This dissertation develops and assesses hypotheses regarding the design and adaptation of institutions for maintaining the quality of a shared natural resource at regional scales. The analysis is centered on arrangements created by governmental actors for deciding how to jointly govern a resource producing high-quality drinking water. The cases studied are Boston (Massachusetts), New York City (New York), Portland (Oregon), and San Francisco (California). Drinking water in each of these cities is provided unfiltered, and it is sourced from lands located in other jurisdictions. To maintain water quality, both providers and landowners in the watersheds have reached agreements defining how to jointly govern the resource. This dissertation studies the design of these arrangements. Studying these dynamics, particularly in a federal regime, highlights the limits that governmental actors face in making decisions with other governments at different levels. The dissertation contains three empirical papers addressing aspects of design in these arrangements. The empirical chapters are structured as separate papers that follow a common theme. Throughout the dissertation, insights from various research traditions are brought in to complement the analysis of institutional design. The studies in this dissertation combine arguments from the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, Common-Pool Resource Theory, Transaction Cost Economics, social network analysis, Adaptive Governance, and theories of information processing stemming from the Punctuated Equilibrium literature in public policy.

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A great challenge for democracy is to account for the conflict between the ideal of self-governance and the capacity of the average person to participate in democratic decision-making. This challenge has led some observers to question the defensibility of democracy and consider other systems of social organization. I argue instead that the problem can be solved with a technologically enhanced version of Thomas Christiano’s choice of aims model of democracy. I begin by setting up the voter competency problem: I describe the ideals of democracy and the role that is ascribed to citizens under traditional accounts of democracy, then proceed to a discussion of the empirical evidence that shows how unlikely it is that voters could ever adequately perform such a role. While I consider a number of alternative democratic models which attempt to reconstruct the role of citizens in a way that is consistent with their capacities and with the democratic ideal of self-governance, I find that the choice of aims model strikes this balance in a way that is most tenable. Despite this, I argue that changes to the way information is distributed in modern democracies, to do with the rise of the internet, pose a serious threat to the viability of even this model, as it is becoming increasingly difficult for voters to ascertain reliable information. The second half of the thesis offers support to Christiano’s model in the form of technologically enhanced institutions. Chapter 3 provides a basic understanding of an emerging technology called distributed ledger technology, which offers a new paradigm for how information is stored, controlled, and distributed around society. The final chapter demonstrates how this technology can be used to strengthen democratic institutions so that citizens are able to truly be said to self-govern in a way that is consistent with their capacities. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Yes / This paper challenges ideas that it is possible to `get the institutions right¿ in the management of natural resources. It engages with the literature and policy specifying `design principles¿ for robust institutions and uses data from a river basin management project in Usangu, Tanzania, to illustrate the complexity of institutional evolution. The paper draws on emerging `post-institutionalist¿ perspectives to reject over-formalised managerial approaches in favour of those that accept the dynamic nature of institutional formation, and accommodate a variety of partial and contingent solutions. Data from Usangu suggests that external `crafting¿ is inevitably problematic because, to a certain extent, institutions elude design.

Based on the assumption that security institutions are designed rationally, I study the variations in design schemes and their possible effects on institutional performance. Military alliances vary with respect to their membership size, level of security obligations undertaken by the allies, incorporation of non security clauses such as economic agreements, level of institutionalization, specified duration of existence, as well as the conditions under and reasons for which they are formed. This dissertation studies the effects of above mentioned design features on the probability of security alliances expanding their scope by addressing non-security agreements such as free trade agreements and conflict management clauses. I find support for the argument that states include economic agreements within a military alliance as a means to bolster the credibility of an otherwise weak security alliance. Results indicate that allies facing high levels of external threat and low levels of intra alliance cohesion are more likely to include conflict management provisions in the alliance. Finally, I conduct a systematic study of the possible effects of variation in structural design on the durability of an alliance. I find that design features that increase the costs of breaking the alliance increase the duration of an alliance.

This thesis examines the EU's influence on regional cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mercosur in South America and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) by drawing on concepts from diffusion studies. It argues that conventional perspectives have tended to view different cases of regionalism as independent phenomena reflecting particular structural, institutional or ideational conditions, mainly internal to the respective region itself. I propose instead to conceive of regional organisations as asymmetrically interdependent, in that the EU as the most successful regional grouping in the international system influences other regional organisations in important respects; yet in ways that are ill-captured by the conventional depiction of external influence as a form of coercion. The central question addressed in this thesis is thus: Under what conditions and in what ways does the EU affect the trajectory of formal rules in regional cooperation elsewhere? I advance three main arguments. First, I suggest that given the EU's ideational and material power in global regionalism, it is likely to act as a focal point in debates about regional rule change around which actors' expectations converge when being confronted with an exogenous cooperation problem. This renders EU influence difficult to escape. Second, I argue that there are two dynamics by which EU influence affects outcomes in global regionalism - the EU as switchman and as driver. While the former leads policy-makers to choose EU-type rules instead of similarly viable alternatives given a particular cooperation problem, the latter affects the very incentives for regional rule change and thereby acts as an independent driver of regional cooperation. Third, I argue that, in terms of outcomes, EU influence has been highest in SADC, lower in Mercosur and lowest in ASEAN, mainly reflecting different degrees of material and ideational interdependence between the EU and other regions. Yet, policy-makers' widespread reluctance to share national sovereignty has sharply delineated the boundaries of EU influence in all three regions. I test these arguments across three central areas of regional cooperation: market building, institution building and community building.

The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was the latest organisational innovation aimed at bridging the disjuncture between EU external relations and foreign policy structures. Almost immediately after its creation, it attracted wide-spread criticism of its functioning by the very same actors who had created it. This thesis develops a three-stage bureaucratic-institutionalist framework in order to explore the political contestation of this new organisation and its impact on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. Inception, establishment and consolidation are the three phases of the organisation s life cycle under scrutiny. The thesis begins with the inception of the EEAS during the Convention on the Future of Europe from 2002-2003. Through the lens of rational choice historical institutionalism it analyses the positions of various actors in the Convention and the options that were considered during this phase. It then shows how disagreements between integrationist and more sceptical groups led to a vague compromise on the EEAS and its organisational design. The thesis continues with an analysis of the establishment phase, i.e. the negotiation process leading to the EEAS decision of 2010, throughout which the political conflict continued between the EU institutions on central design elements of the service such as status, scope and staffing. Theoretically, this conflict is captured through the politics of Eurocratic structure approach. In the final consolidation phase, the EEAS started to operate as a new administrative actor, but was heavily influenced by political and bureaucratic contestation. Bureaucracy theory helps to predict the organisational behaviour of the EEAS to a degree, but the thesis shows how the organisation was also shaped by bureaucratic politics between EU institutions and member states. The thesis concludes that a bureaucratic-institutionalist approach explains why the EEAS is a strongly contested bureaucracy and how the processes of contestation at the EU level hindered institutional design throughout the organisation s life cycle of inception, establishment and consolidation. It reveals limitations of this approach, such as the persistence of actors, the weight of decision precedent and the permeability of organisational development phases.

This thesis looks at the failure of individual people living in affluent societies to do more to help those living in conditions of extreme poverty at the present moment. Affluent people have the capacity to assist, by contributing additional funds to aid and humanitarian organisations. Given an understanding of what is at stake, the fact that they fail to do so is both morally problematic and difficult to explain. Yet, without an understanding of the causes of inaction, it is difficult to know what measures may be taken to alleviate extreme suffering in the world today. The thesis draws upon different philosophical accounts of practical reason to argue that the conduct of the affluent can only be understood in one of three ways: these people may lack decisive reason to assist, they may be misinformed, or they may be rationally deficient in some regard. Considering each possibility in turn, it advances two central arguments. Firstly, the normative reasons claim is sound: affluent people, who do not incur minor costs by assisting, ought to do more. Secondly, these people tend to have false beliefs about the nature of poverty, to make substantive errors of judgement, and to follow flawed patterns of reasoning when they deliberate about what to do. Taken together, these factors explain their failure to act. Building upon this diagnosis, the thesis then considers how to respond to the problem of inaction, advancing a solution that is institutional in character. It argues for the construction of a division of labour between state and citizen, at the national level, which would see political institutions take on responsibility for poverty eradication, thereby leaving individuals freer to pursue their own personal goals and objectives. In order to perform this function effectively, wealthy nations would have to improve the quantity and quality of assistance that they provide to low-income countries. They would also have to cease partaking in practices that harm the global poor. This approach has a number of advantages over reliance on private philanthropy alone: it forms part of a fair and effective solution to the problem of motivating assistance, the arrangement it proposes is both stable and legitimate, and it is also something that could be achieved in practice. Therefore, it represents part of the best possible way in which to proceed.

O objetivo da pesquisa foi analisar os principais fatores determinantes para que os conselhos gestores de Unidades de Conservação (UC) contribuam para a emergência de processos de aprendizagem social e para a ocorrência de mudanças na dinâmica territorial relacionadas aos objetivos sociais e ecológicos das UC. O estudo apoiou-se nos casos do Parque Estadual Xixová-Japuí e da Área de Proteção Ambiental Marinha Litoral Centro, unidades localizadas na Baixada Santista, estado de São Paulo, e inseridas em uma matriz altamente urbanizada, envolvendo diversos interesses e desafios à gestão. A análise dos conselhos permitiu identificar as principais características dos processos de surgimento e funcionamento das arenas, verificando que tanto o desenho institucional como a presença de atores sociais hábeis assumem importância fundamental na criação de novas instituições nos conselhos. A principal conclusão do estudo indica que o estabelecimento de regras claras para a seleção de representantes da sociedade civil e a adoção de procedimentos técnicos facilitam a participação dos conselheiros nos processos de discussão e tomada de decisão na gestão da UC. / The research objective was to analyze the determinants facts that contribute to the emergence of social learning processes and territorial dynamics changes in Protected Areas (PA). The scope of the study was defined in the Protected Area Management Councils and was based on the Xixová-Japuí State Park and Litoral Centro Marine Protected Area. Both PA are located in Santos Metropolitan Region, São Paulo, and inserted into a highly urbanized array with diverse interests and management challenges. Councils´ analysis identified the main characteristics of the arenas´ emergence processes and operation, verifying that both institutional design and skilled social actor´s presence assume critical importance on new institutions´ creation. The studys main conclusion indicates that clear rules establishment for the selection of civil society representatives and the adoption of technical process improve actors involvement in discussions and decision making for the protected areas management.

<p>By what means can legislative committees exercise influence on policy outputs? How and why do committees in different countries differ in their abilities to do so? This dissertation argues that legislative committee power is a multidimensional concept. Committee procedures can be distinguished into three analytic dimensions: 1) committees' positive agenda power, their power to ensure the placement of legislative versions preferred by them on the floor; 2) committees' negative agenda power, their power to delay or block the progress of legislation; and 3) committees' information capacity, institutional incentives granted to them to gather and transmit information. These distinct dimensions benefit different legislative actors. Therefore, they reflect different features of a political system, and may not be consistently strong or week.</p><p>Based on an original cross-national data set, the dissertation shows that committee procedures cluster empirically in these three distinct dimensions. Furthermore, the dissertation also demonstrates how legislators' electoral incentives, the composition of multiparty governments, preexisting authoritarian incumbents' uncertainty and bargaining power, and the changes in legislative memberships affect different dimensions of committee power.</p> / Dissertation