This thesis explores the question of what it means to be a critical being, and how we can cultivate and enact a critical orientation through the ancient Aristotelian notion of phronesis. I begin by defending the claim that the familiar traditions and methods of rhetoric and hermeneutics have their practical, experiential and critical origins in a fundamental and constitutive human desire to express and understand ourselves and others through the most primary of human capabilities: listening, speaking, interpreting and understanding. This way of describing hermeneutics and rhetoric gives us a sense of their origins in lived experience. It also reminds us that rhetorical expression and hermeneutic understanding are not to be thought of as merely ‘systematized disciplines’, ‘instruments’ or ‘methods’ that we can be indifferent to, but part of our participatory linguistic experience. I argue that once the interpenetrating relation of rhetorical expression and hermeneutic understanding is made apparent, an implicit critical-thinking dimension in experience also becomes visible. This ‘critical dimension’ is not discovered in static theory, procedure or method, but, rather, something that is enacted over time with and among others. It is Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, and his understanding of insight and practical reasoning that best captures the emergence and enactment of critical thinking-being. Phronesis is a mode of practical reasoning that is always in motion, always challenging and interrogating the relation between the particular circumstances we find ourselves in, and the historical traditions, general rules, laws or procedures that form our normative background. I allow this argument for a critical hermeneutics through phronesis to be challenged by Jürgen Habermas’s critical sociological approach. I conclude, firstly, that Habermas’s critical theory relies for its critical thrust on a hermeneutical reflective tradition of immanent critique and insights about communication that can be grasped through phronetic reasoning, tradition and concrete embodied linguistic practices. Secondly, I argue that critical hermeneutics enacted through practical reasoning and phronesis describes a way of thinking-acting-desiring being that is more congruent with our actual experience, and therefore capable of meeting the personal, occupational, moral and political exigencies of a complex and diverse contemporary world.

This thesis explores the conditions of neoliberal power through the lens of finance as a specific form of social mediation. Based on the recognition that neoliberal financialisation is mediated by financial forms that are characterised by a high degree of abstraction, the conceptualisation proceeds through an immanent critique aimed at tracing out the social sources behind them. In doing so it seeks to uncover the deep structures that make neoliberal power possible yet which tend to remain misrecognised through the refraction produced by its apparent forms. The highly financialised economy of Sweden serves as the concrete case for examining this social phenomenon. Neoliberal power, it is argued, derives its strength from a deepening fetishism that naturalises the alienated condition of the globalised capital relation, ultimately rooted in the way that money absents its own social source. This absenting gives rise to the false but necessary narcissistic social consciousness upon which the process as a whole relies. The absence of a concept of money’s own absenting in theories of neoliberal power tends to reproduce the detotalizing abstraction that the process itself depends on, with implications for the possibility for transformative change.

O recente desenvolvimento de uma teoria crítica dos sistemas, de Gunther Teubner a Andreas Fischer-Lescano, abriu novos horizontes teóricos para aqueles que se propõe a estudar a sociedade e o sistema jurídico. A construção de uma teoria crítica sob condições sistêmicas possibilitou o uso conjunto de temas e conceitos teóricos provenientes da teoria crítica da primeira geração da Escola de Frankfurt (crítica imanente, antagonismos sociais, reificação, dialética do esclarecimento) e da teoria dos sistemas (paradoxo, sistema, sociedade mundial). Partindo disso, o sistema jurídico foi analisado nas dimensões da justiça (como fórmula contingente e transcendente) e de sua crítica imanente como atitude transcendente, especialmente em face de sua tendência em se autorreproduzir como ordem social reificada que gera injustiça pelos excessos de justiça. Para alcançar essas conclusões, este trabalho se propôs a analisar o cenário da sociedade moderna no qual nasce a teoria crítica dos sistemas (Parte 1), lançando bases para os aspectos estruturais e semânticos sobre os quais ela se apoia. Seguidamente, foram estabelecidos os pressupostos teóricos básicos da teoria crítica da Escola de Frankfurt e da teoria dos sistemas de Luhmann (Parte 2) com o fim específico de colher os elementos essenciais à construção de uma teoria crítica dos sistemas voltada para o estudo do sistema jurídico. Logrado esse ponto, focou-se a análise do sistema jurídico e de sua evolução até alcançar sua atual condição na forma de um direito global na sociedade fragmentada (Parte 3). A partir disso a justiça autossubversiva e a crítica imanente do direito foram abordadas em seus aspectos essenciais e possibilitadores de uma autotranscendência sistêmica, capaz de tornar o direito mais responsivo com relação ao seu ambiente, limitando a irracionalidade racional inerente a uma ordem social reificada. A presente dissertação propõe dar mais um passo no sentido do desenvolvimento de uma teoria crítica dos sistemas aplicada ao direito, diagnosticando os dilemas contemporâneos e ao mesmo tempo, apontando os desafios existentes numa sociedade mundial paradoxalmente marcada pela possibilidade de hipertrofia sistêmica das ordens sociais reificadas e pelos processos de constitucionalização que buscam limitar essas ordens. / The recent development of critical systems theory, from Gunther Teubner to Andreas Fischer-Lescano, opened new horizons for the theorists who propose to study the society and the legal system. The construction of a critical theory under systemic conditions allows the joint use of theoretical concepts and themes from the first generation of the Frankfurt School (immanent critique, social antagonisms, reification, Dialectic of Enlightenment) and systems theory (paradox, systems, global society). Starting from this, the legal system was analyzed in the dimensions of justice (as contingent and transcendent formula) and its immanent critique as transcendent attitude, especially against the tendency to self-reproduce as reified social order, which produces injustices because excess of the justice. To reach these conclusions, this study aims to analyze the condition of modern society in which the critical systems theory arises (Part 1), laying the foundation for structural and semantic aspects on which it stands. Subsequently was established the basic theoretical premises of critical theory of the Frankfurt School and the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann (Part 2) with the specific purpose of collecting the essential elements to build a critical systems theory facing the study of the legal system. Reached this point, focused on the analysis of the legal system and its evolution to reach its current status of a global law in a fragmented society (Part 3). Like this the self-subversive justice and the immanent critique of the law have focused on key aspects that enable a systemic self-transcendence, able to make the law more responsive regarding to its environment by limiting its rational irrationality, which implies a reified social order. This thesis proposes give a step further towards the development of a critical theory applied to the law systems, diagnosing contemporary dilemmas and at the same time, pointing out the challenges of a global society paradoxically marked by the possibility of systemic hypertrophy stemmed from reified social orders and the constitutionalization processes that seek to limit such orders.

Em Crítica do Poder, Axel Honneth defende que aqueles que buscam realizar o projeto da teoria crítica têm de desenvolver um quadro conceitual que seja capaz de compreender tanto as estruturas da dominação social como os recursos sociais necessários à sua superação prática. Partindo de uma reconstrução do percurso de Honneth até Luta por Reconhecimento, procuramos inicialmente mostrar que a teoria do reconhecimento corresponde à tentativa do autor de realizar essas tarefas. Explicitando, no entanto, que seus esforços nesse momento se concentram nas tarefas de reconstruir a dinâmica normativa das relações intersubjetivas e o interesse estrutural dos seres humanos pelo reconhecimento, defendemos que Honneth acaba perdendo de vista o fato de que as relações sociais estão perpassadas por relações de poder. Retomando então as críticas dirigidas a Honneth por diversos autores, argumentamos que, tal como formulada em Luta por Reconhecimento, a teoria honnethiana do reconhecimento depende de uma compreensão redutora do poder. Tendo em vista que, após seu debate com Nancy Fraser, Honneth reconhece esse problema e reformula importantes elementos de sua teoria, dedicamos parte da tese à análise dessas reformulações. Ao fazermos isso, nosso objetivo é mostrar que, embora procure dar conta da relação entre reconhecimento e poder, Honneth acaba se afastando, em seus textos mais recentes, da noção de dominação social. Defendendo, por fim, o projeto crítico esboçado em Crítica do Poder, dedicamos a última seção da tese à discussão do trabalho de três diferentes representantes de uma nova geração de teóricos críticos, cujo objetivo parece ser exatamente o de realizá-lo. / In Critique of Power, Axel Honneth argues that those who seek to realize the project of critical theory today must develop a conceptual framework able to comprehend both the structures of social domination and the social resources for its practical overcoming. Starting with a reconstruction of Honneths theoretical development until Struggle for Recognition, our first aim is to show that the theory of recognition corresponds to the author\'s attempt to fulfill these tasks. Pointing out, however, that his efforts at this time are concentrated on the tasks of reconstructing the normative dynamics of intersubjective relations and the structural human interest for recognition, we argue that Honneth ends up losing sight of the fact that power permeate social relations. Resuming, at this point, the criticisms directed at Honneth by various authors, we aim to show that his recognition theory, as presented in Struggle for Recognition, depends on a reductive understanding of power. Considering that, after his debate with Nancy Fraser, Honneth acknowledges this problem and reformulates important elements of his theory, we devote part of this thesis to an analysis of the different strategies deployed by Honneth with this purpose. By doing this, our goal is to show that even thou Honneth tries to account for the relationship between recognition and power, in his most recent texts, he seems to abandon the concept of social domination. Advocating, finally, for the critical project presented by Honneth in Critique of Power, will devote the last section of the thesis to discuss the work of three different representatives of a new generation of critical theorists, whose purpose seems to be exactly to realize it.

This thesis takes the form of a meta-criticism of the hermeneutics of the art-historical enterprise. I begin with an immanent critique of the discipline, paying careful attention to where art historians shift the interpretive focus in the spectrum of maker--object--viewer. After advocating for an increase in our consideration for the viewer in the present context, I then present a synoptic reception model for the interpretation of images in both their original forms and reproduced states. These two modes of viewing hinge upon spatial constructions: that of real spaces (e.g., museums, galleries, etc.) and virtual spaces (e.g., the Internet and other ephemeral media). Instead of relegating reproduced images to the art-historical basement, I argue for the productive interpretation of reproductions through a staged theoretical intervention between Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Walter Benjamin. In order to demonstrate the use of my reception model, I conclude with a case study of a particular image--Francisco de Goya's Untitled (Saturn Devouring One of his Children) of 1820-1823. From the painting's beginnings in a farmhouse in Spain through the vicissitudes of nearly 200 years of grafting--from mural to canvas, Madrid to Paris and back again, and as a reproduced image in its "afterlife"--I analyze the aura of the image as imputed by its viewers. I argue that each subsequent reproduction of the image does not necessarily cause a loss of aura, but that conversely and paradoxically, aura actually increases. I analyze the act of viewing itself not as a passive act of visual consumption, but as an interactive process of cumulative production. In this fashion, the reproduced image can play a significant role in the formation of identities and possesses the phenomenological potential to lead to increased self-awareness. / text

Em Crítica do Poder, Axel Honneth defende que aqueles que buscam realizar o projeto da teoria crítica têm de desenvolver um quadro conceitual que seja capaz de compreender tanto as estruturas da dominação social como os recursos sociais necessários à sua superação prática. Partindo de uma reconstrução do percurso de Honneth até Luta por Reconhecimento, procuramos inicialmente mostrar que a teoria do reconhecimento corresponde à tentativa do autor de realizar essas tarefas. Explicitando, no entanto, que seus esforços nesse momento se concentram nas tarefas de reconstruir a dinâmica normativa das relações intersubjetivas e o interesse estrutural dos seres humanos pelo reconhecimento, defendemos que Honneth acaba perdendo de vista o fato de que as relações sociais estão perpassadas por relações de poder. Retomando então as críticas dirigidas a Honneth por diversos autores, argumentamos que, tal como formulada em Luta por Reconhecimento, a teoria honnethiana do reconhecimento depende de uma compreensão redutora do poder. Tendo em vista que, após seu debate com Nancy Fraser, Honneth reconhece esse problema e reformula importantes elementos de sua teoria, dedicamos parte da tese à análise dessas reformulações. Ao fazermos isso, nosso objetivo é mostrar que, embora procure dar conta da relação entre reconhecimento e poder, Honneth acaba se afastando, em seus textos mais recentes, da noção de dominação social. Defendendo, por fim, o projeto crítico esboçado em Crítica do Poder, dedicamos a última seção da tese à discussão do trabalho de três diferentes representantes de uma nova geração de teóricos críticos, cujo objetivo parece ser exatamente o de realizá-lo. / In Critique of Power, Axel Honneth argues that those who seek to realize the project of critical theory today must develop a conceptual framework able to comprehend both the structures of social domination and the social resources for its practical overcoming. Starting with a reconstruction of Honneths theoretical development until Struggle for Recognition, our first aim is to show that the theory of recognition corresponds to the author\'s attempt to fulfill these tasks. Pointing out, however, that his efforts at this time are concentrated on the tasks of reconstructing the normative dynamics of intersubjective relations and the structural human interest for recognition, we argue that Honneth ends up losing sight of the fact that power permeate social relations. Resuming, at this point, the criticisms directed at Honneth by various authors, we aim to show that his recognition theory, as presented in Struggle for Recognition, depends on a reductive understanding of power. Considering that, after his debate with Nancy Fraser, Honneth acknowledges this problem and reformulates important elements of his theory, we devote part of this thesis to an analysis of the different strategies deployed by Honneth with this purpose. By doing this, our goal is to show that even thou Honneth tries to account for the relationship between recognition and power, in his most recent texts, he seems to abandon the concept of social domination. Advocating, finally, for the critical project presented by Honneth in Critique of Power, will devote the last section of the thesis to discuss the work of three different representatives of a new generation of critical theorists, whose purpose seems to be exactly to realize it.

O recente desenvolvimento de uma teoria crítica dos sistemas, de Gunther Teubner a Andreas Fischer-Lescano, abriu novos horizontes teóricos para aqueles que se propõe a estudar a sociedade e o sistema jurídico. A construção de uma teoria crítica sob condições sistêmicas possibilitou o uso conjunto de temas e conceitos teóricos provenientes da teoria crítica da primeira geração da Escola de Frankfurt (crítica imanente, antagonismos sociais, reificação, dialética do esclarecimento) e da teoria dos sistemas (paradoxo, sistema, sociedade mundial). Partindo disso, o sistema jurídico foi analisado nas dimensões da justiça (como fórmula contingente e transcendente) e de sua crítica imanente como atitude transcendente, especialmente em face de sua tendência em se autorreproduzir como ordem social reificada que gera injustiça pelos excessos de justiça. Para alcançar essas conclusões, este trabalho se propôs a analisar o cenário da sociedade moderna no qual nasce a teoria crítica dos sistemas (Parte 1), lançando bases para os aspectos estruturais e semânticos sobre os quais ela se apoia. Seguidamente, foram estabelecidos os pressupostos teóricos básicos da teoria crítica da Escola de Frankfurt e da teoria dos sistemas de Luhmann (Parte 2) com o fim específico de colher os elementos essenciais à construção de uma teoria crítica dos sistemas voltada para o estudo do sistema jurídico. Logrado esse ponto, focou-se a análise do sistema jurídico e de sua evolução até alcançar sua atual condição na forma de um direito global na sociedade fragmentada (Parte 3). A partir disso a justiça autossubversiva e a crítica imanente do direito foram abordadas em seus aspectos essenciais e possibilitadores de uma autotranscendência sistêmica, capaz de tornar o direito mais responsivo com relação ao seu ambiente, limitando a irracionalidade racional inerente a uma ordem social reificada. A presente dissertação propõe dar mais um passo no sentido do desenvolvimento de uma teoria crítica dos sistemas aplicada ao direito, diagnosticando os dilemas contemporâneos e ao mesmo tempo, apontando os desafios existentes numa sociedade mundial paradoxalmente marcada pela possibilidade de hipertrofia sistêmica das ordens sociais reificadas e pelos processos de constitucionalização que buscam limitar essas ordens. / The recent development of critical systems theory, from Gunther Teubner to Andreas Fischer-Lescano, opened new horizons for the theorists who propose to study the society and the legal system. The construction of a critical theory under systemic conditions allows the joint use of theoretical concepts and themes from the first generation of the Frankfurt School (immanent critique, social antagonisms, reification, Dialectic of Enlightenment) and systems theory (paradox, systems, global society). Starting from this, the legal system was analyzed in the dimensions of justice (as contingent and transcendent formula) and its immanent critique as transcendent attitude, especially against the tendency to self-reproduce as reified social order, which produces injustices because excess of the justice. To reach these conclusions, this study aims to analyze the condition of modern society in which the critical systems theory arises (Part 1), laying the foundation for structural and semantic aspects on which it stands. Subsequently was established the basic theoretical premises of critical theory of the Frankfurt School and the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann (Part 2) with the specific purpose of collecting the essential elements to build a critical systems theory facing the study of the legal system. Reached this point, focused on the analysis of the legal system and its evolution to reach its current status of a global law in a fragmented society (Part 3). Like this the self-subversive justice and the immanent critique of the law have focused on key aspects that enable a systemic self-transcendence, able to make the law more responsive regarding to its environment by limiting its rational irrationality, which implies a reified social order. This thesis proposes give a step further towards the development of a critical theory applied to the law systems, diagnosing contemporary dilemmas and at the same time, pointing out the challenges of a global society paradoxically marked by the possibility of systemic hypertrophy stemmed from reified social orders and the constitutionalization processes that seek to limit such orders.