Sweden has long been nonaligned in peace with the aim to remain neutral in the event of an outbreak of war. Building confidence for this neutrality was important for Sweden during the Cold War. This placed high demands on the Swedish Navy to detect and repel violations of Swedish territorial waters. The archives, which contain the secret reports on the violations that occurred during the 1960s, have recently been opened up. The purpose of this essay is to study how the incidents that took place in Swedish territorial waters in the 1960s were managed and to examine if the handling of them was different depending on whether they were caused by the east or west side. Furthermore, the aim is also to try to categorize and interpret these measures from the two pairs of concepts of deterrence and reassurance and integration and screening. In making it possible to answer the questions, all the reports - 66 altogether - which refers to the incidents which occurred during the years 1962 through 1969, have been studied. Then the measures taken have been classified in order to be able to make a statement. Finally, these measures have been interpreted and categorized under each pair of concepts by using an analytical model. The study has shown that. East accounted for 62 % of all 66 incidents. The most exercised approach turned out to be no action at all. The results also show that there were differences in how to handle violations based on blocks belonging. The most obvious example is where no action at all took place and where it differed as much as 11 percent units between the blocks, depending on whether the incident was caused by east-or west. Furthermore, measures have been interpreted and categorized under the respective concepts. The main conclusions that could be drawn from the material studied is that there are differences in the management of incidents and that the most part of the measures taken against East could be categorized as reassurance. / Sverige har sedan en längre tid varit alliansfritt i fred med syfte att kunna vara neutralt i händelse av krig. Att skapa förtroende för denna neutralitetspolitik var viktigt för Sverige under det kalla kriget. Detta ställde höga krav på den svenska marinen att upptäcka och avvisa kränkningar av svenskt sjöterritorium. Arkiven, som innehåller de hemliga rapporter rörande de kränkningar som skedde under 1960-talet, har nyligen öppnats. Syftet med uppsatsen är att studera hur de incidenter som ägde rum på svenskt sjöterritorium under 1960-talet hanterades och att undersöka om hanteringen av dem skilde sig åt beroende av om de var orsakade av öst- respektive västblocken. Vidare är syftet också att försöka kategorisera och tolka dessa åtgärder utifrån de båda begreppsparen avskräckning och förtroendeskapande respektive integration och avskärmning. För att besvara frågeställningarna har samtliga rapporter - 66 stycken -, som avser de incidenter som inträffat under åren 1962 till och med 1969, studerats. Därefter har de vidtagna åtgärderna klassificerats för att en sammanställning skulle kunna göras. Slutligen har dessa åtgärder tolkats och kategoriserats under respektive begreppspar med hjälp av en analysmodell. Resultatet visar att Öst stod för 62 % av samtliga 66 incidenter. Den vanligaste åtgärden visade sig vara att inte vidtaga någon åtgärd alls. Resultatet visar också, att det fanns skillnader i hur man hanterade incidenter utifrån blocktillhörighet. Det tydligaste exemplet är där man inte vidtog någon åtgärd alls och där skilde det hela 11 procentenheter mellan blocken. Vidare har åtgärderna tolkats och kategoriserats under respektive begrepp. De viktigaste slutsatserna som kunnat dras från det studerade materialet är att det finns skillnader i hanteringen av incidenterna och att den övervägande andelen av åtgärder som vidtogs mot Öst kunde kategoriseras som förtroendeskapande.

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There has always been a gray zone between peace and war, but never have nations tried to exploit this fact as much as today. Nations use the cognitive and legal spaces between peace and war to their advantage, with the purpose of achieving political and military goals. While this fact broadens the spectrum of war, it also challenges existing laws, regulating when and how militaries can use deadly force. The sea has been part of several recent gray zone conflicts, primarily involving Russia and China. The successes this type of warfare has achieved, makes it likely these nations will continue on the same path in the future.   The purpose of this paper is to answer in what way Swedish law restricts the Swedish Navy tactically in a gray zone conflict. This is done through a case study involving a fictive case by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, creating a plausible gray zone scenario in Sweden and the Baltic Sea Region. Additions are made to the case to aim the focus on the maritime domain. Law regulating when the Swedish Navy can use force, is triangulated with part of Wayne P. Hughes’s theory, Six cornerstones. The part used to analyze the case is the sixth cornerstone, Attack effectively first, which emphasizes the importance of attacking first in order to achieve tactical success at sea.   The analysis concludes that Swedish law puts the Swedish Navy in a severe tactical disadvantage, in a gray zone conflict, by restricting the use of force against non-military vessels. Because of that, Swedish ships will always be second to fire, preventing the possibility of attacking effectively first.