Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 236-240).

Zugl.: Potsdam, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.

Includes bibliographic references (p. 260-264).

Universiẗat, Diss., 2003--Tübingen.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Philos.--Lausanne.

abstract: This thesis is concerned with the methodological role of intuitions in metaphysics. It is divided into two main parts. Part I argues that an academic field can only employ a method of gathering evidence if it has established some agreed-upon standards regarding how to evaluate uses of this method. Existing meta-philosophical disputes take the nature of intuitions to be their starting point. This is a mistake. My concern is not the epistemic status of intuitions, but rather how metaphysicians appeal to intuitions as a form of evidence. In order for intuitions to play a viable role in research they must be subject to certain constraints, regardless of whether they allow individual researchers to know that their theories are true. Metaphysicians are not permitted to use intuitions as arbitrarily having different evidential status in different circumstances, nor should they continue to use intuitions as evidence in certain disputes when there is disagreement amongst disputants about whether intuitions should have this evidential status. Part II is dedicated to showing that metaphysicians currently use intuitions in precisely the sort of inconsistent manner that was shown to be impermissible in Part I. I first consider several competing theories of how intuitions function as evidence and argue that they all fail. As they are currently used in metaphysics, intuitions are analogous to instruments in the sciences in that they are taken to be a substantial non-inferential source of evidence for theories. I then analyze several major metaphysical disputes and show that the source of controversy in these disputes boils down to inconsistencies in how the different parties treat intuitions as evidence. I conclude that metaphysicians must abandon appeals to intuition as evidence--at least until the field can agree upon some general standards that can resolve these inconsistencies. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Philosophy 2014

Sammanfattning:   Arbetets bakgrund har handlat om min vilja att hitta en mer intuitivt baserad kompositionsmetod då jag upplevt en begränsning och förutsägbarhet med teoretiska metoder. Inspirationen till detta arbete kom ifrån boken ”Do the work” (Pressfield, 2011) där författaren bl.a. skriver om begreppet ”Trust the soup” och att lyssna efter ”potentiellt existerande låtar”. Jag har även med anledning av osäkra framföranden innan som musiker velat hitta en lämplig instuderings – och inlärningsrutin till mina kompositioner.    Syftet med detta examensarbete har varit att utveckla en mer intuitivt baserad kompositionsmetod samt att testa en lämplig instuderings – och inlärningsrutin för genomförandet av mina kompositioner.    Syftet har fördjupats i forskningsfrågorna: Hur kan jag utveckla och tillämpa min intuitivt baserade kompositionsmetod baserad på Pressfields citat? Vilka val samt åtgärder har jag behövt ta för att bli klar med mina kompositioner och hur motiverar jag dessa? Hur väljer jag och tillämpar min inlärnings – och instuderingsmetod?    Arbetets metoder har bl.a. varit: ”Trust the soup” – metoden, SMART – mål, setsoch reps, andra kompositions metoder och inspelning samt notering.    Resultatet blev två inspelade och noterade låtar; Trust the soup och Number 2. ”Trust the soup”-metoden bidrog delvis till en mer intuitiv kompositionsprocess. Setsoch repssamt SMART-mål bidrog till tydligare målsättningar.

This paper describes the tension between intuition about number theory and attempts to formalize it. I will first examine the root of the dilemma, Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which demonstrates that in any reasonable formalization of number theory, there will be independent statements. After proving the theorem, I consider some of its consequences on intuition, focusing on Freiling's "Dart Experiment" which is based on our usual notion of the real numbers as a line. This experiment gives an apparent refutation of the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis; however, it also leads to an equally apparent paradox. I conclude that such paradoxes are inevitable as the formalization of mathematics takes us further from our initial intuitions.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / Henri Bergson’s interpretation of Aristotle has not been adequately considered in scholarship. Bergson was greatly inspired by Aristotle’s method and discoveries in psychology and metaphysics, but Bergson also accused Aristotle of having reduced philosophy to an analysis of language. Beneath the apparent rigid formalism of Aristotelian logic, he had in fact described life in a dynamic and qualitatively rich way that is consonant with Bergson’s “qualitative multiplicity.” I show the commonalities between their philosophies and suggest ways of interpreting Aristotle from a Bergsonian perspective. In tracking all Bergson’s discussions of Aristotle—some very critical and reductive; others quite favorable and generous—it becomes evident that Aristotle’s dynamic sense of being describes qualitative multiplicity. This becomes clear when we examine the interrelated problems of movement, force, life, intuition, the soul, embodiment, time, ethics, and art. The theory of dynamics, or the dynamic sense of being, is the underlying thread which weaves these topics together in both Aristotelianism and Bergsonism. This dissertation demonstrates how effort and energy, constituting a hylomorphic unity of experience, provides phenomenological evidence grounding the theory of dynamics. The work of Bergson’s mentor, Félix Ravaisson, is decisive in this historical reconstruction. Ravaisson’s dynamic interpretation highlights Aristotle’s own critiques of logical formalism and presents an intuitive knowledge of life which is inexpressible in language. Bergson clearly borrows insights from Ravaisson’s interpretation but also discredits the validity of them. The burgeoning field of phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle contribute to the dynamic interpretation. I use this scholarship to refute aspects of Bergson’s logical interpretation. In sum, I show that Aristotle’s theory of dynamics is the central paradigm for his whole philosophy, tying together his physics, biology, psychology, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics. Bergson built further upon dynamics, evolving it endogenously, in order to create his qualitative multiplicity, flowing of duration, and élan vital. After critiquing the logical interpretations of Aristotle for their reliance on a metaphysics of presence, it becomes clear Aristotle had already described intensity, continuity, sympathy, and developmental progression as qualitative multiplicity, along the lines of Bergson. Key Words: Dynamism, Continuity, Virtual, Intensity, Development, Analogy, Integral, Concrete, Presence, Time, Energeia, Entelecheia, Movement, Invention, Intuition, Derivation, Habit, Intelligence, Indivisibility, Number, Qualitative, Multiplicity, Auto Affection, Phenomena, Aesthetics, Life. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

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