Bulan, Jiří. Je třeba reformovat české zpravodajské služby? Praha, 2011. 101 s. Diplomová práce (Mgr.) Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut politologických studií. Katedra mezinárodních vztahů. Vedoucí diplomové práce Gen. Ing. Andor Šándor. Abstract The thesis is a comparative analysis of the Czech intelligence system. It is trying to answer how and whether or not to reform the Czech intelligence services on the basis of scholarly articles and especially interviews with current and former intelligence officials and particular politicians. It turned out that among some of the Czech intelligence services and even within those services prevails the tense atmosphere, which had been caused by various personal failings. All the cases were the individual personal excesses, not the system errors. Representatives of the services assesses the ability to detect security threats very critically. The services miss particularly tight government management as well as the independent overview of the service operations. How to improve the intelligence services work? The intelligence community must establish a common vision that will emerge from a deeper internal discussion only. It is not possible to reform the system without it.

The broad subject of this diploma thesis would be the Czechoslovak Secret Police (StB) during the years 1945-1969; and, more narrowly, certain aspects of its organization and activities in relation to the then applicable legislation. The overriding objective, which was reflected in this legislation, was the protection of the Communist political system, the regime. This regime protection goal clearly influenced the evolution and organization of the StB and the related policies on the imprisonment of those individuals that represented a threat to the State and the State System. Similar general principles and policies have basically remained in effect into the current period. The paper begins with an Introduction and Preface, which take a look at the events and nature of the society in this post-World War II period. This material is derived from an examination of historical source materials. The remainder of the paper is divided into four additional Chapters with related subsections. The Introduction and Preface focus on the nature and state of the society in the immediate post-war period, which provided the context and background used for the development of the new legislation and the newly created institutions developed for the protection of this new social order and the punishment and incarceration...

En suivant la trajectoire de quatre leaders africains au temps des indépendances, Barthélémy Boganda (République centrafricaine), Patrice Lumumba (République du Congo), Félix Moumié et Ruben Um Nyobè (Cameroun), ce travail cherche à explorer par le biais de l’anthropologie historique, de la méthode comparative et à l’échelle de l’Afrique centrale, en quoi l’assassinat politique peut constituer un moyen de réguler les relations internationales et peut être un fondement de la construction nationale de leur pays d’origine. Au fil de l’itinéraire politique de ces leaders, seront évoquées leurs désillusions onusiennes et panafricaines qui resserrent sur eux l’étau mortel d’une Realpolitik entre bipolarisation et néocolonialisme. L’autre hypothèse explorée est la suivante : il serait possible par le biais de l’Histoire comparée de faire émerger des invariants à l’assassinat politique sous forme de processus récurrents comme l’arme judiciaire, l’arme médiatique, l’absence de sépultures décentes, la damnatio memoriae dont ils sont frappés qui aboutit a contrario à une inversion symbolique et iconique. L’étude s’appuie sur de nombreuses sources qui se sont complétées afin de reconstituer l’enchaînement des évènements et de nouvelles interprétations : archives privées inédites, archives publiques dont certaines ont été déclassifiées pour cette étude, sources audiovisuelles et imprimées, témoignages oraux inédits recueillis par l’auteure. / Through a close examination of the trajectory of four African leaders, Barthélémy Boganda (Republic of Central Africa), Patrice Lumumba (Republic of Congo), Félix Moumié et Ruben Um Nyobé (Cameroun), during the independence era, and by means of the historical anthropology, the comparative method and focusing on Central Africa, this study tries to explore to what extent political assassination could constitute a way of regulating international relationships and lay the foundations of the national construction of their country of origins. Along their political career path, their UN-related and Pan–Africanism disillusionment that tightens around them the lethal noose of a Realpolitik caught between bipolarization and neo-colonialism will be referred to. The other hypothesis developed here is as followed : it could be possible through comparative history to bring out invariance within political assassination under the forms of recurrent processes such as the judiciary weapon, the media weapon, the lack of a decent burial place and the damnatio memoriae they’ve been sentenced to which all contrastingly led to a symbolic and iconic reversal. The study relies on numerous sources that complete each other in order to reconstitute the chain of events and allow new interpretations: private exclusive archives, public archives, some of which having been declassified for this purpose, audio-visual and printed sources, exclusive oral narratives collected by the author.

Essa tese pretende demonstrar as conexões repressivas estabelecidas entre as ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia, por meio da colaboração entre os seus órgãos de informação, desde 1973, ano do golpe de Estado no Uruguai, até 1985, ano em que ambos os regimes se encerraram. Considerada de vital importância na concepção da Doutrina de Segurança Nacional, a informação, bem como sua produção, controle e difusão, adquiriu caráter ímpar nas ditaduras que se instalaram no Cone Sul nas décadas de 1960 e 1970, pois era percebida como instrumento de controle social. Nas premissas dessa doutrina, a violência, antes de ser repressiva, era preventiva, e os órgãos de informação das ditaduras desempenharam papel fundamental nessa execução. As ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia modificaram órgãos de informação e segurança já existentes, bem como criaram novos organismos que se adequassem à realidade das novas conjunturas. No Brasil, esse sistema ficou conhecido como “comunidade de informações”; já no Uruguai, eram denominados “serviços de inteligência”. Tinham por função a busca e coleta de informação, utilizando-se de diversos métodos sistemáticos, tais como suspeição, infiltração, interrogatório e tortura, levando à promoção do terrorismo de Estado nessas ditaduras. Para o desenvolvimento da presente tese, foram analisados vários documentos produzidos pelo complexo do sistema de informações das ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia. Um conjunto documental de grande relevância para essa pesquisa refere-se aos órgãos de inteligência e espionagem vinculados aos Ministérios das Relações Exteriores do Brasil e do Uruguai, assim como de suas embaixadas e consulados. A preocupação da ditadura brasileira com os brasileiros que estivessem fora do território nacional era tamanha que no ano de 1966 o ex-embaixador no Uruguai criou o Centro de Informações do Exterior, baseado na sua experiência de monitoramento aos exilados ali presentes. Somou-se a esse órgão a Divisão de Segurança e Informações do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, rearranjada em 1967, presente em todos os ministérios civis. No Uruguai, cabia principalmente ao Departamento II (Exterior) do Servicio de Información de Defensa a espionagem dos uruguaios que estivessem fora do país. A colaboração entre esses órgãos de informação, inteligência e espionagem das ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia foi abundante, e alguns casos foram analisados na presente tese. As conexões repressivas também operaram por outros caminhos. Destaca-se a preocupação que ambas as ditaduras possuíam em relação aos exilados, sendo que num primeiro momento o Uruguai converteu-se no santuário do asilo político para os brasileiros; num segundo momento, a dinâmica inverteu, e foram os uruguaios que passaram a buscar refúgio político no Brasil. Esses movimentos foram acompanhados de perto pelos dois governos. Nessa conexão, releva-se o papel do estado do Rio Grande do Sul, fronteira entre Brasil e Uruguai. Na Doutrina de Segurança Nacional, as fronteiras territoriais cederam espaço às “fronteiras ideológicas”, ou seja, na luta contra o “comunismo internacional” as fronteiras se desfariam. Nesse sentido, ressalta-se a montagem e a orquestração da chamada Operação Condor, realizando ações conjuntas entre os países do Cone Sul, inclusive entre Brasil e o Uruguai, como foi o caso que ficou conhecido como “sequestro dos uruguaios” e a suspeita, até hoje não eliminada, da morte do ex-presidente João Goulart. / This thesis aims to demonstrate the repressive connections established between the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships, through collaboration among their information organs, from 1973, the year of the coup d'état in Uruguay, until 1985, the year in which both regimes ended. Considered of vital importance in the conception of the National Security Doctrine, information, as well as its production, control, and diffusion, acquired a unique character in the dictatorships that settled in the South Cone in the decades of 1960 and 1970 since it was perceived as an instrument of social control. Within the premises of this doctrine, violence, before being repressive, was preventive, and the informational organs of dictatorships played a fundamental role in this execution. The Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships modified existing information and security organs, as well as created new organizations to fit the reality of these new conjunctures. In Brazil, this system became known as an "information community"; already in Uruguay, it was called "intelligence services." Their function was to search for and collect information, using a variety of systematic methods, such as suspicion, infiltration, interrogation, and torture, leading to the promotion of State terrorism in these dictatorships. For the development of this thesis, several documents produced by the information system complex of the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships were analyzed. Documents of great relevance for this research refers to the intelligence and espionage organs linked to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Brazil and Uruguay, as well as their embassies and consulates. The concern of the Brazilian dictatorship with the Brazilians who were outside the national territory was such that in 1966 the former ambassador in Uruguay created the Foreign Information Center based on his experience of monitoring the exiles. It was joined by the Security and Information Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rearranged in 1967, present in all civilian ministries. In Uruguay, it was primarily for Department II (Exterior) of the Defense Information Service to spy on Uruguayans who were out of the country. The collaboration between these organs of information, intelligence and espionage of the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships was abundant, and some of those cases were analyzed in the present thesis. The repressive connections also operated in other ways. The concern that both dictatorships had about the exiles was emphasized. In a first moment, Uruguay became the sanctuary of the political asylum for the Brazilians; in a second moment, the dynamics reversed, and it was the Uruguayans who began to seek political refuge in Brazil. These movements were closely monitored by both governments. In this connection, the role of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the border between Brazil and Uruguay stands out. In the National Security Doctrine, territorial boundaries gave way to "ideological frontiers," i.e., in the fight against "international communism" the borders would be misplaced. In this sense, the assembly and orchestration of the so-called Condor Operation is highlighted, carrying out joint actions between the countries of the Southern Cone, including between Brazil and Uruguay, as was the case known as "kidnapping of Uruguayans" and the suspicion, until today, not eliminated, of the death of former president João Goulart.

Essa tese pretende demonstrar as conexões repressivas estabelecidas entre as ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia, por meio da colaboração entre os seus órgãos de informação, desde 1973, ano do golpe de Estado no Uruguai, até 1985, ano em que ambos os regimes se encerraram. Considerada de vital importância na concepção da Doutrina de Segurança Nacional, a informação, bem como sua produção, controle e difusão, adquiriu caráter ímpar nas ditaduras que se instalaram no Cone Sul nas décadas de 1960 e 1970, pois era percebida como instrumento de controle social. Nas premissas dessa doutrina, a violência, antes de ser repressiva, era preventiva, e os órgãos de informação das ditaduras desempenharam papel fundamental nessa execução. As ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia modificaram órgãos de informação e segurança já existentes, bem como criaram novos organismos que se adequassem à realidade das novas conjunturas. No Brasil, esse sistema ficou conhecido como “comunidade de informações”; já no Uruguai, eram denominados “serviços de inteligência”. Tinham por função a busca e coleta de informação, utilizando-se de diversos métodos sistemáticos, tais como suspeição, infiltração, interrogatório e tortura, levando à promoção do terrorismo de Estado nessas ditaduras. Para o desenvolvimento da presente tese, foram analisados vários documentos produzidos pelo complexo do sistema de informações das ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia. Um conjunto documental de grande relevância para essa pesquisa refere-se aos órgãos de inteligência e espionagem vinculados aos Ministérios das Relações Exteriores do Brasil e do Uruguai, assim como de suas embaixadas e consulados. A preocupação da ditadura brasileira com os brasileiros que estivessem fora do território nacional era tamanha que no ano de 1966 o ex-embaixador no Uruguai criou o Centro de Informações do Exterior, baseado na sua experiência de monitoramento aos exilados ali presentes. Somou-se a esse órgão a Divisão de Segurança e Informações do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, rearranjada em 1967, presente em todos os ministérios civis. No Uruguai, cabia principalmente ao Departamento II (Exterior) do Servicio de Información de Defensa a espionagem dos uruguaios que estivessem fora do país. A colaboração entre esses órgãos de informação, inteligência e espionagem das ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia foi abundante, e alguns casos foram analisados na presente tese. As conexões repressivas também operaram por outros caminhos. Destaca-se a preocupação que ambas as ditaduras possuíam em relação aos exilados, sendo que num primeiro momento o Uruguai converteu-se no santuário do asilo político para os brasileiros; num segundo momento, a dinâmica inverteu, e foram os uruguaios que passaram a buscar refúgio político no Brasil. Esses movimentos foram acompanhados de perto pelos dois governos. Nessa conexão, releva-se o papel do estado do Rio Grande do Sul, fronteira entre Brasil e Uruguai. Na Doutrina de Segurança Nacional, as fronteiras territoriais cederam espaço às “fronteiras ideológicas”, ou seja, na luta contra o “comunismo internacional” as fronteiras se desfariam. Nesse sentido, ressalta-se a montagem e a orquestração da chamada Operação Condor, realizando ações conjuntas entre os países do Cone Sul, inclusive entre Brasil e o Uruguai, como foi o caso que ficou conhecido como “sequestro dos uruguaios” e a suspeita, até hoje não eliminada, da morte do ex-presidente João Goulart. / This thesis aims to demonstrate the repressive connections established between the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships, through collaboration among their information organs, from 1973, the year of the coup d'état in Uruguay, until 1985, the year in which both regimes ended. Considered of vital importance in the conception of the National Security Doctrine, information, as well as its production, control, and diffusion, acquired a unique character in the dictatorships that settled in the South Cone in the decades of 1960 and 1970 since it was perceived as an instrument of social control. Within the premises of this doctrine, violence, before being repressive, was preventive, and the informational organs of dictatorships played a fundamental role in this execution. The Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships modified existing information and security organs, as well as created new organizations to fit the reality of these new conjunctures. In Brazil, this system became known as an "information community"; already in Uruguay, it was called "intelligence services." Their function was to search for and collect information, using a variety of systematic methods, such as suspicion, infiltration, interrogation, and torture, leading to the promotion of State terrorism in these dictatorships. For the development of this thesis, several documents produced by the information system complex of the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships were analyzed. Documents of great relevance for this research refers to the intelligence and espionage organs linked to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Brazil and Uruguay, as well as their embassies and consulates. The concern of the Brazilian dictatorship with the Brazilians who were outside the national territory was such that in 1966 the former ambassador in Uruguay created the Foreign Information Center based on his experience of monitoring the exiles. It was joined by the Security and Information Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rearranged in 1967, present in all civilian ministries. In Uruguay, it was primarily for Department II (Exterior) of the Defense Information Service to spy on Uruguayans who were out of the country. The collaboration between these organs of information, intelligence and espionage of the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships was abundant, and some of those cases were analyzed in the present thesis. The repressive connections also operated in other ways. The concern that both dictatorships had about the exiles was emphasized. In a first moment, Uruguay became the sanctuary of the political asylum for the Brazilians; in a second moment, the dynamics reversed, and it was the Uruguayans who began to seek political refuge in Brazil. These movements were closely monitored by both governments. In this connection, the role of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the border between Brazil and Uruguay stands out. In the National Security Doctrine, territorial boundaries gave way to "ideological frontiers," i.e., in the fight against "international communism" the borders would be misplaced. In this sense, the assembly and orchestration of the so-called Condor Operation is highlighted, carrying out joint actions between the countries of the Southern Cone, including between Brazil and Uruguay, as was the case known as "kidnapping of Uruguayans" and the suspicion, until today, not eliminated, of the death of former president João Goulart.

The main goal of this diploma thesis is analysis and reconstruction of the information network of major representative of anti-Austrian resistance abroad T. G. Masaryk in the First World War. The analysis and reconstruction will be put in context of contemporary events. Emphasis will be put on foreign and domestic information sources. It will show by which way and by whom was T. G. Masaryk informed about events in Bohemia and Austria-Hungary and what meaning this information had for his activities abroad.

Essa tese pretende demonstrar as conexões repressivas estabelecidas entre as ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia, por meio da colaboração entre os seus órgãos de informação, desde 1973, ano do golpe de Estado no Uruguai, até 1985, ano em que ambos os regimes se encerraram. Considerada de vital importância na concepção da Doutrina de Segurança Nacional, a informação, bem como sua produção, controle e difusão, adquiriu caráter ímpar nas ditaduras que se instalaram no Cone Sul nas décadas de 1960 e 1970, pois era percebida como instrumento de controle social. Nas premissas dessa doutrina, a violência, antes de ser repressiva, era preventiva, e os órgãos de informação das ditaduras desempenharam papel fundamental nessa execução. As ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia modificaram órgãos de informação e segurança já existentes, bem como criaram novos organismos que se adequassem à realidade das novas conjunturas. No Brasil, esse sistema ficou conhecido como “comunidade de informações”; já no Uruguai, eram denominados “serviços de inteligência”. Tinham por função a busca e coleta de informação, utilizando-se de diversos métodos sistemáticos, tais como suspeição, infiltração, interrogatório e tortura, levando à promoção do terrorismo de Estado nessas ditaduras. Para o desenvolvimento da presente tese, foram analisados vários documentos produzidos pelo complexo do sistema de informações das ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia. Um conjunto documental de grande relevância para essa pesquisa refere-se aos órgãos de inteligência e espionagem vinculados aos Ministérios das Relações Exteriores do Brasil e do Uruguai, assim como de suas embaixadas e consulados. A preocupação da ditadura brasileira com os brasileiros que estivessem fora do território nacional era tamanha que no ano de 1966 o ex-embaixador no Uruguai criou o Centro de Informações do Exterior, baseado na sua experiência de monitoramento aos exilados ali presentes. Somou-se a esse órgão a Divisão de Segurança e Informações do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, rearranjada em 1967, presente em todos os ministérios civis. No Uruguai, cabia principalmente ao Departamento II (Exterior) do Servicio de Información de Defensa a espionagem dos uruguaios que estivessem fora do país. A colaboração entre esses órgãos de informação, inteligência e espionagem das ditaduras brasileira e uruguaia foi abundante, e alguns casos foram analisados na presente tese. As conexões repressivas também operaram por outros caminhos. Destaca-se a preocupação que ambas as ditaduras possuíam em relação aos exilados, sendo que num primeiro momento o Uruguai converteu-se no santuário do asilo político para os brasileiros; num segundo momento, a dinâmica inverteu, e foram os uruguaios que passaram a buscar refúgio político no Brasil. Esses movimentos foram acompanhados de perto pelos dois governos. Nessa conexão, releva-se o papel do estado do Rio Grande do Sul, fronteira entre Brasil e Uruguai. Na Doutrina de Segurança Nacional, as fronteiras territoriais cederam espaço às “fronteiras ideológicas”, ou seja, na luta contra o “comunismo internacional” as fronteiras se desfariam. Nesse sentido, ressalta-se a montagem e a orquestração da chamada Operação Condor, realizando ações conjuntas entre os países do Cone Sul, inclusive entre Brasil e o Uruguai, como foi o caso que ficou conhecido como “sequestro dos uruguaios” e a suspeita, até hoje não eliminada, da morte do ex-presidente João Goulart. / This thesis aims to demonstrate the repressive connections established between the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships, through collaboration among their information organs, from 1973, the year of the coup d'état in Uruguay, until 1985, the year in which both regimes ended. Considered of vital importance in the conception of the National Security Doctrine, information, as well as its production, control, and diffusion, acquired a unique character in the dictatorships that settled in the South Cone in the decades of 1960 and 1970 since it was perceived as an instrument of social control. Within the premises of this doctrine, violence, before being repressive, was preventive, and the informational organs of dictatorships played a fundamental role in this execution. The Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships modified existing information and security organs, as well as created new organizations to fit the reality of these new conjunctures. In Brazil, this system became known as an "information community"; already in Uruguay, it was called "intelligence services." Their function was to search for and collect information, using a variety of systematic methods, such as suspicion, infiltration, interrogation, and torture, leading to the promotion of State terrorism in these dictatorships. For the development of this thesis, several documents produced by the information system complex of the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships were analyzed. Documents of great relevance for this research refers to the intelligence and espionage organs linked to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Brazil and Uruguay, as well as their embassies and consulates. The concern of the Brazilian dictatorship with the Brazilians who were outside the national territory was such that in 1966 the former ambassador in Uruguay created the Foreign Information Center based on his experience of monitoring the exiles. It was joined by the Security and Information Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rearranged in 1967, present in all civilian ministries. In Uruguay, it was primarily for Department II (Exterior) of the Defense Information Service to spy on Uruguayans who were out of the country. The collaboration between these organs of information, intelligence and espionage of the Brazilian and Uruguayan dictatorships was abundant, and some of those cases were analyzed in the present thesis. The repressive connections also operated in other ways. The concern that both dictatorships had about the exiles was emphasized. In a first moment, Uruguay became the sanctuary of the political asylum for the Brazilians; in a second moment, the dynamics reversed, and it was the Uruguayans who began to seek political refuge in Brazil. These movements were closely monitored by both governments. In this connection, the role of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the border between Brazil and Uruguay stands out. In the National Security Doctrine, territorial boundaries gave way to "ideological frontiers," i.e., in the fight against "international communism" the borders would be misplaced. In this sense, the assembly and orchestration of the so-called Condor Operation is highlighted, carrying out joint actions between the countries of the Southern Cone, including between Brazil and Uruguay, as was the case known as "kidnapping of Uruguayans" and the suspicion, until today, not eliminated, of the death of former president João Goulart.

En 2015, deux lois relatives au renseignement entrent en vigueur simultanément au Canada et en France. Ces deux lois soulignent respectivement les failles des cadres juridiques canadien et français quant à la collecte et à l’analyse des renseignements. Malgré les différences indéniables existant entre les deux pays tant dans la forme d’organisation que dans les pratiques institutionnelles, les manquements relevés sont relativement similaires et soulignent un affaiblissement des principes de l’État de droit au nom de la sécurité et plus particulièrement de la lutte antiterroriste. Les services de renseignement, disposant de pouvoirs plus importants, sont aujourd’hui amenés à contourner les mécanismes en vigueur sur le plan national destinés à protéger les droits fondamentaux des citoyens. Plus encore, dès lors qu’il s’agit d’un partage du renseignement au-delà des frontières, cette liberté, associée à l’absence de réglementation internationale dans ce domaine, conduit les actions des services de renseignement à de graves violations des droits humains. Le présent mémoire a pour but d’étudier l’équilibre entre sécurité et droits humains dans le cadre de la lutte antiterroriste. Plus précisément, il s'agira de relever les défis existants dans les valeurs de l'État de droit, et ce, eu égard à la collecte et au partage des renseignements. / In 2015, two laws related to intelligence were simultaneously adopted in Canada and France. Both of these laws highlight major faults in Canadian and French legal frameworks regarding the collection and sharing of intelligence. Despite undeniable differences between both countries with regards to organizational frameworks and institutional practices, their legal breaches are relatively similar and emphasise a weakening of the rule of law’s principles in the name of the security and counterterrorism. Intelligence services have greater powers than ever before and are more inclined to bypass national mechanisms designed to protect citizens’ fundamental rights. Moreover, when it comes to the sharing of information, these powers, combined with the lack of intelligence norms on an international scale, lead to numerous human rights violations. This dissertation focuses on the balance between security and human rights in light of counterterrorism. We will outline the existing challenges faced by the principles of the rule of law in relation to the collection and sharing of intelligence.

Alors que depuis 2015, en France, la menace terroriste d’inspiration jihadiste s’avère prégnante, protéiforme et durable, sa détection s’impose dorénavant comme un enjeu fondamental pour les services de renseignement soumis à des missionsd’une sensibilité accrue. Le volume important d’ individus détectés et suivis au titre de la radicalisation violente d’inspiration jihadiste, a entraîné un redimensionnement des services de renseignement français depuis ces quatre dernières années. Leur rôle et leur implication s’inscrivent désormais au travers d’une démarche proactive mise en oeuvre par des moyens humains réévalués mais aussi soutenue par des procédés techniques toujours plus élaborés et encadrés par un droit du renseignement récent qui a su s’imbriquer au sein d' un arsenal juridique antiterroriste en plein essor. Si le droit du renseignement est un droit d'exception permettant aux services de renseignement de bénéficier de pouvoirs exorbitants, pour autant, il est strictement encadré et soumis à des contrôles institutionnels et juridictionnels prévus par la loi. La restructuration des services français de renseignement, depuis 2015, afin de s’adapter à ses nouveaux défis, semble avoir atteint le niveau d’efficacité requis pour lutter contre le processus de radicalisation violente d’inspiration jihadiste et ainsiéviter le passage à l’acte. Mise sous la pression constante d’une obligation de résultats, la communauté des services de renseignement français doit, parallèlement, agir sous une contrainte juridique permanente afin d’atteindre ses buts sans pour autant négliger le format des moyens mis en oeuvre. / Since 2015, France is facing a more acute and multifaceted jihadist-inspired terrorist threat. This crisis is intended to be a long -lasting one and early detection is becoming a priority issue for intelligence services who are subject to more and more sensitive missions.The increasing amount of detected individuals for jihadist-inspired radicalization has led to a resizing of French Intelligence apparatus over the four past years. Their role and involvement are nowadays more proactive, supported by a rescaling of the human resources and abilities to use more sophisticated intelligence techniques. The latter needed to be framed by a renewed intelligence itself properly nested into the booming counter-terrorist legal framework.The restructuring of the French Intelligence services since 2015, decided in order to face its new challenges, seems to have completed the required level of efficiency when dealing with violent jihad-inspired violence and thus the subsequent action. Intelligence law is a law of exception allowing an outrageous power to intelligence services. Though, it remains strictly monitored andsubmitted to judicial and constitutional review provided by the law. French Intelligence community has to work under a dual obligation of law abiding procedures and results obligation to reach its goals without ever neglecting the proper form about the implemented means.