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Thesis (LLD (Public Law))—University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH SUMMARY: The point of departure of this dissertation is that transformation in South Africa depends on transformative politics – extra-institutional, substantive, oppositional, transformation-oriented politics. One challenge South Africa’s constitution therefore poses to courts is to take account of the impact of adjudication on transformative politics. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between adjudication and transformative politics within a specific context – adjudication of socio-economic rights cases. This relationship is commonly described in a positive light – either that adjudication of socio-economic rights cases promotes transformative politics by giving impoverished people access to the basic resources required for political participation; or that adjudication of such cases is in itself a space for transformative politics. Although there is much truth in both these descriptions, both under-estimate the extent to which adjudication also limits transformative politics. This dissertation focuses on the extent to which adjudication limits transformative politics – it comprises an analysis of socio-economic rights cases with the aim of showing how adjudication of these cases, despite positive results, also limited transformative politics. The theoretical aspects of this problem are outlined in the first chapter. After a description of the body of case law on which the analysis focuses two chapters follow in which two ways in which adjudication limits transformative politics are investigated. The first traces how courts in socio-economic rights cases participate in discourses about impoverishment that tend to describe the problem as non-political – specifically how courts tend to describe impoverishment as technical rather than political in nature; and how courts implicitly legitimise in their judgments liberal-capitalist views of impoverishment that insist that impoverishment is best addressed through the unregulated market. Then follows a chapter investigating how views of legal interpretation in terms of which legal materials have a certain and determinable meaning that can be mechanically found by courts limit transformative politics by insulating adjudication from critique and emphasising finality in adjudication. Throughout it is shown how courts can mitigate the limiting effects of adjudication, by legitimating the political agency of impoverished people, by using remedies requiring political engagement between opponents and postponing closure in adjudication, and by adopting a different approach to interpretation, that emphasises the pliability and relative indeterminacy of legal materials. Despite this, the conclusion of the dissertation is that courts can never wholly avoid the limiting impact of adjudication on transformative politics, but should rather aim to remain continually aware of it. / AFRIKAANS OPSOMMING: Die uitgangspunt van hierdie proefskrif is dat transformasie in Suid-Afrika afhang van transformatiewe politiek – buite-institusionele, substantiewe, opposisionele, transformasie-gerigte politiek. Een eis wat Suid-Afrika se grondwet daarom aan howe stel, is om ag te slaan op die impak van beregting op transformatiewe politiek. Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die verhouding tussen beregting en transformatiewe politiek binne ‘n spesifieke konteks – beregting van sake oor sosio-ekonomiese regte – te ondersoek. Meeste beskouinge van hierdie verhouding beskryf dit in ‘n positiewe lig - óf dat die beregting van sake oor sosio-ekonomiese regte transformatiewe politiek bevorder deur vir verarmde mense toegang tot basiese lewensmiddele te bewerkstellig sodat hulle aan politieke optrede kan deelneem; óf dat beregting van sulke sake opsigself ‘n spasie is vir transformatiewe politiek. Hoewel daar waarheid steek in beide beskrywings, onderskat hulle die mate waartoe beregting ook transformatiewe politiek kan beperk. Hierdie proefskrif fokus op hoe beregting transformatiewe politiek beperk - dit behels ‘n analise van sake oor sosio-ekonomiese regte met die doel om te wys hoe beregting van hierdie sake, ten spyte van kennelik positiewe gevolge ook transformatiewe politiek beperk het. Die teoretiese vergestalting van hierdie probleem word in die eerste hoofstuk beskou. Na ‘n beskrywing van die liggaam van regspraak waarop die analise fokus volg twee hoofstukke waarin twee maniere waarop beregting transformatiewe politiek beperk ondersoek word. Die eerste beskou hoe howe in sake oor sosio-ekonomiese regte deelneem aan diskoerse oor verarming wat neig om hierdie probleem as non-polities te beskryf - spesifiek hoe howe neig om hierdie problem as tegnies eerder as polities van aard te beskryf; en hoe howe liberaal-kapitalistiese sieninge van verarming, ingevolge waarvan verarming deur die ongereguleerde mark aangespreek behoort te word, implisiet in hul uitsprake legitimeer. Dan volg ‘n hoofstuk wat naspeur hoe sieninge van regsinterpretasie ingevolge waarvan regsmateriaal ‘n sekere en vasstelbare betekenis het wat meganies deur howe gevind word, transformatiewe politieke optrede beperk deur die openheid van beregting vir kritiek te beperk en finaliteit in beregting in die hand te werk. Deurgaans word gewys hoe howe die beperkende effek van beregting kan teëwerk, deur die politike agentskap van verarmde mense te legitimeer, deur remedies te gebruik wat politieke onderhandeling tussen opponente bewerkstellig en finale oplossings uitstel, en deur ‘n ander benadering tot interpretasie, wat die buigsaamheid en relatiewe onbepaalbaarheid van regsmateriaal erken, te omarm. Tog is die gevolgtrekking van die proefskrif dat howe nooit die beperkende effek van beregting op transformatiewe politiek geheel kan vermy nie, maar eerder deurgaans daarop bedag moet wees.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-07-25T11:52:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernanda Mara de Oliveira Macedo Carneiro Pacobahyba.pdf: 2034067 bytes, checksum: 3152b483af6e834bafb8609a021c1b03 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-25T11:52:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernanda Mara de Oliveira Macedo Carneiro Pacobahyba.pdf: 2034067 bytes, checksum: 3152b483af6e834bafb8609a021c1b03 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-04-24 / When observing the way in which the juridical-tax interpretation has been processed, distinct movements are perceived and that seem to fit in a point of intellectual confrontation. On the one hand, traditional hermeneutics, based on the literality of the CTN, which seeks the meaning of normative texts from an extraction of their contents. And from this hermeneutics, the construction of doctrine and jurisprudence that makes verberar a sense of assertiveness, completeness, certainty. From another perspective, movements that identify law as being a language, which culminates in complex ideas and a constant dialogue between texts, given the difficulty always present in seeing the legal reality under the sign of language. In the doctrine and jurisprudence that follow, deepening in matters that before seemed exhausted, returns to the fundamental normative structures and recognition of the incompleteness of everything that is said about the legal-tributary phenomenon. And here, emerges the Logical-Semantic Constructivism, by Paulo de Barros Carvalho. The justification of this research is based on the original approach that seeks to offer to the problematic, considering that it approaches the idea of hermeneutical movements in the Science of Law, in order to investigate the possibility of establishing the proper characteristics of these two movements, located in times not -chronic logics: the first, from the "past that is still present", represents the traditional approach; the second, of the "future that is already present", has as its starting point the fundamental work of Logical-Semantic Constructivism. Thus, the starting problem is: can individual different motifs be identified in the way Brazilian juridical-tax hermeneutics takes place? The general objective of the research is to investigate the possibility of identifying these hermeneutical movements and the establishment of characters that represent the overcoming of the traditional model, given the inflows resulting from the adoption of the paradigm of language, as well as the promulgation of the Federal Constitution of 1988 and, more recently, the new Code of Civil Procedure. The methodology used is the path that interweaves the analytical-hermeneutic method, which is characteristic of Logical-Semantic Constructivism, under the influence of semiotic perspectives in the juridical data: here the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic plans structuring of language, by which the object itself is constructed by a subject, which is also by language. With all of this, the structuring of the thought contained in this work margeia reflections that are processed in the scope of Legal Epistemology, Law Theory and Tax Law itself. The central hypothesis of the work is that, in spite of new intellectual influences in Brazilian juridical-tax doctrine, jurists and scholars of tax law still rely on ulteriorated hermeneutic views, clinging to the use of the various methods scattered in the CTN and masking the complexity of the normative phenomenon. This is true even after the decisive influences of CF / 88. In this way, the possibilities that allow us to deal with different paradigms in the interpretation of texts and legal-tax aspects, as a way of undertaking a new legal rationality that align General Theory of Law and Tax Law from the dialogue between the different languages are deepened, competent and incompetent, which are reflected in Brazilian normative discourse / Ao se observar a maneira como se processa a interpretação jurídico-tributária, percebem-se movimentos distintos e que parecem calhar em um ponto de enfrentamento intelectual. De um lado, a Hermenêutica tradicional, fincada na literalidade do CTN, e que busca o sentido dos textos normativos com base na extração de seus conteúdos. E arrimada nesta Hermenêutica, a elaboração da doutrina e da jurisprudência que que faz verberar um sentido de assertividade, de completude, de certeza. Sob outra perspectiva, movimentos que identificam o Direito como sendo linguagem, o que faz culminar em ideias complexas e em um diálogo constante entre textos, dada a dificuldade sempre ocorrente em se enxergar a realidade jurídica sob o signo da linguagem. Na doutrina e na jurisprudência que lhe seguem, aprofundamentos em matérias que antes pareciam esgotadas, retornos às estruturas fundamentais normativas e reconhecimento da incompletude de tudo quanto se diga acerca do fenômeno jurídico-tributário. E aqui desponta o Constructivismo Lógico-Semântico, de Paulo de Barros Carvalho. A justificativa desta pesquisa se fundamenta no enfoque original que se busca oferecer à problemática, tendo em vista que aborda a ideia de movimentos hermenêuticos na Ciência do Direito, de sorte a investigar a possibilidade de estabelecimento dos caracteres próprios desses dois movimentos, situados em tempos não cronológicos distintos: o primeiro, do “passado que ainda se faz presente”, representa o enfoque tradicional; o segundo, do “futuro que já se faz presente”, tem como ponto de partida a obra fundamental do Constructivismo Lógico-Semântico. Com efeito, o problema de partida é: podem ser individualizados mo(vi)mentos distintos na maneira como se processa a Hermenêutica Jurídico-Tributária brasileira? O objetivo geral da pesquisa é investigar a possibilidade de identificação desses movimentos hermenêuticos e o estabelecimento de caracteres que representem a superação do modelo tradicional, dados os influxos decorrentes da adoção do paradigma da linguagem, bem como da promulgação da Constituição Federal de 1988 e, mais recentemente, do Código de Processo Civil de 2016. A metodologia utilizada é o caminho que interlaça o método analítico-hermenêutico, próprio do Constructivismo Lógico-Semântico, sob os influxos de perspectivas semióticas no dado jurídico: aqui, a estruturação de planos sintático, semântico e pragmático da linguagem, pelo qual o próprio objeto é construído por um sujeito, que também é pela linguagem. Com tudo isso, a estruturação do pensamento contido neste trabalho margeia reflexões que se processam no âmbito da Epistemologia Jurídica, da Teoria do Direito e do próprio Direito Tributário. A hipótese central do trabalho é que, apesar de novos influxos intelectuais na dogmática jurídico-tributária brasileira, os juristas e estudiosos do Direito Tributário ainda se valem de panoramas hermenêuticos ultrapassados, apegando-se à utilização dos diversos métodos espraiados no CTN e que mascaram a complexidade do fenômeno normativo. E isso se dá mesmo após as influências determinantes da CF/88. Efetivamente, aprofundam-se as possibilidades que permitem lidar com paradigmas diferenciados na interpretação dos textos e dos fatos jurídico-tributários, como a maneira de empreender uma nova racionalidade jurídica que alinhe Teoria Geral do Direito e Direito Tributário com esteio no diálogo entre as diversas linguagens, competentes e incompetentes, que se plasmam no discurso normativo brasileiro

published_or_final_version / Law / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / English / Master / Master of Philosophy

This thesis explores the significance of Godel's Theorem for an understanding of law as rules, and of legal adjudication as rule-following. It argues that Godel's Theorem, read through Wittgenstein's understanding of rules and language as a contextual activity, and through Derrida's account of 'undecidability,' offers an alternative account of the relationship of judging to justice. Instead of providing support for the 'indeterminacy' claim, Godel's Theorem illuminates the predicament of undecidability that structures any interpretation and every legal decision, and which constitutes the opening to justice. The first argument in this thesis examines Godel's proof, Wittgenstein's views on rules, and Derrida's undecidability, as manifestations of a common concern with the limits of what can be formalized. The meta-argument examines their misinterpretation and misappropriation within legal theory as a case study of just what they mean about meaning, context, and justice as necessarily co-implicated.

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Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-11-21T09:00:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonard Ziesemer Schmitz.pdf: 2040475 bytes, checksum: 4703c1d0434a03117e5c00bb5132f267 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-21T09:00:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonard Ziesemer Schmitz.pdf: 2040475 bytes, checksum: 4703c1d0434a03117e5c00bb5132f267 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present doctoral thesis seeks to deal with judicial presumptions, thus understood inferential reasoning about unknown facts, from facts known and proven in a concrete case. First, we want to identify if there are the spaces of discretion that are shielded by insufficient presumptive arguments. The work is divided into two parts, with three chapters each. The first part serves to establish theoretical premises, and the second part to approach more closely the topic of presumptions in court. The first chapter discusses the conditions of possibility for the interpreter of a particular case to become aware of the facts narrated by other Interpreter-Subjects. Further notes are given on how the ransom of the past occurs when the judge analyzes the evidence and the probative narratives of the parties. The second chapter deals with science and rationality as grounds for the relation between two facts – one known, one unknown. Considerations are made about generalizations from experience, which allow for deductive, inductive, and analogical reasoning. Also questioned is the sufficiency of the use of the argument of "rationality", often insufficient to infer. The third chapter discusses the relationship between evidence and truth, especially when a judicial presumption is often made in the name of the "pursuit of truth" in the judicial process. Moving on to the second part, the fourth chapter addresses the division of labor between parties and judge in the correctness of the facts, establishing limits of action of each Subject of the process. There is also talk of judicial evidentiary activism. The fifth chapter deals specifically with the presumptions and rules of experience (Article 375 of the CPC), which serve as argumentative basis for inferences. The sixth and final chapter captures presumptions in their practical use and speaks, in detail, of the decision to reorganize and organize the process (article 357 of the CPC), which may be an opportune moment for the correct treatment of the subject. Finally, conclusions are drawn about a possible criteriology for the legitimate and discursive use of inferential reasoning / A presente tese de doutoramento busca tratar das presunções simples ou presunções judiciais, assim entendidos os raciocínios inferenciais sobre fatos não conhecidos, a partir de fatos conhecidos e provados em um caso concreto. Quer-se, antes de tudo, identificar quais são os espaços de discricionariedade que se blindam por trás de fundamentos presuntivos insuficientes. O trabalho está dividido em duas partes, com três capítulos cada. A primeira parte serve para estabelecer premissas teóricas, e a segunda para abordar mais de perto o tema das presunções em juízo. O primeiro capítulo fala a respeito das condições de possibilidade para que o intérprete de um caso concreto tome conhecimento dos fatos narrados por outros Sujeitos-intérpretes. São feitas ainda anotações sobre a maneira como o resgate do passado ocorre quando o juiz analisa as provas e as narrativas probatórias das partes. O segundo capítulo trata da ciência e da racionalidade como fundamentos para a relação entre dois fatos – um sabido, outro não sabido. Fazem-se considerações sobre as generalizações a partir da experiência, que permitem raciocínios dedutivos, indutivos e analógicos. É também questionada a suficiência do uso do argumento “racionalidade”, muitas vezes insuficiente para presumir. O terceiro capítulo fala sobre a relação entre provas e verdade, especialmente quando uma presunção judicial frequentemente é feita em nome da “busca da verdade” no processo judicial. Dando início à segunda parte, o quarto capítulo discute a divisão de trabalho entre partes e juiz no acertamento dos fatos, estabelecendo limites de atuação de cada Sujeito do processo. Fala-se também do ativismo judicial em matéria de provas e da possibilidade de produção oficiosa de provas. O quinto capítulo trata especificamente das presunções e das regras da experiência (art. 375, do CPC), que lhes servem de base. O sexto e último capítulo capta as presunções em seu uso prático e fala, com detalhe, da decisão de saneamento e organização do processo (art. 357, do CPC), que pode ser um momento oportuno para o trato correto do tema. Por fim, são traçadas conclusões a respeito de uma possível criteriologia para o uso legítimo e discursivo do raciocínio inferencial probatório

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Taxpayers have traditionally assessed personal vulnerability to particular taxes through a study of past litigated cases. One of the premises of the study was that useful information concerning the enforcement of the accumulated earnings tax could be obtained through a statistical analysis of such cases.