La sépulture est souvent appréhendée à titre d’exception ou par une superposition de notions : copropriété familiale, bien familial, chose hors commerce, indivision perpétuelle, droit réel spécial... Cette approche disparate dissimule l’existence d’un droit des sépultures qui peine, en conséquence, à constituer un droit unifié. Le droit des sépultures se trouve fractionné en plusieurs branches : droit civil, droit pénal et droit public. A travers elles, apparaissent de nombreuses problématiques, liées à la nature et au régime proposés. Pour ces raisons, il est nécessaire d’aborder le droit des sépultures par la recherche de ses fondements, inchangés depuis le droit romain et le droit médiéval. Le premier fondement est le sacré ; le second la communauté. Tous deux prennent leur source dans l’histoire du droit et continuent d’exister dans le droit positif. Ils font apparaître une unité du droit des sépultures, autour d’une double fonction : assurer la séparation du mort et du vivant et perpétuer le culte des morts. Du point de vue anthropologique, le sacré, premier fondement, se distingue du religieux, et se manifeste selon deux opérations : la délimitation d’une frontière entre sacré et profane par la séparation, puis la protection de ce nouvel espace délimité par la répression de toute atteinte. Pour les sépultures, ces deux opérations sont effectuées respectivement par l’extracommercialité et par la protection pénale. Le premier mécanisme est issu du droit romain et montre une protection originale de la sépulture ; toute activité juridique qui n’est pas incompatible avec le respect des morts est autorisée. L’autre mécanisme concerne l’incrimination de violation de sépulture, qui perpétue sa dimension sacrée. Le second fondement est communautaire : il est apparu pour les sépultures de famille avec les communautés médiévales, à une époque où les biens et les personnes étaient soudés en un groupe familial unique. Désormais adapté par l’affectation familiale, un tel fondement se maintient dans notre droit avec un régime de propriété collective, à travers la transmission successorale restreinte au groupe familial et un principe égalitaire, ce qui fait de la sépulture une véritable propriété communautaire. Bien sacré, propriété communautaire, les fondements des sépultures mettent en exergue des dimensions originales de la propriété. / Burials are often considered in terms of acceptions or superimpositions of notions: family co-ownership, family property, off-trade affairs, joint possession, specific real right… This multi-entry approach conceals the existence of a right of burial which, as a consequence, is difficult to define as a unified right. The right of burial is divided up into various branches— civil law, criminal law, public law—which rise various questions linked to the very nature if the different systems. For this reason, it is necessary to tackle the right of burial from the point of view of its foundations, which have not changed since the establishment of Roman law and Medieval law.The first founding principle concerns the sacred; the second is about the community. Both originate in legal history and are still valid in the field of positive law. They show a unity in the right of burial as regards two main functions: ensure the separation between the living and the dead and keep up the traditional practice of ancestor worship. From the anthropological viewpoint, the sacred—the first principle—distinguishes from the religious, and is expressed in two main missions: the definition of a frontier between the sacred and the profane by the separation, then the protection of this new space delineated by the suppression of any violation. For the burials, these two missions are respectively accomplished by a position out of commerce and by the criminal procedure. The first mechanism comes from Roman law and shows an original protection of the burial process; every legal activity which is not incompatible with the respect of the dead is allowed. The other mechanism concerns the incrimination of the violation of the burial process and its sacred nature. The second founding principle is about the community: it was created for family burials by medieval communities, at a time when properties and people were seen as a unique family unit. Nowadays adapted by the family affectation, such a principle is maintained in our legal system because of a collective ownership regime, through the transmission of the succession restricted to the family and an egalitarian principle, which turn burials into a property of the community. Sacred property, property of the community, the founding principles of burials bring to light specific dimensions of the concept of property.

As it is evident from the title, in my thesis I would like to provide an overview of the undertakings' procedural rights in proceedings under Article 101 and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Given the extensive investigative powers that are granted to the European Commission by the Council Regulation No 1/2003 and the consequences of being found guilty of violating Article 101 and/or 102 of the TFEU, it is necessary to ensure that the undertakings have enough ways available to exercise their right to defence and other rights and privileges guaranteed by the EU law and international treaties such as European Convention on Human Rights (e.g. the right to respect for private life). For this reason the EU law provides a range of procedural rights that should guarantee that both all the fundamental rights are observed and also serve as a system of checks and balances that prevents the misuse of the Commission's investigative powers. My thesis will focus individual rights of undertakings that are provided to them by the Council Regulation No 1/2003 and EU courts judicature. I will analyse their scope and purpose, the conditions under which they can be exercised and their limitations. Simultaneously a comparison between the rights of undertakings in the EU and U.S. legal system will...

This Doctoral thesis entitled the Constitutionality of Employers' Investigative Procedures and Disciplinary Hearing Processes with Specific Reference to Dismissal of Employees on the Basis of Criminal Misconducts in South Africa, focusses on individual labour law principles of fair labour practices entrenched in section 23(1) of the Constitution. The thesis deals with fairness in situation where an employee who is suspected of committing a criminal act is investigated and subsequently goes through a disciplinary hearing for dismissal. It determines the extent to which an employee’s criminal guilt is decided before dismissal. As such, the thesis is based upon South African judicial interpretation of the right to fair dismissal. In the process the thesis examines the application of principles informing the employer’s duty to provide fair reason concerning the dismissal of employees criminal suspects. In examining if employers observe constitutional transformative objective when conducting criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings - the thesis reviews the extent to which the employer respects constitutional rationales of equity based on the principles of natural justice. These natural justice principles are the basis upon which section 23(1) fairness is founded. Section 23 (1) is implemented through the LRA provisions. The thesis then concludes that, only one principle of natural justice - audi alteram partem is respected within employer flexibility-based fairness while the other principle - nemo judex in propria sua causa is ignored. It is this denial that causes serious procedural challenges in the quest for equity intended in section 23(1) fair labour practices. It is upon these foundational equity concerns that this thesis opposes the flexibility in employer’s criminal investigations and disciplinary hearing processes entrenched in item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 of the LRA fair procedure for dismissal of employees suspected of criminal acts. The thesis interlinks labour law and criminal law to advocate for the missing constitutionally justiciable fairness for employees who have committed criminal misconducts. It argues that the current judicial interpretation of labour law fairness is based upon the principle of flexibility underlying dismissals, asserting that fairness based on flexibility breeds informal procedural processes which exempt employers from observing crucial constitutional fairness principles expressed through proportionality-based prescripts. The thesis concludes that the practice of including the right against self-incrimination in employment law, done in other common law countries be introduced into the South African labour law through section 39 of the Constitution so that the identified procedural challenges are regulated. / Mercantile Law / LL.D.

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage. / The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights.