Thesis--Leyden. / In Periodical Room.

Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Andrea Staiti / This study concerns the nature and role of analyticity in the work of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. Its initial goal is that of clarifying the place of analytic judgment in Kant's critical project. Against the widely held assumption that analytic judgment has no role to play in the critical project, I show that analytic judgment has a precise and genuinely important role to play in the context of Kant's metaphysics. Analytic judgment has the role of clarifying our a priori conceptual repertoire and thus of making possible the synthetic a priori judgments that are properly constitutive of metaphysics. The next goal of the study is that of unifying and defending Kant's various characterizations of analytic judgment. Whereas a number of commentators have suggested that Kant is vague or ambivalent as regards the properties of analytic judgment, I show that we can extract a clear, consistent picture of analytic judgment from his work. The key to seeing this, I argue, is becoming clear on Kant's basic assumptions concerning concepts, logic, and propositional form. Subsequently, I turn to Husserl. Picking up on the fact that for Husserl, too, analyticity has metaphysical, or ontological significance, I spell out his conception of analyticity in detail. I show that analyticity for Husserl embraces two essentially symmetrical domains of law: the a priori laws of objective givenness and the a priori laws of propositional form. I then bring Husserl and Kant together. After showing that Husserl fails to capture the essence of Kant's theory of analytic judgment, and so fails to see exactly where he stands relative to Kant, I argue that what ultimately distinguishes Husserl from Kant is the claim that analytic truth is properly articulated in a purely formal context. I show that this departure from Kant has extremely significant consequences. For example, it enables Husserl to describe whole systems of judgment, such as mathematics or logic, as analytic; and it enables Husserl to defend the possibility of analytic judgments having empirical content. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Doctor of Philosophy(PhD) / Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is most well known as a matematician, or a logician, and then famed a the initiator of a phenomenological movement. He has been accused of promoting transcendental indealism to the point of solipsism. His focus on pure consciousness has been received as a method which operates above its historical context and straight to the 'seeing essences.' This is partly because of his problematic wording in his earlier writings. However, his last published (yet unfinished) work, The Crisis of European Sciences (Belgrade, 1936), is certainly a very different introduction to his phenomenology. In this publication he struggles with the issue of Life-world, the world we live in, before it gets to be described abstractly, in a scientific way. One aspect of our experience in this Life-world is our consciousness of internal time (not the clock-time, not even a simple measuring of duration). This investigation into the consciousness of internal time, impinges his definition of pure consciousness. Consciousness is embedded in internal-time-consciousness. Consciousness cannot operate "outside" time. In this line of thinking Husserl almost "by accident" came to formulate his philosophy of history, for which is so far much less known. Husserl's 'Philosophy of History' is his last contribution as a philosopher who had failed to systematize his teaching, as in his Erste Philosophie mss. of 1923-'24., and again in Cartesianische Meditationen, mss. 1929. which he has kept revising and ultimately dropping. Just as well in the latter case, since tempora mutantur and nos mutamus in illis, and so, as I will contend, his new conderns with history emerged. This is my thesis presented here, and it is my own original research, that Hussel's philsosphy of history is not only worthy of reconstruction but a very significant aspect of his mature phenomenology.

Texte remanié de: Ph. D. diss.--Aarhus, 2002. / Bibliogr. p. 207-223. Index.

München, Philos. Hochsch., Diss., 2009

This thesis is an investigation of memory. Reflective memory demands two things. First, that it might relate and logically position itself in relation to what is absent. Second, that it is to remain open to free repetition for so long as it goes unchallenged by forgetting or correction. Under these structural requests, the ground for an ontological comparison appears: are not these demands also the demands of language? According to Husserl’s Logical Investigations, a sign must, in its hunger for truth and fulfillment, be able both to constitute a relation with the signified, though absent, object and to repeat its sense and meaning over time. Analogously then, memory is like a language insofar as it speaks of the past in its absence and, at the same time, drives forward to its ‘death’, self-effacement, and dissolution; that is, forward into the resolution of truth.

No description available.

Doctor of Philosophy(PhD) / Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is most well known as a matematician, or a logician, and then famed a the initiator of a phenomenological movement. He has been accused of promoting transcendental indealism to the point of solipsism. His focus on pure consciousness has been received as a method which operates above its historical context and straight to the 'seeing essences.' This is partly because of his problematic wording in his earlier writings. However, his last published (yet unfinished) work, The Crisis of European Sciences (Belgrade, 1936), is certainly a very different introduction to his phenomenology. In this publication he struggles with the issue of Life-world, the world we live in, before it gets to be described abstractly, in a scientific way. One aspect of our experience in this Life-world is our consciousness of internal time (not the clock-time, not even a simple measuring of duration). This investigation into the consciousness of internal time, impinges his definition of pure consciousness. Consciousness is embedded in internal-time-consciousness. Consciousness cannot operate "outside" time. In this line of thinking Husserl almost "by accident" came to formulate his philosophy of history, for which is so far much less known. Husserl's 'Philosophy of History' is his last contribution as a philosopher who had failed to systematize his teaching, as in his Erste Philosophie mss. of 1923-'24., and again in Cartesianische Meditationen, mss. 1929. which he has kept revising and ultimately dropping. Just as well in the latter case, since tempora mutantur and nos mutamus in illis, and so, as I will contend, his new conderns with history emerged. This is my thesis presented here, and it is my own original research, that Hussel's philsosphy of history is not only worthy of reconstruction but a very significant aspect of his mature phenomenology.

Wuppertal, Universiẗat, Diss., 2000.