Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Texas, Aug., 2009. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the silence principle (i.e. the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination) and to determine its place within procedural and constitutional law. Should the silence principle be entirely abolished, sustained as a limited evidentiary rule or elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The central question to be argued is whether the silence principle has a rationally justifiable and valid procedural place within the accusatorial-adversarial Anglo-American system of criminal justice. The methodology employed in the main body of this thesis involves a critical and comparative examination of the silence principle and is founded on the following four legs : a) A historical analysis of the silence principle and its antecedents. Does the historical silence principle support the modern silence principle in description and scope? b) An analysis of the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege". Why is the accused's right to silence distinguished from the witness privilege? Is there a philosophical justification for the silence principle? c) A comparative study of the two major jurisdictions of the Anglo-American system of justice, namely : i) The American silence principle constituted as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and entrenched within the U.S. Constitution; ii) The English silence principle constituted until recently as a common law evidentiary rule contained within a body of ill-defined principles loosely referred to as the unwritten English Constitution. The common law rule has been statutorily formalized in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and will be greatly influenced by the new Human Rights Act 1998. iii) The South African interpretation of a silence principle is caught between the two extremes of an American absolute right and an English evidentiary rule. Silence in South Africa is a relative right subject to a balance of interest and reasonable limitation. Which of these definitions is better suited as a template for an ideal silence principle? vi d) A comparative international study of the procedural differences between an inquisitorial and an accusatorial system. How does a principle of silence function outside the accusatorial system? The conclusion of the thesis is that the most suitable role of a silence principle within the accusatorial system is one of a flexible compromise. While it does not deserve abolition neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. Silence is best suited to the role of a procedural evidentiary rule. A circumstantial item of evidence with its trial admissibility determined by the criteria of relevancy and prejudice. If the legal, political and cultural pressures upon a particular jurisdiction are such as to demand constitutional entrenchment then the second best alternative is to define the silence principle as a relative right susceptible to a properly applied balance of interest test. The worst alternative is to define the silence principle in absolute terms. Silence as an evidentiary rule or a relative right means that it will sometimes be necessary to emphasise the autonomous interests of the individual in remaining silent and at other times the societal interest in crime prevention. Which interest is to be preferred and to what extent will depend on the prevailing social pressures of the day. It shall be argued that the elevation of a silence principle into a constitutional right stifles a critical examination of the essentiale of silence by disguising its inherent irrationality and lack of a philosophical raison de etre. The interpretation of a silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United States is confusing, contradictory and riddled with innumerable exceptions. By contrast the English approach to silence is pragmatic and highly successful. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 gives a meaningful interpretation of silence which takes into account its logical flaws. The English statute is a successful compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal process and the need to combating crime in the most efficient manner possible. While the South African interpretation of silence is a workable compromise, South Africa may have been better served by defining its silence principle in terms of the pragmatic English statutory model which allows for the efficient but carefully controlled use of silence in the combating of crime. / Jurisprudence / LL.D. (Jurisprudence)

In South Africa, as in most jurisdictions which profess to be based on an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, the right against compelled self-incrimination is a guaranteed Constitutional right. This study is prompted by the realization that the right against self-incrimination is being undermined and eroded by an aspect of South Africa’s bail laws. The current study addresses the constitutional validity of section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in so far as it allows for the admission of incriminating evidence at trial, in contravention of the accused’s right against self-incrimination, which incriminatory evidence was tendered by the applicant during a bail application in circumstances where the applicant was compelled to prove that he would be acquitted at trial where reliance is placed on a weak State’s case in proving exceptional circumstances in compliance with section 60(11)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Whilst section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is undoubtedly aimed at combatting crime, the pre-occupation with crime control measures threatens to undermine individual liberty and poses a threat to our Constitutional project of building a human rights culture. I advance an argument which supports the view that section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is unconstitutional, in the above context, in that it infringes upon the accused’s right against compelled self-incrimination at trial and does not amount to a justifiable limitation on the rights of an accused in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. I also advance an alternative legal remedy aimed at fulfilling the initial mischief which Section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was designed to prevent in order to bring the section in line with the Constitution and a rights-based society. / Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2017. / Procedural Law / LLM / Unrestricted

證人以不自證己罪為由主張拒絕證言權之相關問題，在刑事審判過程中主要牽涉四大層面：一為此項拒絕證言權之適用範圍為何，亦即證人所得主張權利之射程範圍是否僅止於供述證據，抑或涵蓋其他刑事訴訟中的強制處分、提出命令；二為審判程序中證人應如何主張、行使此項權利，而一旦證人主張此權利，司法機關應如何審查以為准駁；三為證人行使拒絕證言權之舉，對於本案被告案件中，乃至於證人日後改列被告時，可否評價（是否具有證據能力）、抑或應如何評價之（證明力問題）；四為若檢察官或法院未盡告知義務告知證人有此項權利致使證人為自陷己罪之陳述時，該陳述對於本案被告案件中，乃至於證人日後改列被告時，可否評價（是否具有證據能力）、抑或應如何評價（證明力問題）。上開層面即為本文探討之主軸。

Le développement croissant de règles créatrices d'un dispositif juridique particulier, notamment à l'aune des lois du 23 décembre 1980 ayant redéfini le crime de viol et du 17 juin 1998 relative à la prévention et la répression des infractions sexuelles ainsi qu'à la protection des mineurs, permet à certains auteurs de la doctrine de constater l'existence d'un ensemble de règles spécifiques. Aucune étude approfondie n'a à ce jour été effectuée sur les agressions et atteintes sexuelles, si ce n'est par le prisme des infractions à caractère sexuel ou celui des infractions violentes et sexuelles commises à l'encontre des mineurs. Il a semblé intéressant d'effectuer une approche synthétique de ces deux catégories d'incriminations au regard de la réponse pénale particulière qu'elles suscitent. La présente étude tend à étudier la persistance de ce dispositif apparemment spécifique. Sur le plan législatif et jurisprudentiel, il est apparu au regard de l'analyse synthétique, bien que non exhaustive, de ces dispositions, que le mouvement de spécificité n'a pas perduré et s'est éloigné des objectifs initiaux poursuivis, de préservation de la victime et de prévention de la récidive équilibrée entre surveillance et réinsertion. Le caractère initialement spécifique de ces dispositions doit aujourd'hui être relativisé concernant l'appréhension pénale de ces faits, comme leur sanction pénale. / A whole set of specific rules has been recorded about sexual assaults and minor's sexual abuses, in the light of two different laws. The first one is dated December 23rd 1980 and redefined the crime of rape. The second one dates back to June 17th 1998 and refers to the prevention and repression of sexual offences as well as to minors' protection. Until today, neither sexual assaults nor sexual abuses have been studied thoroughlly, except for sexual offences or sexual and violent offences committed on minors. Considering the particular penal sentence that both of these categories of incrimations raise, it seemed interesting to carry out a synthetic approach. The following work aims at studying the persistence of these rules which appear to be specific. From a legislative and judicial point of view, the global analysis of these rules showed that this movement of specifity did not last and even moved away from its first objectives which were protecting the victim and preventing from a second offence; the latter being balanced between surveillance and rehabilitation. The initially specific nature of these rules have to be put into perspective regarding the penal understanding of these facts and their penal sanction.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcio Rached Millani.pdf: 1174248 bytes, checksum: a7b10e5dc4901736fd7dbffc2c9099f5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-28 / Several countries adopted in their Constitutions or in their infra-laws the right to not self-incrimination. This right is also guaranteed by several international treaties which were incorporated to the internal laws of several countries, including Brazil. It can be observed that the texts adopted by the countries are similar and include, in general, the right of the investigation or the accused remain silent, that is, the right not to testify against themselves in criminal investigation or proceeding instituted for the determination of a particular offense. In short, investigated or defendants are not compelled to assist in the production of evidence in cases filed against them. While texts of legal provisions that enshrine the right to self-incrimination are similar and in some cases almost identical, it is observed that our jurisprudence conferred much greater extension to the right than that observed in comparative law coverage, and in some cases this expansion eventually become ineffective legal provisions in force, as happened with the recent sealing of the use of certain alcohol tests for evidence of intoxication. Several arguments can be raised to try to explain why the right to not self-incrimination have become an almost absolute right, among them: an erroneous interpretation of its contents; not weighting of conflicting values in the case concert; the notion that the individual s body cannot, under any circumstances, be used as a test object; the exaggerated importance given to individual rights; and the confusion between authority and authoritarianism that took place in our society after the end of the dictatorial regime / Vários países adotam em suas Constituições ou em suas leis infraconstitucionais o direito à não autoincriminação. Tal direito é também garantido por vários tratados internacionais que se incorporaram às legislações internas dos vários países, entre eles o Brasil. Pode-se observar que as redações adotadas pelos países são similares e abrangem, de modo geral, o direito de o investigado ou o réu permanecerem em silêncio, vale dizer, o direito de não deporem contra si mesmos em investigação ou processo penal instaurados para a apuração de determinado delito. Em suma, não são os investigados ou réus compelidos a auxiliar na produção da prova em processos contra eles instaurados. Conquanto as redações dos dispositivos legais que consagram o direito à não autoincriminação sejam similares e em alguns casos quase idênticas, observa-se que a nossa jurisprudência conferiu ao referido direito uma abrangência muito maior do que a observada no direito comparado, sendo que em algumas hipóteses tal ampliação acabou por tornar sem efeito dispositivos legais em vigor, como ocorreu com a recente vedação da utilização de determinados testes de alcoolemia para comprovação da embriaguez. Várias hipóteses podem ser levantadas para tentar explicar a razão de o direito à não autoincriminação ter se tornado um direito quase absoluto, entre elas: uma errônea interpretação de seu conteúdo; a não ponderação dos valores em conflito no caso concreto; a noção de que o corpo do indivíduo não pode, em hipótese nenhuma, ser utilizado como objeto de prova; a exagerada importância conferida aos direitos individuais; e a confusão entre autoridade e autoritarismo que ocorreu na nossa sociedade após o término do regime ditatorial

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisors: Maxwell B. Stinchcombe and R. Preston McAfee. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:27:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RochesterOA_DISSERT.pdf: 1967968 bytes, checksum: e042fe7c363667513adbe806fe52d94f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-25 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / The right against self-incrimination is a fundamental right that works in the criminal prosecution, and therefore deserves a study supported by the general theory of criminal procedure. The right has a vague origin, and despite the various historical accounts only arises when there is a criminal procedure structured that aims to limit the State?s duty-power to punish. The only system of criminal procedure experienced that reconciles with seal self-incrimination is the accusatory model. The inquisitorial model is based on the construction of a truth and obtaining the confession at any cost, and is therefore incompatible with the right in study. The consecration of the right arises with the importance that fundamental rights have come to occupy in the Democratic Constitutional States. In the Brazilian experience before 1988 was only possible to recognize that self-incrimination represented a procedural burden for accused persons. Despite thorough debate in the Constituent Assembly, the right remains consecrated in a textual formula that?s closer to the implementation made by the Supreme Court of the United States, known as "Miranda warnings", than the text of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that established originally the right against self-incrimination with a constitutional status. However, the imprecise text does not prevent the consecration of the principle as a fundamental right in Brazilian law. The right against self-incrimination is a right that should be observed in the Criminal Procedure and relates to several of his canons, such as the the presumption of not guilty, the accusatory model, the distribution of the burden of proof, and especially the right of defense. Because it a fundamental right, the prohibition of self-incrimination deserves a proper study to her constitutional nature. For the definition of protected persons is important to build a material concept of accused, which is different of the formal concept over who is denounced on the prosecution. In the objective area of protection, there are two objects of protection of the norm: the instinct of self-preservation of the subject and the ability to self-determination. Configuring essentially a evidence rule in criminal procedure, the analysis of the case should be based on standards set previously to indicate respect for the right. These standard include the right to information of the accused, the right to counsel and respect the voluntary participation. The study of violations cases, concentrated on the element of voluntariness, starting from the definition of what is or is not a coercion violative of self-determination. The right faces new challenges that deserve attention, especially the fight against terrorism and organized crime that force the development of tools, resources and technologies about proves, methods increasingly invasive and hidden, and allow the use of information not only for criminal prosecution, but also for the establishment of an intelligence strategy in the development of national and public security / O direito contra a autoincrimina??o ? um direito fundamental que incide sobre a persecu??o criminal, e por isso merece um estudo apropriado amparado pela teoria geral do processo penal. O direito possui uma origem remota imprecisa. Apesar dos relatos hist?ricos mais diversos, apenas surge quando existe um processo penal estruturado que tem como objetivo a limita??o do dever-poder de punir do Estado. O ?nico sistema de processo penal experimentado que se compatibiliza com a veda??o a autoincrimina??o ? o modelo acusat?rio. O modelo inquisitivo baseia-se na constru??o de uma verdade e obtens?o da confiss?o a qualquer custo, e por isso ? incompat?vel com o direito em estudo. A consagra??o do direito surge com a import?ncia que os direitos fundamentais passaram a ter nos Estados Democr?ticos Constitucionais. Na experi?ncia brasileira, antes de 1988 somente era poss?vel reconhecer que a autoincrimina??o representava um ?nus processual ao acusado. Apesar do debate aprofundado na Assembl?ia Constituinte, o direito restou consagrado em uma f?rmula textual que mais se aproxima da concretiza??o feita pela Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos, conhecido como avisos de Miranda , do que do texto da Quinta Emenda da Constitui??o Americana que estabeleceu originariamente em sede constitucional o direito contra a autoincrimina??o. Todavia, a imprecis?o textual n?o impede a consagra??o do direito como norma fundamental no ordenamento jur?dico brasileiro. A veda??o de autoincrimina??o ? um direito que deve ser observado no Processo Penal e se relaciona com diversos de seus c?nones, tais como o a presun??o de n?o culpabilidade, o modelo acusat?rio, a distribui??o do ?nus probat?rio e especialmente o exerc?cio do direito de ampla defesa. Por ser um direito fundamental, a veda??o de autoincrimina??o merece um estudo adequado a sua natureza constitucional. Para a defini??o dos sujeitos protegidos ? importante a constru??o de um conceito material de acusado, que n?o se confunde com o conceito formal daquele denunciado na a??o penal. No ?mbito de prote??o objetivo, dois bens jur?dicos s?o o objeto de prote??o da norma: o instinto de autopreserva??o do sujeito e a capacidade de autodetermina??o. Configurando essencialmente em uma regra quanto as provas no Processo Penal, a an?lise do caso concreto deve se basear em crit?rios previamente fixados para indicar o respeito ao direito. Esses crit?rios s?o estabelecidos, incluindo o direito de informa??o do acusado, o acompanhamento por defensor t?cnico e o respeito a voluntariedade na participa??o. O estudo das hip?teses de viola??o se concentram no elemento da voluntariedade, a partir da defini??o do que consiste ou n?o em coer??o violadora da autodetermina??o. O direito enfrenta novos desafios que merecem aten??o, com destaque para o combate ao terrorismo e a criminalidade organizada que for?am ao desenvolvimento de ferramentas, meios probat?rios e tecnologias cada vez mais invasivas e ocultas e permitem a utiliza??o das informa??es n?o somente para a persecu??o criminal, mas tamb?m para o estabelecimento de uma intelig?ncia no desenvolvimento da seguran?a nacional e p?blica

L’attribution d’une compétence d'incrimination à l’Union soulève les questions complexes qui sont traditionnellement rattachées au pouvoir pénal, notamment celle de la promotion, par les choix d’incrimination d’une conscience collective et de l’expression des valeurs essentielles à une société. En l’occurrence, c’est la question d’une identité européenne. Le projet d’intégration pénale s’est développé très rapidement depuis les trente dernières années sans qu’une réflexion approfondie sur la légitimité d’une telle évolution ne soit menée. Son caractère expérimental a souvent été considéré comme une illustration de la banalisation de la réponse pénale, qu’il s’agisse d’apporter une réponse à des violations suscitant une forte alarme sociale ou de viser à rendre efficace une législation technique. L’absence de politique pénale européenne fait craindre une intervention de l’Union méconnaissant les exigences liées à l’intervention pénale dans un État de droit que sont le respect de la personne et surtout le principe de l’ultima ratio. / The attribution of a criminalisation competence to the Union raises complex questions traditionally attached to the criminal law power, particularly the one of promotion through criminalisation choices of a collective conscience and the expression of values essential to the society. It is the question of a European identity. The penal integration project has developed very rapidly the last thirty years without any deep reflection on the legitimacy of this evolution. Its experimental character is often considered as an illustration of the banalisation of the criminal sanction, being it in order to respond to violations rising a high social alarm or in order to give effectivity to a technical legislation. The absence of criminal policy creates the fear of a European intervention not respecting the requirement attached to the resorting to criminal law in a State under the Rule of Law that are the respect of the person and mostly the principle of ultima ratio

Over the last several decades, researchers have documented how impaired reasoning by adult offenders impeded the intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. Logically, it stands to reason that juveniles – who are developmentally less mature and have less life experience than their adult counterparts – would possess even greater impairment, thereby heightening their risk for invalid Miranda waivers. Juvenile Miranda research supports this notion; with some researchers finding that psychosocial maturity, among other factors, affect a juvenile’s understanding of their rights. Yet, relatively few studies have examined its relation to Miranda reasoning and decision-making. Thus, the current study investigated the specific role of maturity in juveniles’ Miranda comprehension and reasoning. Participants included 236 legally-involved juveniles recruited from either a juvenile detention center or a juvenile justice alternative education program. The effects of psychosocial maturity were examined on a variety of Miranda-related measures and assessed a broad range of Miranda abilities. It was found that, in general, immature juveniles performed more poorly on all Miranda measures as compared to their mature counterparts. However, the impact of maturity varied considerably depending on the ability. Specifically, maturity was most important in the context of Miranda reasoning. As a novel addition to the literature, the current study also investigated the effects of developmental timing on maturity (i.e., immaturity-delayed versus immaturity-expected) on Miranda abilities.