In the knowledge economy, the 'creative industries' are recognised as a new paradigm. They are industries which use creativity as an intangible asset to generate wealth. The creative industries are described as 'evolving' and their outcomes frequently categorised as 'intangibles'. The thesis outlines what I term a creative industries approach to the engagement of visual artists with industry. The artist-in-industry program, a component of New Possibilities for Paper, was established with an explicit brief to generate creative products and contained an implicit agenda to breed intellectual capital. It was conceived as a means of crossfertilising hitherto siloed sectors -- an arts environment with entrenched attitudes towards the subsidy, proprietorship and authority of creativity and the traditionally conservative paper industry. Establishing creative industries characteristics and indicators to describe and measure creative industries operation in this program required careful consideration, with the characteristics and indicators selected able to recognise trends or changes. The analysis of the seven partnerships confirmed that the artistin-industry program is a creative industries approach upon which future programs between visual artists and the paper industry could be constructed. The research found that the creative industries processes in most need of being addressed, if visual artists are to maximise their benefits, included an understanding and utilisation of intellectual property, knowledge of commercialisation processes and a positive attitude towards commercialisation. For paper companies that invest in R&D, there is recognition that potential tangible and intangible benefits can result from engaging in such partnerships. Additionally, a partnership in which the artist's role (or service) is focused on the industry's customers and contributes to employee knowledge was seen as being of greatest value to the paper industry.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2005. / Typescript. Includes appendices. Includes bibliographical references: leaf 201-214.

Zugl.: Münster (Westfalen), Univ., Diss. / Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universität Münster, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 659-727) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)(Technology Management)--University of Pretoria, 2004. / Title from opening screen (viewed March 14, 2005). English summary. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.Sc.)--Victoria University of Wellington, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 308-334). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--American University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 544-587).