem destaque os seguintes pontos abordados primeiramente por Agostinho e posteriormente desenvolvidos por Husserl: 1) a mente é uma realidade íntima e indubitável; 2) a essência da mente é sua reflexividade, sua capacidade de apreender-se a si mesma; 3) a atenção ou intentio voluntatis é um fator constituinte do ato de percepção e de qualquer ato do cogito; 4) o tempo é abordado por Agostinho não como realidade independente do espírito, mas sim como uma realidade vinculada ao espírito, de modo que o passado, o presente e o futuro são articulados com a memória, a atenção e a expectativa. Em suma, o objetivo das análises e comparações é contribuir para uma visão mais rica e complexa da história do método reflexivo e, ao mesmo tempo, defender sua legitimidade e seu valor cognitivo. A reflexão é instrumento intelectual capaz de fornecer não só conhecimentos seguros sobre a estrutura apodíctica da consciência e dos diferentes estratos da pessoa humana, como também é válida para que cada indivíduo possa conhecer a si mesmo em sua singularidade. E essa individualização é marcada por fatores psíquicos, corpóreos e pelo mundo espiritual do sujeito, isto é, pelo mundo da vida. / The objective of this thesis is to evaluate, under a phenomenological perspective, the concepts present in the work of St. Augustine regarding the use of reflection as a tool of self-knowledge. We study the works Confessions (397AD) The Trinity (416AD) and fragments of other works in which he addresses the topic of reflection. We consider two different levels at which ideas are in his works: the descriptions of subjective states narrated in first person by Augustine in the Confessions and the presentations made by Augustine in his other works. Some themes have proved of great importance for understanding the role of reflection in the Augustine\'s works. Firstly, we analyze how Augustine develops the concept of mind understood as an inner reality, self-consciousness, characterized as immaterial substance. Secondly, we examined the role of the reflective method in his researches on memory, on perception and on the strata of the human person. Thirdly we analyzed how Augustine understands the life of the spirit in their interrelations with the world and with God. In the second part of the thesis, the issues addressed in the first part were reexamined under a phenomenological perspective, according to the methodological approach outlined by Husserl in Ideas 1 (1913) and Ideas 2 (1952). In the third part of the thesis, we made a comparative analysis of concepts and methods adopted by the two authors. We observe that although there are differences in the way of applying the reflection, many of the conclusions drawn by Husserl had already been anticipated by Augustine, albeit with a lower level of rigor. In particular the following points addressed first by Augustine and later developed by Husserl: 1) the mind is an intimate and undeniable reality. 2) The essence of mind is its reflexivity, its ability to know herself directly. 3) attention or intentio voluntatis is a constituent factor of the act of perception 4) the time is approached by Augustine not as a reality independent of mind, but as a reality linked to the spirit, so that the past, present and future are articulated with memory, attention and expectation. In short, the purpose of analysis and comparisons is to contribute to a richer and complex history of the reflective method and at the same time maintaining its legitimacy and its cognitive value. Reflection is an intellectual instrument able to provide apodictic knowledge of the structure of consciousness, about the different strata of the human person, and helps individuals to know himself in his uniqueness. And that individualization is marked by psychological factors, by corporal\'s factors and by his world of life.

Principalement analysée comme un retour à l’esthétique réaliste qui était celle de Virginia Woolf à ses débuts, la fiction tardive de l'écrivaine s’écarte radicalement de ses productions des années vingt et de leur modernisme affiché. La présente étude se propose de comprendre cet écart à travers le filtre de la mimésis : le basculement en jeu dans les œuvres tardives a à voir avec la représentation fictionnelle du réel et les inflexions que lui apporte Virginia Woolf au tournant des années trente. En effet, là où des textes comme Mrs Dalloway ou To the Lighthouse mettaient en scène un réel de l’intériorisation, un monde passé au crible de la conscience, les dernières œuvres de l'écrivaine adoptent une logique inverse et translatent l’intériorité à la surface même des choses et des événements. Ce déplacement inédit, qui « signe » la mimésis woolfienne tardive, nous semble par ailleurs devoir être mis en rapport avec un concept philosophique contemporain de la fiction tardive de Virginia Woolf, celui de « monde de la vie » ou Lebenswelt. Développé par Edmund Husserl dans son ultime ouvrage, La Crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale, le Lebenswelt permet de penser une extériorisation de la vie subjective dans un monde qu’elle façonne à mesure qu’elle en fait l’expérience. À cet égard, les conceptions du réel qu’échafaudent au même moment Woolf et Husserl se révèlent être singulièrement proches. Cependant il s’agira moins ici d’appliquer le concept au texte, de comprendre le littéraire à travers le philosophique, que de mettre en place un dialogue « intertextuel » entre ces principes souvent concurrents : le Lebenswelt, loin de s’apparenter à une « réponse » aux questions soulevées par les textes de Woolf, peut au contraire nous aider à dégager la logique propre de la fiction tardive de l’écrivaine – tant et si bien que l’analyse du monde de la vie husserlien sera d’abord pour nous l’occasion de faire émerger un monde de la vie authentiquement woolfien. / Mainly analysed as a return to the realist aesthetics of her first novels, Virginia Woolf’s late fiction stands in stark contrast with her “high modernist” works of the 1920s. The present study suggests that such a reorientation is best understood when looked at through the lens of mimesis: the change affecting Woolf’s late fiction has to do with the representation of reality and with its alterations at the turn of the 1930s. Indeed, whereas texts like Mrs Dalloway or To the Lighthouse defined reality as the internalisation of the world, sieved through the consciousnesses of fictional characters, Woolf’s late fiction reverses this process by exporting the self directly to the outside world of things and events. Moreover, our intuition is that this unprecedented displacement, which comes to define Virginia Woolf’s last works, is to be compared with a philosophical concept emerging at the same time: Edmund Husserl’s Lifeworld. The Lifeworld, or Lebenswelt, theorised by Husserl in his last work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, provides a conceptual framework in which the externalisation of subjectivity and its shaping of the outside world become conceivable. In this respect, Woolf and Husserl’s contemporary conceptions of reality appear particularly close. Our aim, however, is not to use the concept as a key for the text – nor will we analyse Woolf’s fiction from a philosophical standpoint. Instead of this, we intend to set up an “intertextual” dialogue between the often opposing principles of literature and philosophy: the Lifeworld, far from solving the questions raised by Woolf’s texts, is better conceived of as a catalyst destined to expose the underlying logic of Woolf’s late fiction. We thus take Husserl’s Lifeworld into account only inasmuch as its analysis paves the way for the discovery of Woolf’s own Lifeworld.

Levinas s’intéresse à la notion du concret de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En 1930, Levinas montre que la notion de l’être a son origine dans l’expérience concrète de l’être qui est l’intuition immanente philosophique. Dans les années 1940, d’une part, Levinas met en relief que la phénoménologie consiste à rechercher dans les vécus concrets l’origine du phénoménologue et de sa vie ; et d’autre part, il détermine l’esprit humain par sa puissance de coïncider avec l’origine de sa vie et de lui-même. À l’époque de Totalité et infini, Levinas clarifie que la description phénoménologique de l’expérience concrète d’une entité est à la fois l’événement même de la révélation de l’être concret de cette entité et l’événement même de l’effectuation de cette entité. D’où Levinas met en évidence, d’une part, la méthode de concrétisation qui lie les expériences concrètes les unes aux autres et, d’autre part, le perspectivisme qui décrit l’expérience concrète telle qu’elle est vécue maintenant. Dans Totalité et infini, Levinas effectue la description phénoménologique comprise par lui. En décrivant les expériences concrètes du moi, il les distribue en deux séries : celle du besoin (vie naïve) et celle du désir (critique de soi). Dans la série du besoin, sur la base de l’habitation se fondent les expériences du moi naïf : le travail, la possession et la représentation. Et dans la série du désir se distribuent les expériences avec autrui : la parole, l’amour avec la femme et la fécondité. Ces deux séries d’expériences constituent la forme originaire de l’expérience du moi personnel. Totalité et infini est en ce sens la description phénoménologique du moi personnel par excellence. / Levinas brings out the notion of the concrete from Husserl’s phenomenology. In his 1930 book, Levinas shows that the notion of the being has its origin in the concrete experience of the being that is philosophical immanent intuition. In two articles published in the 1940s, Levinas reveals that the phenomenology searches in concrete experiences the origin of the phenomenologist himself and his life. On the other hand, he determines the human spirit by its power to coincide with the origin of his life and himself. In four articles published around 1960, Levinas clarifies the phenomenological description of the concrete experience of an entity is the very event of revelation of the concrete being of this entity and the very event of the effectuation of the entity. Hence, Levinas brings out the method of concretization which connects together concrete experiences as well as the perspective which describes concrete experience as it is now experienced. In Totality and infinity, Levinas practices the phenomenological description understood by himself. By describing concrete experiences of the “I”, Levinas categorizes them into two series of experience: that of need (naive life) and that of desire (self-criticism). In the series of need, the experiences of the naive “I” relies on the dwelling : labor, possession and representation. And in the series of desire, experiences with the other are distributed: speech, love with woman and fecundity. These two series of experiences constitute the proto-form of the experience of the personal “I”. Totality and infinity is in this sense the phenomenological description of the personal “I” par excellence.

Cette thèse vise à reconstituer la théorie de l'espace développée par Husserl dans les manuscrits des premières années quatre-vingt-dix qui composent le Livre de l'espace. On en exposera les thématiques principales et identifiera les influences exercées sur la pensée de Husserl durant sa formation philosophique, avec une attention particulière en ce qui concerne les aspects mathématiques et scientifiques du problème de l'espace. / My thesis aims to reconstruct the first husserlian space theory, as developed in several unpublished manuscripts from the early 1890s, which were meant to compose the so-called "Book of Space".The author will present the Book of space in its several aspeccts, by offering a general averview of its topics and identifying those theoretical influences that somehow shaped Husserl's philosophical formation. Moreover, part of this thesis is dedicated to discuss the background of mathematical and scientifc ideas animating the debate about the problem of space, between nineteenth and twentieth century.

On part d’une difficulté d’interprétation qui a partagé les commentateurs concernant le statut transcendantal de la philosophie de Martin Heidegger. En effet, alors que beaucoup des concepts fondamentaux d’Être et temps (1927) semblent résister à une interprétation transcendantaliste (le Dasein, le « on », le comprendre, l’ustensilité, la tournure, l’angoisse, l’appel), au sens où il désignent la façon dont nous sommes immédiatement au monde, sans la médiation d’un sujet constituant, Heidegger désigne lui-même l’orientation générale de son traité comme une orientation transcendantale. En effet, la temporalité couronne l’édifice, et fonde même l’existence dans sa dimension la plus concrète. De quel transcendantal Heidegger fait alors usage, s’il refuse le sujet comme substance, et qu’il n’y a donc plus d’instance subjective constitutive de l’expérience ? On défend une interprétation pratique de ce transcendantal : le fondement est bien la quête de Heidegger, mais en tant qu’il est toujours à fonder par un Dasein libre et responsable de lui-même. Cette interprétation que nous appelons « praxiologico-transcendantale » permet d’inscrire Heidegger dans une tradition métaphysique bien déterminée, en montrant comment sa philosophie s’élabore contre les conceptions transcendantalistes des néokantiens, en montrant aussi comment Husserl et Scheler lui donnent les outils phénoménologiques pour associer pratique et transcendantal, et enfin en l’inscrivant dans une tradition dont Kant fut le précurseur dans quelques textes, et dont Fichte fut le vrai fondateur : un kantisme qui décrit un sujet pratique, au moyen de l’union des deux première Critiques. Ainsi, loin de rompre avec la métaphysique en 1927, Heidegger en régénère-t-il une figure fondamentale dont on essaie d’indiquer les concepts cruciaux. / This PhD work starts from a difficulty of interpretation that had divided commentators, concerning the transcendental status of the Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. Indeed, whereas many basic concepts in Sein und Zeit (1927) appear to resist a transcendentalist interpretation (« Dasein », « Man », « Verstehen », ustensility, « Angst », « Ruf »…), because they designate the way we are immediatly in the world without the mediation of a constituting subject, Heidegger indicates the treaty’s general direction as a transcendental direction. Indeed, the temporality crowns the building, and grounds existence in its most concrete dimension. What is the Heidegger’s transcendental, if he refuses the subject as substance, and if there is therefore no more constituting subject for experience ? We defend a practical interpretation of this transcendental : the ground is indeed the quest of Heidegger, but as it is always to be found by a free and responsible for himself Dasein. This interpretation, that we call « praxiologico-transcendental », allows to link Heidegger to a well determined metaphysical tradition, by showing how his philosophy confronts neokantian’s transcendentalist conceptions, by showing also how Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler provide phenomenological tools for joining praxis and transcendental, and finally by locating him within a tradition of which Kant was the precursor in some texts, and of which Fichte was the true founder : a kantism that describes a practical subject, by means of the union of the two first Critique. Thus, far from breaking with metaphysics in 1927, Heidegger regenerates one of its fundamental figure, of which we try to indicate crucial concepts.

Cette thèse examine la phénoménologie en tant que philosophie-en-travail, en tant que projet ouvert de recherche. Sa tâche principale consiste à déterminer la façon d’accomplir le travail phénoménologique. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous examinons les analyses de la doctrine phénoménologique de l’attitude (Partie I.), de la doctrine de la méthode (Partie II.) et de l’architectonique « flexible » (Partie III.) de la phénoménologie. Ces élaborations nous permettent de thématiser la dé-limitation de la conscience, l’enrichissement de sens et l’institution du nouveau en tant que traits caractéristiques de la manière phénoménologique d’opérer. Cette recherche exige une oscillation constante entre une systématique ouverte de la philosophie d’Edmund Husserl et des analyses phénoménologues particulières. / This dissertation examines phenomenology as working philosophy (Arbeitsphilosophie), that is, as an open research project. The main aim of the study consists in determining the mode of performance (Vollzugsweise) of the phenomenological work in progress. To achieve this goal we provide an analysis of the doctrine of attitude (Part I.), the doctrine of method (Part II.), and then the “flexible” architectonics (Part III.) of phenomenology. These elaborations enable us to thematize the de-limitation of consciousness (Entschränkung), the enrichment of sense (Sinnbereicherung) and the institution of the new as the characteristic features of the phenomenological method of operating. This research project requires a constant oscillation between an open systematization of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy and particular phenomenological analyses. / Diese Dissertationsforschung hat zwei parallellaufende Aufgaben vor sich. Die erste besteht darin, die allgemeine Form und die spezifische Vollzugsweise der phänomenologisch philoso-phischen Arbeit zu bestimmen; die zweite besteht ihrerseits darin diese Arbeit im Verlauf – auf ihrem Weg zu zeigen. Dafür hat dieser Dissertationstext zwei Einleitungen: die systematische Einleitung, die die offene Systematik (die sog. «flexible Architektonik») der phänomenologi-schen Philosophie darstellt, und die propädeutische Einleitung, die die Grundintuitionen der phä-nomenologischen Philosophie (z. B. das Unverständlichwerden des Selbstverständlichen – das philosophische Erstaunen, die Enttäuschung bei der Trugwahrnehmung etc.) formuliert. Anders gesagt, das Ziel besteht darin, das Spezifische der phänomenologischen Arbeit zu verstehen und zu vollziehen.

La thèse propose une étude de la notion de « monde de la vie » (Lebenswelt) telle qu’elle se déploie dans la pensée d’Edmund Husserl, fondateur de la phénoménologie. Prenant pour fil conducteur le problème qui est inscrit dans le nom même de cette notion (le problème d’une détermination du sens d’être du monde à partir de la vie intentionnelle du sujet), la thèse élucide la notion moyennant une approche fonctionnelle, fondée sur la distinction cardinale entre les régimes naturel et transcendantal de la vie intentionnelle. On montre en premier lieu que le monde de la vie se comprend comme monde corrélatif du passage d’une vie intentionnelle naturelle à la vie constituante de la subjectivité transcendantale (I), puis, à l’inverse, comme corrélat du recouvrement de cette vie transcendantale avec la vie naturelle de la conscience psychologique mondaine (II). Alors que la première partie rend compte de la genèse de cette notion dans la pensée de Husserl et montre qu’elle est indissociable du développement puis de la relativisation de l’idée d’une ontologie matérielle, la seconde partie montre que la notion de monde de la vie prend tout son sens lorsqu’elle est définie à partir des conditions de l’unité de la vie transcendantale et de la vie naturelle : on peut dès lors définir la phénoménologie husserlienne comme un positivisme transcendantal, au sein duquel le concept de monde de la vie reçoit des déterminations anthropologiques et biologiques tout en devenant le lieu d’une restitution transcendantale du sens de la positivité naturelle. / This PhD studies the concept of « life-world » (Lebenswelt) as it is developed in Edmund Husserl’s thought. Using as a leading clue the problem inscribed in the very name of the notion (the problem of a determination of the world’s mode of being from the intentional life of the subject), the PhD clarifies the notion through a functional approach, funded on the cardinal distinction between the natural and transcendental sides of the intentional life. First, it shows that the life-world can be understood as a world correlated to the transition from the natural intentional life toward the constituting life of a transcendental subjectivity (I) ; then, conversely, as the correlate of the unity between this transcendental life and the natural-psychological life of a worldly consciousness (II). In the first part, the PhD highlights the complex genesis of this notion in Husserl’s thought and shows that it is linked with the development and then the relativisation of the idea of a material ontology ; in its second part, it shows that the notion of life-world is the most significant when defined on the basis of the conditions of the unity of transcendental and natural life : the Husserlian phenomenology can therefore be defined as a transcendental positivism, in which the concept of life-world receives anthropological and biological determinations while allowing at the same time a transcendental restitution of the world’s natural positivity.

Back to Husserl: Reclaiming the Traditional Philosophical Context ofthe Phenomenological ‘Problem’ of the Other: Leibniz’s Monadology”. The internalmotivation that led Husserl to revise his early view of the pure Ego as empty ofessential content is traced to the end of explicating his reformulation of phenomenologyas the egology of the concrete transcendental Ego. The necessity ofrecasting transcendental phenomenology as a transcendental idealism that followsfrom this reformulation is presented and the appearance of transcendentalsolipsism of this idealism exposed as unfounded. That the ground of this exposureis Husserl’s phenomenological appropriation of Leibniz’s metaphysical insightsinto the problem of accounting for the plurality of monads, and, therefore, not theCartesian problem of the other mind, is presented as the key to reclaiming thetraditional philosophical context of the phenomenological problem of the other. / La motivación interna que llevó a Husserl a revisar su visión tempranadel Ego puro como vacío de contenido esencial puede rastrearse con el fin de explicarsu reformulación de la fenomenología como la egología del Ego trascendentalconcreto. Este artículo presenta la necesidad de replantear la fenomenologíatrascendental como un idealismo trascendental que se sigue de esta reformulación,y se expone como infundada la apariencia de solipsismo trascendentalde este idealismo. El presente artículo también se ocupa de mostrar que la basepara esta exposición es la apropiación fenomenológica que hace Husserl de laspenetrantes intuiciones metafísicas de Leibniz en torno al problema de cómoexplicar la pluralidad de mónadas, y, por lo tanto, no el problema cartesianode la otra mente. Esto es considerado clave para reclamar el contexto filosóficotradicional del problema fenomenológico del otro.

La phénoménologie est née comme une philosophie de la conscience, au début du XXe siècle. En cela, elle est l’héritière d’un concept particulièrement marqué par la pensée empiriste, de Locke à Brentano. En tant que telle, la naissance de la phénoménologie peut s’interpréter au titre d’un événement historique, et nous l’abordons sous l’angle de la question : « les évolutions propres au concept phénoménologique de conscience s’inscrivent-elles en continuité ou en rupture, par rapport à sa tradition ? ». D’un autre côté cependant, les textes qui témoignent de cette naissance sont aussi l’oeuvre d’un homme, et le résultat d’un effort de pensée. Les interpréter ainsi exige alors une toute autre approche. Nous avançons dans ce travail les éléments d’une lecture pratique, à savoir que la philosophie, comme toute pratique, progresse par répétition de gestes. Nous adressons alors la question : « comment cette répétition peut-elle parvenir à des résultats nouveaux sur le plan de la conscience ? ». C’est le croisement, nullement prémédité, de ces deux problématiques, qui caractérise notre travail. En cela, le concept d’intention y occupe une place centrale. Initialement dédié au domaine de l’action humaine, il sert pourtant à caractériser l’essence même de l’acte de conscience, dans les Recherches Logiques. C’est pourquoi, loin de prétendre unifier ces deux problématiques, nous avons seulement cherché à les articuler, à partir de ce concept. / The phenomenological movement was born as a philosophy of consciousness, at the beginning of the XXth century. In this regard, it inherits a concept particularly marked by empiricism, from Locke to Brentano. As such, the rise of phenomenology can be interpreted as a historical event, and I therefore address the following question : “is the phenomenological concept of consciousness part of a continuum, or a more radical shift, regarding its tradition?”. On another side however, the texts that bear witness of this birth are also the work of an individual thinker, and the result of a thinking effort. To interpret them as such requires thus a very different approach. I propose in my work to offer the starting elements of a practical interpretation, precisely in the sense that philosophy, like any other practice, progresses by repetition of gestures. I therefore address the following question: “how can this repetition produce new results for the concept of consciousness?”. It is the junction, that wasn’t predetermined, of these two problems, that characterises my work. Therein, the concept of intention plays a central role. Initially dedicated to human action, it is however used to characterise the essence of the conscious act, in the Logical Investigations. Far from pretending unifying these two problems, I have only tried to articulate them, with the help of this concept.