Implicit prejudice, and in particular, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), are paradigmatic examples of psychological concepts and research methods that have recently enjoyed great publicity and accessibility. However, little is known about the possible reflexive consequences of this popularization for the public understanding of prejudice, and by implication, for the formulation of social policy aimed at the reduction of prejudice and racism. Specifically, how does the public interpret and contextualize the claims of the IAT and implicit prejudice? With what social and political preoccupations does this operationalization of implicit prejudice resonate? Furthermore, how do members of the public experience and interpret the IAT as both a scientific instrument and as a bearer of psychological truth? In answer to these questions, this dissertation comprises a report of two empirical studies of public encounters with the IAT and the concepts of implicit prejudice. The first of these focused on popular responses to IAT research in the New York Times. Employing a discourse analytic approach to reader comments, it identified the social and psychological concerns against which the public makes sense of the IAT. In responding to the IAT, readers drew on skeptical and confessional discourses to position themselves reflexively in relation to its claims. I argue that these discourses constitute a space within which strong injunctions to self-scrutiny, impartiality and objectivity are established as moral-psychological ideals. Building on these findings, the second study examined the IAT as a discursive practice through a focus on the lived experience of taking the test. Recruited participants took the IAT, and were subsequently interviewed to elicit moment-by-moment accounts of this process. Hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of these accounts revealed thematic concerns that both resonated with and augmented those in the analysis of public discourse. In particular, the IAT was experienced as a vivid demonstration of the operationalization of "implicit bias". I argue that the test embodies and communicates this paradigm to test-takers, and therefore functions as a psychological pedagogical tool. The dissertation closes by discussing the implications of these analyses for public understandings of, and responses to, prejudice.

Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) is the intentional destruction of bodily tissue in the absence of suicidal motives. NSSI is strongly associated with self-criticism (Gilbert et al., 2010) and individuals who self-injure often report doing so to punish themselves. Conversely, self-compassion, or the tendency to be caring with oneself, is associated with psychological well-being (Neff et al., 2007). The aim of the present study was to determine whether experimentally inducing self-criticism or self-compassion would lead to changes in implicit identification with NSSI. The Self-Injury Implicit Association Test (SI-IAT; Nock & Banaji, 2007) is an assessment of the strength of the automatic associations that a person holds between themselves and NSSI. Participants were randomly assigned to a self-criticism induction, a self-compassion induction, or a neutral condition and completed the SI-IAT before and after the induction. Results showed that participants in the self-criticism induction experienced an increase in their implicit associations with NSSI while implicit associations in the self-compassion and control conditions generally did not change. Results were not significantly different for those with or without a history of NSSI and highlight the importance of self-criticism in NSSI. Future research should examine increases in self-criticism as a potential precursor of NSSI in longitudinal samples.

Background: Childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has the potential to compromise the socioemotional development of the victim resulting in an increased vulnerability to difficulties regulating emotions and one’s sense of self. Emotion is thought to play a key part in a number of psychological disorders which CSA survivors are at increased risk of developing. A better understanding of the basic emotions experienced in this population and emotion regulation will inform current treatment. Aims: This research aimed to develop a better understanding of the emotions experienced by survivors of CSA and the relationship between “implicit” and explicit emotions and psychopathology. Method: Two empirical studies were conducted. Study 1 employed a cross-sectional consecutive case series design involving 109 survivors of CSA. Participants completed a set of measures relating to basic emotions, emotion regulation and symptoms. Exploratory factor analyses were conducted on the Basic Emotions scale (BES). Regression analyses were used to explore the relationship between emotions experienced, emotion regulation strategies and psychological symptoms. Study 2 examined basic emotions, “implicit disgust self-concept” and psychopathology in a population of CSA survivors (n=26) and a group of individuals currently receiving psychological therapy who reported that they had not experienced childhood trauma (n=25). Participants completed self-report measures pertaining to emotion, emotion regulation, symptoms and cognitive fusion. Participants also completed an implicit association test. Results: Exploratory factor analyses supported the structure of three versions of the BESWeekly, General, and Coping in a sample of survivors of childhood sexual abuse. In all three versions of the scale, disgust explained the largest proportion of variance. The basic emotions of sadness, fear and disgust as well as external dysfunctional coping strategies appear to predict PTSD symptomatology in this sample. The results of Study 2 also support the finding that self-reported disgust is prominent in the emotion profile of CSA survivors. Implicit disgust self-concept was not significantly correlated with other emotions or psychopathology. However, implicit disgust self-concept was found to be significantly associated with cognitive fusion. Discussion: Psychotherapeutic approaches for survivors of childhood sexual abuse should address the emotional experience of this population. In particular, these findings suggest that sadness and disgust should be targeted in therapy.

Following the 9/11 terror attacks, many Americans experienced some form of habit or mood-altering stress though, most had received their impressions of the violence via distributed media reporting rather than firsthand exposure. Researchers have found that the propagating effects of media broadcasting can exasperate the effects of terror. However, little is known of how reports of terror violence affect group dynamics in geographically distant nations. The purpose of this study, following terror management theory, was to understand if terrorist violence influences cognitive and implicit racial evaluations in a culturally similar, but geographically distant, population. The study's design was a quantitative natural experiment. Time of completing the assessment, either before or after the 2015 Paris Bataclan terror attack, comprised the 2-level independent variable; the dependent variables were the Race Implicit Association Test (IAT) and a cognitive evaluation of racial anxiety. Age and religiosity served as covariates. The target population included White citizen residents of the United States over the age of 18; 263 participants were derived from archival data. Comparisons of raw IAT scores showed an 8% increase in negative implicit racial evaluations following the attack; however, the MANCOVA failed to achieve multivariate significance (p > .05). Despite the lack of statistical significance, important details on implicit racial attitudes were uncovered. Results of this study have the potential to foster positive social change by informing individuals on how their implicit associations might be affected following exposure to reports of terrorist violence. Additionally, these findings may guide national security and intelligence professional's development of post-attack response measures and task forces.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Fibromyalgia Syndrome (FMS) is a chronic, painful rheumatic condition characterized by recurrent musculoskeletal pain, fatigue, and nonrestorative sleep, for which there is currently no biological marker. People who suffer from fibromyalgia are extremely susceptible to the effects of psychological stressors which may in turn exacerbate the symptoms of the disease. As unrelenting pain is the main symptom of fibromyalgia, it follows that patients would experience personal losses and changes in their self-schemas or the way in which they view themselves as a result. This study was particularly focused on identifying the enmeshment of self-schemas and pain-schemas, and the extent to which women with fibromyalgia experience pain and self-schema enmeshment (PSSE). Additionally, this study sought to determine the utility of using the Implicit Association Test as a measure of PSSE. The present study compared FMS patients to a group of diabetes patients on several measures of schema enmeshment, including the IAT. It was hypothesized that the two disease groups would differ significantly on the level of PSSE indicated by the IAT, and the two disease groups would not differ on enmeshment with illness indicated by the IAT. Additionally it was hypothesized that the IAT would be correlated with explicit measures of PSSE. Results did not support either of these hypotheses; however the sample size and statistical power necessary to test these hypotheses was severely lacking and thus they could not be evaluated in an appropriate manner. Results did not support the hypothesis that the IAT would be highly correlated with the explicit measures of PSSE. Based on these results and the existing literature, it is still somewhat unclear as to whether or not the IAT would be an acceptable/feasible tool in assessing PSSE in fibromyalgia patients.

No description available.

A robust associative self network automatically biases attention, memory, and impression formation in a heuristic-like way. This thesis examines whether this self-heuristic underlies association formation of novel person and object representations to the self network and how this structure influences perceptions. This was tested across three experiments. The first employed an implicit task to assess whether self-similar individuals were represented with greater association strength to self-concept than self-dissimilar individuals. The second used an implicit task to measure whether newly-owned, previously-owned, and unowned objects exhibited different association strength with self-concept. The third determined the impact of minimal self-similarity to another individual, presented either before or after encoding, on memory for encoded information about them. Results of these experiments support three conclusions summarizing how a self-heuristic affects perceptions of novel stimuli. First, self-relevance automatically biases cognitive representation of novel self-similar (versus self-dissimilar) people and owned (versus unowned) objects, evidenced by stronger implicit association strength between these stimuli and self-concept. Next, this representation biases memory accuracy and errors in favour of heuristic-consistent information, even in contexts of minimal self-similarity. Finally, representation of self-similar people and owned objects relative to the self network biases perception through first-order effects, whereby unrelated concepts sharing an association to the self-network can influence one-another. Owned objects were automatically more favourably evaluated due to a first-order association with self-positivity. Perception of well-established self-knowledge was malleable based on response pairing with first-order associated self-similar or self-dissimilar individuals. Finally, when memory retrieval for self-similar and self-dissimilar individuals failed, responses were predicted based on first-order associated personality traits. These conclusions provide novel support for the existence of an automatic and ubiquitous self-heuristic that biases representation formation and subsequent perception of novel people and objects. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / A highly accessible network of self-representation biases attention and memory in favour of self-relevant information. I investigated how this network mediates representation of novel people and novel objects, stimulus categories that have received little attention in the social cognitive literature. An implicit test of cognitive association strength (i.e. the Implicit Association Test) revealed that novel self-similar (versus self-dissimilar) people and owned (versus unowned) objects are immediately associated to the self network. The new representations led to perceptual biases through first-order associations, whereby strictly self-relevant information was generalized to self-similar people and owned objects. For instance, even minimal self-similarity to a novel individual biased memory retrieval and reconstruction so that the retrieved information was consistent with the expectation of self-similarity. Together, the findings highlight the ubiquity and automaticity with which self-associations mediate cognitive representations and consequent perceptions of novel people and objects in realistic social situations.

Though the workforce in the United States is comprised of more than 50% women, women hold only 26% of professional computing jobs, and at some companies the percentage is even lower (National Center for Women & Information Technology, 2011). This study aims to examine whether employees within the tech industry have an implicit association between the concepts of “maleness” and “tech”. Participants will complete a priming task, an Implicit Association Test, and a survey about existing sexist beliefs and their jobs. The Expectation States Theory (Eagly, Beall, & Sternberg, 2004) suggests that all participants will have an implicit association between these concepts, though participants primed with an article about a man in tech and participants from companies with more men overall, in leadership, and in tech positions will have a stronger bias. Additionally, the Unified Theory (Greenwald et al., 2002; Smeding, 2012) suggests that the proposed results will show that women working in tech positions have a slightly weaker bias, and priming about a woman in tech will not reverse the bias. If implicit biases are addressed within the tech industry, these fixes can help the field maintain its upward trajectory by becoming an inclusive space for men and women.

The purpose of this research was to investigate the nature of listeners' attitudes toward foreign-accented speech and the manner in which those attitudes are formed. This study measured 165 participants' implicit and explicit attitudes toward US- and foreign-accented audio stimuli. Implicit attitudes were measured with an audio Implicit Association Test. The use of audio stimuli as repeated tokens for their phonological attributes represents an innovation in IAT methodology. Explicit attitudes were elicited through self-report. The explicit task was contextualized as a fictional medical malpractice trial; participants heard the recorded audio testimony of two actors (one US-accented and one Korean-accented) portraying opposing expert witnesses. Four test conditions counterbalanced across participants were created from the recordings. Participants rated the experts on fourteen dependent variables ('traits'): believability, credibility, judgment, knowledge, competence, trustworthiness, likeability, friendliness, expertise, intelligence, warmth, persuasiveness, presentation style, and clarity of presentation. Participants were also asked for their attitudes toward the speakers relative to each other (i.e., Which doctor would you side with in this dispute?). The question of speaker preference was posed as a binary choice, an 11- point slider scale measure, and two confirmation questions asking participants to state how fair they thought an outcome for each party would be. This study's hypothesis that participants' implicit and explicit attitudes toward the same speech would diverge was confirmed. The IAT results indicated an implicit bias [ D =.33, p∠.05] in favor of the US-accented speaker, while the self-report results indicated an explicit bias [ F (2,121)=3.969, p=.021, η 2 =.062] in favor of the foreign-accented speaker in the slider scale and confirmation questions [ F (2,121)=3.708, p=.027, η 2 =.058, and F (2,121)=3.563, p=.031, η 2 =.056]. While the binary choice question showed a trend toward favoring the foreign-accented speaker, the result was not significant. No discernable pattern was found to exist in attitudes toward the speaker by trait. This study's findings argue for the recognition of both implicit and explicit attitude constructs and the integration of implicit attitudes measurement methodologies into future language attitudes research. Additional theoretical implications of these findings for future language attitudes research are also discussed, including implications for selecting an appropriate cognitive processing model.

Unverfälschbarkeit stellt ein wichtiges Gütekriterium psychologischer Testverfahren dar. Dieses Kriterium gilt dann als erfüllt, wenn das Testverfahren auf Grund seiner Konstruktion keine Steuerung oder Verzerrung der Ausprägung von Testwerten seitens der Versuchspersonen ermöglicht (vgl. Moosbrugger & Kelava, 2012). Im Gegensatz zu direkten Verfahren (z.B. Fragebogen und Interviews), bei welchen die Ausprägung hinsichtlich eines Merkmales durch Selbstbeschreibung der Versuchspersonen erfragt wird und eine Verfälschung (z.B. durch sozial erwünschtes Antwortverhalten) nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann, wurde indirekten Verfahren (z.B. dem Impliziten Assoziationstest; IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) lange Zeit Immunität gegen Fälschungsversuche unterstellt. Diese begründet sich unter anderem durch die Annahme, dass mittels indirekter Verfahren implizite Merkmale gemessen werden. Implizite Merkmale unterscheiden sich von den „eher klassischen“ expliziten Merkmalen, welche vorwiegend mittels direkter Verfahren gemessen werden. Ein wesentlicher Unterschied besteht darin, dass Versuchspersonen nicht notwendigerweise um die Ausprägung hinsichtlich ihrer impliziten Merkmale wissen und dass sie diese Ausprägung auch nicht kontrollieren können (vgl. De Houwer, 2006; De Houwer & Moors, 2007, in press). Die theoretischen Annahmen bezüglich der Eigenschaften impliziter Merkmale bzw. Messergebnisse legen zwei Implikationen nahe. Erstens: Wir können implizite Merkmale ausschließlich über indirekte Zugänge erfassen, da diese nicht notwendigerweise bewusst sind und so eine Selbstauskunft nicht möglich erscheint. Zweitens: Personen können ihre impliziten Messergebnisse nicht kontrollieren und folglich auch nicht verfälschen. Vermutlich gab es auch aus diesem Grund vor wenigen Jahren einen regelrechten Boom, der zu der Entwicklung einer Vielzahl indirekter Verfahren zur Erfassung impliziter Merkmale geführt hat. Ob jedoch die Messergebnisse dieser Verfahren tatsächlich implizit und damit nicht verfälschbar sind, darf nicht nur theoretisch unterstellt, sondern muss empirisch überprüft werden (vgl. De Houwer, 2006). Der IAT gilt als das bekannteste, reliabelste und valideste indirekte Verfahren (Bosson, Swan, & Pennebaker, 2000; Rudolph, Schröder-Abé, Schütz, Gregg, & Sedikides, 2008). In meiner Dissertation habe ich mich aus diesem Grund der empirischen Überprüfung auf Verfälschbarkeit des IATs gewidmet. Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus insgesamt fünf Kapiteln. Das 1. Kapitel bildet eine theoretische Einführung zu den Themen Fälschung im diagnostischen Kontext und zum IAT. Grundlegende Befunde und Fragen zur Verfälschbarkeit des IATs werden dargestellt. Kapitel 2 bis 4 bilden empirische Beiträge meiner Forschung, die sich jeweils schwerpunktmäßig mit unterschiedlichen Aspekten der Verfälschbarkeit des IATs beschäftigen. In Kapitel 2 wird der Frage nachgegangen, unter welchen Bedingungen der IAT verfälschbar ist. Bis dato haben die wenigen existierenden Studien ein sehr widersprüchliches Bild bezüglich der Verfälschbarkeit des IATs aufgezeigt. Ein Grund hierfür könnte sein, dass potentiell relevante Faktoren, welche die Verfälschbarkeit des Verfahrens beeinflussen können, noch nie gemeinsam in einer Studie untersucht wurden. Die vorliegende Studie wurde genau mit diesem Ziel konstruiert und durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse verweisen auf ein komplexes Zusammenspiel verschiedener Faktoren und zeigen auf, unter welchen Bedingungen der IAT verfälschbar ist. Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse werden kritisch diskutiert. In Kapitel 3 werden die Fragen beantwortet, wie Personen den IAT verfälschen und ob Fälschung im IAT detektierbar ist. Die Forschung hat sich bislang nur bedingt damit beschäftigt, was fälschende Personen tun, um ihre Messergebnisse wie gewünscht zu beeinflussen. Es wurde auch noch nicht untersucht, ob Versuchspersonen unter verschiedenen Bedingungen (z.B. Fälschungsziel: hohe vs. niedrige Testwerte) unterschiedliche Strategien anwenden. Dennoch wurden Indices vorgeschlagen, welche in der Lage sein sollen, Fälschung im IAT zu detektieren (Agosta, Ghirardi, Zogmaister, Castiello, & Sartori, 2011; Cvencek, Greenwald, Brown, Gray, & Snowden, 2010). In der vorgestellten Studie habe ich einerseits untersucht, welche Strategien fälschende Personen anwenden und ob sie, je nach Bedingung, zu unterschiedlichen Strategien greifen. Andererseits habe ich untersucht, welche dieser Strategien tatsächlich mit erfolgreicher Fälschung des IATs einhergehen. Schließlich habe ich untersucht, ob die in der Vergangenheit vorgeschlagenen Indices tatsächlich in der Lage sind, erfolgreiche FälscherInnen zu detektieren. Meine Ergebnisse zeigen, dass fälschende Personen unterschiedliche Strategien anwenden, um ihr Ziel zu erreichen. Damit verbunden zeigte sich auch, dass es schwerer ist als bislang angenommen, erfolgreiche FälscherInnen im IAT zu detektieren. Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse werden kritisch diskutiert. Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob kognitive Fähigkeiten ein erfolgreiches Fälschen im IAT erleichtern. Bisher wurden diese Fähigkeiten nur mit Fälschungserfolg in direkten Verfahren in Verbindung gebracht (vgl. Hartshorne & May, 1928; Nguyen, Biderman, & McDaniel, 2005; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996; Pauls & Crost, 2005; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999; Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012; Weiner & Gibson, 2000). In der vorgestellten Studie habe ich untersucht, ob sie auch beim Fälschen des IATs eine Rolle spielen. Besonders habe ich mich dabei für die Rolle des g Faktors der Intelligenz, der Verarbeitungsgeschwindigkeit und der Konzentrationsfähigkeit interessiert. Die Ergebnisse meiner Studie zeigen auf, dass einige dieser Prädiktoren tatsächlich einen Einfluss auf den Fälschungserfolg im IAT haben. Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse werden kritisch diskutiert. Das 5. Kapitel bildet eine Zusammenführung und Integration der Befunde meiner Forschung in die bestehende Theorie. Zudem werden ein Ausblick für die weitere Forschung sowie Empfehlungen für die Praxis gegeben.