This dissertation develops and explores how a particular variety of virtue epistemology (VE) applies to the theory and practice of education. To this end, several key issues are addressed: knowledge and epistemology, knowledge in education, virtue and culture, and the application of a particular variety of VE to education. Furthermore, this dissertation employs a philosophical methodology based in theoretical work from two disciplines—philosophy and education. In Chapter I, I explicate the purpose of this dissertation and provide a rationale for pursuing this project. I also clarify some key terminology, discuss some delimiting factors, and offer chapter previews. In Chapter II, I discuss how Edmond Gettier challenged the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief. This resulted in the development of virtue-based epistemologies. Having distinguished between several forms of VE, I conclude this chapter by advancing regulative virtue epistemology (RVE). In Chapter III, I provide a conceptual and historical overview of the concept of knowledge in the specific context of educational theory. This discussion provides important context for the application of RVE to educational matters. In Chapter IV, I consider how the concept of virtue is understood in several diverse cultural contexts. Here I ameliorate a potential worry—that virtue is a distinctly Western concept. Finally, in Chapter V, I apply RVE to the theory and practice of education. It is shown that RVE has important implications for the epistemic aims of education—that is, the ultimate knowledge-related purposes of education. Specifically, I find that understanding offers a more holistic account of educational theorizing, and places greater responsibility on teachers and students in their educational activities. I also conclude that RVE widens the aims of education to include other epistemic goods. I then demonstrate that communication—an important feature of education—is also regulated by intellectual virtue. Finally, I present two proposals for teaching from an RVE perspective, and find that each has particular strengths and weaknesses. I conclude with some areas for future research.

This essay is a critical interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, as it attempts to reconcile the tension between moral virtue and intellectual virtue, the two virtues which Aristotle deems characteristic of man. This paper looks to include both moral and intellectual virtue in Aristotle’s conception of the happy life, through the summarization and analyzation of David Keyt, J.L Ackrill, John Cooper and Daniel Devereux’s modern interpretations of the ethics.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work aims to apply virtue epistemology in the specific context of educational practice and theory. With its focus on intellectual character traits, such as inquisitiveness, open-mindedness and intellectual autonomy, I explore the nature of intellectual virtues, its relationship with emotions, the reasons to treat them as an aim of education, the criteria for the selection of relevant intellectual virtues in school environments and some didactic strategies to cultivate them in the school community. Chapter 1 approaches the nature of intellectual virtues, where I argue that an intellectually virtuous person is characteristically a person that possesses a valuable intellectual condition, a critical and well-informed assessment of her own intellectual condition and for being responsible for the stability and improvement of her own intellectual condition. In this chapter, I also present and explore two kinds of relations between intellectual virtues and emotions. In chapter 2, I develop three arguments in favor of the idea that we should take intellectual virtues as an aim of education. Some objections about the desirability of this idea are raised and answered. Next, I articulate five criteria for the selection of relevant intellectual virtues in school environments. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the elaboration of general strategies for the teaching of intellectual virtues. Some specific intellectual virtues are selected to show how these general strategies would look like in practice. The selection of such virtues follows one or another criterion of selection stipulated in the previous chapter. / Este trabalho é uma tentativa de aplicar a epistemologia das virtudes no contexto específico da prática e teoria educacional. Com o foco em traços de caráter intelectual, tais como inquisitividade, mentalidade arejada e autonomia intelectual, eu exploro a natureza das virtudes intelectuais, suas relações com as emoções, as razões para tratá-las como um fim da educação, os critérios para a seleção de virtudes intelectuais relevantes em ambientes escolares e algumas estratégias didáticas para cultivá-las na comunidade escolar. O capítulo 1 aborda a natureza das virtudes intelectuais, onde se argumenta que uma pessoa intelectualmente virtuosa se caracteriza por ser possuidora de uma condição intelectual celebrável, de uma avaliação crítica e bem-informada sobre sua própria condição intelectual e por ser responsável pela estabilidade e aperfeiçoamento de sua própria condição intelectual. Ainda neste capítulo, apresento e exploro duas relações que as virtudes intelectuais e as emoções estabelecem entre si. No capítulo 2 eu desenvolvo três argumentos favoráveis à ideia de que as virtudes intelectuais devem ser tomadas como um fim da educação. Algumas objeções quanto à desejabilidade desta ideia são apresentadas e respondidas. Em seguida, passo à articulação de critérios para a seleção de virtudes intelectuais relevantes em ambientes escolares. O capítulo 3 se dedica à elaboração de estratégias gerais para o ensino de virtudes intelectuais. Algumas virtudes intelectuais específicas são selecionadas para exemplificarmos como seria uma educação voltada às virtudes intelectuais na prática. A seleção de tais virtudes é feita com respeito a um ou outro critério de seleção estipulado no capítulo anterior.

This dissertation engages with contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche and Heidegger on the issue of self-knowing with respect to the notions of honesty and authenticity. Accounting for the two philosophers' developing conceptions of these notions allows a response to interpreters who conceive the activity of self-knowing as a primarily personal problem. The alternative accounts proposed take as a point of departure transitional texts that reveal both thinkers to be engaged in processes of revision. The reading of honesty in Chapters 1 and 2 revolves around Nietzsche's groundwork on prejudice in Morgenröthe (1880-81), where he first problematizes the moral-historical forces entailed in actuating the 'will to truth'. The reading of authenticity in Chapters 3 and 4 revolves around Heidegger's lectures on what motivates one's thinking in Was heißt Denken? (1951-52). The lectures call into question his previous formal suppositions on what calls forth one's 'will-to-have-a-conscience', in an interpretation of Parmenides on the issue of thought's linguistic determination, discussed further in the context of Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Chapter 5 shows how Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche contributed to his ongoing revisions to the notion of authenticity, and to the attending conceptions of critique and its authority. Particular attention is given to the specific purposes to which distinct Nietzschean foils are put near the confrontation's beginning--in Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche's second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung (1938), and in the monograph entitled Besinnung (1939) which they prepare--and near its end, in the interpretation of Also Sprach Zarathustra (1883-85) presented in the first half of Was heißt Denken? Chapter 6 recapitulates the developments traced from the vantage point of the retrospective texts Die Zollikoner Seminare (1959-72) and the fifth Book of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1887). Closing remarks are made in relation to recent empirical research on the socio-environmental structures involved in determining self-identity.