yes / Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weaponsEfforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are obstructed by lack of capacity to trace sources and lines of supply for arms. Such efforts are necessary in order to identify points of diversion or loss of responsible control so that actions can be taken to tackle the problems. This hampers efforts to prevent future loss and diversion, for example, or to close down unauthorised or destabilising arms supply networks. Measures to enable tracing of sources and lines of supply of SALW are therefore a priority. Because of the international scope of the flows of SALW, such measures need to be taken by all states and all other relevant members of the international community. International standards and mechanisms to enable tracing need to be established and developed as a priority. An effective international system to enable tracing of sources and flows of SALW requires three essential elements: adequate marking to uniquely identify each weapon; detailed and accessible record-keeping; and mechanisms for international co-operation in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW. At present there are substantial weaknesses and problems in each of these three areas. (SALW) are obstructed by lack of capacity to trace sources and lines of supply for arms. Such efforts are necessary in order to identify points of diversion or loss of responsible control so that actions can be taken to tackle the problems. This hampers efforts to prevent future loss and diversion, for example, or to close down unauthorised or destabilising arms supply networks. Measures to enable tracing of sources and lines of supply of SALW are therefore a priority. Because of the international scope of the flows of SALW, such measures need to be taken by all states and all other relevant members of the international community. International standards and mechanisms to enable tracing need to be established and developed as a priority. An effective international system to enable tracing of sources and flows of SALW requires three essential elements: adequate marking to uniquely identify each weapon; detailed and accessible record-keeping; and mechanisms for international co-operation in tracing sources and lines of supply of SALW. At present there are substantial weaknesses and problems in each of these three areas.

yes / A prerequisite for effective international action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) is that states develop a common understanding of what constitutes the ¿legal¿ trade and therefore what is ¿illicit¿. At the same time, failure to exert e ffective control over the legal trade in SALW opens up possibilities for diversion to illicit markets and end-users and blurs the lines between the legal and illicit trade. All governments are potential suppliers of SALW, since even those with no manufacturing capacity will have the potential to export surplus weapons once owned by their police and/or armed forces. A major concern for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects should thus be to define clear parameters for and to agree on a comprehensive mechanism for controlling the legal trade in these weapons. / British American Security Information Council (BASIC), International Alert

yes / Small arms and light weapons have become the weapons of choice in conflicts around the world and figure prominently in crime. Recently, considerable attention has been focused on the proliferation of SALW at the national, regional and international level. The recognition that m o s t illicit SALW began as legal weapons is, however, fundamental to efforts to reduce the proliferation and misuse of SALW and the diversion of civilian weapons is one source of supply. Indeed, it is estimated that there are as many SALW in the hands of civilians worldwide as there are in the possession of states, and that in many parts of the world diversion from civilian stocks is the principal source of the illicit supply. Consequently, strengthening domestic regulation, which reduces the diversion of legal weapons to illegal markets, is a critical part of any strategy to address illicit trafficking. It is also consistent with resolutions from the United Nations Security Council and other Commissions as well as regional initiatives. This briefing reviews the ways in which SALW are diverted from legal to illegal markets and the measures which can be used to reduce this diversion. In addressing illicit trafficking in all its aspects, it is imperative that the UN Conference not does neglect this significant problem.

yes / Evidence suggests that many of the arms transfers to the worst affected conflict regions and human rights crisis zones are organised and trafficked by arms brokering and transport agents. Targeting those states with weak national export controls and enforcement, unscrupulous brokers and transportation agents organise the transfer of arms and security equipment to a range of illegitimate end users such as criminals, terrorists and human rights abusers. Arms brokers can be defined as middlemen who organise arms transfers between two or more parties, often bringing together buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers and insurers to make a deal. They generally do so for financial gain, although political or religious motivation may also play a part in some deals. Often such brokers do not reside in the country from which the weapons originate, nor do they live in the countries through which the weapons pass or for which they are destined. As a result, such `third party¿ arms brokering is notoriously diff i c u l t to trace, monitor or control. Arms brokers work very closely with transport or shipping agents. These agents contract transport facilities, carriers and crews in order to move arms cargoes by sea, air, rail or road.

yes / Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking in, and proliferation and misuse of, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are hampered by lack of relevant information-exchange and transparency. International information exchange and transparency arrangements are key elements of each of the main elements of the international action programme on SALW to be launched at the UN 2001 Conference. There is great scope to develop information management and distribution arrangements to disseminate and exchange of relevant information on SALW without seriously compromising national security, necessary commercial secrecy, or law enforcement. Indeed, national security, commerce, crime prevention and law enforcement are generally enhanced by appropriate transparency and information exchange

yes / Small arms and light weapons can enter the illicit market at many stages in their lifecycle. From manufacture, to sale/export, to import, and then to final end use, States must establish and enforce stringent and comprehensive licensing and monitoring systems to ensure that small arms and light weapons (SALW) remain under legal control. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and ensuing follow-up process provide States with important opportunities to analyse and compare how existing systems governing the manufacture and trade in SALW are working. They further provide the context in which best practice can be agreed and implemented internationally, and for the discussion of how future trends and developments in SALW manufacture and transfer can be more effectively brought within State control. To this end, this briefing paper covers two separate but closely related issues. The first section of the report will analyse existing State and regional controls on SALW manufacture and examine how international measures, including the UN Conference, can reinforce such controls. In this regard, the growth of licensed production and co-production agreements is highlighted, together with implications for the development of adequate regulations. The second section examines those systems that are currently in place for the authorisation of SALW transfers and for the certification and monitoring of their ultimate end-use. Recommendations for best practice and implications for the UN Conference process are also discussed.

yes / The majority of small arms and light weapons currently in circulation are in civilian possession1. An estimated fifty-nine percent of weapons around the world are in civilian hands and in some regions such as Europe this is closer to eighty per cent.2 While the majority of these arms are used for lawful purposes a significant percentage are not. The misuse of these arms by civilians can cause major damage to people¿s livelihoods, health and security as well as broader repercussion such as hampering economic, social and political development and the provision of health care. One of the more controversial outcomes of the UN Small Arms conference was the failure of states to explicitly commit to more effective regulation of civilian possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Despite clear evidence of the opportunities for diversion of SALW from civilian possession to illicit trade and the serious impact of this on human security, opposition from some states to any mention of this issue within the Programme of Action (PoA) prevented the inclusion of language concerning the regulation of privately owned SALW. Nevertheless, the Programme of Action does contain limited provisions including the criminalisation of illicit possession of SALW and a requirement that states ensure responsibility for SALW issued by them. This Policy Briefing elaborates on how these and other international commitments should be interpreted and implemented so as to enhance human security.

This study was conducted in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of drug trafficking with specific reference as to how South African drug mules are used in crossborder drug smuggling. Through media analysis, semi-structured interviews with drug trafficking experts and a literature study the researcher was able to make findings and recommendations as per the objectives of the study. The objectives of the study included examining how drug mules smuggle drugs across South African borders; what role drug mules play in drug trafficking syndicates and the motivations and reasons why South Africans are increasingly being recruited as drug mules. The researcher also attempted to determine the nature and extent of the drug demand supply in and to South Africa. By making the deduction that drug demand and drug supply are interrelated the researcher was ultimately able to conclude that drug mules will continue to engage in drug smuggling as long as there is a demand for drugs and readily available drug supply routes to and from a county. From the media reports analysed cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin were the drugs most smuggled by South African drug mules. It is also clear from the media reports that cocaine and methamphetamine are smuggled in the largest quantities by South African drug mules. The quantities of heroin found in the possession of South African drug mules were insignificantly small. This contradicts treatment centre data analysed that indicated heroin and methamphetamine users were almost double in numbers in comparison to cocaine users being treated at centres. Most South African drug mules are used to smuggle drugs to the cocaine markets in Europe and South Africa; the cannabis/marijuana (herb) market in Europe; the cannabis (resin) hashish market in Canada and the United States of America; the crystal methamphetamine market in the Far East (largely Japan and Korea) and the heroin market in South Africa. Using criminology theories as a basis, the researcher attempted to describe why people are vulnerable to being recruited as drug mules. Findings concluded that structural factors such as poverty and unemployment and substance abuse-related problems, particularly in marginalised and disadvantaged communities, all contribute to South Africans becoming drug mules. Recommendations by the researcher focused on identifying specific vulnerabilities associated with drug mule recruiting and its consideration in legislation relating to drug trafficking in South Africa. The recommendations focus on the specific prosecution of drug abusers, drug mules, drug distributors and drug mule recruiters. Lastly it is projected by the researcher that the drug demand in South Africa will continue to increase if the drug supply routes and drug smuggling operations by syndicates are not addressed more firmly / Criminology / M.A. (Criminology)

This study was conducted in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of drug trafficking with specific reference as to how South African drug mules are used in crossborder drug smuggling. Through media analysis, semi-structured interviews with drug trafficking experts and a literature study the researcher was able to make findings and recommendations as per the objectives of the study. The objectives of the study included examining how drug mules smuggle drugs across South African borders; what role drug mules play in drug trafficking syndicates and the motivations and reasons why South Africans are increasingly being recruited as drug mules. The researcher also attempted to determine the nature and extent of the drug demand supply in and to South Africa. By making the deduction that drug demand and drug supply are interrelated the researcher was ultimately able to conclude that drug mules will continue to engage in drug smuggling as long as there is a demand for drugs and readily available drug supply routes to and from a county. From the media reports analysed cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin were the drugs most smuggled by South African drug mules. It is also clear from the media reports that cocaine and methamphetamine are smuggled in the largest quantities by South African drug mules. The quantities of heroin found in the possession of South African drug mules were insignificantly small. This contradicts treatment centre data analysed that indicated heroin and methamphetamine users were almost double in numbers in comparison to cocaine users being treated at centres. Most South African drug mules are used to smuggle drugs to the cocaine markets in Europe and South Africa; the cannabis/marijuana (herb) market in Europe; the cannabis (resin) hashish market in Canada and the United States of America; the crystal methamphetamine market in the Far East (largely Japan and Korea) and the heroin market in South Africa. Using criminology theories as a basis, the researcher attempted to describe why people are vulnerable to being recruited as drug mules. Findings concluded that structural factors such as poverty and unemployment and substance abuse-related problems, particularly in marginalised and disadvantaged communities, all contribute to South Africans becoming drug mules. Recommendations by the researcher focused on identifying specific vulnerabilities associated with drug mule recruiting and its consideration in legislation relating to drug trafficking in South Africa. The recommendations focus on the specific prosecution of drug abusers, drug mules, drug distributors and drug mule recruiters. Lastly it is projected by the researcher that the drug demand in South Africa will continue to increase if the drug supply routes and drug smuggling operations by syndicates are not addressed more firmly / Criminology and Security Science / M. A. (Criminology)

La Révolution de 1979 a provoqué en Iran une vague de méfiance à l’égard des autres pays et l’hostilité envers les États-Unis a mis le pays dans une position conflictuelle avec le monde occidental. Avec l’affaire de la prise d’otages en novembre 1979, les relations entre l’Iran, les États-Unis et l’Europe ont été coupées. Tout cela n’a pas été sans conséquences sur la conservation du patrimoine culturel : si Persépolis a échappé à la destruction, en revanche le mausolée de Reza Shah a été complétement détruit par les révolutionnaires. Cependant des démarches effectuées par les spécialistes eurent pour résultat l’enregistrement pour la première fois de trois monuments historiques de l’Iran sur la liste du patrimoine mondial : Tchogha Zanbil près de Suse, Persépolis dans la province de Fars et la place de Naghsh-e-Jahan à Ispahan. Malheureusement, le déclenchement subit de la guerre avec l’Irak n’a pas laissé le temps de mettre en place les mesures de protection et pendant huit ans les sites et les monuments historiques de l’Iran ont subi quantité de dégâts.Après la guerre, jusqu’en 1997, le gouvernement de M. Rafsandjani entreprit de relever les ruines résultant de « la Guerre Imposée ». Mais l’inflation, qui pourtant ne fut à aucun moment supérieure à ce qu’elle avait été pendant « l’époque de la Construction », entraîna peu à peu la dépréciation de la monnaie et l’augmentation des inégalités sociales. Cette situation, qui empira jusqu’au gouvernement de M. Rohani, fit qu’on porta moins d’attention au patrimoine culturel. En fait, après la Révolution de 1979, les biens du patrimoine culturel de l’Iran ont été répartis en deux groupes : ceux qui pouvaient être considérés comme le patrimoine religieux, et ceux qui, antérieurs à la conquête musulmane de la Perse, n’avaient aucun rapport avec la spiritualité musulmane chiite. Les investissements pour la restauration et la protection des monuments du premier groupe n’ont été faits que pour propager le chiisme et dans le but d’influencer de plus en plus l’opinion publique, déjà sensible à la question de la religion et aux miracles des imams chiites. Cependant, bien qu’appartenant à ce groupe, certaines mosquées historiques et des caravansérails n’intéressent pas les organismes culturels du pays, du fait de leur faible rentabilité. En soi, la meilleure solution pour réaliser les plans de sauvegarde des monuments historiques serait la participation de la population, mais l’étude du lien entre la société et le gouvernement montre qu’une telle coopération dépasse largement le seul domaine culturel et prend aujourd’hui en Iran un sens politique. / The Revolution of 1979 in Iran leaded to a wave of distrust of the other lands and to hostility towards the United States. It put the land also into a situation of confrontation with western world. The hostage-taking in November 1979 resulted in a breakup of relations between Iran, the United States and Europe. All of this has not been without effect on the heritage conversations.If Persepolis escaped the destruction, but Reza Shah’s Mausoleum was completely demolished by revolutionists. However the employment of specialists had an outcome, that for the first time three historical monuments of Iran were put on the list of UNESCO-world heritage site: Tchogha Zanbil near Susa, Persepolis in Fars-province and Naghsh-e Jahan Square (world-image) in Esfahan. Unfortunately the sudden outbreak of war with Iraq allowed no time for protection-sanction and for 8 years the historical cities and monuments of Iran have been much more damaged.After the war, the government of Akbar Rafsanjani committed to rebuild the ruins resulted by imposed war. But never higher as “period of construction”, the inflation leaded gradually to a currency debasement, also to an increase in social inequality. Got worse till 11. government, this situation made the people pay less attention to cultural heritage.After the revolution of 1979, the cultural goods of Iran were separated into two groups, on the one hand, the ones regarded as religious heritage and on the other hand, the ones built before the Muslims’ conquest with no deal with shiitic spirituality. The investment for protection of monuments in the first group aimed to dissemination of Shiism thus the public opinion, which has already been sensitive to the religion issues and the miracle of shiitic imams, should be influenced. But a few historical mosques and caravansaries belonged to this group, due to its low profitability didn’t interest the culture-organization.The best solution to ensure the preservation of historical monuments should be the involvement of population. However the investigations of the relation between society and government showed, that such a cooperation goes far beyond the cultural field and has a political meaning in society.