The main ambit of this research is to seek to find a link between bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment. This offers a contribution on the ongoing debate on the effect of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment. In order to analyze this debatable role of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment a case study of the recently signed Bilateral Investment and Promotion and Protection Act between Zimbabwe and South Africa (BIPPA) is carried out with a special focus on Zimbabwe. The argument is BIPPA contains many rights which investors can use against the host. These clear outlined rules increase investor confident which will result in flows of investments to the host nation. The rules have a disciplinary effect upon the host. This is further qualified by the notion that BIPPA will have more effect on the Zimbabwean side were the government have to convince investors that their property will be protected. Domestic policies will be highlighted as being in conflict with investors rights. BIPPA can thus be used as shield to these domestic policies thereby encouraging foreign direct investment. These treaties however have their own cost effects which will be categorized as reputational, sovereignty and arbitration. Other issues such as the effect of bilateral investment treaties on development will also be deliberated on. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

Foreign investment is mainly protected through national laws. However the wide-spreading network of bilateral investment treaties aims to ensure a certain standard of protection. These treaties demonstrate far-reaching implications at both treaty level and international level. The implications raise an important question as to whether bilateral investment treaties are coherent or not. Coherence can be viewed as an attempt to prettify the law and minimise the effect of politics which may leave the law incoherent. It is obvious that bilateral investment treaties need to be coherent for a number of reasons. Firstly, incoherent treaties may create problems in relation to the development policy of member countries. Secondly, coherence reassures that negotiators of such treaties would not encounter possible contradictions and inconsistencies amongst the countries’ agreement network as well as between the treaties and domestic laws. Thirdly, coherence is critical to treaty interpretation as it is necessary to avoid further complications which may arise from contradictory awards. The aim of this thesis is mainly to elucidate the meaning of coherence and use it to provide an understanding as to how coherent these treaties are. The coherence of bilateral investment treaties will be evaluated in a number of aspects: coherence between bilateral investment treaties and the fundamental principles of international investment law; coherence between bilateral investment treaties and their objectives of investment promotion and investment liberalisation; coherence within the bilateral investment treaties network; coherence between bilateral investment treaties and customary international law on foreign investment; coherence between bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements; coherence between bilateral investment treaties’ obligations and non-investment obligations of states.

<p>Ostensibly, BITs are the ideal international treaty. First, until just recently, they almost uniformly came with explicit dispute resolution mechanisms through which countries could face real costs for violation (Montt 2009). Second, the signing, ratification, and violation of them are easily accessible public knowledge. Thus countries presumably would face reputational costs for violating these agreements. Yet, these compliance devices have not dissuaded states from violating these agreements. Even more interestingly, in recent years, both developed and developing countries have moved towards modifying the investor-friendly provisions of these agreements. These deviations from the expectations of the credible commitment argument raise important questions about the field's assumptions regarding the ability of international treaties with commitment devices to effectively constrain state behavior.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis contributes to academic debate about the question: how much substantive protection should investment treaties (IITs) provide to foreign investment? Chapters 5 and 6 argue that arbitral tribunals have interpreted fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation provisions of existing IITs in several different ways. Each of these interpretations is sketched as a model level of protection that could be explicitly adopted by states in the future, either through inclusion in new IITs, or through amendment to existing IITs. In this way, the thesis defines a range of prospective options available to states concerning the level of protection to provide to foreign investment through IITs. The thesis evaluates the relative desirability of these different levels of protection. The thesis argues that different levels of protection should be evaluated according to their likely consequences. The thesis develops a framework for inferring and understanding the likely consequences of adopting different levels of protection. The framework proposes that the consequences of a given level of protection can be understood in terms of its likely effect on: economic efficiency; the distribution of economic costs and benefits; flows of foreign direct investment into host states; the realisation of human rights and environmental conservation in host states; and respect for the rule of law in host states. Within this framework, the thesis provides an assessment and synthesis of existing empirical evidence and explanatory theory so far as they relate to the consequences of IIT protections. It also specifies the normative criteria by which these consequences should be evaluated. Through the application of this framework, the thesis concludes that lower levels of protection of foreign investment are, in general, likely to be more desirable than higher levels of protection.

The investment treaty network and the tax treaty network comprise more than 3,000 treaties each. The provisions of these treaties generally are highly customized on the basis of the investment flows and economic interests of the contracting States. The number of treaties in force and their customization potentially turn the amendment of these treaty networks in their entirety into a cumbersome and long process. To modify the treaty networks in a swift and coordinated manner, the investment treaty makers and the tax treaty makers almost contemporaneously developed the idea of implementing treaty changes through a single multilateral convention. On 10 December 2014, the United Nations adopted the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor' State Arbitration, also known as the Mauritius Convention. In addition, on 24 November 2016, the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), commonly referred to as the Multilateral Tax Instrument, was concluded under the aegis of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Mauritius Convention and the Multilateral Tax Instrument share the object and purpose of modifying an extensive number of treaties. However, due to their novelty, little research has been done until now on their common characteristics and differences. The article aims at filling this gap by comparing both multilateral conventions. It also aims at drawing lessons from the analysis of both multilateral conventions that might be of benefit for future modifications of an extensive number of treaties through a single instrument.

Interaction between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU law A major change in the regulation of foreign investments is underway in the European Union involving a transfer of (certain) competences within the field from Member States to the EU, all being a part of a wider initiative with the ultimate goal of establishing a common European investment policy, which, it is argued, might eventually replace the network of bilateral investment treaties concluded between Member States and third countries. Starting with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is exclusively competent to regulate extra-EU foreign direct investments since the term "foreign direct investment" was introduced in Article 207 (1) TFEU dealing with the common commercial policy, in which, in accordance with Article 3 (1) (e) TFEU, the EU shall have exclusive competence. Even though the wording is seemingly simple, certain issues, especially concerning the scope of the new EU competence, have been raised and are still not settled. First, the issue of the scope of forms of foreign investments which are to be covered by the EU regulation is unclear. It has been argued that the exclusive competence extends only over direct investments, while other forms, if they are to be covered, would fall under shared competence. This would result...

Die Studie beschäftigt sich mit den Auswirkungen der von Deutschland geschlossenen bilateralen Investitionsschutzverträge (Bilateral Investment Treaties, BITs) auf die wirtschaftliche, soziale und ökologische Regulierung von ausländischen Investitionen. Die Analyse der 137 deutschen BITs sowie die Auswertung relevanter Schiedsgerichtsentscheidungen hat folgende zentrale Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der Einschränkung staatlicher Regulierungsmöglichkeiten ergeben: <br><br> Aufgrund eines breiten Enteignungsbegriffs kann eine umweltpolitische Regulierung, die wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen auf ausländische Investoren hat, eine Verpflichtung zur Entschädigung nach sich ziehen, denn den deutschen BITs ist nicht klar zu entnehmen, dass staatliche Regulierung im Regelfall nicht als Enteignung gelten sollte. <br><br> Empirisch kann weder eine Verbindung zwischen dem Abschluss von BITs und einem Anstieg des Investitionsvolumens noch ein Automatismus zwischen dem Zufluss von privatem Kapital und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung hergestellt werden. Im Gegenteil sind sogar staatliche Maßnahmen, die für kapitalimportierende Länder eine Möglichkeit wären, den wirtschaftlichen Nutzen von ausländischen Investitionen zu erhöhen, durch Regelungen in den BITs untersagt. Problematisch im Bereich geistiges Eigentum ist, dass Rechtsinhaber vor einem internationalen Schiedsgericht Entschädigung einklagen können, wenn staatliche Regulierung im öffentlichen Interesse zu einem enteignungsgleichen Eingriff führt. <br><br> Dienstleistungen unterliegen aufgrund ihrer Eigenschaften besonders stark der staatlichen Regulierung, so dass auch hier Konflikte bezüglich des Enteignungsschutzes und des Grundsatzes der gerechten und billigen Behandlung entstehen. Bei der Beteiligung privater Unternehmen in der Daseinsvorsorge ist problematisch, dass jede Verletzung vertraglicher Zusicherungen durch den Gaststaat aufgrund der Abschirmungsklausel als Verstoß gegen die deutschen BITs gilt. Damit erschweren die Verträge, die häufig über lange Zeiträume geschlossen sind, Reaktionen staatlicher Stellen auf neu auftretende Regulierungsbedürfnisse. <br><br> Im Bereich des Arbeitnehmerschutzes und der Sozialpolitik kann in bestimmten Konstellationen die Verschärfung von Arbeitsstandards gegen die Abschirmungsklausel verstoßen oder die Umverteilung von Land ohne volle Entschädigung mit dem Enteignungsschutz in Konflikt geraten. Bei der Besteuerung ausländischer Investoren können insbesondere Widersprüchlichkeiten im Steuerrecht, die sich zuungunsten ausländischer Investoren auswirken, als Verstoß gegen den Grundsatz der Inländerbehandlung interpretiert werden, selbst wenn ihnen keine protektionistische Intention zugrunde liegt. <br><br> Auch das Investor-to-State Verfahren trägt dazu bei, dass der Ausgleich zwischen Investitionsschutz und legitimen staatlichen Regulierungsinteressen teilweise nur unzureichend gelingt. Das liegt unter anderem an seiner Nichtöffentlichkeit, der fragmentarischen Natur der Entscheidungen und der fehlenden Nähe der Schiedsgerichte zu den tatsächlichen und rechtlichen Hintergründen der Streitigkeiten. <br><br> Als Konsequenz aus den genannten Problembereichen werden Reformvorschläge für deutsche bilaterale Investitionsabkommen als ein erster Schritt zur Schaffung eines Gleichgewichts zwischen Investorenrechten und Investorenpflichten entwickelt. Durch eine Reform sollten den Gaststaaten größere Handlungsspielräume eröffnet und ihre Flexibilität erhöht werden, um den ökonomischen Nutzen ausländischer Investitionen für Entwicklungsländer zu steigern und allen Ländern eine Regulierung von Investitionen im öffentlichen Interesse zu ermöglichen.

1 Abstract Host-State Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration: Holding Investors Accountable for Human Rights Violations International investment arbitration has been long criticized for its structural bias against host states in favour of the defence of the interests of investors. The one-way character of this dispute settlement mechanism has been, however, recently challenged in the light of numerous cases in which arbitrators were confronted with counterclaims of host states, requesting damages for investors' illegal conduct. To successfully assert counterclaims in arbitral proceedings, host states have to deal with a series of difficulties. The submission of a dispute to an arbitral tribunal first requires consent both on the part of an investor and a host state. Its scope is determined by the language of dispute settlement provisions in international investment agreements. While these instruments generally accept a wide range of investors' claims related to their investments, counterclaims of host states fall within the jurisdiction of tribunals only if the international investment agreements contain a dispute settlement clause with broad wording. The second condition which concerns the admissibility of host states' counterclaims is their close connection with the primary claims advanced by investors....

Many governments in developing countries including Tanzania have embarked upon an ambitious effort to conclude bilateral investment treaties. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are currently used as a famous means for establishing the legal framework for foreign investment in the world. BITs have been entered to by Tanzania mostly to improve the foreign investment climate and hence attract more foreign investment. Foreign investors are often worried about the quality of host countries institutions and enforceability of the law in developing countries. As a result, BITs guarantee them certain standards of treatments that can be enforced through investor state dispute settlement in international tribunals. Developing countries conclude BITs and accept restrictions on their sovereignty in the hope that the protection from political and other risks lead to increase in FDI flows. BITs aspire to protect, promote and in some instances to remove obstacles to foreign investment flows without looking at their implications on sustainable development. The purpose of this research is to examine the BITs framework in Tanzania, explores the increasing persuasiveness of these agreements in promoting FDIs and their impacts upon sustainable development. Sustainable development here refers to development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The thesis tries to look at what BITs say and identifies a number of key emerging development linkages and their implications on sustainable development. The thesis demonstrates that some BITs provisions have been seen to have disturbing and potentially worrying legal and policy implications for host states. Most BITs offer an avenue for dispute settlement mechanism that permits foreign investors to take host states to international arbitrations in cases where the investor alleges that the treaty’s provisions have been violated. As will be seen in this paper, the number of treaty based arbitrations has enormously increased in recent years. One of the main findings of the research is that, BITs are not mutually beneficial agreements and are one sided in favour of capital exporting countries. They are unbalance and can hardly provide the basis for a durable investment regime though they are reciprocal in appearance. Despite the fact that they establish equal rights and duties for both sides, capital flows from one side only. Thus, it is argued in this thesis that BITs lack clarity and consistency as benefits will accrue to the capital exporting countries. The thesis further argues that Tanzania faces some challenges regarding the provisions of BITs already concluded. Foreign investors are increasingly aware of the protection available under BITs, and increasingly inclined to invoke those rights in the face of undesirable government initiatives or proposals. The dissertation concludes that BITs will harbour important consequences for Tanzania and may have significant adverse implications if not well negotiated. It further reveals that BITs are not efficient in promoting sustainable development and there is a need for investment agreement to be balanced in a development dimension. Most of the treaties compare unfavourably with the model investment agreement drafted by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), and that the latter agreement provides a more development friendly template for such agreements. For that reason, Tanzania has to review its BITs so as to ensure that they are in harmony with the country’s broader social and economic principles for sustainable development. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

This research paper addresses the issue whether cryptocurrencies are protected investments under  bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Through BITs a host state has a responsibility to protect the investments of the nationals of the other contracting state to the treaty. This governing relationship however may introduce several requirements for an investment to comply with, such as territorial links, the use of language under BITs compliance requirements. With this, cryptocurrencies being a new of age asset class may find several future hurdles in qualifying as an investment under BITs. Especially with the on-going confusion on an international scale in regulating and defining cryptocurrencies.  In determining the afore-mentioned requirements, this research paper first identified a cryptocurrency and a comparison was first made in regards to money. Then, the research paper proceeded in comparing a cryptocurrency with the characteristics of digital assets. Followed by a general approach to the meaning of investment and an analysis to the definition of investment through past approaches taken by arbitral tribunals. Therefore, finally leading in deciding whether cryptocurrencies will qualify as an investment under BITs.