Thesis (MComm) -- Stellenbosch University, 2001 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: For many years the view of South African courts and academics have been that the literal meaning of words is the cornerstone in regard to the interpretation of legislative provisions. This view has changed drastically over the years and academics and the courts have later accepted that the intention of the legislature is the determining factor in the interpretation of a legislative provision. In recent years the courts have also moved towards a more purposive approach in interpreting legislative provisions. Despite these developments the belief remained with some academics and especially tax practitioners that in the interpretation of fiscal legislation, the literal meaning of words remains the deciding factor in the interpretation of such legislation. In this study, the courts' approach in the interpretation of fiscal legislation, with specific reference to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is investigated in order to determine whether a different approach is followed in the interpretation of fiscal legislation in contrast with the interpretation of other legislation. This study first examines the principles applicable in the interpretation of legislation in general and the developments that have taken place over the years. This is necessary in order to set a standard against which the interpretation of fiscal legislation may be measured. The study then examines the courts' approach to the interpretation of fiscal legislation and draws a comparison between the interpretation of fiscal legislation and the interpretation of legislation in general. In this regard the specific theories of interpretation as well as the presumptions of interpretation is considered in detail. From this examination the conclusion is drawn that there are no grounds for distinguishing between the interpretation of fiscal legislation and other legislation in general except for the fact that the concept of equity was never accepted and applied in the context of fiscal legislation whereas it has been in regard to other legislation. The specific reasons for this exception are also discussed in detail. The impact of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa on the interpretation of legislation in general and fiscal legislation in particular is then considered. From this examination the inference is drawn that the Constitution has no impact on the interpretation of fiscal legislation in so far as the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Constitution are not infringed by a taxing provision. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Suid-Afrikaanse howe en akademici het vir baie jare die mening gehuldig dat die letterlike betekenis van woorde die hoeksteen van wetsuitleg is. Hierdie siening het oor die jare aansienlik verander en die howe en akademici het later aanvaar dat die bedoeling van die wetgewer die bepalende faktor in die uitleg van enwetsteks is. In afgelope paar jaar het die howe egter 'n meer doeldienende benadering betreffende wetsuitleg begin volg. Ten spyte van hierdie verwikkelinge het die persepsie by sommige akademici en in die besonder belastingpraktisyns bly voortbestaan dat die letterlike betekenis van woorde in die wet steeds die deurslaggewende faktor by die uitleg van belastingwetgewing is. In hierdie studie sal die howe se benadering ten opsigte van die uitleg van belastingwetgewing, met spesifieke verwysing na die Inkomstebelastingwet 58 van 1962 ondersoek word ten einde vas te stel of en ander benadering gevolg word by die uitleg van belastingwetgewing teenoor die benadering wat gevolg word by die uitleg van wetgewing in die algemeen. Die studie ondersoek eers die beginsels van toepassing by die uitleg van wetgewing in die algemeen en die ontwikkeling van hierdie beginsels deur die jare. Hierdie ondersoek is noodsaaklik ten einde en maatstaf te vestig waarteen die uitleg van belastingwetgewing getoets kan word. Die studie ondersoek daarna die howe se benadering ten opsigte van die uitleg van belastingwetgewing en vergelyk die uitleg van belastingwetgewing met die uitleg van wetgewing in die algemeen. In hierdie verband word die onderskeie teoriee van wetsuitleg asook die vermoedens van wetsuitleg in besonderhede ondersoek. Uit hierdie ondersoek word daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat daar geen grande is om te onderskei tussen die uitleg van belastingwetgewing en wetgewing in die algemeen nie behalwe vir die feit dat die konsep van billikheid nooit in die konteks van belastingwetgewing aanvaar en toegepas is nie. Die spesifieke redes vir hierdie uitsondering word ook in besonderhede bespreek. Die impak van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika op wetsuitleg in die algemeen en belastingwetgewing in die besonder word dan oorweeg. Uit hierdie ondersoek word daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die Grondwet geen impak op die uitleg van belastingwetgewing het nie vir sover die bepalings van Hoofstuk 2 van die Grondwet nie geskend word deur die bepalings van belastingwetgewing nie.

No abstract available. / Theses (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2013

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-10-05T12:15:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ruy Veridiano Patu Rebello-Pinho.pdf: 1247599 bytes, checksum: c44c5bdfc39b4b689b84b1dd0766568e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-05T12:15:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ruy Veridiano Patu Rebello-Pinho.pdf: 1247599 bytes, checksum: c44c5bdfc39b4b689b84b1dd0766568e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-31 / The purpose of this dissertation is to emphasize the existence of the duty of legal independence of the registrar and the notary, who are responsible of a legal function constitutionally decentralized by the Charter of 1988 and disciplined by Law 8935/94, the Law of Notaries and Registrars. Independence is not a state of the person, but takes place contemporaneously in an argumentative intersubjective process of cooperative order. This mechanism of decentralization of powers and competences outside the structure of the State, gives an independent legal professional a bundle of legal responsibilities to be exercised through an administrative and technical organization, so that along legal independence, that all legal profession implies, goes the management and administration of its resources under private law. Every legal function must be accountable to the society and to be supervised; by law, the inspection and technical standardization of the services is attributed to the Judiciary. In order to concentrate the finite judicial powers in its nuclear activity, the Judiciary has an important role in ensuring the legal independence of the registrar and the notary as legal duties to society / O objetivo desta dissertação é sublinhar a existência do dever de independência jurídica do registrador e do notário, que exercem função jurídica descentralizada constitucionalmente pela Carta de 1988 e disciplinada pela Lei 8935/94, a Lei dos Notários e dos Registradores. Independência que não é um estado da pessoa, mas que ocorre, na contemporaneidade, em um processo intersubjetivo argumentativo de ordem cooperativa. Esse mecanismo de descentralização de poderes e competências para fora da estrutura do Estado, atribui a um profissional do Direito independente um feixe de responsabilidades jurídicas a serem exercidas por meio de uma organização administrativa e técnica, de modo que ao lado da independência jurídica, que toda profissão jurídica implica, se encontra a gestão e administração de seus recursos em regime de direito privado. Toda função jurídica deve prestar contas à sociedade e ser fiscalizada; por lei, a fiscalização e a uniformização técnica das serventias é de atribuição do Poder Judiciário. A fim de concentrar as energias judiciárias, que são finitas, em sua atividade nuclear, o Poder Judiciário tem importante atuação no sentido de garantir a independência jurídica do registrador e do notário como deveres jurídicos para com a sociedade

Contemporary conflicts over such issues as abortion, same-sex marriage, circumcision, and veiling highlight the need for renewed reflection on the justification of religious norms and authority. While abstract investigation of these questions is necessary, inquiry into them is not foreign to religious traditions. Philosophical engagement with these traditions of inquiry is both intellectually and practically advantageous. This does not demand, however, that these discussions be conducted within a discourse wholly internal to a particular religious tradition; dialogue between a religious tradition and philosophical reflection can be created that is mutually beneficial. To that end, this dissertation explores a central issue in philosophy of halakha (Jewish law): the relation between the justification of halakhic norms and halakhic-legal practice. A central component of philosophy of halakha is the project of ta'amei ha-mitzvot (the reasons for the commandments). Through such inquiry, Jewish thinkers attempt to demonstrate the rationality of Jewish religious practice by offering reasons for halakhic norms. At its best, it not only seeks to justify halakhic norms but also elicits sustained reflection on issues in moral philosophy, including justification and normativity. Still, there is a tendency among its practitioners to attempt to separate this project from halakhic-legal practice. Legal practice is thus isolated from philosophical reflection, and the reasons for the norms do not guide their application. Ta'amei ha-mitzvot therefore also provokes queries in legal philosophy concerning the relation between normative and legal justification. This study explores the relation between the justification of halakhic norms and halakhic-legal practice in modern Jewish thought by placing it into dialogue with both moral and legal philosophy. This occurs in two stages: First, the philosophies of halakha of three influential twentieth-century Jewish thinkers, Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903-1994), Joseph Soloveitchik (1903-1993), and Eliezer Berkovits (1908-1992) are examined and critically assessed. It is shown that despite the denials of Leibowitz and Soloveitchik, all their accounts of the reasons for the commandments influence their approaches to halakhic-legal practice; they each combine a foundationalist approach to justification with skepticism about the practical normativity of reason; and none of them adequately grounds halakhic-legal authority. However, their skepticism is based on unduly constricted conceptions of reason and untenable alternative sources of normativity, such as will, metaphysics, or revelation. Second, through engagements with the work of Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Raz an alternative to their accounts of the justification of halakhic norms and authority is developed. This alternative is described as critical philosophy of halakha, for it does not attempt to justify halakhic norms or authority but articulates the rational constraints on, and practical consequences of, their justification. In terms of justification, this account is contextualist, that is, pragmatic and intersubjective, rather than foundationalist, and it is responsive to failures of justification. Correspondingly, it entails pluralism yet avoids moral and epistemic relativism. In terms of authority, this account is instrumentalist and thus mediates between normative and legal justification without reducing the latter to the former. Consequently, authority is circumscribed as opposed to total. Critical philosophy of halakha therefore represents a method whereby the modern religious believer may hold herself accountable to both her faith and other individuals.

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This thesis covers the status of the Jewish law in the messianic era as it was anticipated in Jewish texts from the biblical period until the seventeenth century. Although the predominant perspective is the law's perpetuity, a future idealized version was particularized in each age and stylized by various groups. The view of the law's continuity was challenged by streams of thought and ambiguities in the texts that allowed for changes and cessations in the law in messianic times. Concrete messianic movements, such as that of the New Testament in the first century and the Sabbatean movement of the seventeenth century, brought some of these underlying currents to the forefront with their reinterpretations of the law and their antinomian behaviour.

This thesis studies a method of legal reasoning used in determining legal rulings guided by the principle of maslahah (public interest), promulgated by a liberal thinker of the medieval period, Najm al-Din al-Tufi (d. 710/716 A.H.). His theory of maslahah is not confined only to cases which have no textual basis but is also applied to those problems that come within the purview of the revealed texts. His theory of maslahah is, no doubt, unique and original. He prefers to place maslahah above all legal sources, including the Qur'an and the Hadith which, according to him, cannot lead people to uniform rulings. He believes that only with this theory can human welfare be secured. / Due to its unique and controversial nature, al-Tufi's theory of maslahah was not welcomed and even received severe criticism from other jurists. Indeed, this theory went beyond al-Tufis times and was much later seen as suitable for anticipating social change. Therefore, in modern times, in which law reform is needed his theory of maslahah receives serious attention. This thesis also attempts to argue that, even though their concept of maslahah is not as liberal as that of al-Tufi the modern reformists' theory of maslahah is, by and large, inspired and even influenced by al-Tufis maslahah.

Table of cases: leaves [771]-783 / Bibliography: leaves [784]-795 / 2 v. (xix, 795 leaves) ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Law School, 1988