S'appuyant sur la distinction de Fink à l'égard des concepts thématiques et des concepts opératoires dans la phénoménologie husserlienne, ce mémoire prend pour premier fil directeur *la question de l'origine* afin de retourner circulairement à *l'origine de la question*, et ainsi y éclairer la tension à l'œuvre entre la *fixité* et le *devenir*. Il s'agit de rendre compte que l'origine y fonctionne comme le concept opératoire par excellence, permettant dès lors de montrer que chaque tentative thématique auprès de l'origine entraîne des thématisations différentes de la méthode phénoménologique elle-même. Cette étude prend donc également pour second fil directeur le passage et la continuité entre la phénoménologie statique - qui entend fixer la validité absolue de la connaissance - et la phénoménologie génétique - qui renvoie cette validité à la dimension opératoire de sa genèse. Ce faisant, les trois chapitres qui composent cette étude retracent ces fils conducteurs à travers trois moments cruciaux de la pensée de Husserl, à savoir (1) un moment d'apparition dans les *Recherches logiques* où l'origine se thématise comme essence ou *être-vrai-fixe*, (2) un moment de transition dans les *Leçons sur le temps* en raison des considérations nouvelles sur la temporalité, et (3) un moment de dépassement dans la phénoménologie transcendantale de 1917-1921 avec l'association de l'origine à ce qu'on nomme l'*être-en-devenir*.

Este trabalho pretende investigar as relações existentes entre as filosofias de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger a partir do traço cartesiano identificado na fenomenologia. Seu objetivo primeiro consiste em reconstruir a descrição husserliana da etapa transcendental de sua filosofia e analisar sua relação com o pensamento de Descartes. Em seguida, a investigação se voltará à exposição da crítica que Heidegger dirige ao projeto fenomenológico em suas preleções de Marburg e buscará compreender de que modo a crítica mesma, mais uma vez permeada pelas teses cartesianas, apresenta um caminho para a constituição da ontologia fundamental, cuja forma maturada terá seu lugar em Ser e Tempo. / Martin Heidegger\'s philosophies through the lenses of phenomenology and its Cartesian features. Revisiting Husserl\'s description of the transcendental stage of his philosophy and analyzing its connection with Descartes\' thought is, thus, the main objective of this work. Thenceforth, we expose Heidegger\'s criticism over this phenomenological project, seen in his Marburg Lectures. His criticism is also suffused with the Cartesian theses, and therefore we attempt to understand how it may have laid the path to forging a fundamental ontology. An ontology whose mature configuration will then find its place in Being and Time.

O objetivo desta tese consiste em avaliar, sob um prisma fenomenológico, as concepções presentes na obra de Santo Agostinho referentes ao uso da reflexão como instrumento do conhecimento de si. Para isso, analisamos as obras As confissões (397d.C.) A trindade (416 d.C.) e fragmentos de outras obras em que ele aborda o tema da reflexão. Consideramos dois diferentes níveis em que as ideias se encontram presentes nas obras: nas descrições de estados subjetivos narrados em primeira pessoa por Agostinho nas Confissões e nas exposições feitas por Agostinho em outras de suas obras. Investigamos alguns temas que se mostraram de grande importância para se compreender o papel da reflexão em Agostinho. Em primeiro lugar, o espírito humano entendido como uma realidade íntima, um ser reflexivo e imaterial. Em segundo lugar, analisamos o papel do método reflexivo em suas investigações acerca da memória, da percepção e das inter-relações entre o corpo e a mente. Em terceiro lugar procuramos observar como Agostinho compreende a vida do espírito em suas inter-relações com o mundo e com Deus. Na segunda parte da tese, os temas foram retomados e abordados sob um prisma fenomenológico. Para isso procuramos expor e avaliar, no que tange aos temas abordados por Agostinho, o percurso metodológico traçado por Husserl em Ideias 1 (1913) e Ideias 2 (1952). Na terceira parte da tese, fizemos uma análise comparativa entre as concepções e os métodos adotados pelos dois autores. Observamos que, embora haja diferenças no modo de aplicar a reflexão, muitas das conclusões tiradas por Husserl já haviam sido antecipadas por Agostinho, embora, neste, com um menor nível de rigor. Merecem destaque os seguintes pontos abordados primeiramente por Agostinho e posteriormente desenvolvidos por Husserl: 1) a mente é uma realidade íntima e indubitável; 2) a essência da mente é sua reflexividade, sua capacidade de apreender-se a si mesma; 3) a atenção ou intentio voluntatis é um fator constituinte do ato de percepção e de qualquer ato do cogito; 4) o tempo é abordado por Agostinho não como realidade independente do espírito, mas sim como uma realidade vinculada ao espírito, de modo que o passado, o presente e o futuro são articulados com a memória, a atenção e a expectativa. Em suma, o objetivo das análises e comparações é contribuir para uma visão mais rica e complexa da história do método reflexivo e, ao mesmo tempo, defender sua legitimidade e seu valor cognitivo. A reflexão é instrumento intelectual capaz de fornecer não só conhecimentos seguros sobre a estrutura apodíctica da consciência e dos diferentes estratos da pessoa humana, como também é válida para que cada indivíduo possa conhecer a si mesmo em sua singularidade. E essa individualização é marcada por fatores psíquicos, corpóreos e pelo mundo espiritual do sujeito, isto é, pelo mundo da vida. / The objective of this thesis is to evaluate, under a phenomenological perspective, the concepts present in the work of St. Augustine regarding the use of reflection as a tool of self-knowledge. We study the works Confessions (397AD) The Trinity (416AD) and fragments of other works in which he addresses the topic of reflection. We consider two different levels at which ideas are in his works: the descriptions of subjective states narrated in first person by Augustine in the Confessions and the presentations made by Augustine in his other works. Some themes have proved of great importance for understanding the role of reflection in the Augustine\'s works. Firstly, we analyze how Augustine develops the concept of mind understood as an inner reality, self-consciousness, characterized as immaterial substance. Secondly, we examined the role of the reflective method in his researches on memory, on perception and on the strata of the human person. Thirdly we analyzed how Augustine understands the life of the spirit in their interrelations with the world and with God. In the second part of the thesis, the issues addressed in the first part were reexamined under a phenomenological perspective, according to the methodological approach outlined by Husserl in Ideas 1 (1913) and Ideas 2 (1952). In the third part of the thesis, we made a comparative analysis of concepts and methods adopted by the two authors. We observe that although there are differences in the way of applying the reflection, many of the conclusions drawn by Husserl had already been anticipated by Augustine, albeit with a lower level of rigor. In particular the following points addressed first by Augustine and later developed by Husserl: 1) the mind is an intimate and undeniable reality. 2) The essence of mind is its reflexivity, its ability to know herself directly. 3) attention or intentio voluntatis is a constituent factor of the act of perception 4) the time is approached by Augustine not as a reality independent of mind, but as a reality linked to the spirit, so that the past, present and future are articulated with memory, attention and expectation. In short, the purpose of analysis and comparisons is to contribute to a richer and complex history of the reflective method and at the same time maintaining its legitimacy and its cognitive value. Reflection is an intellectual instrument able to provide apodictic knowledge of the structure of consciousness, about the different strata of the human person, and helps individuals to know himself in his uniqueness. And that individualization is marked by psychological factors, by corporal\'s factors and by his world of life.

O presente trabalho consiste na tradução anotada da Terceira Parte das Lições do Semestre de Inverno de 1904-1905 intitulada Fantasia e Consciência de Imagem, acompanhada de uma introdução. Nesta apresentamos inicialmente a teoria da intencionalidade desenvolvida nas Investigações Lógicas, cujos elementos são fundamentais para a compreensão da análise da estrutura intencional das imagens físicas e da fantasia empreendida nas Lições. Num segundo momento, buscamos retraçar o percurso analítico feito por Husserl nas Lições, o qual conduz ao reconhecimento de que as fantasias, consideradas inicialmente imagens, possuem uma estrutura intencional semelhante à das percepções. Esta descoberta o levará ao questionamento e à crítica do esquema apreensão-conteúdo de apreensão, até então válido para descrever os diversos modos de consciência intencional, e ao esboço de uma nova teoria para explicitar a diferença entre o caráter atual dos atos presentantes e o caráter inatual dos atos presentificantes, como a memória, a fantasia e a expectativa. / This dissertation comprises the annotated translation of the Third Part of the Lectures from the Winter Semester 1904/1905, entitled Fantasy and Image Consciousness, and an introduction. In the introduction, we initially present the theory of intentionality developed in the Logical Investigations, whose elements are fundamental to understand the analysis of the intentional structure of physical and fantasy images carried out in the Lectures. Secondly, we seek to retrace the analytical path taken by Husserl in the Lectures, which leads to the recognition that fantasies, initially considered as images, have an intentional structure similar to that of perceptions. This discovery will lead him to criticize the scheme apprehension-content of apprehension, hitherto valid for describing the various modes of intentional consciousness, and to outline a new interpretation to explain the difference between the actual character of the acts of presentation and the inactual character\" of the acts of representation, such as memory, fantasy and expectation.

Ce travail thématique et historique a pour objectif de mettre en lumière les difficultés que l'on peut rencontrer lorsque nous tentons de saisir ce que signifie la vie de l'ego d'un point de vue phénoménologique et scientifique. Les questions qui nous animent sont les suivantes et rythment le travail présent : que signifie précisément dire « Je » ? ; Quelle est la caractérisation de l'ego dans la phénoménologie husserlienne ? Dans quelle mesure la vie de l'ego peut-elle être naturalisée ?Notre cheminement suit les traces du corpus husserlien, en ce que nous considérons qu'il est tout d'abord nécessaire d'éclaircir le sens du terme ego dans l'optique d'une « phénoménologie analytique ». Cela nous a permis de comprendre que l'indexical « Je » peut être la marque d'une « ingénuité descriptive » qui consiste en une incapacité à décrire pleinement une situation ou la subjectivité exprimant un indexical. Seule une entente phénoménologique du « Je » peut modifier cette conception en ce qu'elle induit la présence d'une subjectivité en chair et en os, un Nullpunkt irréductible à quelque réification que ce soit. Le langage phénoménologique, en plus de valoriser la part subjective du vécu (Ichrede), permet en outre de modifier notre conception ontique du sens des termes usités afin de décrire un état de chose d'un point de vue eidétique – la chose comme corrélat.En reprenant cette idée cardinale, nous avons par la suite tenté de résoudre l'énigme du Je d'un point de historique à partir d'une étude comparée entre la phénoménologie husserlienne et celle de ses disciples (Reinach, Ingarden, Sartre). À partir de là, nous étions en mesure d'appréhender le bienfondé des critiques apportées à l'égard du tournant transcendantal de la phénoménologie. Pourtant, ces critiques ne sauraient dépasser ni compromettre la pensée de Husserl en ce qu'elle déborde selon nous le cadre formel et stérile d'une binarité idéalisme-réalisme. Nous avons ainsi voulu mettre en exergue le renouvellement, dès le tournant génétique, de la phénoménologie à partir de ce que nous nommons le « naturalisme phénoménologique » de Husserl, en particulier en ce qui concerne le traitement qu'il a accordé aux sujets comme la naissance, la mort, l'anomalité et l'animalité. Ce faisant, nous avions tous les éléments pour démontrer que Husserl n'était idéaliste qu'en apparence et que son œuvre contenait les germes de l'entreprise naturaliste en développement depuis quelques dizaines d'années.Il fallut dès lors montrer les corrélations entre la phénoménologie « classique » et la naturalisation de la phénoménologie à travers une étude des textes contemporains présentés par des auteurs comme F.Varela, N.Depraz ou J-L Petit. Il nous apparut ainsi que la naturalisation en restait à l'état embryonnaire, mais qu'elle pouvait dans un avenir proche, grâce à des recherches sur l'agentivité, la dépression, ou sur la phénophysique, éclairer les sciences cognitives dans l'optique d'une étude cogénérative et fertile en ce qu'elle joint les perspectives à la première et la troisième personne. Or, il nous semble malgré tout que la naturalisation de la phénoménologie demeure davantage asubjective, au sens que donne Patocka, que pleinement phénoménologique. Nous concluons de la sorte en affirmant qu'il faut distinguer deux types de phénoménologie de même que deux types de naturalisation, tout en avançant qu'il serait judicieux de prendre également en considération le rôle du système nerveux entérique, en plus du cerveau, dans la caractérisation de la vie subjective. / This thematic and historical work aims to highlight the difficulties that can be encountered when we try to grasp what the egological life means from a phenomenological and scientific point of view. The questions that animate us are the following and rhythm the present work: what exactly does it mean to say "I"? ; What is the characterization of the egological life in Husserlian phenomenology? To what extent can the egological life be naturalized?Our path follows the Husserlian corpus for we consider that it is first necessary to clarify the meaning of the term “ego” in the perspective of an “analytic phenomenology”. This allowed us to understand that the indexical “I” can be the mark of a “descriptive ingenuity” which consists in an inability to fully describe a situation or a subjectivity expressing itself. Only a phenomenological understanding of the “I” may modify this conception by inducing that the presence of a subjectivity made of flesh and bones is an irreducible Nullpunkt. The phenomenological language, in addition to valuing the subjective part of live experience (Ichrede), also allows to modify our ontic conception of the meaning of termes used in order to describe a state of things from an eidetic point of view – a thing as correlate.By taking up this cardinal idea, we have subsequently attempted to solve the enigma around the I from a historical point of view on the basis a comparative study between Husserlian phenomenology and what critics made by Husserls disciples such as Reinach, Ingarden and Sartre. From then on, we were able to grasp the depth and validity of some critics made against the transcendental turn of phenomenology. Yet, these critics cannot go beyond or compromise Husserl'sthinking for this latter one overflows in our view the formal and sterile framework of an idealistic-realistic binarity. In this way, we wanted to highlight the renewal of phenomenology from the genetic point of view, starting with what we call the “phenomenological naturalism”, especially in regard to the treatment Husserl accorded to subjects such as birth, death, a(b)no(r)mality and animality. In doing so, we had the evidence to show that Husserl was only apparently an idealist and that his work contains the seeds of the naturalistic enterprise under developent for some decades.It was therefore necessary to show the correlations between the “classical” phenomenology and the naturalization of phenomenology through a study of contempory texts presented by authors such as F. Varela, N. Depraz or J-L Petit. It appeared to us that naturalization was still embryonic, but that it may in the near future, through researches on agentivity, depression or phenophysics, illuminate cognitive sciences from the perspective of a cogenerative and fertile study for it joins the first and third person perspectives. However, it seems to us that the naturalization of phenomenology remains more asubjective, in the sense given by Patocka, than fully phenomenological. In conclusion, we affirm that two types of phenomenology must be distinguished, as well as two types of naturalization, while arguing that it would be also wise to take into consideration the role of the enteric nervous system, in addition to the brain, in the characterization of subjective life.

The purpose of this essay is to discuss relationality in G.W Leibnizs Monadologie (1714). In general terms this essay analyzes the notion of individuation in relation to the concept of monads. The analysis proposes a question regarding the body in this individuation, and what consequences follows for the understanding of the relation between the single individual and other individuals. It will be shown that the irreducibility of having a body transcendens something like ownness, subjectivity, personality and individuation, and this is explained through the pre-established harmony between the monads – where the plurality of monads is detected before the monads singularity. To widen this investigation of relationality between the monads, I will turn to Edmund Husserls phenomenological operation for solving the egological problem of solipsism in Cartesian Meditations (1929). In his meditations, Husserl uses the monad as a self-conscious ego with peculiar ownness. After having outlined the relevant characteristics of Husserl phenomenological methodical operation, I turn to Deleuzes non-phenomenological reading of Leibniz in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988). In Deleuzes reading Leibniz is ascribed a transcendental philosophy which bears on the event rather than the phenomenon. The purpose is to develop a discussion between Leibniz, Husserl and Deleuze about relationality in relation to the concept of monads, and about the different ways in which we can approach this subject.

Habilitationschrift--Tübingen. / Bibliography: p. 406-410.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Köln, 2003/04.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper aims to describe from a steiniana perspective on the theme of empathy, as constitutor element of uniqueness of the human person, in the relationships we have subjectively and intersubjectively with each other. He background thread is to present, as Edith Stein philosophically position yourself in search of the essence of the theme of empathy, and what are the prospects opening up from its investigation. In this sense, questions and notes are highlighted on the subject of empathy of her teacher Edmund Husserl and confrontations with other similar experiences, raised by other philosophers, such as; Theodor Lipps and Max Scheler. Edith Stein puts in theoretical confrontation with the phenomenological tradition, seeking to describe the essence of the acts of empathy, and affirms the importance of this experience, as constitutor element of uniqueness of the human person. We develop our research, substantiated by the phenomenological method and literature, of which, there is the work of Edith Stein, "About the problem of empathy" (Zum problem der Einfühlung) and Ideas II of Edmund Husserl. The structure of the dissertation was divided into three parts inextricably linked, from which we highlight: At first we describe on the subject of empathy Edmund Husserl, where we present his phenomenological position on the issue, and some developments that allowed her reflection. Our main goal at the moment is to present basic research, in which Stein followed. The second time, presents the theme of empathy in essence according to Stein. In this sense we list the main concepts and philosophical clashes that Stein sets out to do, showing genuine character as a result of empathy and their execution conditions. The third time, we discussed the act of empathizing. Our intention is to introduce empathy, as constitution experience the uniqueness of the human person and the affirmation of personal and other people's values in their relations. However, we affirm that in our relations, there is the possibility of a reciprocal exchange of knowledge and personal values, or formed by our community, safeguarding the dignity of our own existence. This reciprocity is qualified by experience of empathy that enables us to put up from 'other' point of view (the one originating in 'other') and discover hitherto unknown values. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo descrever, desde uma perspectiva steiniana, sobre o tema da empatia, como elemento constituidor da singularidade da pessoa humana nas relações que estabelecemos subjetiva e intersubjetivamente com o outro. A discussão de fundo consiste em apresentar como Edith Stein posiciona-se filosoficamente na busca da essência do tema da empatia e quais são as perspectivas que se abrem desde sua investigação. Nesse sentido, ressaltam-se os questionamentos e os apontamentos sobre o tema da empatia de seu mestre, Edmund Husserl, bem como as confrontações com as outras vivências similares levantadas por outros filósofos, como por exemplo: Theodor Lipps e Max Scheler. Edith Stein coloca-se em confronto teórico com a tradição fenomenológica, na busca de descrever a essência dos atos de empatia e afirma a importância desta vivência, como elemento constituidor da singularidade da pessoa humana. Desenvolvemos nossa pesquisa, fundamentada pelo método fenomenológico e por pesquisa bibliográfica, da qual, destaca-se a obra de Edith Stein, Sobre o problema da empatia (Zum problem der Einfühlung) e Ideias II , de Edmund Husserl. A estruturação da dissertação foi dividida em três partes intrinsecamente interligadas, das quais destacamos: No primeiro momento, descrevemos sobre o tema da empatia de Edmund Husserl, onde apresentamos o seu posicionamento fenomenológico sobre o tema e alguns desdobramentos que a sua reflexão permitiu. Nosso objetivo principal nesse momento, é apresentar a base de investigação, pela qual Stein seguiu. O segundo momento apresenta o tema da empatia em sua essência, segundo Stein. Neste sentido, elencamos os principais conceitos e embates filosóficos que Stein se propõe a fazer, mostrando como resultado o caráter genuíno da empatia e suas condições de efetivação. Já no terceiro momento, discutimos sobre o ato de empatizar. Nossa intenção tem como finalidade apresentar a empatia como vivência constituidora da singularidade da pessoa humana e da afirmação dos valores pessoais e alheios em suas relações. Contudo, afirmamos que, em nossas relações existe a possibilidade de uma troca recíproca de conhecimento e dos valores pessoais ou constituídos pela nossa comunidade, que garantem a dignidade da nossa própria existência. Essa reciprocidade é qualificada pela vivência da empatia que nos possibilita colocar-se deste outro‟ ponto de vista (aquele originário do outro‟) e descobrir valores até então desconhecidos.

Etant donné que la phénoménologie husserlienne se propose de résoudre les problèmes philosophiques en adoptant pour méthode la réflexion et la description de l'expérience vécue, il est très tentant de voir en Husserl un héritier de cette tradition philosophique qui se trouve ruinée par les arguments de Wittgenstein. En partant du présupposé que la déconstruction du « mythe de l'intériorité » enclenchée par Wittgenstein est juste en son principe, il s'agira de montrer que l'on ne peut trouver chez Wittgenstein une réfutation implicite de la conception phénoménologique de l'intériorité qu'en faisant une lecture superficielle des Recherches logiques et des Idées directrices. En effet, si l'on sait porter attention aux détails des textes pertinents, on peut déceler chez Husserl une réflexion très fine sur la nature du langage qui débouche éventuellement sur une critique de la conception moderne et empiriste de l'intériorité du sujet très similaire à celle mise en chantier par les Recherches philosophiques, critique qui, de surcroît, a l'avantage de désamorcer certaines difficultés rencontrées par Wittgenstein. Une telle étude comparative et polémique permettra de tirer deux grandes conclusions à l'égard de la méthode devant être employée en philosophie. Premièrement, il sera démontré que la réflexivité exigée par le discours philosophique se reflète dans l'usage que Husserl et Wittgenstein font des guillemets. Cette observation en apparence triviale permettra d'établir que le discours philosophique repose sur l'usage d'un dispositif typographique banal appartenant à la grammaire de notre langage ordinaire. Ensuite, la supériorité de la méthode « généalogique » de la phénoménologie génétique de Husserl sera mise en relief. Cette dernière a le mérite d'éviter les apories du conventionnalisme de Wittgenstein tout en désamorçant les difficultés soulevées par l'essentialisme de la phénoménologie statique des Idées directrices. / Since Husserl's phenomenology purports to solve philosophical problems through description and reflection upon lived experience, it is extremely tempting to see him as an inheritor of the philosophical tradition that Wittegenstein's arguments demolished. Taking as its starting point the assumption that the deconstruction of the « myth of interiority » instigated by Wittgenstein is well founded, this project will attempt to show that Wittegenstein's arguments can only appear to refute Husserl's conception of interiority on the basis of a superficial reading of the Logical Investigations and of the Ideas I. Indeed, upon a close examination of the relevant texts, Hussserl's reflexions on the nature of language can be shown to lead him to a critique of the modern and empiricist conception of interiority very similar to Wittgenstein's, a critique that turns out to have the ressources to avoid some of the major difficulties that the latter faces. This comparative and polemical study will defend two more general theses about the method that philosophical inquiry ought to rely upon. First, it will be argued that the reflexiveness required for philosophical discourse is illustrated in both Husserl and Wittgenstein's use of quotation marks. This seemingly trivial observation will support the claim that philosophical discourse relies on the use of a banal typographical devise belonging to the grammar of ordinary language. Second, a case will be made for the superiority of the « genealogical » method of Husserl's genetic phenomenology, for it manages to avoid the pitfalls of Wittgenstein's conventionalism while also steering clear of the problems incurred by the essentialism of the Ideas I static phenomenology.