af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The issue of the vertical /or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights (chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to horizontal relationships' in terms of section35{3). This apparently was a political compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, as demonstrated by the decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the courts. If courts, as it happend in De Klerk's case fail to realise the full import of section 35 ( 3) aspects of the existing law which are unjust could remain and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be hampered. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

The dissertation consists of an analysis of the Constitutional Court decision S v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 CC. The analysis focuses on the significance of the different interpretative approaches adopted by the members of the Court in analysing section 241(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Afii.ca Act 200 of 1993. The theoretical approaches to constitutional interpretation are first briefly discussed. This is followed by a description of the four respective judgments in the decision. The case is then analysed in respect of section 3 5, Chapter 3 and the Constitution itself in order to determine the significance. The jurisprudence of the Court (developed in its first eight decisions) is evaluated to assess the approach of the Constitutional Court to Chapter 3 and the remainder of the Constitution respectively. The conclusion is reached that the Court has endorsed a generous/purposive approach to constitutional interpretation and that this extends to the entire text of the Constitution. / Law / LL.M.

En droit communautaire, les notions « souples », « élastiques », les « mots à sens multiples » ,dont le contenu est déterminé non pas par leur auteur mais par leur interprète, sont nombreux. <p>Parmi ces notions « floues », certaines, à la fois conceptuelles et fonctionnelles, sont intentionnellement indéterminées parce qu’elles permettent une mesure des comportements et des situations en termes de normalité et nécessitent, pour leur application aux cas d’espèce, des références exogènes au droit. C’est le cas, par exemple, des notions de « bon père de famille », de « bonnes mœurs », de « délai raisonnable », d’« abus de droit », de « confiance légitime », ou encore d’ « ordre public ». <p>Ce type particulier de notion indéterminée constitue un standard. <p>La question se pose de savoir si, et dans quelle mesure, les standards présentent des particularités dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, du point de vue de leur substance, c’est à dire de leur contenu, et du point de vue de leur fonction.<p>Il apparaît, d’abord, que la spécificité substantielle du standard n’est que partielle. <p>En effet, certains standards sont marqués par une forte coloration communautaire en ce qu’ils touchent au noyau dur de l’intégration communautaire et à la répartition des compétences au sein de cet ordre juridique (les notions de subsidiarité, de coopération loyale notamment). D’autres standards, en revanche, ont une substance proche de celle qui leur est attribuée dans les ordres juridiques nationaux ou internationaux, tout en étant adaptée à la logique de l’ordre communautaire (c’est le cas, par exemple, des notions de confiance légitime, de bonne administration, ou encore de procès équitable).<p>Il apparaît, ensuite, que la spécificité fonctionnelle du standard communautaire est manifeste. <p>Ce type de notion indéterminée joue, en effet, un rôle lié non seulement aux particularités du système juridictionnel de l’Union et à la contribution du juge à l’intégration européenne, mais aussi aux particularités structurelles de l’ordre juridique communautaire.<p><p> / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Scholarship on the modern history of the Middle East has undergone profound revision in the previous three decades or so. Many earlier perceptions, largely based on modernization theory, have been either contested or modified. However, the perception of the Egyptian ulama (the traditionally-educated, religious Muslim scholars) in academic scholarship remains largely affected by the legacy of hypotheses of the modernization theory. Old assumptions that the Egyptian ulama were submissive to political power and passive players incapable of accommodating, let alone of fathoming, conditions of the modern world, and who chose or were forced to retreat from this world, losing much, if not all, of their relevance and significance, still infuse the scholarly literature. Making use of materials obtained from the Egyptian National Archives, this study offers an examination of modern legal reform in Egypt from the nineteenth century through the first part of the twentieth century with the ulama and their legal institutions in mind. As the findings of this study effectively illustrate, the Egyptian ulama were by no means submissive. Rather, they were patient. Far from being passive agents of the past, the Egyptian ulama were active participants who played a critical role in the building of modern Egypt. The ulama had at their disposal sustained social and moral influence, a long-standing position as community leaders, a reputation as defenders and representatives of Islam, the power to validate or invalidate the political establishment by means of public and doctrinal legitimization, and the final authority over laws of family and personal status. Through these strengths, the ulama were able to influence the direction of change and to impact its scope and nature during transitional period that witnessed the making and remaking of modern Egypt. Considering the nature of changes that they allowed to be introduced to the shari-based justice system and the ones they resisted, as well as their stance regarding social matters, the Egyptian ulama comprehended and recognized modernity as useful. Advanced techniques had to be embraced to strengthen state institutions. However, the ulama thwarted massive and sudden adoption of modernity's cultural elements, so that Egypt would not become a chaotic country and go astray. On the weight of their position as the ultimate authority over family law, the Egyptian ulama blocked rapid social change imposed from the top. Alterations to family law and the social structure were undertaken gradually and with a great deal of delicacy. Therefore, the long-standing social order was not suddenly destroyed and replaced with a new one. Instead, changes to the long-standing social structure were allowed to evolve slowly, while the core was largely preserved. The ulama's far-reaching plan, which was realized in the long run, was to maintain Islam's position in modern Egypt as a guide and as the main source of legitimacy. As will be shown in this study, the history of the Egyptian ulama reveals not passivity, detachment, or submission but careful, and deliberate action.

Contemporary South Africa prides itself on having a Bill of Rights. For 84 years (1910 to 1994) public administration regulated the general welfare and lives of inhabitants in the finest detail, while being subject to almost only the whims and political objectives of the governing authority. On 27 April 1994 the 1993 Constitution introduced a constitutional obligation and radical change to the manner in which public administration must be exercised. Today, still an infant in experience relating to a bill of rights, public administration must be exercised with the Bill of Rights as an integral part of this inhabitant / governing authority interaction. The primary aim of this study is to attempt to describe the manner in which public administration was exercised, firstly, during constitutional dispensations prior to 1994 and, secondly, since public administration became subject to constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights. The empirical investigation is aimed at exploring and analysing the extent to which public administration has realised the constitutional obligation in practice. The results of the empirical investigation highlighted, primarily, that the majority of the officials that participated in the survey do not know of the Bill of Rights, and that half of those who do know of the Bill have little knowledge of its provisions. More than half of the respondents lack awareness of section 195 of the 1996 Constitution, which states that public administration must be governed by democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution. Barely one tenth of respondents were informed of the significance of the Bill and its role regarding public administration. The majority of respondents have not of their own accord studied the Bill and the Bill does not have the desired effect on the manner in which public administration is exercised. Two thirds of respondents have mixed perceptions as to whether to serve the interests of inhabitants above the political objectives of the governing authority and less than a quarter of respondents give recognition to the Bill when rendering public services. It seems as if South African public administration has a long way to go in adhering to its constitutional obligation in practice. / Public Administration / D. Litt et Phil.(Public Administration)

Islamic banking in the United States of America, became recognized as an alternative to expand into the market of traditional Muslim consumers, living in the United States. Because of strict regulatory guidelines, no Islamic banks exist in the United States. Instead, conventional banks, Islāmic banking windows (IBW) and other financial institutions offer Shari‘ah compliant products by modifying classical Islamic contracts or attaching a rider to define contract verbiage. This study reviewed techniques of adapting contracts used for Shari‘ah compliant products in the United States to determine if the contracts maintain the true characteristics of the original classical Islamic contracts. Contracts in Islamic sacred law provide protections by ensuring wealth is not wasted, and no injustice is performed by either of the contracting parties. Wealth protection and justice are the inherit characteristics of contracts in the Islāmic law. Any changes or modifications may void or decrease the protections provided in Islamic law. This research reviewed the theoretical aspects of contract modifications, by analyzing the procedures used for the derivative Shari‘ah compliant product contracts used in the Islamic finance industry in the United States. Data was evaluated and compared with the requirements of classical Islamic contract equivalents, to determine the effects of these changes. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Phil. (Religious Studies)

Contemporary South Africa prides itself on having a Bill of Rights. For 84 years (1910 to 1994) public administration regulated the general welfare and lives of inhabitants in the finest detail, while being subject to almost only the whims and political objectives of the governing authority. On 27 April 1994 the 1993 Constitution introduced a constitutional obligation and radical change to the manner in which public administration must be exercised. Today, still an infant in experience relating to a bill of rights, public administration must be exercised with the Bill of Rights as an integral part of this inhabitant / governing authority interaction. The primary aim of this study is to attempt to describe the manner in which public administration was exercised, firstly, during constitutional dispensations prior to 1994 and, secondly, since public administration became subject to constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights. The empirical investigation is aimed at exploring and analysing the extent to which public administration has realised the constitutional obligation in practice. The results of the empirical investigation highlighted, primarily, that the majority of the officials that participated in the survey do not know of the Bill of Rights, and that half of those who do know of the Bill have little knowledge of its provisions. More than half of the respondents lack awareness of section 195 of the 1996 Constitution, which states that public administration must be governed by democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution. Barely one tenth of respondents were informed of the significance of the Bill and its role regarding public administration. The majority of respondents have not of their own accord studied the Bill and the Bill does not have the desired effect on the manner in which public administration is exercised. Two thirds of respondents have mixed perceptions as to whether to serve the interests of inhabitants above the political objectives of the governing authority and less than a quarter of respondents give recognition to the Bill when rendering public services. It seems as if South African public administration has a long way to go in adhering to its constitutional obligation in practice. / Public Administration and Management / D. Litt et Phil.(Public Administration)

La thèse effectue une revue de la littérature scientifique sur la Cour dans le processus d’intégration juridique, en classant les différentes positions selon qu’ils définissent le rôle de la Cour comme réactif ou pro-actif. En faisant cette revue de la littérature, cinq facteurs sont mis en exergue pour ce qui concerne la problématique de l’autonomie de la Cour, qui feront l’objet d’une analyse approfondie dans la suite de la thèse :<p>I) Limites inhérentes à l’interprétation juridique des Traités tels qu’ils se retrouvent dans les règles institutionnalisées du raisonnement de la Cour ;<p>II) L’interaction, au niveau européen, entre la Cour et les autres institutions ;<p>III) Les pressions et les stratégies d’influence des Etats membres vis-à-vis de la Cour comme agent de leurs préférences ;<p>IV) La dépendance structurelle de la Cour supranationale vis-à-vis ses interlocuteurs judiciaires au niveau national ;<p>V) Le degré d’obéissance que les appareils administratifs et exécutifs des Etats membres démontrent vis-à-vis la jurisprudence de la Cour.<p>Par rapport à ces facteurs, et leur importance relative dans la détermination de la ligne d’action de la Cour de Justice, la thèse évalue les changements et les défis auxquels est soumise la fonction de la Cour de justice au niveau de l’Union européenne, en particulier par rapport à l’environnement de plus en plus critique ou évolue la trajectoire jurisprudentielle de la Cour par rapport aux acteurs politiques et juridiques, l’érosion du caractère sui generis du droit communautaire dans le contexte du droit international, le rôle de plus en plus affiché des cours nationales, et le contexte institutionnel dans lequel se trouve à agir cette juridiction. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Les juges de la Cour Suprême des États-Unis et la notion de constitution vivante.Une constitution écrite peut-elle évoluer au cours du temps et s’adapter aux besoins et aux valeurs évolutives de la société, sans pour autant être révisée formellement ? Et si oui, qu’en est-il du texte constitutionnel ? Devant ces interrogations, la notion de constitution vivante vise à résoudre le paradoxe du changement matériel de la Constitution sans modification du texte. Elle est sans aucun doute un topos – qui ne manque pas de susciter des critiques,notamment celle de la théorie dite « originaliste » - de la pensée constitutionnelle américaine, un concept mobilisé, en l’occurrence, pour justifier la cause de la réforme juridique et sociale. Elle a été développée,durant le XXe siècle, principalement par des juges de la Cour Suprême américaine qui ont fourni une approche stimulante et fertile de la nature de la Constitution. La notion de constitution vivante exprime donc une conception évolutive de la Loi suprême, qui saurait, par sa flexibilité et sa fonctionnalité,s’adapter au changement de circonstances. Dans ce cadre, elle a été instrumentalisée afin de surmonter la rigidité de la procédure de révision formelle prescrite par l’article V de la Constitution. Cette notion est dès lors porteuse de la tension entre la permanence du texte et l’évolution du droit constitutionnel positif. Pour justifier ce décalage entre la forme et le fond, les juges défenseurs de la constitution vivante ont toujours traité le texte comme un « document vivant », qui doit être lu à la lumière des valeurs évolutives et des idéaux partagés par le peuple américain. / The Justices of the United States Supreme Court and the notion of the livingConstitutionCan a written constitution evolve over time and adapt itself to the changingneeds and values of society, without being formally amended? If yes, thenwhat about the text? The notion of the living constitution tries to solve theparadox of constitutional change without modification of the text. It is acommon place notion – though subject to fierce criticism, notably byoriginalism - of U.S. constitutional thought, a concept invoked on manydifferent occasions in order to promote constitutional and social change. It hasbeen primarily elaborated by certain Justices of the Supreme Court of theUnited States during the 20th century, who have offered a stimulatingapproach of the nature of the U.S. Constitution. From their point of view, thenotion of the living constitution is based on the idea that the Constitutionevolves over time adapting itself to the ever changing circumstances. It thusleads to a theory of interpretation which treats the constitutional provisionsthat allocate powers or guarantee individual rights as flexible and vital.Furthermore, the notion of the living constitution has been used as a means ofovercoming the barrier of the amendment procedure as prescribed by Article Vof the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, it is marked by the tension between thepermanence of the text and the evolution of constitutional law. In order tojustify this evolution, the Justices who defend the notion of the livingConstitution, have always treated the text as a living document, which mustbe read in light of the aspirations and the high ideals of the American people.