Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D.

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The issue of the vertical /or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights (chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to horizontal relationships' in terms of section35{3). This apparently was a political compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, as demonstrated by the decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the courts. If courts, as it happend in De Klerk's case fail to realise the full import of section 35 ( 3) aspects of the existing law which are unjust could remain and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be hampered. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

The dissertation consists of an analysis of the Constitutional Court decision S v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 CC. The analysis focuses on the significance of the different interpretative approaches adopted by the members of the Court in analysing section 241(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Afii.ca Act 200 of 1993. The theoretical approaches to constitutional interpretation are first briefly discussed. This is followed by a description of the four respective judgments in the decision. The case is then analysed in respect of section 3 5, Chapter 3 and the Constitution itself in order to determine the significance. The jurisprudence of the Court (developed in its first eight decisions) is evaluated to assess the approach of the Constitutional Court to Chapter 3 and the remainder of the Constitution respectively. The conclusion is reached that the Court has endorsed a generous/purposive approach to constitutional interpretation and that this extends to the entire text of the Constitution. / Law / LL.M.

No description available.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Essenism is, according to the data being discussed in this thesis, closely associated with the Dead Sea Scrolls material and had alienated itself from Second Temple Judaism as manifested through both Pharisaism and Sadduceanism. The problem that presents itself is the fact that Essenism is sometimes seen, with Pharisaism and Sadduceanism, as one of the three major trends within Second Temple Judaism, albeit schismatic in origin and nature. With Sadduceanism deriving its authority from the Temple and written Torah, and with Pharisaism its authority from both the written Torah as well as the oral tradition of the Sages, this thesis attempts to determine the criteria to be applied to cults of the Second Temple period in order for them to be classified as being Judaic. This is done in order to be able to establish what, in their own minds, set the Essenes apart from the other two prominent groups. That their motivation for exclusiveness must have been very strong becomes clear through the fact that, in their writings, the Essenes did not see themselves as just another group within Judaism, but as the only true and legitimate group. The ultimate aims of this thesis therefore are, firstly to find out exactly what constituted mainstream Second Temple Judaism according to certain historical and religious factors as well as Judaic ha/achic interpretation. Secondly, the thesis attempts to ascertain if Essenism met the determined criteria to be regarded as part of mainstream Judaism, and if not, if it can be regarded as sectarian Judaism, or as a separate religion altogether. In view of all the abovementioned criteria discussed, the probable conclusion would be that the sectarians from Qumran never thought of themselves as anything other than Jews within the ha/achic tradition, even though it may have been a ha/acha that may in certain respects have radically deviated from that of their fellow Jews. They can therefore rightly be regarded as part of the Judaic tradition of the Second Temple period. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Essenisme is, volgens die data bespreek in hierdie tesis, nou geassosiëer met die materiaal van die Dooie See Rolle, en die eksponente daarvan het hulself vervreem van Tweede Tempel Judaïsme soos gemanifesteer deur beide Fariseïsme en Sadduseïsme. Die probleem wat homself voordoen, is dat Essenisme, saam met Fariseïsme en Sadduseïsme, somtyds gesien word as een van die drie hoofstrominge binne Tweede Tempel Judaïsme, alhoewelskismaties van aard. Met Sadduseïsme wat sy outoriteit aan die Tempel en geskrewe Tora ontleen, en Fariseïsme sy gesag van beide die geskrewe Tora en die mondelinge tradisie van die Wyses, probeer hierdie tesis die kriteria bepaal wat toegepas kan word op kultusse van die Tweede Tempel tydperk, om sodoende as Judaïsties geklassifiseer te kan word, al dan nie. Dit word gedoen om vas te stel wat, in hul eie oë, die Esseners onderskei het van die ander twee prominente groepe. Uit hul geskrifte kan 'n mens aflei dat die Esseners se dryfveer vir eksklusiwiteit baie sterk moes gewees het, aangesien hulle hulself nie net as nog 'n verdere groep binne die Judaïsme gesien het nie, maar in der waarheid as die enigste ware en legitieme groep. Die uiteindelike doel van hierdie tesis is dus eerstens, om vas te stel presies wat verstaan kan word as Tweede Tempel Judaïsme, aan die hand van sekere historiese en religieuse faktore, asook ha/aehiese interpretasie. Tweedens, probeer dit vasstelof Essenisme aan die vasgestelde kriteria voldoen het om as deel van die hoofstroom Judaïsme gesien te kan word, en indien nie, of dit gesien kan word as sektariese Judaïsme, of as 'n heeltemal aparte godsdiens. In die lig van al die bogemelde bespreekte kriteria, sal die waarskynlike gevolgtrekking wees dat die sektelede van Qumran hulself nooit gesien het as enigiets anders as Jode binne die ha/aehiese tradisie nie, alhoewel dit 'n ha/aeha was wat in sekere opsigte radikaal verskil het van die van hul mede-Jode. Hulle kan gevolglik met reg gesien word as deel van die Judaïstiese tradisie van die Tweede Tempel tydperk.

Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The protection of human rights is one of the main aims of international law. Since the Second World War, the United Nations and various other international organs have recognised the protection of human rights in various treaties. These treaties protect citizen.s rights against possible infringement on the side of the state. South Africa was isolated from the development that occurred in international human rights law due to the system of apartheid. When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, international law had to be made part of South African law so that South Africa could once again take its place in the international community. Therefore, the Constitution of 1996 contains various sections that deal with international law and its place within the South African legal system. In particular, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution places an obligation on courts, tribunals and forums to consider international law in interpreting the bill of rights. With regard to section 39(1)(b), this thesis questions whether the Constitutional Court fulfils its obligation when interpreting the right to property and housing in sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution respectively. Through a discussion of Constitutional Court cases on the right to property, it is discovered that the Court does not optimally use the international law sources that are available. The Court does not reflect on the status of international law sources and confuses international law with foreign law. Therefore, the sources relating to the right to property in international and regional international law are outlined. On the basis of the available sources in international law that relate to the right to property, it is argued that there is no justification for the Court not considering the relevant international law sources. With regard to the right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution and the case law relating to the right, the Constitutional Court is more willing to consult international law to aid its interpretation of the right. This is partly attributable to fact that the right to adequate housing is a well developed right in international law. As a result, the Court refers to a wide range of international law sources when interpreting the right of access to adequate housing. However, the Court does not indicate the status of the various international law sources it uses to interpret the right to adequate housing. Therefore, it is argued that in the instances where there are relevant international law sources available to aid the interpretation of the rights to property and adequate housing, they should be considered. In the event that the Constitutional Court uses international law sources, their status within South African law and their relevance to the rights in question should be made clear. As a result, a method for the use of international law as a guide to interpretation is proposed. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die beskerming van menseregte is van groot belang in internasionale reg. Na afloop van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het verskeie internasionale agente, met die Verenigde Nasies in die voorgrond, menseregte begin erken in verskeie internasionale konvensies. Omdat Suid-Afrika die apartheidstelsel toegepas het, was die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geïsoleerd van die ontwikkeling rakende die beskerming van menseregte in internasionale reg. Met die koms van demokrasie was Suid-Afrika genoodsaak om internasionale reg deel te maak van Suid-Afrikaanse reg om te verseker dat Suid-Afrika weer die internasionale gemeenskap kon betree. Gevolglik bevat die Grondwet van 1996 verskeie artikels wat met internasionale reg handel. In besonder plaas artikel 39(1)(b) 'n verpligting op howe, tribunale en ander forums om internasionale reg te gebruik wanneer enige reg in die handves van menseregte geïnterpreteer moet word. In hierdie tesis word daar besin oor die vraag of die Grondwetlike Hof die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) nakom wanneer die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte behuising in artikels 25 en 26 onderskeidelik geïnterpreteer word. Na 'n bespreking van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg tot eiendom, word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die Grondwetlike Hof nie die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) konsekwent nakom nie. Die Hof verwys nie na relevante internasionale of streeks- internasionale reg nie. Verder verwar die Hof internasionale reg met buitelandse reg. In die gevalle waar die Hof wel gebruik maak van internasionale reg, word die status van dié reg in die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel nie duidelik uiteengesit nie. Na aanleiding van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg van toegang tot geskikte behuising, is dit duidelik dat die Grondwetlike Hof meer gewillig is om internasionale reg in ag te neem. 'n Moontlike rede hiervoor is die feit dat die reg tot behuising goed ontwikkel is in internasionale reg. Gevolglik maak die Grondwetlike Hof geredelik van internasionale reg gebruik om artikel 26 van die Grondwet te interpreteer. Nietemin, die status van die internasionale reg bronne wat die Hof wel gebruik word nie uiteengesit nie. Daarom word daar aangevoer dat indien daar internasionale reg beskikbaar is wat relevant is tot die geskil, behoort die Grondwetlike Hof sulke reg in ag te neem. Indien die Hof wel internasionale reg gebruik om die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte behuising te interpreteer, moet die status van die bronne uiteengesit word. Daarom word daar ook in die tesis 'n voorstel voorgelê hoe howe te werk moet gaan indien internasionale reg bronne geraadpleeg word.

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Thesis (LLM )-University of Stellenbosch, 2004. / 150 leaves printed on single pages, preliminary pages i-xi and numbered pages 1-138. Includes bibliography. / Digitized at 600 dpi grayscale to pdf format (OCR), using a Bizhub 250 Konica Minolta Scanner. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The concept of sectional ownership has been unknown in the Botswana common law because of the maxim superficies solo cedit, which does not recognize separate ownership of apartments in a building. The law must always serve the felt and real needs of the times, and in order to give effect to those needs, the Botswana Sectional Titles Act was enacted in 1999. It is based on the South African Sectional Titles Act of 1986, as amended, which repealed the 1971 Act. In this thesis, a comparative analysis of the South African and Botswana sectional titles law is made to determine whether and, if so, how the existing position in the South African sectional titles law could aid interpretation and application of the sectional titles legislation of Botswana, specifically pertaining to aspects of establishment of sectional title schemes. The main focus is on the legislative provisions of both jurisdictions. However, South African case law is also considered. Landownership and sectional titles is discussed, to determine whether sectional ownership is genuine ownership. This entails a discussion on the publicity principle, which in the case of land is normally achieved by means of registration in the Deeds Registries. The thesis analyses the Botswana and South African statutes on the requirements and procedures involved in the establishment of sectional title schemes to bring to light any shortcomings that may exist in either of the two statutes. An understanding of the shortcomings of the South African statute is relevant to the interpretation and application of the Botswana statute. An examination of the procedural aspects of establishment of a sectional title scheme, as well as the roles of the parties involved in the establishment thereof is undertaken, so as to identify consequences that may ensue if they fail to comply with the requirements of either of the statutes. Consequently, a comparative analysis on the effect of registration of the sectional plan and opening of the sectional title register is made. Although it is not suggested that the Botswana Act should be completely similar to the South African Act, as Botswana may have its own peculiar circumstances, suggestions as to the amendment of the Botswana statute are made. Amendments would make the Botswana Act even more flexible, and would open up the possibilities of development to achieve greater access to land. Further more improvements to the Act will have to be made, some before its implementation, and some after a period of application of the Act, as real practical problems become apparent. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die konsep van deeltitel was tot dusver in Botswana se gemenereg onbekend weens die maxim superficies solo cedit, wat nie aparte eienaarskap van woonstelle in 'n gebou erken nie. Die wet moet altyd die werklike behoeftes van die tyd dien, en om te voldoen aan daardie behoeftes is die Botswana Wet op Deeltitels in 1999 uitgevaardig. Dit is gebaseer op die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Deeltitels van 1986, soos gewysig, wat die 1971 Wet herroep het. In hierdie tesis word 'n vergelykende studie gedoen van die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Deeltitels en die gelyknamige Wet in Botswana om te bepaal of, en indien wel, hoe die bestaande posisie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Deeltitels kan help met die interpretasie en toepassing van die deeltitel wetgewing van Botswana, veral waar dit gaan oor die vestiging van deeltitelskemas. Die tesis fokus op die wetgewende bepalings in albei lande, maar konsentreer op probleemareas in die nuwe Deeltitel wet van Botswana. Grondeienaarskap en deeltitels word bespreek om te bepaal of deeltiteleienaarskap werklike eienaarskap is. Dit behels 'n bespreking van die publisiteitsbeginsel, waaraan gewoonlik, in die geval van grond, voldoen word deur registrasie in die Akteregister. Die tesis ontleed die Suid-Afrikaanse statuut en die statuut van Botswana wat gaan oor die vereistes en prosedures betrokke by die vestiging van deeltitelskemas en enige tekortkominge wat bestaan in enige van die twee statute. Dit is belangrik om die tekortkominge van die Suid-Afrikaanse statuut te begryp, as die statuut van Botswana geinterpreteer en toegepas moet word. Die prosedures wat gevolg word in die vestiging van 'n deeltitelskema, asook die rolle van die verskillende partye betrokke, word bespreek sodat die gevolge as daar nie aan die vereistes van die statuut voldoen word nie, identifiseer kan word. Gevolglik word 'n vergelykende ontleding gedoen van die effek van registrasie van die deeltitelplan en die opening van die deeltitelregister. Die slothoofstuk bevat aanbevelings vir verdere navorsing. Alhoewel daar nie voorgestel word dat die wet in Botswana identies aan die Suid-Afrikaanse wet moet wees nie, (Botswana het te make met ander omstandighede) word voorstelle aan die hand gedoen vir die wysiging van die wet in Botswana. Hierdie wysigings sal die wet meer buigsaam maak en daar sal meer moontlikhede wees vir ontwikkeling wat groter toegang tot grond sal bewerkstellig. Verder sal daar verbeterings aan die wet aangebring moet word nadat dit eers in werking getree het en die werklike probleme kop uitsteek.

Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of a criminal and civil nature. Courts also respond to complaints which require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion proceedings. In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been done. To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction. There has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law. However, in disputes of constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift from observing the rule of judicial precedent. The disregard for this rule manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by controversy. It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. Three constitutional rights are analysed. The right to life in its three manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political controversies. In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.