In four experiments on insight problem solving, we investigated the time course of the development of solution knowledge prior to response, as well as the impact of stimulus familiarity on task performance and eye movement measures. In each experiment, participants solved anagram problems while their eye movements were monitored. In Experiments 1a and 1b, each anagram problem consisted of a circular array of letters: a scrambled four-letter solution word containing three consonants and one vowel, and an additional randomly-placed distractor consonant. Viewing times on the distractor consonant compared to the solution consonants provided an online measure of knowledge of the solution. Viewing times on the distractor consonant and the solution consonants were indistinguishable early in the trial. In contrast, several seconds prior to the response, viewing times on the distractor consonant decreased in a gradual manner compared to viewing times on the solution consonants. Importantly, this pattern was obtained across both trials in which participants reported the subjective experience of insight and trials in which they did not. These findings are consistent with the availability of partial knowledge of the solution prior to such information being accessible to subjective phenomenal awareness. In Experiments 2 and 3, each anagram problem consisted of a centrally located three-letter string plus three additional individual letters located above and to the side of the central letter string. All the letters in the central letter string were members of the five-letter solution word, while one of the individual letters was a randomly placed distractor. In Experiment 2, we replicated our findings of the gradual development of solution knowledge using this more complex stimulus display. In Experiment 3, we manipulated the familiarity of the central letter string by presenting it either in the form of a three-letter word, or as a meaningless string of letters. Behavioural measures showed an overall negative impact of familiarity on task performance, while eye movement measures revealed a more complex pattern of effects, including both interference and facilitation. Critically, the effects of familiarity on problem solving did not interact with the development of solution knowledge prior to response.

In four experiments on insight problem solving, we investigated the time course of the development of solution knowledge prior to response, as well as the impact of stimulus familiarity on task performance and eye movement measures. In each experiment, participants solved anagram problems while their eye movements were monitored. In Experiments 1a and 1b, each anagram problem consisted of a circular array of letters: a scrambled four-letter solution word containing three consonants and one vowel, and an additional randomly-placed distractor consonant. Viewing times on the distractor consonant compared to the solution consonants provided an online measure of knowledge of the solution. Viewing times on the distractor consonant and the solution consonants were indistinguishable early in the trial. In contrast, several seconds prior to the response, viewing times on the distractor consonant decreased in a gradual manner compared to viewing times on the solution consonants. Importantly, this pattern was obtained across both trials in which participants reported the subjective experience of insight and trials in which they did not. These findings are consistent with the availability of partial knowledge of the solution prior to such information being accessible to subjective phenomenal awareness. In Experiments 2 and 3, each anagram problem consisted of a centrally located three-letter string plus three additional individual letters located above and to the side of the central letter string. All the letters in the central letter string were members of the five-letter solution word, while one of the individual letters was a randomly placed distractor. In Experiment 2, we replicated our findings of the gradual development of solution knowledge using this more complex stimulus display. In Experiment 3, we manipulated the familiarity of the central letter string by presenting it either in the form of a three-letter word, or as a meaningless string of letters. Behavioural measures showed an overall negative impact of familiarity on task performance, while eye movement measures revealed a more complex pattern of effects, including both interference and facilitation. Critically, the effects of familiarity on problem solving did not interact with the development of solution knowledge prior to response.

Intervening early in the course of psychotic illness (e.g. schizophrenia) may significantly improve prospects for the recovery, both in medical and psychosocial terms, of the individuals who experience these conditions. Engaging such individuals in care, however, remains a challenge. One barrier to engagement is lack of insight, or the low illness awareness that is considered to be a typical characteristic of people who experience psychotic illnesses, particularly in their early phases. The dominant view of this phenomenon is that it is primarily related to the illness itself and thus is biologically based. There is reason to believe, however, that understanding the psychosis experience is also an interpretive process, and that the meaning of this experience for the individual arises out of dialogue between the person, mental health professionals and significant others. There is also reason to believe that the relationship between insight and recovery may not be as straightforward as presumed. While the dominant view sees insight as a crucial condition for recovery, emerging evidence suggests that insight once gained may lead to depression and demoralization. Insight thus may be understood as an interpretive, dialogical process that is fundamentally narrative in nature, the consequences of which may be divergent. Using qualitative methods (constructivist grounded theory complemented by narrative analysis), the present study sought to understand the process by which insight developed in early psychosis, and sought to explore the relationship between insight and the early stages of illness management and recovery, as reflected by the written and oral accounts of twelve individuals who were within the first three years of illness. Overall, the results suggest that insight development in early psychosis can be conceptualized as the process of coming to an acceptable, adaptive explanation. More specifically, the results first of all suggest that insight development involves finding or negotiating an account of illness that fits or can be accommodated with the individual’s own story of the psychosis experience. The process also involves finding an account of illness and its treatment that can be envisioned as a helpful rather than disruptive aspect of the individual’s future biography.

Poor insight has clinical significance as a predictor of non-adherence to treatment, increased number of relapses, hospitalisations, recovery and risk of violence. Empirical research has led to advances in the redefinition, knowledge and understanding of insight in psychosis. However, the use of a wide range of definitions and measures has created difficulties in interpreting research findings, without clarifying the concepts being measured and evaluating the quality of their associated assessment tool. Therefore, the aim of the first piece of work, a Systematic Review (SR), was to identify and describe the constructs of insight in psychosis and their assessment tools and briefly evaluate their psychometric properties. Insight in psychosis is particularly relevant to Forensic Mental Health Services, given its link with offending behaviour and risk to others. However, outside of those provided by risk appraisal tools, there are no current guidelines that specifically target the assessment, or intervention, of insight. Therefore, the second piece of work, a research project (RP), aimed to explore current practices, as described by experienced clinicians. The SR identified twelve assessment tools and fourteen papers for detailed analysis. Twelve theoretical constructs were identified, the most prominent being awareness of mental illness and awareness of the need for treatment. Other prominent theoretical constructs included awareness of negative consequences of illness and awareness of generic or specific symptoms. However, few of the subscales associated with each theoretical construct were supported by empirical evidence. Further work to clarify aspects of insight that are important areas for intervention, along with the provision of data to support these, should continue to be a focus for on-going research. The RP was a qualitative design using Thematic Analysis. Data was collected by semi-structured interviews from 11 qualified Clinical Psychologists working in Forensic Mental Health Services across Scotland. The RP identified three overarching themes. The first “risk related” illustrated the influence of risk to other when assessing and treating patients. The second “holistic approach” illustrated that insight or mental illness was rarely looked at in isolation. The third theme “no specific or satisfactory unified approach” illustrated the diversity of the conceptualising, assessment and treatment of insight. Opportunities exist to develop a more uniformed approach and to introduce or develop outcome measures for interventions.

This thesis presents an empirical research that aims to explore insight generation in discrete-event simulation (DES) studies. It is often claimed that simulation is useful for generating insights. There is, however, almost no empirical evidence to support this claim. The factors of a simulation intervention that affect the occurrence of insight are not clear. A specific claim is that watching the animated display of a simulation model is more helpful in making better decisions than relying on the statistical outcomes generated from simulation runs; but again, there is very limited evidence to support this. To address this dearth of evidence, two studies are implemented: a quantitative and a qualitative study. In the former, a laboratory-based experimental study is used, where undergraduate students were placed in three separate groups and given a task to solve using a model with only animation, a model with only statistical results, or using no model at all. In the qualitative study, semi-structured interviews with simulation consultants were carried out, where participants were requested to account examples of projects in which clients change their problem understanding and generate more effective ideas. The two separated parts of the study found different types of evidence to support that simulation generates insight. The experimental study suggests that insights are generated more rapidly from statistical results than the use of animation. Research outcomes from the interviews include descriptions of: the phase of a simulation study where insight emerges; the role of different methods applied and means used in discovering and overcoming discontinuity in thinking (for instance, the role of consultant s influence in problem understanding); how some factors of a simulation intervention are associated with the processes of uncovering and overcoming discontinuity in thinking (for example, the role of clients team in the selection of methods used to communicate results); and the role of the model and consultant in generating new ideas. This thesis contributes to the limited existing literature by providing a more in depth understanding of insight in the context of simulation and empirical evidence on the insight-enabling benefits of simulation based on an operational definition. The findings of the study provide new insights into the factors of simulation that support fast and creative problem solving.

This content analysis assesses the insight facilitating capacity of some very common inquiry-based writing activities (featured in today's mainstream first-year college composition texts). It accomplishes that assessment by using three language-based insight facilitating methods--one centered on metaphor, another on opposition, and the other on paradox--as evaluative lenses. The position of this study is that these methods--advanced by widely published scholars in the fields of science, psychology and business as effective insight facilitators--can shed light on development opportunities (where insight facilitation is concerned) in the design and protocol of the writing activities selected for analysis. The outcome is ultimately a comparison of sorts drawn between key insight facilitators at work in the proven methods and comparable features capable of eliciting insight in the writing activities. While the analysis aims to show just how effectively insight facilitation is prompted in the selected writing activities, it also--through its evaluative lens--suggests ways the activities could more effectively do so.

[pt] Prejuízo de insight costuma ser reportado no Transtono Bipolar (TB), sobretudo quando os pacientes viram para o pólo maníaco do transtorno. Essa falha na consciência verbal dos déficits, sinais e sintomas do transtorno pode vir acompanhada de uma forma de insight implícito, que é a demonstração indireta de algum nível de conhecimento sobre a doença ou uma deficiência com perda parcial ou total de reconhecimento verbal. Dois estudos foram conduzidos para verificar as relações entre as formas de insight explícito e implícito no TB. Para isso, foi utilizado um modelo teórico conhecido como The Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM), que permite investigar dissociações nos padrões de consciência implícita e explícita. No primeiro estudo, os participantes foram avaliados em relação à uma série de variáveis clínicas, incluindo uma medida de insight explícito, além de uma medida de insight implícito com estímulos ligados à depressão e à mania. No segundo estudo, os participantes foram igualmente testados em relação às variáveis clinicas, incluindo uma medida de insight explícito, além de uma medida de insight implícito com estímulos ligados à condição de saudável e doente. Os resultados de ambos os estudos apontaram para diferenças nas medidas de insight explícito entre os grupos de maníacos e eutímicos, e demonstraram diferenças no tempo médio de reação para auto-associações implícitas para condição. A partir desses resultados, pode-se sugerir que os pacientes em mania se autoavaliam explicitamente de forma similar aos pacientes em eutimia, o que pode trazer prejuízos na adesão ao tratamento, ao passo que os pacientes bipolares apresentaram uma forma de insight implícito tanto para os sintomas quanto para a condição de doente avaliadas. / [en] Lack of insight is usually reported in Bipolar Disorder (TB), especially when patients have seen the manic pole of the disorder. This lack of verbal awareness of deficits, signs and symptoms of the disorder may be accompanied by an implicit insight, which is the indirect demonstration of some level of knowledge about the disease or a disability with partial or total loss of verbal recognition. Two studies were conducted to verify the relationships between explicit and implicit forms of insight into TB. For this, a theoretical model known as The Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM) was used, which allows to investigate dissociations in the patterns of implicit and explicit consciousness. In the first study, participants were assessed for a number of clinical variables, including an explicit insight measure, as well as an implicit insight measure with depression and mania-related stimuli. In the second study, participants were also tested for clinical variables, including an explicit insight measure, as well as an implicit insight measure with stimuli linked to healthy and ill status. The results of both studies pointed to differences in measures of explicit insight between the manic and euthymic groups and demonstrated differences in mean reaction time for implied self-associations for condition. From these results, it can be suggested that patients in mania explicitly self-evaluate in a similar way to patients in euthymia, which can lead to impairment in adherence to treatment, whereas bipolar patients presented an implicit insight for symptoms and for the patient s condition evaluated.

Today smartphones are everywhere and they ease the lives of millions of people every day. However there are people who, because of various reasons, are unable to receive the benefits of these devices because they are not able to interact with a smartphone in the intended way; using their hands. In this thesis we investigate an alternative method for interacting with a smartphone; using a commercially available electroencephalography (EEG) headset. EEG is a technique for measuring and recording brain activity, often through the use of sensors placed along the scalp of the user. We developed a prototype of a brain-computer interface (BCI) for use with android and the Emotiv Insight commercial EEG headset. The prototype allows the user to control an on-screen cursor in one dimension within an android application using the Emotiv Insight. We performed three case studies with one participant in each. The participants had no prior experience with EEG headsets or BCIs. We had them train to use the Emotiv Insight with our BCI prototype. After the training was completed they performed a series of tests in order to measure their ability to control an on-screen cursor in one dimension. Finally the participants filled out a questionnaire regarding their subjective experiences of using the Emotiv Insight. These case studies showed the inadequacies of the Emotiv Insight. All three participants had issues with training and using the headset. These issues are reflected in our tests, where 44 out of 45 attempts at moving the cursor to a specific area resulted in a failure. All participants also reported fatigue and headaches during the case studies. We also concluded that the Emotiv Insight provides a poor user experience because of fatigue in longer sessions and the amount of work needed to train the headset.

From Introduction: This thesis involves a detailed explication of my experience as a client in psychotherapy. Being in therapy has brought about extremely important ·changes in my life and continues to do so. Being involved · in the field of· psychology as a student and therapist-to-be, the experience of therapy has also been a valuable source of a greater understanding of the process itself. The various facets of the importance of my experience of psychotherapy will become clear in my explication. It is a fact that experience, which is an essential aspect of our humanness, has been sadly neglected in psychological research. It is surely psychology's task to explore all aspects of humanity, and this neglect of experience has only fairly recently been questioned. Its reasons have been psychology's bias towards the natural sciences whose methods are not suitable for the study of experience. The tremendous achievements of the natural sciences caused psychology to adopt this slant, as Sigmund Koch (19.69) puts it, "The stipulation that psychology be adequate · to science outweighed the commitment that it be adequate to man". (p 65).

Humans readily infer the meanings of novel symbols in communicative contexts of varying complexity, and several researchers in the field of language evolution have explicitly acknowledged that inference plays a key role in accounting for the evolution of symbolic communication. However, in this field at least, there has been very little investigation into the nature of inference in this regard. That is, evolutionary linguists have yet to address the following questions if we are to have a fuller picture of how humans came to communicate symbolically: 1. What kinds of inference are there? Specifically, i Diachronically, what forms of inference are comparatively simpler in evolutionary terms, and thus shared with a wider range of species? What forms of inference are more complex, and limited to humans or to us and our closest relatives? ii Synchronically, if humans are capable of several kinds of complex inference, how do we know which particular kind of inference is being applied in solving a given problem? 2. How do symbol-learning problems vary? Specifically, i What makes a particular symbol-learning problem more or less complex in terms of the kind of inference needed to solve it? ii How would the communicative context of our pre-linguistic ancestors have been different from that of a human child learning words from its linguistic parent? This dissertation takes a step towards answering these questions by investigating a little-known form of inference called `abduction' (or insightful hypothesis generation), which has thus far been wholly overshadowed in language evolution by a much better understood form called `induction' (or probabilistic hypothesis evaluation). I will argue that abduction and induction are both comparatively complex in the diachronic terms expressed above in 1.i, and while induction is useful in accounting for how modern children learn words from linguistic adults, abduction is more important in situations like those that would have faced our pre-lingistic ancestors as they first began to use symbols. That is, I will argue on both theoretical and empirical grounds that abductive inference was an evolutionary milestone as our ancestors crossed what Deacon (1997) calls the symbolic threshold.