Transmutation is explored with respect to the sixteenth century text L'Idea del Theatro, by Giulio Camillo, linking the arts of alchemy, eloquence and divination. Alchemy establishes the doctrine of transmutation; eloquence is founded on the creative movement of deviation, while divination points to symbolization. The 'corporeal visions' of Camillo are set in opposition to the 'single eye' vision from which originate theories on perspective by the architects Leon Bastista Alberti and Sebastiano Serlio.

This thesis explores the question of history’s future as a research discipline in the academy and the question of the discipline’s function in ‘pure’ inquiry. Central to the notion of research is the notion of discovery of new knowledge, but what constitutes new historical knowledge rather than simply more historical information is not clear. As the idea of research (which is understood to mean the discovery and creation of new knowledge) is central to the idea of the modern university, the future of history as a research discipline in the research university would seem to depend on the discipline being clear on its research function. Further complicating resolution of this question is the fact that the funding of research is informed by science and technology paradigms where research is defined as ‘pure basic research’, ‘strategic basic research’, ‘applied research’, and ‘experimental development’. / Curiously, what these classifications mean for the humanities generally and history in particular, remains unexamined—despite the fact that professional survival depends on the academic convincing sceptical funders of the relevance of humanist research. Do historians do basic research? If basic research is inquiry at the edge of understanding, how, and by whom, is the edge defined? In the first decades of the University of Berlin—the institution that formed the model for the modern research-university—the edge was defined through philosophy and history. Hegelian systematic philosophy, Fichtean philosophy of the subject, and the philosophical historicism of such thinkers as Ranke, Niebuhr, Ast and Boeckh was concerned with the subject’s knowledge of knowledge: there lay the edge. By the end of the nineteenth century no discipline was foundational. Epistemological ‘advance’ had resulted in not only the split of knowledge into that derived from humanities or ‘spirit’ studies (Geisteswissenschaften) and that from science studies (Naturwissenschaften), but also the proliferation of disciplinary specialization that further entrenched the dichotomy. / In the twenty-first century, inquiry’s edge has moved on. Climate change, environmental degradation and biological and genetic engineering have posed wholly new existential questions. The Archimedean point from where the edge is viewed is no longer anthropocentric. Society and nature are inextricably connected. The physical and the spiritual can no longer be considered separately. When ‘we’ can either be manufactured or artificially enhanced the notion of autonomy and self-fashioning takes on a different hue in postmodernity than in modernity. There is now an increasing but unsatisfied need for more interdisciplinary and holistic knowledge. Unfortunately, no effective models or processes exist to enable this need to be met. This thesis explores ways in which the deficiencies might be overcome and explores academic history’s possible location within a future integrated-knowledge schema.

The study of perfection, progress and evolution is a central theme in the history of ideas. This thesis explores this theme seen and understood as part of a discourse in the new fields of anthropology, sociology and psychology in the nineteenth century. A particular focus is on the stance taken by philosophers, scientists and writers in the discussion of theories of human physical and mental evolution, as well as on their views concerning the nature of social progress and historical change. The wisdom and feasibility of improving the human species is discussed alongside an analysis of new methods of investigating and measuring physical and mental attributes of the human organism. The instruments used to assess the development of mind, body and society are described, and are viewed as part of an increased emphasis on the use of technology as an integral part of modern life, and as a means toward the ordered gathering of information in social-scientific practice. An international perspective is taken by observing the way in which ideas about the physical and mental development of humankind was discussed in light and consequence of English and European scientific exploration in the Southern Hemisphere. Further, an evaluation is made of the manner of the spread of new thought in the social sciences from the intellectual and cultural �centre� of England and Europe to the Anglo-European community located at the �periphery� in Australia in the late nineteenth century. In particular the educative role played by the non-professional enthusiast as a pivotal conduit for the dissemination of these ideas is highlighted and linked back to a significant tradition of amateur scholarship as a central phenomenon in the study of the history of ideas.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexanders-Universität Erlangen, 1905. / Also issued in: Humboldt-Gymnasium Berlin. Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresbericht ; Programm nr. 61. Vita. Bibliography: p. [1].

Titel: Tre Dimensioner av Benchmarking – En Studie inom SMEs i Gävleborg. Nivå: C-uppsats i ämnet företagsekonomi Författare: Jenny Jonsson, Cecilia Karman Handledare: Tomas Källquist, Stig Sörling Datum: 2015 – juni Syfte: Tidigare forskning menar att SMEs inte använder sig av benchmarking. Vi ställer oss frågande till detta och menar att benchmarking kan användas på olika sätt, något som tidigare forskning förbisett. Vårt syfte är därmed att belysa hur benchmarking används inom SMEs, med utgångspunkt i de tre dimensionerna process, struktur och idé. Metod: Utifrån vårt hermeneutiska synsätt har vi utfört en kvalitativ fallstudie med semistrukturerade intervjuer, där respondenterna var ifrån tio olika små och medelstora företag (SMEs) i Gävleborg. Därefter jämförde vi det empiriska materialet med den teoretiska referensramen för att kunna utföra vår analys och finna vårt bidrag. Resultat & Slutsats: Enligt vår studie använder sig SMEs, till skillnad från vad tidigare forskning påstår, i stor utsträckning av benchmarking. Vi har sett att den strikta syn på benchmarking som beskrivs i tidigare forskning inte passar SMEs förutsättningar eller arbetssätt. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Då vi utförde vår empiriska undersökning såg vi att det inom SMEs är vanligt med benchlearning. Det har forskats begränsat om detta och vi skulle gärna se en framtida studie med benchlearning inom SMEs som utgångspunkt. Uppsatsens bidrag: Vår studie visar att det krävs en ny, mindre strikt syn på benchmarking än vad tidigare forskning erbjudit för att se hur SMEs använder sig av detta verktyg. Nyckelord: Benchmarking, SMEs, process, struktur, idé. / Title: Three Dimensions of Benchmarking – A Study within SMEs in Gävleborg Level: Final assignment for Bachelor Degree in Business Administration Author: Jenny Jonsson, Cecilia Karman Supervisor: Tomas Källquist, Stig Sörling Date: 2015 - June Aim: Previous research shows that SMEs do not use benchmarking. We question this and believe that benchmarking can be used in different ways, something that previous research has overlooked. Our aim is therefore to illustrate how benchmarking is used within SMEs, based on the three dimensions process, structure and idea. Method: Based on our hermeneutic approach we have chosen to conduct a qualitative case study with semi-structured interviews, where the respondents were from ten different small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Gävleborg. We then compared the empirical material with our theoretical references to conduct our analysis and find our contribution. Result & Conclusions: According to our study SMEs use benchmarking to a great extent, in spite of what previous research shows. We have found that the strict view on benchmarking that is described in previous research does not suit SMEs conditions or ways of working. Suggestions for future research: While conducting our empirical study we saw that benchlearning is common within SMEs. The research on this is limited and we would like to see a future study focused on benchlearning within SMEs. Contribution of the thesis: Our study shows a need for a new, less strict view on benchmarking than what is offered in previous research to see how this is used within SMEs. Key words: Benchmarking, SMEs, process, structure, idea.

Accusé par Albert Burgh de considérer sa propre philosophie comme étant la meilleure entre toutes, Spinoza rectifie : il sait seulement qu'est vraie la philosophie qu'il comprend. Mais on cherchera vainement une authentique définition, chez lui, de l'idée de philosophie, ainsi qu'un programme d'ensemble des connaissances rationnelles, comme s'appliquent à en dresser Bacon, Descartes ou Hobbes. Y a-t-il chez Spinoza une conception précise, voire singulière, de l'idée de philosophie? Étudier les occurrences, la nature de la définition, ce qu'enfin peut signifier le passage d'un titre pressenti de Philosophie à celui d'Éthique, produit autant d'indices d'une idée de philosophie conçue comme praxis de distinction ou, comme le disait Althusser, comme activité de tracer des lignes de démarcation. Mais une idée même de philosophie se constitue en ce geste, et seulement en ce geste, à savoir par le biais de relations nécessaires avec ce qui a priori n'est pas elle: le vulgaire, l'ignorant, le théologien, le souverain. L'idée de philosophie, en d'autres termes, s'autoproduit dans un système de rencontres singulières. En analyser les fruits permet alors de recomposer l'idée de « vraie philosophie» : elle est d'abord celle d'une pratique de production d'idées (comprendre, philosopher droitement, parler en philosophe) et de leur communication (s'adresser au vulgaire, au souverain, enseigner en tant que philosophe). Mais se fait jour, en outre, comme un naturel philosophe, effort s'éprouvant selon une réjouissance propre au « vrai philosophe », déjà sage en vertu de son mouvement de se perfectionner et d'accroître sa puissance. / Being accused by Albert Burgh of appraising his own philosophy as the best above all others, Spinoza rectified : only the philosophy he could understand did he know as true. But vainly will one seek any authentic definition, in his works, of the idea of philosophy, or an overall programme of rational knowledge, such as Bacon, Descartes or Hobbes endeavored to make out. Can one find in Spinoza a specific, singular indeed conception of the idea of Philosophy ? Studying occurrences, the nature of the definition, eventually what the change from the prospective title Philosophy to that of Ethics may signify, generates as many indications about an idea of philosophy conceived as a praxis of distinction, or, as Althusser would say, as activity consisting of drawing boundaries. But a very idea of philosophy constitutes itself by this movement, and only by this movement, namely via necessary relations with what, a priori, is not itself : the vulgar, the ignorant, the theologian, the sovereign. In other words the idea of philosophy generates itself within a system of singular encounters. Analyzing their fruits enables one, then, to recompose the idea of “true philosophy”: it is firstly that of a practice of producing ideas (understanding, philosophizing with rectitude, speaking as philosopher) and of communicating them (speaking to the “vulgar”, to the sovereign, disseminating as philosopher). Finally something like a philosophic natural disposition comes to light, an effort experienced in an exultation proper to the “true philosopher”, who is already wise by virtue of his movement toward perfection and his growing power.

No seu Tratado sobre os Princípios do Conhecimento Humano, publicado em 1710, George Berkeley realiza uma filosofia da mente, da ideia e da linguagem, através do ponto de vista da imaterialidade da realidade percebida pelo homem, explicada por uma teoria do conhecimento com base na totalidade perceptiva compreendida pela mente, ou espírito, ou percipiente. Historicamente, a questão da inexistência da matéria como um ser exterior à mente, inerte, independente do percipiente, interpretada dentro de um contexto filosófico rigidamente empirista, é o cerne da contenda que Berkeley propõe à filosofia de Locke. Porém, ultrapassando os limites de seu século, o ponto de vista de Berkeley doravante não poderá ser ignorado em qualquer debate concernente à teoria do conhecimento posterior à sua época, articulando-se com traços de importantes correntes filosóficas, tais como o idealismo em Kant e a filosofia da linguagem em Wittgenstein. E por conter em seu núcleo a problematização da falha intrínseca ao dualismo do pensamento, a filosofia de Berkeley ainda é capaz de alimentar e iluminar a natureza do artifício dessa falha, cujo apagamento é denunciado por Habermas no final do século XX, mas cujo ponto de partida parece ter sido estabelecido pela remota herança de Anaxágoras, a qual implica a reiteração da radicalidade existencial no espírito, ponto central da filosofia de Berkeley. / In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge published in 1710, George Berkeley realizes a philosophy of the mind, the idea and the language through the point of view of the immateriality of the reality perceived by man, explained by a theory of knowledge based on the perceptive totality understood as the mind, the spirit or the perceiver. Historically, the issue of the inexistence of matter as a being external to the mind, inert and independent from the perceiver, interpreted in a rigid empirical philosophic context, is the core of the debate offered by Berkeley to the philosophy of Locke. Overpassing the limits of his century, Berkeley\'s point of view, articulated on important philosophical currents such as Kant\'s idealism and the philosophy of language of Wittgenstein, could not be ignored anymore in any debate about the theory of knowledge posterior to that time. In spite of ncompassing in its core the problematic of the intrinsic fissure of the dualism of thought, Berkeley\'s philosophy is still able to feed and enlighten the nature of the device of this fissure, which deletion is denounced by Habermas at the end of the twentieth century, but which starting point seems to have been established by the remote inheritance of Anaxagoras which involves the reiteration of existential radicalism in the spirit, core point of Berkeley\'s philosophy.

A tese é uma análise interpretativa do trecho conhecido como símile do Sol na obra República de Platão (508b-509b). Esta análise tem por base dois vieses: i) aquele das questões de relação entre autor e seus personagens, e das questões da relação dos personagens com o próprio drama vigente no diálogo; e ii) aquele das questões relativas à argumentação metafísica apresentada nesta parte do debate, seja quanto aos seus conteúdos, seja quanto aos métodos nela empregados. Estas duas perspectivas de abordagem do símile são atravessadas tendo como fio condutor da exegese o elemento dramático que o próprio autor Platão fez questão que se seguisse à exposição de Sócrates da analogia solar: a reação do personagem Glauco, sobretudo a seguinte passagem: E Glauco muito humorosamente falou: Ah, Apolo, mas que exagero extraordinário! (República VI 509c1-2). O símile do Sol assim é analisado segundo os seus possíveis aspectos de autoria, drama, comicidade e religiosidade, de um lado, e, do outro, segundo os aspectos de sua relação com alguns pontos filosóficos apresentados pelo próprio personagem Sócrates platônico no diálogo e alhures, como a assim chamada Teoria das Ideias, o chamado caminho mais longo, e alguns aludidos métodos de investigação. A partir disso, o presente estudo pretende discutir com, e lançar dúvidas sobre, algumas posições que a tradição da filosofia ocidental construiu nos séculos XX e XXI a respeito da Ideia de Bem dentro do texto da República. / This thesis is an interpretative analysis of the analogy known as simile of the Sun in Plato\'s Republic(508b-509b). The analysis is based on two perspectives: i) that of issues about relationship between author and his characters, and about relationship between the characters and own living drama in the dialogue; and ii) that of issues related to metaphysical argumentation presented in this part of work, whether about its contents or about its methods. In both these approach perspectives of the simile the exegesis\' leitmotiv is the dramatic element that author Plato himself decided put after Socrates\' exposition of analogy of sun: the reaction of character Glaucon, mainly this passage: And Glaucon very comically said: Oh, Apollo, what an extraordinary exaggeration! (RepublicVI 509c1-2). Therefore simile of Sun is analyzed according to its possible features of authorship, drama, comicality and religiosity, on one hand, and, on the other, according to its features about relationship between it and some points made by character Socrates himself in the dialogue and elsewhere, as so called Theory of Ideas, so called longer way, and some alluded to methods of inquiry. With these bases, this study intends discuss with, and cast doubts on, some positions developed at XX and XXI centuries by Western Philosophy tradition about Idea of Good within Republic\'s text.

A presente dissertação busca analisar como a concepção de representação é desenvolvida na filosofia de Leibniz tendo como pano de fundo a crítica que o filósofo faz ao modo como Descartes e Locke compreendem o conceito. Tomaremos como ponto de partida a crítica que Leibniz formula ao conceito de ideia tal como ele se encontra em Descartes, e a reformulação do conceito que ele opera a partir da compreensão da ideia como um gênero expressão. A partir dela, podemos compreender em que sentido Leibniz se vale do paradigma imagético da ideia em um sentido completamente diverso de Descartes. Ademais, ele nos permitirá compreender como, aos olhos de Leibniz, as noções de representação em Descartes e Locke se aproximam, por mais que suas concepções sobre a origem das ideias sejam opostas. Pretendemos com isso mostrar que, apesar da doutrina leibniziana da representação estar implicada em seu sistema, ela é profundamente marcada pela oposição ao cartesianismo e ao empirismo de Locke. / The following thesis aims to study how the concept of representation is developed in the philosophy of Leibniz having as a background the philosophers critic of the way Descartes and Locke understand the concept. We will take as our starting point the critique that Leibniz formulates the concept of idea as it is in Descartes, and the reformulation of this concept understanding the idea as a genre of expression. From this, we can understandin what sense Leibniz make use of the imagetic paradigm to understand the representative content of the idea in a completely diferente sense as Descartes. Furthermore, it will allow us to understand how, in Leibniz point of view, the concept of representation in Descartes and Locke are similar, albeit the description of its origins differ completely in both philosophers. We intend to show that despite the fact that Leibnizian doctrine of representation is implicated in his system, this doctrine is deeply marked by the opposition to cartesianism and Lockes empiricism.

Today the Internet is used more and more as a transportation for information. Much of the information is confidential and should not be read by those not privileged. To protect the information from unauthorized access cryptography can be applied. The cryptography algorithms in use today all have their pros and cons. They are therefore suited for different applications. We've compared three different cryptography algorithms RSA, DES and IDEA. What we've focused on is the level of security the algorithms give. DES and IDEA are symmetrical algorithms and as such they use the same key for encryption and decryption. RSA on the other hand is an asymmetrical algorithm. Asymmetrical algorithms use two keys, one for encryption and the other for decryption. The factor that is most decisive for the algorithms security is the length of the key that is used. What is interesting concerning the keys is that security increases linearly for the symmetrical algorithms, as the key length increases. For asymmetrical algorithms it increases on an expontiell curve. RSA has got a big advantage compared to DES and IDEA. The advantage is key management. RSA can be used to exchange symmetrical keys in a safe way. The big disadvantage of RSA is that it's very slow to use. According to measurements that we have seen it is about 3 to 4 times slower then DES and IDEA during encryption, when using a key length of 1024 bits. At decryption RSA is about 120 times slower using a key length of 1024 bits. DES on the other hand is slower then newer symmetrical algorithms such as IDEA. This makes it uncalled for to use it in it?s original shape as it?s obsolete and insecure. Using DES will only give a false sense of security, unless the information doesn't need to be secure for more then a short time period. IDEA offers high using it's 128 bits key and it's also the fastest of the two symmetrical algorithms, compared to the level of security that it offers. IDEA today has no known weaknesses and it has not been broken. Of the three IDEA is the best choice to use when it concerns cryptography of information, for example information which is stored on a hard disc, or information that is sent in e-commerce.