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Intensional Context-Free GrammarLittle, Richard 02 January 2014 (has links)
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a new generative grammar, based on the principles of intensional logic. More specifically, the goal is to create a psychologically real grammar model for use in natural language processing. The new grammar consists of a set of context-free rewrite rules tagged with intensional versions.
Most generative grammars, such as transformational grammar, lexical functional-grammar and head-driven phrase structure grammar, extend traditional context-free grammars with a mechanism for dealing with contextual information, such as subcategorization of words and agreement between different phrasal elements. In these grammars there is not enough separation between the utterances of a language and the context in which they are uttered. Their models of language seem to assume that context is in some way encapsulated in the words of the language instead of the other way around.
In intensional logic, the truth of a statement is considered in the context in which it is uttered, unlike traditional predicate logic in which truth is assigned in a vacuum, regardless of when or where it may have been stated. To date, the application of the principles of intensionality to natural languages has been confined to semantic theory. We remedy this by applying the ideas of intensional logic to syntactic context, resulting in intensional context-free grammar.
Our grammar takes full advantage of the simplicity and elegance of context-free grammars while accounting for information that is beyond the sentence itself, in a realistic way. Sentence derivation is entirely encapsulated in the context of its utterance. In fact, for any particular context, the entire language of the grammar is encapsulated in that context. This is evidenced by our proof that the language of an intensional grammar is a set of context-free languages, indexed by context.
To further support our claims we design and implement a small fragment of English using the grammar. The English grammar is capable of generating both passive and active sentences that include a subject, verb and up to two optional objects. Furthermore, we have implemented a partial French to English translation system that uses a single language dimension to initiate a translation. This allows us to include multiple languages in one grammar, unlike other systems which must separate the grammars of each language. This result has led this author to believe that we have created a grammar that is a viable candidate for a true Universal Grammar, far exceeding our initial goals. / Graduate / 0984 / 0800 / 0290 / rlittle@uvic.ca
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A lÃgica das entidades intensionais / The logic of intensional entitiesFrancisco Gomes Martins 29 February 2012 (has links)
nÃo hà / Um grave problema presente quando aplicamos semÃntica composicional, que atribui simples
valores de verdade a frases, Ã que quando essas seqÃÃncias estÃo presentes em alguns
contextos especÃficos, a substituiÃÃo de certas expressÃes com a mesma referÃncia pode
cambiar o valor de verdade da frase maior ou entÃo impedir que inferÃncias vÃlidas sejam
realizadas. Por exemplo, da afirmaÃÃo "Pedro acredita que Alexandre o Grande foi aluno de
AristÃteles", nÃo se pode inferir corretamente neste contexto de crenÃa que a substituiÃÃo de
"Alexandre o grande" por "o vencedor da batalha de Arbela" seja vÃlida porque
eventualmente Pedro pode nÃo saber que "Alexandre o Grande à o vencedor da batalha de
Arbela" e por isso a verdade das premissas nÃo garante a verdade da conclusÃo: "Pedro
acredita que o vencedor da batalha de Arbela foi aluno de AristÃteles". A conclusÃo nÃo se
segue pois ela nÃo depende da relaÃÃo de identidade efetiva entre âAlexandre o Grandeâ e âO
vencedor da Arbelaâ, e sim depende, de maneira contingente, do conjunto de crenÃas de
Pedro; ou ainda, segundo Frege, depende do sentido que Pedro associa a descriÃÃo
âAlexandre o Grandeâ. Em contextos intensionais a verdade da conclusÃo (apÃs substituiÃÃo)
depende de uma maneira especÃfica da maneira de conceber o nome em questÃo, por isso a
substituiÃÃo entre nomes cujo referente à o mesmo, mas que diferem em sentido, nÃo funciona
em todos os casos. O fato à que Frege nunca estabeleceu critÃrios de identidade para o sentido (Sinn), apenas reservou-se a declarar simplesmente que o sentido à o "modo de apresentaÃÃo" da referÃncia. Pretendemos apresentar critÃrios de identidade para o sentido em geral, e em
contextos intensionais, em particular. Os sucessores de Frege, dentre eles o lÃgico Alonzo
Church e o filÃsofo Rudolf Carnap foram os primeiros a estabelecer que duas expressÃes tÃm
o mesmo sentido se e somente se sÃo sinonimamente isomorfas e intensionalmente isomorfas,
respectivamente. Tais critÃrios devem ser entendidos à luz dos pressupostos lÃgicos de
Church em sua LÃgica do Sentido e da DenotaÃÃo (LSD) e das idÃias de Carnap â muitas
delas constituintes do programa filosÃfico do Positivismo lÃgico, em seu livro Meaning and
Necessity. Mais recentemente, Pavel Tichà estabeleceu de maneira mais exata o que à o
sentido e sua identidade atravÃs do Procedural isomorphism o qual constitui um dos
fundamentos da LÃgica Intensional Transparente (TIL). / A feature of the distinction between extensionalism and intensionalism, which has been
widely taken as a criterion to separate the two positions, is that within an extensionalist logic,
substitution is possible salva veritate (that is, without thereby changing the truth-value of the
statement concerned) with respect to identical instances of some basic logical form â and in
an intensionalist logic it is not. The different logical forms with respect to which such
substitution might take place accounts for some of the variety of different extensionalisms on
offer in the current philosophical landscape. So our starting-point is Fregeâs puzzle. This
question is frequently accepted as one of the foundations of modern semantics. To explain
why a true sentence of the form âa = bâ can be informative, unlike a sentence of the form âa =
aâ, Frege introduced an entity standing between an expression and the object denoted
(bezeichnet) by the expression. He named this entity Sinn (sense) and explained the
informative character of the true âa=bâ-shaped sentences by saying that âaâ and âbâ denote one
and the same object but differ in expressing (ausdrÃcken) distinct senses. The problem,
though, is that Frege never defined sense. The conception of senses as procedures that is
developed here has much in common with a number of other accounts that represent
meanings, also, as structured objects of various kinds, though not necessarily as procedures.
In the modern literature, this idea goes back to Rudolph Carnapâs (1947) notion of intensional
isomorphism. Church in (1954) constructs an example of expressions that are intensionally
isomorphic according to Carnapâs definition (i.e., expressions that share the same structure
and whose parts are necessarily equivalent), but which fail to satisfy the principle of
substitutability. The problem Church tackled is made possible by Carnapâs principle of
tolerance (which itself is plausible). We are free to introduce into a language syntactically
simple expressions which denote the same intension in different ways and thus fail to be
synonymous. TichÃâs objectualist take on âoperation-processesâ may be seen in part as
linguistic structures transposed into an objectual key; operations, procedures, structures are
not fundamentally and inherently syntactic items, but fully-fledged, non-linguistic entities,
namely, constructions.
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The programming language TransLucidDitu, Gabriel Cristian, Computer Science & Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW January 2007 (has links)
This thesis presents TransLucid, a low-level, purely declarative, intensional programming language. Built on a simple algebra and with just a small number of primitives, TransLucid programs define arbitrary dimensional infinite data structures, which are then queried to produce results. The formal foundations of TransLucid come from the work in intensional logic by Montague and Scott. The background chapters give a history of intensional logic and its predecessors in the Western world, as well as a history of intensional programming and Lucid, the first intensional programming language. The semantics of TransLucid are fully specified in the form of operational semantics. Three levels of semantics are given, in increasing order of efficiency, with the sequential warehouse semantics, the most efficient, being presented together with a proof that any expression will be evaluated by only examining relevant dimensions in the current context. The language is then extended in three important ways, by adding versioned identifiers, (declarative) side-effects and timestamped equations and demands. Adding versioned identifiers to TransLucid enriches the expressiveness of the language and allows the encoding of a variety of programming paradigms, ranging from manipulating large data-cubes to pattern-matching. Adding side-effects supports one of the main reasons for TransLucid: namely, to provide a target language, together with a methodology, for translating the main programming paradigms, thus creating a uniform end platform that can be the focus for optimisation and program verification. A translation of imperative programs into TransLucid is given. Timestamped equations and demands enable TransLucid to become a language for synchronous programming in real-time systems, as well as allowing runtime updates to a program's equations. The language TransLucid represents a decisive advance in declarative programming. It has applications in many fields of computer science and opens up exciting new avenues of research.
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The programming language TransLucidDitu, Gabriel Cristian, Computer Science & Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW January 2007 (has links)
This thesis presents TransLucid, a low-level, purely declarative, intensional programming language. Built on a simple algebra and with just a small number of primitives, TransLucid programs define arbitrary dimensional infinite data structures, which are then queried to produce results. The formal foundations of TransLucid come from the work in intensional logic by Montague and Scott. The background chapters give a history of intensional logic and its predecessors in the Western world, as well as a history of intensional programming and Lucid, the first intensional programming language. The semantics of TransLucid are fully specified in the form of operational semantics. Three levels of semantics are given, in increasing order of efficiency, with the sequential warehouse semantics, the most efficient, being presented together with a proof that any expression will be evaluated by only examining relevant dimensions in the current context. The language is then extended in three important ways, by adding versioned identifiers, (declarative) side-effects and timestamped equations and demands. Adding versioned identifiers to TransLucid enriches the expressiveness of the language and allows the encoding of a variety of programming paradigms, ranging from manipulating large data-cubes to pattern-matching. Adding side-effects supports one of the main reasons for TransLucid: namely, to provide a target language, together with a methodology, for translating the main programming paradigms, thus creating a uniform end platform that can be the focus for optimisation and program verification. A translation of imperative programs into TransLucid is given. Timestamped equations and demands enable TransLucid to become a language for synchronous programming in real-time systems, as well as allowing runtime updates to a program's equations. The language TransLucid represents a decisive advance in declarative programming. It has applications in many fields of computer science and opens up exciting new avenues of research.
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Argumentation et engagement ontologique de l’acte intentionnel : Pour une réflexion critique sur l’identité dans les logiques intentionnelles explicites / Argumentation and ontological commitment of the intentional act : Critical dissertation about identity in explicit intentional logicsFontaine, Matthieu 07 May 2013 (has links)
L'intentionalité est la faculté qu'a l'esprit humain de se diriger vers des objets de toutes sortes. On la capture linguistiquement à travers l'usage de verbes comme "savoir", "croire", "craindre", "espérer". Les énoncés intentionnels comme "Jean croit que Nosferatu est un vampire" ou "Oedipe aime Jocaste" défient les lois de la logique classique, remettant en cause la validité de principes logiques tels que la généralisation existentielle ou encore la substitution des identiques. Je propose dans ma thèse une analyse fondée sur les logiques intentionnelles explicites, des logiques où le langage est enrichi au moyen d'opérateurs qui expriment explicitement l'intentionalité. Des aspects originaux de la signification des énoncés intentionnels sont saisis au coeur des pratiques argumentatives, dans le contexte de la logique dialogique notamment. S'intéressant plus spécifiquement au cas de la fictionalité, paradigme où se mêlent naturellement considérations logiques, linguistiques et métaphysiques, je défends une théorie artefactuelle dans laquelle on définit des critères d'existence et d'identité pour les identités fictionnelles littéraires au moyen de la notion de relation de dépendance ontologique. La notion de dépendance ontologique est toutefois sujette à de graves difficultés que l'on repasse ici dans le contexte d'une sémantique modale-Temporelle, défendant alors une approche novatrice de la dimension artefactuelle des fictions. In fine, on propose une combinaison de la théorie artefactuelle à une sémantique pour l'opérateur de fictionalité qui permet l'articulation entre différents points de vue sur la fiction, les points de vue interne et externe notamment. / Intentionality is that faculty of human mind whereby it is directed towards objects of all kinds. It is recorded linguistically in verbs such as "to know", "to believe", "to fear", "to hope". Intentional statements such as "John thinks that Nosferatu is a vampire" or "Oedipus loves Jocasta" challenge classical logical laws such as existential generalization or substitution of identical. I propose here an analysis grounded on explicit intentional logics, i. e. logics in which languages are enriched by means of specific operators expressing intentionality. Some original aspects of the meanings of intentional statements are grasped within argumentative practices, more specifically in the context of dialogical logic. I focus more specifically on fictionality, a paradigm in which logical, linguistic and metaphysical considerations are naturally embedded. I defend an artifactual theory in which existence and identity criteria for fictional entities are defined by means of the notion of ontological dependence relation. That notion faces several difficulties overcome here in a modal-Temporal semantics in which an innovating approach to the artifactual diemnsion of fiction is defended. Ultimately, a combination of that theory to a semantic for the fictionality operator is suggested. This enable us to articulate external and internal viewpoints on fictionality.
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