There has always been a gray zone between peace and war, but never have nations tried to exploit this fact as much as today. Nations use the cognitive and legal spaces between peace and war to their advantage, with the purpose of achieving political and military goals. While this fact broadens the spectrum of war, it also challenges existing laws, regulating when and how militaries can use deadly force. The sea has been part of several recent gray zone conflicts, primarily involving Russia and China. The successes this type of warfare has achieved, makes it likely these nations will continue on the same path in the future.   The purpose of this paper is to answer in what way Swedish law restricts the Swedish Navy tactically in a gray zone conflict. This is done through a case study involving a fictive case by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, creating a plausible gray zone scenario in Sweden and the Baltic Sea Region. Additions are made to the case to aim the focus on the maritime domain. Law regulating when the Swedish Navy can use force, is triangulated with part of Wayne P. Hughes’s theory, Six cornerstones. The part used to analyze the case is the sixth cornerstone, Attack effectively first, which emphasizes the importance of attacking first in order to achieve tactical success at sea.   The analysis concludes that Swedish law puts the Swedish Navy in a severe tactical disadvantage, in a gray zone conflict, by restricting the use of force against non-military vessels. Because of that, Swedish ships will always be second to fire, preventing the possibility of attacking effectively first.

Sammanfattning   Digitaliseringen har skapat ömsesidiga beroenden som bidrar till stora sårbarheter i samhället. Nu möter vi nya hot delvis på grund av sårbarheter som vi själva har skapat. Vi ser att hoten mot vårt land är mer omfattande än på flera år och de har antagit nya former inom flera områden. Påverkansoperationer, främmande underrättelseinhämtning och kontroll över kritisk infrastruktur är några exempel som utgör ett hot mot samhällets skyddsvärda delar. Klyftan mellan hoten och våra säkerhetsskyddsåtgärder är stor och den ökar hela tiden. Hotbilden inom gråzonsproblematiken är diffus, komplex och spänner över stora delar i samhället, det försvårar en tydlig gränsdragning mellan fred och krig.   Vår lägesbild blir otydlig och skapar ett beslutsvakuum där våra resurser förblir outnyttjade. Vi anser att prioritering av resurser sker efter ett föråldrat synsätt. Det djupt rotade binära tankesättet skapar juridiska låsningar och bidrar till att skapa ett beslutsvakuum.   Resultat visar även att störningar i samhället sätter förtroendet för samhällskontraktet på spel, detta menar vi kan leda till att försvarsviljan och vår demokrati påverkas negativt. Paradoxen är även att när samhället utsätts för svåra påfrestningar ligger det nära till hands att ta till extrema metoder, metoder som inskränker individens rättigheter och som på sikt även kan hota vår demokrati.   En av vår mest framträdande slutsats är att vi bör fokusera mera på våra egna sårbarheter och mindre på hotet. Att enbart bygga en större armé kommer inte lösa problemet. Tillsammans måste vi bygga ett robustare samhälle för att kunna möta gråzonsproblematiken på ett helt annat sätt än idag. Det kommer kosta tid, effektivitet och pengar. Frågan är bara vilket pris samhället är beredd att betala?   En annan viktig slutsats är att flera nya empiriska referenspunkter förflyttat oss in i ett nytt fredstida normalläge. Ett normalläge som vi säger är en ny nyans av det konventionella kriget. I konventionella krig finns krigets lagar och folkrätten att förlita sig på, dessa lagar täcker dock inte den nya nyansen av kriget. Den nya nyansen utmanar våra gamla strukturer, där folkrätten och krigets lagar blir helt verkningslösa. Om fenomenet ses för vad det egentligen är så kommer vi bli bättre rustade att möta det.  Vi anser att gråzonsproblematiken är en del av kriget och ska inte tolkas som något annat. Gråzonsproblematiken utgör krigets nya nyans där en demokrati som Sverige initialt slår i ett underläge och utmanas till det yttersta. / Digitalization has created mutual dependencies that contribute to major vulnerabilities in society. Now we face new threats partly because of vulnerabilities that we ourselves have created. We see that the threats to our country are more extensive than in several years and they have adopted new forms in several areas. Influencing operations, foreign intelligence gathering, and control of critical infrastructure are some examples that pose a threat to the parts of society that are worth protecting. The gap between the threats and our security measures is great and it is constantly growing. Threat scenario within the grey zone and its related problems are diffuse, complex and spans over large parts of society, making the distinction between peace and war unclear.   Our overview of the situation becomes unclear and a vacuum which hinders decision making is created and our resources remain untapped. We believe that prioritizing resources takes place according to an outdated approach. The deeply rooted binary mindset creates legal locks and helps create the previously mentioned vacuum.   Our results also show that disturbances in society put the trust in the social contract at stake, this means we can lead to the defense will and our democracy being adversely affected. The paradox is that when society is subjected to severe stress it is close taking to extreme measures, methods that restrict the individual's rights and in the long term might also threaten our democracy.   One of our most prominent conclusions is that we should focus more on our own vulnerabilities and less on the threat. Building a larger army alone will not solve the problem. Together, we must build a more robust society in order to be able to meet the gray zone problem in a completely different way than today. It will cost time, efficiency and money. The question is just what price is our society willing to pay?   Another important conclusion is that several new empirical reference points moved us into a new peacetime normal position. A normal mode we say is a new nuance of conventional war. In conventional wars there are the laws of war and international law to rely on, however, these laws do not cover this new nuance of the war. The new nuance challenges our old structures, where international law and the laws of war become completely ineffective. If the phenomenon is seen for what it really is, we will be better equipped to meet it. We believe that the gray zone problem is part of the war and should not be interpreted as anything else. The gray zone problem is the new nuance of the war, where a democracy like Sweden initially beats in a disadvantage and is challenged to the utmost.

This study aims to identify, establish and discuss the potential problems associated with outsourcing military functions to private enterprises within the context of “grey-area” threats. This is of high relevance as essential parts of the Swedish armed forces (SAF) sea logistic chain are dependent on private shipping companies (PSC) as they do not possess these functions inhouse, and the “grey-area” in particular is a subject of great juridical uncertainty. By focusing on chartering and freighting outsourcing between PSCs and the SAF, the ambition is to identify certain risks, complications and difficulties for the operational capacity of the SAF, that may arise as a result of threatful situations within the grey-area.By conducting in-depth interviews with prominent personnel within both the SAF and PSCs, it has been possible to identify certain areas of complex issues and challenges necessary to address when entering into freighting agreements adequate for grey-area threats. In conclusion the study identified the following main problematic areas: ·      No guarantee from the state to ensure PSC assets when damaged by grey-area activity, puts increasing demand for good will between parties. This is problematic in the sense of becoming a normative relationship, and not substantial. ·      The SAF may find themselves in a disadvantageous position in terms of competences and resources when negotiating agreements.  ·      Lack of PSC involvement in defence planning leads to deficient understanding for SAF needs and demands. ·      PSCs as civilian corporations are more vulnerable to societal disturbances, which may lead to slow response in crisis-situations. ·      PSCs as a global industry risk (i) exploitation of free-market dynamics by antagonistic activity through foreign co-ownership and buyout, (ii) juridical limitations through PSCs using ships of foreign nations (flag), and (iii) shortage in manpower, as well as security threats to SAF interests may arise by PSCs using multinational crews. ·      Freighting between parties is a time-consuming process which may be problematic for quick response to grey-area threats.

There is an ongoing discussion on grey zone deterrence and how states should deal with grey zone situations. Most studies are based around Russian actions in Crimea and Chinas actions in the East and South China Sea. The objective of this paper is to create a better understanding of the grey zone deterrence and the handling of grey zone situations by the Swedish navy. The method for achieving this is a text analysis of Swedish strategic, operative, and tactical doctrines. The result of the analysis shows that there is a discussion of grey zone deterrence on the operative level in the Swedish armed forces, where the Swedish navy can assist the police, coast guard, customs et.al. There is only a limited and implicit discussion on the tactical level specifically for naval units.  The conclusion of this paper is that the Swedish navy can work with other governmental departments to handle grey zone situations, however the Swedish navy is limited in the ability to handle grey zone situations independently.

The extensive digital development has fundamentally changed the way we receive information. As a result, new security policy challenges have arisen, and it is therefore important to increase resilience to the dissemination of deceptive information that risks harming society and democracy. The purpose of this study is to investigate which factors covariate with an uncritical approach to misleading information in social media among the Swedish population, with the hope that the results can form the basis for targeted attempts to strengthen resilience. The study examines the specific factors age, trust in traditional news media as well as politicians, and opinion on the factual issue that the misleading information expresses. Using survey data collected by Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Defense Research Agency, the covariation of these factors with the respondents' degree of critical approach to information on social media is analyzed through multiple regression analysis (OLS). The study finds that middle-aged individuals are somewhat more critical of information than other age groups are, especially the older age groups. The differences between the age groups are, however, very small. Individuals who have a high level of trust in traditional news media are, on average, slightly less critical of false information on social media than those who have a lower level of trust. The same applies to individuals who have a high level of trust in politicians. The most prominent finding of the study is that respondents are significantly less critical of false posts when they agree with the opinion expressed in the post. Thus, confirmation bias seems to be of great importance for how we value the credibility of information. This indicates that efforts to convert misconceptions in people who have been misled by false information are ineffective, as individuals have difficulty believing in information that challenges their existing position. Preventive efforts to promote critical thinking in society could therefore be more effective to avoid people getting misled in the future. / Den omfattande digitala utvecklingen har förändrat vårt sätt att ta till oss information i grunden. Till följd av detta har nya säkerhetspolitiska utmaningar uppkommit, och att öka motståndskraften mot spridning av vilseledande information som riskerar att skada samhället och demokratin är därför angeläget. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka vilka faktorer som samvarierar med ett okritiskt förhållningssätt till vilseledande information i sociala medier hos den svenska befolkningen, med förhoppningen om att resultaten ska kunna ligga till grund för riktade insatser för att stärka motståndskraften mot påverkansförsök. I studien undersöks de specifika faktorerna ålder, förtroende för traditionell nyhetsmedia samt för politiker och åsikt i sakfrågan som den vilseledande informationen uttrycker. Med hjälp av enkätdata insamlad av SCB och FOI analyseras dessa faktorers samvariation med respondenternas grad av kritiskt förhållningssätt till information i sociala medier genom multipel regressionsanalys (OLS). Studien finner att individer i medelåldern förhåller sig något mer kritiskt till information än resterande åldersgrupper, särskilt jämfört med de äldsta respondenterna. Skillnaderna mellan åldersgrupperna är dock väldigt små. Individer som har ett högt förtroende för traditionell nyhetsmedia är i genomsnitt något mindre kritiska till falsk information i sociala medier än de som har ett lägre förtroende. Detsamma gäller för individer som har ett högt förtroende för politiker. Den mest framträdande upptäckten som studien gör är att respondenterna är betydligt mindre kritiska till falska inlägg när de håller med om den åsikt som inlägget uttrycker. Således tycks konfirmeringsbias ha en stor betydelse för hur vi värderar trovärdigheten hos information. Detta indikerar att insatser för att konvertera felaktiga uppfattningar hos personer som har blivit vilseledda av falsk information är ineffektiva, eftersom individer har svårt att tro på information som utmanar deras befintliga ståndpunkt. Insatser som verkar förebyggande för att främja det kritiska tänkandet i samhället skulle därför kunna vara mer verksamma för att förhindra att människor vilseleds i framtiden.