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This study presents a longitudinal analysis of three monolingual Iranian children's language development between ages 1;8-2;6, 2;2-3;2 and 2;4-3;4. The overall aims are to identify and establish the structural patterns in the acquisition of Persian, a pro-drop, inflectional and mostly verb final language. Structural patterns particular to Persian are identified in contrast to English and data drawn from the children's language progress are discussed in the light of recent theories of language acquisition. In addition, the study provides a comprehensive and systematic description of children's syntactic development in such a way as to be useful for clinical data analysis by Iranian speech and language therapists and includes some cross-linguistic comparisons with other research on language acquisition. The applicability of MLU (Mean Length of Utterance) measures to Persian is investigated and it is found that MLU measured in morphemes is most appropriate for evaluating the Iranian children's early language development up to value 4. In order to give a more detailed analysis of the children's language acquisition, the LARSP (Language Assessment Remediation and Screening Procedure) framework (Crystal, Fletcher and Garman, 1989) is adapted to Persian. Analysing Persian data with LARSP categories shows that there are many features common to both languages. Particular categories are identified. A PLARSP (Persian LARSP) profile is established based on the hypothesis that structures can be assigned to stages according to their number of elements at clause and phrase levels. The profile provides a framework for the analysis of language development in Persian and is employed in chapters 6 and 7 to set out the developmental picture of the children's language at approximately equal MLU values in the early stages, and age in the later stages. Close examination of the data points to the use of formulas by the children at early stages. Apart from the formulas, although the children show different strategies of language acquisition, the resulting distribution of categories is found to fit the data well, presenting an orderly progress down the chart according to MLU and age.

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / Throughout twenty-five years of strained relations, U.S. policy efforts have delayed but not thwarted Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program, largely because Washington has failed to influence Iran's motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons. There are three main motivations behind Iran's nuclear program. First, at the systemic level, external threats drive Iran's perceived need for a nuclear deterrent. Second, at the individual level, well placed governmental elites propel the nuclear security myth to spur nationalistic support for nuclear weapons. Third, at the state level, institutional bureaucracies, created to build Iran's nuclear infrastructure, now compete against other organizations for their own self interests, which are closely associated with the continued development of nuclear weapons. The thesis recommends three policy tracks, addressing causal factors at each level. First, the United States should try to create a new Gulf Security organization, including Iran and the new Iraqi government, to build a collective security environment without nuclear weapons. Second, Washington should build a multilateral coalition to contain Iranian proliferation activities while offering economic incentives for Iranian disarmament. Third, the United States should work to discredit Iran's nuclear security myth by fostering a public debate within Iran on the costs of nuclear weapons, using U.S.-run media. / Major, United States Air Force

In the face of Tehran's vitriolic rhetoric and outright refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, why do Russia, China and India refuse to support the United States and the EU-3 in their efforts to curtail Iran's pursuit of a complete and indigenous nuclear fuel cycle? Russia's motivations stem from its desire to establish itself as a counter to American hegemony and also to maximize its significant financial relationship with Iran. China's booming economy is dependant on its vast manufacturing infrastructure, which is increasingly dependant on Middle Eastern oil for its energy needs. Thus, China is unlikely to take a hard stand on Iran. India's energy demands are growing almost as quickly as those of China and Iran is a vital source of natural gas and oil for India. Also, Iran can be seen as a test case in India's desire to maintain an independent foreign policy. Containing Iran to the detriment of relations with these countries is not a path the United States should follow. U. S. foreign policy should support a verifiably peaceful nuclear program in Iran, with defined and unambiguous penalties should it come to light that the technology is diverted towards a military application. / US Navy (USN) author.

In this study I investigate the Iranian Green Movement supporters' use of slogans as political discourse on the Persian-language opposition website www.kaleme.com. Data was collected from the website's Kaleme section in the form of 22 articles and 3,500 user comments. A coding scheme was constructed to measure the presence of categories and themes in the site's comments section. Findings support the propositions of narrative theorists (e.g. Franzosi, 1998; Benford, 1993) that frequent use of slogans in the comments may reflect a unique cultural element of Persian-language political discourse and reinforce the Green Movement's narrative of opposition to the government.

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This study is primarily concerned with answering several important questions surrounding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1950-1951 which have remained unanswered. What were the detailed origins of the disputes between the Iranian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company? Why was such a favourable oil concession granted to a British citizen? What was the impact of the occupation of Iran on the Iranian people's way of political thinking and how did oil become an issue for public debate? Why was there an oil crisis in 1951 ? What were the motivations of the parties to the oil dispute? Was the crisis mainly over economic grievances ? What was the role of nationalism ? These are answered within a framework that highlights the salient variables such as politics, economy, international relations and diplomacy. The methodology adopted is a descriptive analysis of archival material and literature on the related subjects. The emphasis is on the Iranian view of the crisis for the reason that, although it received international attention and was in many ways an international crisis, it originated in Iran. There were features unique to it which were Iranian. Given the nature of Iranian society with its strong oral traditions, the past is important to an explanation of the crisis. It is alive in Iranian mind in a way not apparent to western society. Conceptions of the past and an awareness of the weakness of Iranian autonomy are important in the context of the 1950 crisis.Consequently, it is necessary to examine the concept of history prevalent in Iran. This takes the staring point of the thesis to the D'Arcy oil concession. In 1900, Iran was bankrupt in Western terms, the Shah needed immediate cash payment,I authorities were financially corrupt and politics was riddled with foreign intrigue. Oil had been sought in Iran since 1878 without much success. By 1900, the demand for Iranian oil was supported by the British Legation. D'Arcy, an English financier, managed to obtain, through connections with a string of individuals, an oil concession for 60 years. The Iranian authorities had every reason to believe that this oil concession, like all other oil concessions would eventually lapse. However, D' Arcy worked the concession to the point of bankruptcy and his engineer, to the point of exhaustion. As a result an oil industry was established which "was to see the Royal Navy through two world wars, and to cause Persia more trouble than all the political manoeuvrings of the great powers put together". 2The world oil rivalry, compounded with the British government's desire for oil independence, turned the Iranian oil industry into the largest oil industry of the time and an important source of income for the British Treasury. The exploitation of the oil reserves of Iran by an industrial power soon became a matter of great controversy as disputes developed between two parties which extended over several decades. Iran received some funds in revenues. However, the revenues did not improve the Iranian standard of life considerably although they affected the balance of payments, currency reserves and purchase of arms. Iranian society was in the process of transition from a traditional society to a modern one. The Constitutional Movement of 1906 had an impact on the public's political way of thinking. Reza Shah suppressed the society but the desire for a democratic system continued to exist. During the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), a large portion of the rural population moved to urban areas. The industrialisation of Iran helped in developing a new class of urban middle class and artisans. It was obvious that the relationship between Iran and the oil company needed readjusting. However, the oil company officiIs did not show much interest in this until it was too late. The occupation of Iran in 1941 helped several political forces appear on the political scene. The released communist prisoners quickly formed the Tudeh Party. The communists were assisted by the Soviet forces in the North to the extent that the Tudeh, a communist party, became one of the main political parties of this period in an Islamic society. However, several factors helped monarchists overcome the communists. One such factor was an increasing American involvement in Iran after Pearl Harbour which functioned as a third power to reduce the dominance of the others. The Tripartite Treaty of 1942 regularised the presence of American troops. The Tehran Declaration of 1943 provided for economic aid at the end of the war. In 1947, the ideological basis for American involvement in Iran was provided by Truman Doctrine. The final blow to the Tudeh Party was delivered in 1949. The attempt on the Shah's life gave the monarchists an excuse to outlaw the Tudeh. Contrary to their ideology, Moscow provoked discontented Iranian minorities rather than encouraging class struggle ! Moscow menaced Iran several times. At least at two occasions Moscow demanded an oil concession. They also threatened Iranian integrity and caused a great deal of public anxiety which directed public attention to Iranain problems. The Azarbaijan crisis of 1945-1946 turned Iranian problem into an international one. Moscow's pressure on Greece and Turkey threatened Western interests in the Near and Middle East and caused inter-Allied friction. In 1941, Iran appeared to have become a model for Allied cooperation. By 1944, however, the first post-war oil crisis seemed to haye turned Iran into a battleground between foreign powers ; the early stages of the cold war. On the Iranian side, at least since 1944 there was a demand for oil nationalisation. The idea developed first into a law forbidding negotiating or granting new oil concessions to foreign powers until Iran was occupied. Mosaddegh was mainly responsible for this. Then in 1947, an overwhelming majority of Majles deputies rejected a Soviet proposal for an oil concession in the North. The Majles instructed the government to negotiate with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for better terms. This set in motion a chain of events which resulted in a proposal to supplement the 1933 oil concession which had replaced the D' Arcy concession. In 1949, a small group of nationalists fiercely fought the proposals. The press criticisms, the Majles debates and public gatherings helped ordinary people understand the oil issue. However, despite strong opposition, the monarchists were III favour of the Supplementary Agreement and attempted to resolve the issue by appointing a strong military man, General Razmara, as prime minister in June 1950. The idea, however, backfired as public desire for the removal of foreign influence was now strong. The Majles opposition, the press and the public appeared to be united. Nationalist feelings were fuelled by long-term resentment over the oil company's handling of the oil issue. By early 1951 nationalist sentiment was too strong to be curtailed. By this time Razmara had become a threat both to the Shah and to the nationalists and acted like an obstacle on the way to the oil nationalisation. His assassination, in March 1951, removed this obstacle. By this time the support for the movement, the demand for oil nationalisation and respect for Mosaddegh covered far-right to the far-left as both clergy and communists supported the nationalists. The communists were represented by the banned Tudeh Party. The political activities of the clergy was mainly associated with Kashani. His role in the movement and relationship with Mosaddegh were vital to the existence of the movement. However, Mosaddegh and Kashani were on a collision course. The Western-educated Mosaddegh was secular. Kashani, on the other hand, was in favour of an Islamic state. The same definition applied to their supporters. However, although they differed in their outlook, the unifying figure of Mosaddegh brought them together over the oil issue; a process which was reversed after 1951. Kashani and some nationalists weakened Mosaddegh and assisted in his downfall. Mosaddegh initiated the first petrodiplomacy in Iranian history. He dedicated his life to fight foreign domination and the nation trusted him. Without him it would be impossible for the nationalists to acquire a political standing strong enough to nationalise the oil. Regrettably, his downfall in 1953 brought an end to his efforts to remove foreign influence from Iran. Iran has been a centre of major political events for over 2000 years. In recent history, the development of two superpowers, Russian and British empires, on either side of Iran changed Iran's geopolitical situation to the extent that they fought within Iran for the dominance of Asia. As a result Iran's independence was weakened, its integrity was threatened, domestic feud was encouraged, corruption and intrigue were promoted, and self-interest and low morality became a feature of life.Whether a victim of international power politics, or a victim of internal strife. low political culture, and short-sightedness of Iranian politicians, the super powers could not tolerate the upset of the oil control in the Middle East. The country-by-country flare-up effect of such an achievement would be disastrous for the Western economy. In their view, the nationalist movement of Iran had to be defeated. Indeed, no other oil-producing country considered oil nationalisation for many years to come.

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