A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Science, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science. Johannesburg, 2016 / Maintenance of technical systems aims at retaining their reliability and availability, restoring their capability of continuing their operation in case they have failed. A number of reliability and maintenance policies that play a significant role in reducing system failures and in making cost-effective decisions on whether to repair or replace a system will be examined in great detail. This research report places greater emphasis on the total repair cost (TRC) limit policy and compares it with other polices like the economic lifetime (EL) policy. The maintenance cost rate will be used to obtain the optimal parameters. When a system fails, it is replaced with an identical unused one if the total repair cost goes beyond a pre-determined repair cost limit by a preventive replacement if in the time period (0, v) no failure forces a replacement of the system. Else, a repair is carried out. / M T 2016

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Alabama, 2007. / Advisers: Anup Agrawal, Harris Schlesinger. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1931. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M. Com.)--University of Canterbury, 2009. / Typescript (photocopy). "March 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-82). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 107-111). Also available in electronic version.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-09T12:28:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2014-11-10Bitstream added on 2015-04-09T12:47:32Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000814919.pdf: 1106420 bytes, checksum: 6bbc007e3e1451a2648cbfdb3aeef795 (MD5) / The insurer that has an effective control of the risks involved by the insureds can avoid issues such as bankruptcy and loss of profitability. The purpose of the research was to identify the varieties that define the risk associated with future buyers, enabling classify them into one of two groups, the claimed and the unclaimed, based in probabilities defined by a multivariate model. Therefore, were questions considered (variables) existing on the risk evaluation of the insurers questionnaire and others nominated by the expert brokers of the insurers. To achieve the objective, was used in the analyses, the multivariate statistical technique, known as Discriminant Analysis, in order to segregate the individual into one of two groups. A discriminant function was constructed from the independent variables, associated to the risks, and from the dependent variable, which covers the two groups. Other results as estimation of the classification rule, evaluation of the quality of the discrimination rule settings, estimation of the overall probability of correct answers and tests related to the assumptions of discriminant analysis were presented. The studied sample was consisted of 2,000 insured served by the broker, divided into two groups: the first composed of individuals without claims; and the second with those who has one or more claims. The model enabled to classify individuals by the two groups, wherein in the development sample and test the classification represented 69% accuracy. The separation was carried out by variables with higher importance degrees. Where elected: car power, time of insurance, bonus, parking lot use, and professional activities defined by the insured occupation. Such variables can be considered highly discriminating, based on the contribution coefficient for the discrimination. This work has presented results that contradict the common sense in the insurance market, in which technicians say that sex and age determine whether / The insurer that has an effective control of the risks involved by the insureds can avoid issues such as bankruptcy and loss of profitability. The purpose of the research was to identify the varieties that define the risk assciated with future buyers, enabling classify them into one two groups, the claimed and the unclaimed, based in probabilities defined by a multivariate model. Therefore, were questions considered (variables) existing on the risk evaluation of the insurers questionnarie and others nominated by the expert brokers of the insurers. To achieve the objective, was used in the analysis, the multivariate statistical technique, known as Discriminant Analylsis, in order to segregate the individual into one of two groups. A discriminant function was constructed from the independent variables, associated to the risks, and the dependent variable, which covers the two groups. Other results as estimation of the classification rule, evaluation of the quality of the discrimination rule settings, estimation of the overall probability of correct answers and tests related to the assumptions of discrimination analysis were presented. The studied sample was consisted of 2,000 insured served by the broker, divided into two groups: the first composed of individuals without claims; and the second with those who has one or more claims. The model enabled to classify individuals by the two groups, wherein in the development sample and test the classification represented 69% accuracy. The separation was carried out by variables with higher importance degrees. Were elected: car power, time of insurance, bonus, parking lot use, and professional activities defined by the insured occupation. Such variables can be considered hihgly discriminating, based on the contribution coefficient for the discrimination. This work has presented results that contradict the common sense in the insurance market, in which technicians say that sex and age determine...

Orientador: Manoel Henrique Salgado / Banca: Gladys Dorotea Cacsire Barriga / Banca: João Pedro Albino / Resumo: The insurer that has an effective control of the risks involved by the insureds can avoid issues such as bankruptcy and loss of profitability. The purpose of the research was to identify the varieties that define the risk associated with future buyers, enabling classify them into one of two groups, the claimed and the unclaimed, based in probabilities defined by a multivariate model. Therefore, were questions considered (variables) existing on the risk evaluation of the insurers questionnaire and others nominated by the expert brokers of the insurers. To achieve the objective, was used in the analyses, the multivariate statistical technique, known as Discriminant Analysis, in order to segregate the individual into one of two groups. A discriminant function was constructed from the independent variables, associated to the risks, and from the dependent variable, which covers the two groups. Other results as estimation of the classification rule, evaluation of the quality of the discrimination rule settings, estimation of the overall probability of correct answers and tests related to the assumptions of discriminant analysis were presented. The studied sample was consisted of 2,000 insured served by the broker, divided into two groups: the first composed of individuals without claims; and the second with those who has one or more claims. The model enabled to classify individuals by the two groups, wherein in the development sample and test the classification represented 69% accuracy. The separation was carried out by variables with higher importance degrees. Where elected: car power, time of insurance, bonus, parking lot use, and professional activities defined by the insured occupation. Such variables can be considered highly discriminating, based on the contribution coefficient for the discrimination. This work has presented results that contradict the common sense in the insurance market, in which technicians say that sex and age determine whether / Abstract: The insurer that has an effective control of the risks involved by the insureds can avoid issues such as bankruptcy and loss of profitability. The purpose of the research was to identify the varieties that define the risk assciated with future buyers, enabling classify them into one two groups, the claimed and the unclaimed, based in probabilities defined by a multivariate model. Therefore, were questions considered (variables) existing on the risk evaluation of the insurers questionnarie and others nominated by the expert brokers of the insurers. To achieve the objective, was used in the analysis, the multivariate statistical technique, known as Discriminant Analylsis, in order to segregate the individual into one of two groups. A discriminant function was constructed from the independent variables, associated to the risks, and the dependent variable, which covers the two groups. Other results as estimation of the classification rule, evaluation of the quality of the discrimination rule settings, estimation of the overall probability of correct answers and tests related to the assumptions of discrimination analysis were presented. The studied sample was consisted of 2,000 insured served by the broker, divided into two groups: the first composed of individuals without claims; and the second with those who has one or more claims. The model enabled to classify individuals by the two groups, wherein in the development sample and test the classification represented 69% accuracy. The separation was carried out by variables with higher importance degrees. Were elected: car power, time of insurance, bonus, parking lot use, and professional activities defined by the insured occupation. Such variables can be considered hihgly discriminating, based on the contribution coefficient for the discrimination. This work has presented results that contradict the common sense in the insurance market, in which technicians say that sex and age determine... / Mestre

This thesis presents an attempt to simplify the language used in life insurance provisions.

This dissertation is a collection of essays on principal-agent contracts under asymmetry of information. The papers investigate how the possibility of acquiring information influences contracts. The first essay analyzes the contract between a principal and an agent, when the principal can conduct an audit of the agent's cost of production. The principal can choose an audit policy after output is produced - but he cannot commit to an audit policy at the beginning. The probability of audit is a best reply to the agent's probability of misreporting given the contract. The interaction between the contract, the audit strategy and the reporting strategy is analyzed. The main result obtained is that, when the cost of production is high the optimal contract requires the agent to produce an amount greater than the output under full information. The principal audits randomly and truthful cost announcements cannot be induced with certainty. It is also shown that the principal audits with a higher probability when he cannot commit as compared to when he can. The second essay considers an effort monitoring problem. It analyzes the contract the principal will offer an agent when the monitoring strategy cannot be committed to. Given the contract, the monitoring strategy is a best reply to the agent's effort strategy. The interaction between the contract, the monitoring strategy and the effort strategy is analyzed. The source of the principal's gain from monitoring is explained. It is shown that the wage payments to the agent may be decreasing in the outcome of the agent's effort. The third essay endogenizes the amount of information the agent will rely on when deciding whether or not to accept the contract. By incurring an observation cost, the agent can observe the state of nature after the contract is offered. If he does so he will be able to turn it down whenever his payoff is negative. It is shown that the principal will always find it in his best interest to offer a contract such that the agent has no incentive to use his ability to observe the state of nature. Furthermore. an increase in the cost of observation is very valuable to the principal. The paper also looks at the case in which the principal is allowed to put several agents in competition for the contract. It is shown that, though the principal has monopoly power and can force the single agent to his reservation utility, having several agents compete for the contract increases the principal's payoff. / Ph. D.