Inom ramen för ISAF genomförs nu en massiv utbildningsinsats i counterinsurgency, detta för att den nya strategin som tillämpas skall få stort genomslag. Den doktrin som används vid utbildning och vid genomförande är den amerikanska FM 3-24. Den bygger på flera andra doktriner, men är som egen helhet ny och relativt oprövad. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om faktorer i doktrinens operationslinjer bidrar till framgång. Detta görs genom att besvara frågan: I vilken utsträckning var det faktorer som framgår av FM 3-24 ”logiska operationslinjer” som gav framgång vid försvenskningen av Skånelandskapen? Designen för undersökningen är en fallstudie, där operationslinjerna i doktrinen har översatts och operationaliserats och sedan jämförts med ett urval av litteratur om försvenskningen av Skånelandskapen. Resultatet stödjer att utifrån detta enskilda fall leder användandet av FM 3-24 operationslinjer till ökad sannolikhet för framgång. Vilket ger en ökad legitimitet i doktrinens nyttjande. Uppsatsen har även ett underliggande syfte, att påvisa att det finns svenskt nationellt exempel på COIN.

No description available.

For years there has been an ongoing conflict, geographically concerning the southern parts of Thailand. The Malay-Muslim inhabitants of the area state that they do not fully belong to Buddhist Thailand and therefore require independence in various forms. Along with the Muslims, the Buddhist inhabitants of the area also suffer from daily violence and killings. The counteractions over the years seems to have resulted in chaotic conditions where civilians die regularly. After many years of violence, this complex situation has not successfully been ended and is still current. This case study will examine the requisites for peace in southern Thailand. The conflict has been studied through a conflict management perspective, thereof the choice of theory; Svante Karlsson’s conflict management theory. The conflict has been described, discussed and applied to the chosen theory. Results presented in this study shows that it is possible to achieve peace in the southern provinces of Thailand, however cooperation between the parts is necessary. A combination of several conflict management methods by Svante Karlsson can possibly result in peace in southern Thailand.

This dissertation seeks to analyse the upsurge of insurgent violence in the North Caucasus following the end of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 2009. By looking at the development of radical Islam and the impact of the Chechen spillover in the region, this research suggests that these factors should be analysed and contextualized in each republic. By comparing the cases of Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate the importance of vendetta, criminal activity, religious repression and corruption as local factors that contribute to the increase of violence. By focusing on the case of Dagestan, the author proposes a political ethnographic approach to study the mechanisms and details of religious repression and corruption in everyday life. This analysis permits us to map out the different pathways towards the participation in insurgent groups in Dagestan. By doing so, it demonstrates that one can identify three different generations of insurgent fighters in Dagestan. This dissertation demonstrates that the role of Salafist ideology is often marginal in the early stages of the process of violent radicalisation, and slowly gains importance as the involvement in violence increases. The emphasis should be placed on vengeance and religious repression as crucial triggering factors as they provoke a cognitive opening for young people in Dagestan to engage in violence.

The aim of this work is to prove that a navy can play an important role during a counter-insurgency campaign and be involved in many different tasks both at sea and from sea, particularly due to its flexibility, mobility and versatility. The main research question of the thesis is: what role can a navy play in a counter-insurgency campaign? The decision to focus on the role of the Royal Navy is based on the fact, that the Royal Navy is probably the most experienced navy in the world in the field of counter-insurgency. Five counter-insurgency campaigns were selected as case studies for this thesis, namely Palestine (1945-1948), Malaya (1948-1960), Cyprus (1954- 1958), Malaysia (1963-1966) and Aden (1965-1967).

In Sri Lanka, the Tamils' demand for a federal state has turned within a quarter of a century into a demand for the independent state of Eelam. Forces of secession set in motion by emerging Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and the resultant Tamil nationalism gathered momentum during the 1970s and 1980s which threatened the political integration of the island. Today Indian intervention has temporarily arrested the process of disintegration. But post-October 1987 developments illustrate that the secessionist war is far from over and secession still remains a real possibility. This thesis focuses on the phenomenon of Tamil armed secessionism. To better understand the forces responsible for the armed secessionist insurrection, this, thesis analyzes the preconditions leading to the violent conflict between the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. The consistent failure of the political system to accommodate the basic Tamil demands has contributed to the emergence of Tamil armed secessionism. Further, diverse factors have given impetus to the growth of Tamil secessionist movements. However, the three main political actors in the secessionist struggle — the Sri Lankan government, the Indian central government together with the state government of Tamil Nadu and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam — have had a major impact on the vicissitudes of the Tamil secessionist insurrection. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

David Galula var en fransk officer som 1964 skrev ner sina teorier om upprorsbekämpning.Dessa teorier har därefter fått ett enormt stort utrymme i både utbildningar och itillämpningar på konflikter världen över. Uppsatsen avhandlar skillnader och likhetermellan Galulas åtta operationella steg och NATO:s nya doktrin för COIN-operationer från2011.Syftet med uppsatsen är att studera de två verken för att utröna hur mycket Galulas teorieranvänds i en modern handbok gällande upprorsbekämpning. Kopplat till användet avGalula i doktrinen vill uppsatsen bedöma hur mycket plats Galulas teorier bör få i denmoderna svenska officersutbildningen.Uppsatsen har nyttjat sig av en kvalitativ textanalys samt en komparativ del där de tvåverken jämförs. NATO:s doktrin för COIN-operationer har analyserats med hjälp avGalulas åtta steg. Resultatet visar att Galulas teorier till viss del går att finna i doktrinen,men det är även mycket som ej går att koppla mellan verken.

Why does civil conflict spread from country to country? Existing research relies primarily on explanations of rebel mobilization tied to geographic proximity to explain this phenomenon. However, this approach is unable to explain why civil conflict appears to spread across great geographic distances, and also neglects the government’s role in conflict. To explain this phenomenon, this dissertation formulates an informational theory in which individuals contemplating rebellion against their government, or “proto-rebels,” observe the success and failure of rebels throughout the international system. In doing so, proto-rebels and governments learn whether rebellion will be fruitful, which is then manifested in the timing of rebellion and repression. The core of the dissertation is composed of three essays. The first exhorts scholars of the international spread of civil violence to directly measure proto-rebel mobilization. I show that such mobilization is associated with conflicts across the entire international system, while the escalation to actual armed conflict is associated with regional conflicts. The second chapter theorizes that proto-rebels learn from successful rebellions across the international system. This relationship applies globally, although it is attenuated by cultural and regime-type similarity. Finally, the third chapter theorizes that governments are aware of this process and engage in repression in order to thwart it. I further argue that this repression is, in part, a function of the threat posed by those regimes founded by rebels.

Analysis of ISIS's Insurgency through the theory of Revolutionary Warfare, by Amerigo Piunti. Ever since the collapse of the brutal Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein, the Sunnis of Iraq were struggling as a minority in a nation governed by Shia. The government of Baghdad was constantly ignoring Sunni's grievances, and for many experts, this aspect was a driving point that led to the establishment of the IS Caliphate. Contrary to popular belief, the so-called Islamic State appeared only for the first time in October 2006. Abū Musʿab al-Zarqāwī was the founder and first tenacious leader of the special detachment called "Al-Qaeda in Iraq." This group later on mutated itself into the notorious Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and it obtained support from international sympathizers and local citizens. The terror group successfully recruited local tribes, experienced fighters and leaders, previous members of the Baathist regime, and it even cooperated with other Jihadists groups. The terror group itself also heavily relied on the spread of Jihadist-Salafist propaganda and eventually created an urgent need for a drastic change in society. The group then expanded its insurgency activities towards Syria, and after only eight years of fighting, it successfully covered each of the necessary stages to...

Guerilla Warfare is a weapon of the weak; it is decisive only where the actor in power fails to commit adequate resources to the conflict. The Chinese and Cuban revolutions are examples of guerilla warfare success, albeit under different conditions and employment techniques; while Mao Tse-tung utilized decentralized guerilla warfare to indoctrinate and mobilize the masses of peasants for revolutionary struggle against a stronger enemy; Fidel Castro employed a more centralized approach to create the conditions necessary for popular support of the revolution. However, in both cases guerilla warfare was simply part of a pragmatic grand strategy to build nationalism across all classes of society. It is well known that revolutionary movements do not succeed where only one class of society is mobilized. As a result, both Mao and Castro designed dual strategies: an internal component focused on the peasant base; and an external component focused on a nationalistic appeal to all classes of society. In a revolutionary setting, the strong force of nationalism can cut across all segments of the population and strongly enable popular support for the insurgents. Both revolutionary leaders skillfully managed the contradictions associated with their respective dual strategies - a difficult task indeed since the dual strategy is one of deception. This thesis will prove that through such a plan of action, Mao and Castro integrated efforts such as leadership and ideology, with the key ingredient of guerilla warfare, to create the conditions for the control of resources necessary to achieve ultimate victory. Following revolutionary success, the experience of guerilla warfare and the dual strategy - particularly in Cuba - shaped the respective foreign policies within the context of a worldwide struggle against imperialism. Cuba has continued to refine the dual strategy in order to obtain international support and maintain the Castro regime in power. China eventually adopted a dual strategy of a different variety: the separation of economics from communist ideology. Although implementation of the dual strategy continues to the present day, it was the revolutionary process that not only validated the concept, but provided the credibility required to continue its execution.