What explains the form and substance of international financial standards? Form refers to the legal or non-legal bindingness of an international standard. Substance refers to how significantly the standard changes the international status quo. The form and substance of international standards on bank capital adequacy, hedge funds, “bail-in” resolution, and insurance capital adequacy challenge the predictions of major rationalist, realist, and two-level perspectives. I propose a novel theory and present original evidence to test two central claims. First, the structure of domestic institutions and strategic interaction within a state incentivizes an actor from that state to prefer and pursue a certain form of international standard: legally or non-legally binding. The state actor, as a first mover, aims to propose a standard at an appropriate international institution which produces standards of its preferred form. Second, the state actor must bargain with representatives of other states according to certain decision-making rules at the international standard-setting institution. The type of decision-making rule used in bargaining—not the market power or other characteristics of key players—explains the substance of the final standard. More restrictive decision-making rules, which use majority or supermajority voting, lead to greater change than open rules, which are based on consensus or unanimity voting. My empirical findings remove the veneer of technocratic legitimacy associated with international standard-setting to reveal intense distributional battles. In pursuing the Basel capital standards, the US Federal Reserve has been motivated more by turf wars with other US bank regulators than by its publicly stated desire to create a “level playing field” for internationally active banks. Supported by domestic collaboration between regulators and industry, French officials set a legally binding and deep de facto international standard for hedge fund managers over the vigorous objections of the City of London. By pursuing a soft standard on bail-in, the Bank of England has sought not only to protect taxpayers from costly bailouts, but also to keep Her Majesty’s Treasury at arm’s length. The lack of international insurance regulation is due not to the lack of effort by the UK Financial Services Authority and its European partners, but to open decision-making rules that allow US state regulators, albeit fragmented and under-resourced, to protect the international status quo. In each of these cases, I specify how domestic and international institutional settings provide enduring opportunities and constraints for key players in global finance.

This study analyzes two British-led police reforms in Sierra Leone from 1945-1961 and 1998-2007, exploring how reinterpretations of sovereignty, security and statehood affected strategies of statebuilding over time. Tracing the effects of reform from the first to the second period, it focuses on three practical questions facing reformers: what kind of coercive capacity the police should be invested with (force); where they should be and for what purposes (territoriality); and in what relation they ought to stand with nonstate policing actors (legitimate authority). A key finding is that reinterpretations of security and sovereignty to center on internal threats and state-society relations served to channel more international attention and resources to police forces in weak states. From a relatively restricted field whose impulses came from policing experiences in other colonies and in Britain, recent post-conflict police reforms were informed by knowledge about economic growth, social mobility and global security. However, strategy was muddled when donors committed to conflicting agendas entered the fray. As a result, the latest reform was profoundly shaped by negotiations of the meaning of key concepts like ‘security’. The second part of the study draws on insights about reform to address debates on intervention and sovereignty. Against the image of Western-led interventions suspending local sovereignty, it is argued that the colonial legacy allowed the Sierra Leonean government to prolong and deepen the recent intervention. Contrary to the image of Sierra Leone’s international relations as exploitative and personalized, the study explores how policing became a field where new and legitimate links with the outside world were established after reform.

This thesis examines important aspects of Canada and Britain’s participation in the Korean War of 1950-53 and the Afghanistan Conflict of 2001-present with a view to better understanding how international law influenced this participation, and whether key leaders and officials understood said law as a binding and distinct phenomenon. It draws on constructivist International Relations (IR) theory and “interactional” International Law (IL) theory, and employs a method of historical reconstruction and process tracing. I argue that, contrary to what realism might predict, international law helped define and shape each state’s possible course of action in the wars, and the justifications that could be made for their behaviour. More specifically, Canada and Britain’s involvement in the conflicts suggests that, when states use force, international law can play four broad roles: 1) it helps constitute the identities of the actors at issue; 2) it helps regulate the political and military practice of the actors at issue; 3) it permits and legitimates certain political and military practices that otherwise might not be permitted; and 4) it helps structure the process by which agents seek to develop and promote new legal rules and legitimate practice. However, I also contend that, contrary to what IL scholars might predict, the discourse and actions of Canadian and British leaders and officials during the Korean War and Afghanistan Conflict offer mixed support for the hypothesis that, when states use force, policy-makers understand international law as a binding and distinct set of legal rules, and the legal status of these rules impacts their decision-making. In sum, my findings suggest that international law can play important roles in world politics and the use of force by states, but it is unclear whether these effects are attributable to an obligatory quality in law.

The following dissertation discusses the role of norms and norm entrepreneurs in the foreign policy-making of the Czech Republic, Poland and Bratislava after the downfall of communism. In at attempt to unpack the mechanics and appliance of “soft power” in foreign policy practice in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, it identifies conditions and analyzes processes via which norms come to play the role of intermediary variable in the articulation and enactment of national interest. Capitalizing on the agency-oriented strand of norm diffusion theory in international relations and discursive institutionalism scholarship in comparative politics, the dissertation argues that normative frameworks advocated by value-bound networks of so-called norm entrepreneurs can play a regulative function in foreign policy-making by setting boundaries for discourse and sustaining logics of appropriateness that constrain the pool of available foreign policy choices at critical junctures. In the first part, “the mission and conversion” (1989-1999), the dissertation focuses on the early stages of norm emergence and habituation in the three states in the 1990s, asserting that ideational influence incurred by American “missionaries” on Czech, Polish and Slovak “converts” to democracy via a range of socialization processes related to NATO enlargement and Western democracy promotion efforts in the region gave rise to norm entrepreneur groups bound by a shared commitment to a normative framework dubbed “dissident geopolitics”. In part two, “the zeal”, the dissertation concentrates on the later stages of norm internalisation, demonstrated by norm enforcement in foreign policy. Using case studies of Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy during the Iraq War (2002-2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004-2005) and the Russia Reset (2009-2011), the dissertation shows how sustained advocacy by norm entrepreneurs with or without structural power, who skillfully use framing to push their normative agendas in discursive competition with other norm entrepreneurs, factors “dissident geopolitics” in the decision-making process that produces activist and value-laden foreign policy outcomes that might not have been expected of “weak” states. Ultimately, the dissertation argues that dominant norms and norm entrepreneur networks can thrive in transition settings when they are less disputed, but they tend to lose coherence and unity, respectively, as the foreign policy landscape diversifies upon completion of democratic consolidation.

This thesis is motivated by uncertainty in the academic literature surrounding the meaning of federalism and the appropriate usage of the concept to describe political systems. In particular, its use in characterising systems of regional integration which have moved beyond a strictly inter-governmental character, but not yet reached Statehood, is today highly contested, as in the case of the European Union. The established consensus that this entity constitutes a wholly novel ‘sui generis’ form, neither federal nor confederal in character, has been tempered in recent years by a growing willingness among scholars to deploy the lens of comparative federalism to analyse the polity. However, the precise relevance of the concept in this new context remains unsettled. Can political science achieve any more definite understanding that removes such doubt? I consider this question through the perspective of the history of ideas, by examining the evolution of federalism from inception to the present day. I argue that the history of the federal idea in the United States reveals that the heart of the problem lies in confusion over the nature of sovereignty. Ever since Philadelphia federalism has been thought to mean ‘a division of sovereignty’. However, the subsequent Civil War did appear to demonstrate that the notion of sovereignty shared between two levels of government was a false construction: either the whole or the parts could be sovereign, but not both simultaneously. This point, it seems - the indivisibility of sovereignty - was not fully taken on board afterwards in the United States and elsewhere. The thesis seeks to put this right and to systematically relate the evolving concept of federalism with the evolving and contested nature of sovereignty. On this ground, I suggest that we clarify the definition of federalism as ‘a division of the powers flowing from sovereignty’. This in turn yields two specific varieties of ‘compound polity’ where before only one was known: the single State and multi-State federal forms. The latter has to date been an unobserved species, which, it would seem, the fact of the EU’s existence now forces us to recognize.

This project approaches ongoing debates over the impact of increased Chinese engagement in African countries through the lens of production and industrialisation. Emerging market FDI into Africa is growing rapidly, and an increasing proportion of this investment is into manufacturing and productive sectors. This trend is led by the commercial expansion of private Chinese manufacturing firms across the continent. The goal of this project is to examine the differentiated impacts on African industrialisation attempts of this phenomenon. It takes as its case study industrial zone development projects in Nigeria, namely, the two official economic and trade cooperation zones being developed as large-scale FDI projects by Chinese firms, with Chinese and Nigerian government support, in Lagos and Ogun states. Analytically, four dimensions of this process are identified for study: the home country context, the host country context, the zone structures and institutions, and the firms themselves. Special attention is paid to the interface between foreign actors and the particular political economy of Nigerian manufacturing, as well as the at times substantial gaps between policy and practice in terms of industrial planning, investment and production. The thesis argues that SEZ projects in general, including the Chinese ETCZs, are industrial policy tools that operate on particular assumptions regarding the organisation of global production. As such, they incentivise the insertion of export-oriented firms into established global networks supplying international markets. However, a closer examination of industrial policy in China, the production environment in Nigeria and the behaviour of internationalising firms reveals that these assumptions are not always accurate. Thus, the SEZ institution as it is currently conceived in Nigeria is ill-suited to lend support to the trend towards Chinese relocation of producer firms, as well as to the reality of Nigerian production—both of which are predicated on domestic and regional markets as the primary driver of African industrialisation and productive sector growth.

This study aims to account for the high degree of influence and intensity displayed in bi-lateral relations between Russia and the other post-Soviet states - specifically Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (BUK.) It seeks to do so by employing an analytical framework based around the concept of 'post-Imperialism,' arguing that persistent legacies of the imperial past have both ensured a high degree of intensity in bilateral relationships as well as providing pathways of influence over certain policy areas - primarily for Russia, but in some instances for BUK as well. It also seeks to examine imperial legacy issues as distinct 'types' - from physical economic and military infrastructure, to cross-border constellations of elite personnel to the normative and cognitive inheritances of imperialism amongst both the elite and the population at large. It concludes that Russia has been able to mobilise and employ power resources not available to alternative actors in order to 'punch above its weight' when competing with other powers for influence in the post-Soviet space, and preserve certain Soviet era patterns of relations. It is not the focus of this study, but it is to be hoped that the framework will prove useful for researchers in other former imperial polities in future.

Economic integration between major powers has long been viewed as a force for international stability. The intuitive logic is appealing: states that are trading with and investing in each other stand to lose if that commerce is jeopardized by conflict. Yet there are sound reasons for supposing that such deepening economic integration can also shift the balance of power between major states, by causing follower economies – states that are not among the most developed in the international system – to grow faster than leading economies, and economic size and development are what underpin national material capabilities. Moreover, a rich body of theory and history suggests that such shifts in the balance of power make interstate war more likely. This dissertation argues, therefore, that economic integration can actually be a potent cause of security competition and war. A theoretical framework that unites economic theory on the differential growth impact of trade, financial flows, and technology diffusion with realist arguments on the conflict implications of polarity shifts and dynamic power differentials is constructed. It is then explored using evidence from three key historical cases: the rise of the Dutch Republic during the 1581-1648 period, the relative decline of the United Kingdom and the relative rise of other great powers between 1870 and 1914, and the differential growth rates and corresponding tensions of 1945-89. Certain scope conditions and qualifications notwithstanding, the empirical evidence supports the theoretical framework. As such, the argument that deepening economic integration raises the mutual cost of fighting and thereby makes conflict less likely is not directly refuted, but an important countervailing mechanism is found to be at work. Such a finding has implications for debates over the security implications of economic globalization, the foundations of realist theory, and the causes and potential consequences of the rise of new powers today.

This thesis examines whether and how participatory governance (PG), a model for incorporating citizen participation in designing and/or implementing strategies to solve public problems, can strengthen civil society and improve the quality of democracy. The study focuses on community-managed schools (CMS) in Honduras and Guatemala, arguably each country's largest PG initiative, in which parents managed rural schools. This thesis advances a "political capabilities" framework to explore state efforts to strengthen civil society and improve the quality of democracy. I use a mixed-methods approach, centering on surveys of over 2,000 parents and eight community case studies. My research first shows how different long-standing political legacies—“controlled inclusion” in Honduras and “coerced marginalization” in Guatemala—impinged on CMS. In Honduras, patronage networks captured CMS. In Guatemala, community- and national-level polarization contributed to CMS's reversal. Both undermined the CMS model and reduced the likelihood that participants would develop political capabilities. Despite these obstacles to stimulating civil society, I find surprising evidence of important individual-level “spillover” effects—such as gaining skills and increasing participation in other organizations—among a non-trivial minority of participating parents. Moreover, regressions and case study analysis indicate that state support, parents' level of involvement, and parents' perceptions of council effectiveness and democraticness can increase the likelihood of certain spillovers. Still, prior organizational experience remains the best predictor of subsequent participation and leadership. And qualitative analysis further demonstrates the limits of CMS's impacts on rural civil society. For the most part, individuals have not used newly acquired skills to build new types of groups and organize autonomously. Instead, community organizations remain very limited in their scope of action and heavily circumscribed by the state. In sum, this thesis demonstrates how, through one type of PG initiative, states can stimulate participation and produce changes in individuals’ civic and political behavior. But CMS was not a “game-changer” for rural civil society—the link from incremental changes in individual behavior to how rural communities organize themselves and engage with the state remains tenuous.

This thesis seeks to explain Poland’s energy security policies towards Russia in the period from 1990-2007. It is inspired by the puzzle that Poland’s commitments to reduce its dependence on imported oil and gas from Russia have varied considerably during this period. Numerous large-scale projects to enhance energy security have been proposed, abandoned and revisited, all in the absence of a significant change to Poland’s level of dependence on Russia or its exposure to supply risks. This puzzle poses a challenge to conventional approaches to energy security, which tend to explain policies as a function of ‘material’ shifts in the price, supply or demand for fossil fuels. Though these factors are undoubtedly important it is argued that, in the case of Poland, energy security is more affected by domestic decision-making processes than by such material shifts. In particular, the degree and form of intervention in the energy sector by the political executive in Poland is highlighted as a key factor explaining energy security policy output. These interventions in Poland are classified and distinguished according to three types of ‘policy network’ – statist, corporatist and liberal, each of which represented a different outlook on the optimal means for ensuring energy security. These policy networks were embedded within different governments, and their preferences fashioned Poland’s responses to energy security challenges occurring under similar material conditions.