Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S –Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries. / Magister Legum - LLM

<p>Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash / Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries.</p>

A regulação direta ou indireta da transferência de tecnologia pelo Brasil desde o final da década de 50 do século XX nem sempre foi devidamente compreendida. O uso da tributação, com efeitos fiscais e extrafiscais, teve reflexos sobre a atuação do INPI e do Banco Centra do Brasil (BACEN) que permanecem até os dias de hoje, mas tinham como fundamento uma política industrial específica e a limitação dos seus efeitos no balanço de pagamentos do país. O Brasil nunca se fechou totalmente aos investidores estrangeiros, mas sempre utilizou limitações setoriais, posteriormente o registro do ingresso do capital estrangeiro e, por muito tempo, o desincentivo à sua saída por medidas limitadoras ou proibitivas de remessas de dividendos e royalties, até mesmo com o uso da extrafiscalidade. Como o país apenas recentemente realmente prioriza de forma geral a pesquisa e desenvolvimento (P&D) tecnológico, o que resulta em pouca tecnologia gerada internamente, os royalties devidos pelo uso da tecnologia das empresas transnacionais sempre foram objeto de crítica e, consequentemente, medidas limitadoras. Essa atuação regulatória representa um risco político aos investidores, com os acordos bilaterais de investimentos (BITs) sendo os tratados internacionais mais utilizados para afastá-lo. O Brasil, porém, apesar de ter assinado diversos deles, não possui nenhum em vigor. O confronto entre as cláusulas de proteção dos BITs e a política regulatória sobre a transferência de tecnologia e investimento estrangeiro que durante muito tempo vigorou no país representa um caso concreto extremamente interessante para avaliar a aplicação desses tratados e eventuais medidas que os violam, auxiliando, ainda, a compreensão de algumas das medidas regulatórias que permanecem em vigor. / The direct or indirect regulation of technology transfer in Brazil since the late 50s of the twentieth century was not always properly understood. The use of taxation, with fiscal and regulatory purposes, had an impact on the performance of the Brazilian PTO and the Central Bank of Brazil, which remains to this day, but was based on a specific industrial policy and the limitation of its effects on the balance of payments of the country. Brazil never completely closed its market to foreign investors, always using sectoral limitations, then the registration of foreign capital and for a long time the disincentive of its return by limiting or prohibiting profit and royalty remittances, even with the use of regulatory taxes. As the country only recently generally prioritizes technological research and development (R&D), resulting in low technology internally generated, the royalties due for the use of transnational corporations technology has always been an object of criticism and regulatory norms. This regulatory policy is a political risk to investors, with the bilateral investment agreements (BITs) being the international treaties most often used to circumvent it. Brazil, however, despite having signed several of them, has no one in force. The confrontation between the protection clauses of BITs and the regulatory policy on technology transfer and foreign investment that has long prevailed in the country represents an extremely interesting case to evaluate the implementation of these treaties and any measures that violate them, also helping to understand some of the regulatory measures that remain in force

Magister Legum - LLM (Mercantile and Labour Law) / Most developed countries that enjoy the lion's share of foreign investment do not have domestic legal frameworks on foreign direct investment. This is because investors are attracted by a holistic picture of these countries. Such countries have strong institutions of governance, enjoy political and economic stability, embrace democracy, have respect for rights, and have high levels of development - factors which attract investors. In terms of regulation, many of these countries are heavily reliant on bilateral investment treaties. However, this is not the case in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. The existence of an effective and efficient legal framework on the governance of foreign direct investment is an important consideration for investors. This emanates from the fact that developing countries often have weak legal systems, shaky economies and uncertain political environments.

A regulação direta ou indireta da transferência de tecnologia pelo Brasil desde o final da década de 50 do século XX nem sempre foi devidamente compreendida. O uso da tributação, com efeitos fiscais e extrafiscais, teve reflexos sobre a atuação do INPI e do Banco Centra do Brasil (BACEN) que permanecem até os dias de hoje, mas tinham como fundamento uma política industrial específica e a limitação dos seus efeitos no balanço de pagamentos do país. O Brasil nunca se fechou totalmente aos investidores estrangeiros, mas sempre utilizou limitações setoriais, posteriormente o registro do ingresso do capital estrangeiro e, por muito tempo, o desincentivo à sua saída por medidas limitadoras ou proibitivas de remessas de dividendos e royalties, até mesmo com o uso da extrafiscalidade. Como o país apenas recentemente realmente prioriza de forma geral a pesquisa e desenvolvimento (P&D) tecnológico, o que resulta em pouca tecnologia gerada internamente, os royalties devidos pelo uso da tecnologia das empresas transnacionais sempre foram objeto de crítica e, consequentemente, medidas limitadoras. Essa atuação regulatória representa um risco político aos investidores, com os acordos bilaterais de investimentos (BITs) sendo os tratados internacionais mais utilizados para afastá-lo. O Brasil, porém, apesar de ter assinado diversos deles, não possui nenhum em vigor. O confronto entre as cláusulas de proteção dos BITs e a política regulatória sobre a transferência de tecnologia e investimento estrangeiro que durante muito tempo vigorou no país representa um caso concreto extremamente interessante para avaliar a aplicação desses tratados e eventuais medidas que os violam, auxiliando, ainda, a compreensão de algumas das medidas regulatórias que permanecem em vigor. / The direct or indirect regulation of technology transfer in Brazil since the late 50s of the twentieth century was not always properly understood. The use of taxation, with fiscal and regulatory purposes, had an impact on the performance of the Brazilian PTO and the Central Bank of Brazil, which remains to this day, but was based on a specific industrial policy and the limitation of its effects on the balance of payments of the country. Brazil never completely closed its market to foreign investors, always using sectoral limitations, then the registration of foreign capital and for a long time the disincentive of its return by limiting or prohibiting profit and royalty remittances, even with the use of regulatory taxes. As the country only recently generally prioritizes technological research and development (R&D), resulting in low technology internally generated, the royalties due for the use of transnational corporations technology has always been an object of criticism and regulatory norms. This regulatory policy is a political risk to investors, with the bilateral investment agreements (BITs) being the international treaties most often used to circumvent it. Brazil, however, despite having signed several of them, has no one in force. The confrontation between the protection clauses of BITs and the regulatory policy on technology transfer and foreign investment that has long prevailed in the country represents an extremely interesting case to evaluate the implementation of these treaties and any measures that violate them, also helping to understand some of the regulatory measures that remain in force

The purpose of this thesis is to offer a complex analysis of newly rising concept of the environmental provisions, with a particular emphasis on China and its deteriorating state of environment. The thesis is composed of eight chapters. The first chapter deals with the core problem of the environmental provisions, that is the colliding nature of the efforts to implement the environmental regulation in the international investment law. The following two chapters address the legal framework of the environmental provisions and the main actors in the field. Chapter four is concerned with the analysis of the material and formal sources of Chinese domestic environmental and investment law, which has been amended recently in reaction to the dramatically deteriorating environment in the country and which prompted the proliferation and greenization of the Chinese bilateral investment treaties. Chapter five proceeds with the analysis of the environmental provisions, their genesis, terminological delimitation and introduction of their typologies. The sixth chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the approach of China towards environmentally responsible investing. Chapter seven proceeds with detailed explanation of the particular types of the environmental provisions, which have been incorporated into the...

Magister Legum - LLM

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais, chacun contribuant à mieux comprendre la façon dont différents types de relations politiques affectent les stratégies d'expansion internationale et la performance des entreprises. Le premier essai examine le rôle des relations politiques comme modérateur de la relation entre les attributs du pays hôte et le choix d’investir dans ce pays par des entreprises. Nous examinons le cas des premiers investissements dans les pays concernés par des entreprises du secteur manufacturier au cours de la période 2003-2010. Les autres essais examinent le rôle des relations politiques comme antécédents directs des décisions et des performances des stratégies d'expansion internationale des entreprises. Le deuxième essai étudie l’influence des différents types de relations politiques dans l’ampleur et le profil de risque des investissements internationaux des entreprises. Enfin, le troisième essai analyse le rôle des connexions politiques en tant que facteur explicatif de la capacité des entreprises à accélérer le financement et le développement de leurs projets. Les deux derniers essais sont testés sur une base de données originale recensant les relations politiques dont bénéficient les plus grandes entreprises françaises au cours de la période 2003-2012. / This dissertation is composed of the three essays, each contributing to address part of the puzzle regarding how different types of political connections affect firms’ international expansion strategies and performance. The first essay examines how political connections moderate the relationship between host country attributes and international strategy in a sample of greenfield investments in manufacturing during the 2003-2010 period. The second and third essays examine how political connections directly impact a firm’s international expansion strategies and performance. The second essay investigates the role of different types of political connections on a firm’s international investments amount and risk profile. Finally, the third essay analyzes the role of political connections as an explanatory factor of firms’ ability to accelerate the provision of funding and development of their project finance-based investments. Both the latter two essays rely on an original dataset on various political connections enjoyed by the largest French firms during the 2003-2012 period.

In der vorliegenden Arbeit sollen Argumente und Vorurteile bezüglich der Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren untersucht werden. Dafür wurden zugehörige Thesen gebildet, welche im Laufe der Arbeit entweder bestätigt oder widerlegt werden. Als Instrument dafür dient eine quantitative Analyse historischer Falldaten. Die Arbeit unterteilt sich in verschiedene Themenkomplexe, denen jeweils passende Thesen zugeordnet wurden.:1. Einleitung 2. Allgemeines zu Schiedsverfahren 2.1 These 1 - Die Anzahl der Investor-Staats-Schiedsverfahren in den letzten Jahren stark angestiegen. 2.2 These 2 - Investor-Staats-Schiedsverfahren sind deutlich schneller als herkömmliche Gerichtsverfahren. 3. Verteilung von Klägern und Angeklagten 3.1 These 3 - Investor-Staats-Schiedsverfahren sind ein Instrument für Unternehmen aus reichen Ländern zur Ausbeutung von ärmeren Ländern. 3.1.1 These 3.1 - Es existiert ein Nord-Süd-Gefälle: Unternehmen aus dem Norden verklagen in erster Linie die Länder aus dem Süden. 3.1.2 These 3.2 - „Eine Krähe hackt der anderen kein Auge aus“ – Investoren aus reichen Staaten verklagen keine anderen reichen Staaten. 3.1.3 These 3.3 - Die USA dominiert die Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren. 4. Bilaterale Investitionsschutzabkommen (BITs) 4.1 These 4 - Bilaterale Investitionsschutzabkommen waren der Katalysator für die Entwicklung von Investor-Staats-Schiedsverfahren. 4.2 These 5 - BITs sorgen für Gleichberechtigung zwischen den Partnern im Bereich der Investor-Staats-Schiedsverfahren. 5. Entscheidungen der Schiedsgerichte 5.1 These 6 - Um zu mehr Klagen anzuregen, entscheiden die Schiedsgerichte tendenziell pro Investor. 5.2 These 7 - Kläger aus Industrieländern gewinnen im Schnitt öfter als Kläger aus ärmeren Ländern. 5.3 These 8 - Urteile von Schiedsgerichten sind unumstößlich. Eine Revision ist nicht möglich. 6. Schadenersatzzahlungen bei Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren 6.1 These 9 - Die hohen Schadenersatzforderungen und – Zahlungen ruinieren die angeklagten Länder. 6.2 These 10 - Selbst bei Sieg vor Gericht – die Staaten bleiben auf den Kosten sitzen. 7. Weitere Thesen 7.1 These 11 - Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren gefährden den Umweltschutz. 7.2 These 12 - Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren sind intransparent. 8. Fazit Literaturverzeichnis

L’arbitrage international, outre le recours aux tribunaux de l’État hôte, est la méthode la plus utilisée pour régler les différends relatifs aux investissements étrangers. Plusieurs accords internationaux d’investissement incluent des dispositions ayant trait à l’arbitrage sous l’égide du Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends relatifs aux Investissements (CIRDI) mis en place par la Convention de Washington de 1966. Les tribunaux arbitraux constitués sous l’égide du Centre sont ainsi appelés à trancher des différends qui concernent la conduite d’États hôtes vis-à-vis ses investisseurs étrangers ; leurs décisions ayant de fortes conséquences sur l’intérêt public, concrètement lorsqu’il s’agit de la protection de l’environnement. L’évolution croissante du droit environnemental et son empiètement sur la protection des investissements a déclenché une série de différends qui ne se limitent plus à mettre en cause des nationalisations ou des violations de contrats - comme auparavant - mais tournent souvent autour de mesures étatiques de politique publique qui impliquent des questions sensibles telles que, inter alia, la gestion de déchets dangereux, l’accès à l’eau potable, l’étalement urbain, la protection de la biodiversité. Par conséquent, le rôle des tribunaux CIRDI et de leurs décisions devient décisif dans le développement du droit des investissements et dans le débat sur la protection des investissements face aux mesures législatives en matière environnementale. Cette étude a pour objet d’analyser la place des considérations environnementales dans les sentences arbitrales CIRDI. Spécifiquement, il s’agit d’étaler les principaux arguments retenus par les tribunaux internationaux, et de dégager les grandes tendances jurisprudentielles en matière d’arbitrage international d’investissements face aux mesures environnementales. / International arbitration is one of the most frequently used methods to resolve disputes related to foreign investment. Several international investment agreements include provisions relating to arbitration under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes established by the Washington Convention of 1966. Arbitral tribunals are called to resolve disputes concerning the conduct of host States vis-à-vis foreign investors. Their decisions have major consequences on the public interest, specifically when it comes to protecting the environment. The growing development of environmental law and its encroachment on investment protection has triggered a series of disputes that are no longer confined to questions of nationalization or breach of contracts as before, but often revolve around State public policy measures that involve sensitive issues such as, inter alia, hazardous waste management, access to clean water, urban sprawl, protection of biodiversity. The role of ICSID tribunals and their decisions is therefore critical in the development of investment law and the debate on investment protection and environmental regulation. This study aims to analyze the role of environmental considerations in ICSID arbitral awards. Specifically, it seeks to display the main arguments retained by international tribunals and to identify the major trends in international investment arbitration vis-à-vis environmental measures.